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ABSTRACT
In 1921 the State of Iraq was established in the Middle East, under a British-held 
mandate from the League of Nations. It took until 1926 for the final geographical 
extent of the new State to be decided.
This thesis analyses the geographical and historical factors which shaped the new 
Iraqi State. Historically, the region that became the Iraqi State lay in the heart of an 
ethnically, religiously and geographically complex area, a fundamental shatterbelt 
zone between rival regional and colonial powers. Iraq’s geostrategic location was the 
key to its political and cultural developments, lying as it did at the frontier of clashing 
geostrategic powers and political ideologies. Many resultant features were to filter 
into the State that was created in 1921, and seriously affect Iraq’s geopolitical 
function and form.
This thesis examines the fundamental factors that impacted upon the geopolitical 
crystallisation of the Iraqi State in the 1920s. The international political climate of the 
post-First World War era filtered into Iraq. The thesis argues that the complexities and 
clashes between the various communal identities, themselves a reflection of Iraq’s 
geopolitical position, presented severe challenges to the new State’s consolidation and 
geopolitical function. Also fundamental was Iraq’s geostrategic location as this 
invited the attentions and ambitions of competing world powers.
Immediately after the First World War, Wilsonian principles of ethnic self- 
determination and nationalism came to the forefront of international politics. Iraq was 
born out of this international political climate, but its mandatory was Britain, an 
established imperial power. Whilst trying to retain the mandate for Iraq by an outward 
display of agreement with the idealism of nationalism, Britain was principally trying 
to secure its interests in the Middle East and, more importantly, India. Thus, the 
British backed a narrow strand of nationalism within Iraq, which was Sunni and Arab
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in essence. With such a limited support base, this Arab administration remained 
militarily, economically and politically dependent upon Britain.
Ethnic and religious divisions were deep-rooted within the Iraqi region, as they had 
been tolerated for centuries under the Ottomans. After the First World War and the 
establishment of the State of Iraq, many of these social divides remained, or were 
even strengthened by resentments from many sides, in particular what was seen as the 
favouring of the Sunni Arab elite and the subsequent neglect of other main ethno­
religious groups. Such unequal access to power was reinforced by the geographic 
distribution of the major ethnic and religious groups, as they tended to be spatially 
clustered.
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underlined; the I of al is not assimilated to the following consonant. All words found 
in the concise Oxford English Dictionary are used with that spelling.
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GLOSSARY
Agha: Kurdish chieftain of tribe or tribal section, landlord, khan
Ahd al-Iraqi: Mesopotamian political society formed in Baghdad in 1913. Means 
literally, ‘People of Iraq’
Ahl-il-ibl: Tribesmen known as ‘people of the camel’
Caliph: civil and religious leader of the Muslim community, successor of the Prophet 
Mohammed
Dir a: a tribal territory
Elay at: the largest Ottoman administrative province which predated the ‘vilayet’
Emir: ruler of an emirate
Emirate: a semi-independent principality
Fatwa: religious (Islamic) edict
Filih: peasantry
Haram: forbidden
Jihad: a religiously sanctioned, possibly armed, struggle
Khan: Kurdish chieftain of tribe or tribal section, landlord, agha
Kiles: Ottoman unit of volume. One kile is the equivalent of 36.37 metric litres
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M a’dan: marshdwellers 
Madras a: school 
Mahallah: city quarter/district 
Mahalle: religious Shi’i school 
Metruk: communal or public land 
Mevat: idle or barren land
Millah: officially recognised religious community or ethnic group, the basis of an 
Ottoman system of administration. Also called 'millet ’
Miri: land that was state property
Mulk: land that was private property
Nahiyes: the extent of a village district
Pasha: Turkish feudal title
Qadha/caza: district of Ottoman regional administration
Salyane: Ottoman tax system in which revenues were split between the provincial 
governors
Sancaks: Ottoman administrative sub-province, (also known as ‘liwa ’)
Shaikh: Arab or Kurdish tribal leader 
Shawiyah: People of the sheep
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Sherif: Arab aristocratic title
Shi’ite: Muslims who follow the ‘party’ of Ali, those who believe that Ali, the 
Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law should have succeeded the Prophet as 
the leader of the Muslims
Sufi: Muslim mystic, most common in Kurdish regions
Sunni: the majority of Muslims, who accepted Abu Bakr as the first Caliph
Tanzimat: Reform era of the Ottoman Empire. In Iraq this covered the time period 
1844-1872
Tapu saned: title deeds for land rights
Timar: Ottoman tax system, allowing cavalry officers to collect and keep taxes on 
certain agricultural lands, in return for military services in time of need
Ulama: holy men and religious leaders. Politically significant in traditional Middle 
Eastern politics
Vali: Governor-general of a vilayet
Vilayet: the largest province of Ottoman regional administration
Waqf: religious endowment lands. Also used for religious taxes and payments
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
l.l.Introduction
For nearly sixty years, “Iraq’s drive for national unity has been impeded by ethnic, 
sectarian and ideological feuds”.1 There has been a continual tension between the 
Iraqi State, representing the central authority governing within defined boundaries, 
and the Iraqi ‘nation’, consisting of a number of smaller autonomous social groups. 
This thesis explores the extent to which these obstacles to national unity were 
embedded in the character of the state as its form crystallised in the 1920s. It is a 
study of the geopolitical factors that were at play at the precise time that the 
geographical area of Iraq became a sovereign state and its inhabitants became 
‘citizens’. This focus raises many important issues. Why did Iraq assume the 
particular form of state that it did, and what international and regional factors affected 
the nature of the new state in the 1920s? What impact did the presence of various 
ideals of statehood, held by Britain and by the many different ethnic and cultural 
groups of the region, have on the structure of the new state? Why did Britain’s vision 
of statehood win out over the other possibilities, and what effect may this have had 
upon the subsequent state?
The period immediately following the First World War is the key focus of this thesis, 
as Iraq was born out of the international political upheavals that followed the War. It 
was at that time that national self-determination came to be championed as an 
important war aim of the Allies, due to their desire to placate an America that had
9 • « »decried pre-war European balance of power pragmatism. The immediate post-First 
World War period represents the peak of recognition of nationalism as a valid force in 
international politics, yet such nations were harder to define in reality than they were 
in theory. Because of this intangibility, the principle of nationalism was vulnerable to 
being manipulated by Britain to secure their own interests within Iraq.
1 Kelidar, Abbas, ‘Iraq: The Search for Stability’, in Conflict Studies, 59, July 1975, p.3
2 See Kissinger, H. ‘Diplom acy’ (Touchstone, N ew York, 1994) especially chapters 1, 2, and 7.
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The State of Iraq was established in 1921, under a British mandate. It was formed 
from the three previous Ottoman vilayets3 of Baghdad, Basra, and, most 
controversially, Mosul.4 The vilayets of Baghdad and Basra had been under British 
administration for a significant part of the First World War, a situation that greatly 
aided the British claim to the Mesopotamian mandate after the War. Control over Iraq 
was of prime strategic importance to Britain, as it provided a crucial link in the British 
network that served to protect British India. However, due to the influence of the 
United States after the First World War, and especially President Woodrow Wilson’s 
Fourteen Point Plan, Britain could not openly turn Iraq into another imperial territory. 
Thus, Britain was forced to establish the apparatus for self-determination within the 
country, and Feisal was enthroned as king of Iraq in 1921. Despite this, Britain’s 
ambitions in the area strongly coloured the nation-state that was constructed, and the 
Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1922 served to safe-guard British influence within the state.
No proper understanding of the nature and characteristics of Iraq at its inception can 
be obtained without reference to the dual legacies of Ottoman administration, and 
colonial state-building. The Ottoman legacy was one of parochialism and the retention 
of local loyalties and allegiances. Ethnic and religious minorities such as Kurds, Shi’i 
Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Jews, Turkomen and Christians, were allowed to retain their 
unique characteristics and cultural values, leading to a mosaic of strong, distinctive 
community groups throughout the Mesopotamian region. Such "bonds o f  cultural 
affinity have a durability that remain. ”5
The British mandate period was instrumental in delimiting the new geographical 
entity of Iraq, in a form that persists largely unchanged today. France and Britain, 
under sanction from the League of Nations, defined, often very artificially, the units 
that were to be seen as distinct states. The result was “the institutionalization and 
consolidation o f territorial states in the image o f the European pattern. ”6 As such a 
political paradigm was being imposed by foreign powers, over a region containing the
3 A vilayet was the largest unit o f  Ottoman regional administration
4 See chapter 5
5 Helms, C.M. ‘Iraq: Eastern Flank o f  the Arab World.’ (Brookings Institute, Washington, 1984), p.20
6 Korany, B. ‘Alien and Besieged Yet Here to Stay: The Contradictions o f the Arab Territorial State’, 
in Salame, G. (ed.), ‘The Foundations o f the Arab State.’ (Croom Helm, London 1987), p.47
18
distinct populations that the Ottoman system had allowed to flourish, so the State of 
Iraq was established with an immediate internal challenge to its authority and 
legitimacy. The country was formed with an inherent tension between the state as a 
political authority exercising control within prescribed territorial limits, and the 
presence of smaller, autonomous and competing social units.
This thesis analyses the crystallisation of the Iraqi State in the 1920s. Such a study 
necessitates an in-depth critique of all the factors that contributed to the emergence of 
Iraq as a modern state, and the ways in which they bore on its subsequent geopolitical 
development in its formative phase. The geographical and historical elements of the 
region are therefore fundamental, as they explain the nature of the area before its 
transition to statehood, and also determine how change would have been accepted.
For example, the composition of the local population, and the existing links with 
external groups, clearly had immense repercussions on the form and identity of the 
resulting political unit.
An insight into the geographical elements that differentiate one space from another, 
also provides answers into the specific geopolitical ‘place’ of one particular area, and 
highlights the geopolitical pressures that may be hampering political consolidation. 
Therefore, Iraq’s position on the world map helps to explain the intense foreign 
interest in the area at the start of the century. Many scholars believe that the impact of 
geography on the political sphere is of paramount importance.7 The geographical and 
historical factors at work in the region at the start of the century need to be fully 
understood before it can be seen how they may have affected the geopolitical 
crystallisation of the Iraqi State. Iraq was an important buffer for the Ottomans, 
between their core areas, and the tribal unrest of southern Arabia, and between their 
empire and European encroachment into the Gulf region. The location of Iraq also 
shaped the British interest, and thus contributed to the great changes that the country 
was to experience.
Geography, and resource and water availability, helped to shape the development of 
different regional economies and distinct cultural and ethnic divisions within Iraq.
7 See chapter 2
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Before the delineation of the Iraqi nation-state, the inhabitants of Mosul were 
culturally and economically closer to the Arabs of Syria than to those of southern 
Iraq. Basra was historically orientated towards the Gulf region and India, due to its 
role as a port city. Such underlying patterns posed great challenges to the political 
structure set up by the British in Iraq after the First World War: “Political behaviour 
in Iraq, like that in any other country, is shaped by geography, by the availability o f 
natural resources, and by the human adaptation to the environment. In Iraq these 
factors have influenced the interaction between rural and urban society, the ability o f 
a central government to extend its control, and the territorial aspirations o f ruling 
elites relative to regional political forces and the strategic position o f the state. ”8
This thesis demonstrates how specific geographies of power at global, regional and 
local levels fundamentally fashioned the crystallisation of the Iraqi State after the First 
World War. Iraq’s geographic location in a vital strategic region for several major 
global powers determined the level of foreign involvement and interest in the
area. Regional and local geographies of power also fashioned the society and various 
cultural identities of Mesopotamia. Such factors fed into the Iraqi State that was 
established by the British in 1921. Access to power was increasingly polarised under 
the British mandate, with Sunni Arabs elevated to a dominant position by virtue of the 
greater educational and employment opportunities they had enjoyed under the Sunni 
Ottoman Empire. In contrast, the other major communities of Iraq, such as the Kurds 
and the Shi’is, found themselves increasingly politically disenfranchised. As Sunni 
Arab authority consolidated under British protection, access to power for other ethnic 
and religious groups was curtailed. This led to a volatile and unhappy majority lying 
beneath an unstable minority, a situation only maintained by British military force. 
Thus geography, at all levels, informs our examination into the structure of the Iraqi 
state in the 1920s.
8 Helms, C.M. 1984, p.7
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1.2. Geographical and Historical Characteristics of Mesopotamia: 
Factors Impacting on the Iraqi State
1.2.1. Defining the Region
In broad terms the area known today as the State of Iraq is approximately coterminus 
with the ancient realm of Mesopotamia, although the two are by no means always the 
same. Mesopotamia, the ‘land between the rivers’, is the name given by the Greek 
scholars, the historian Polybius (second century B. C.) and the geographer Strabo 
(first century B.C.-A. D.) to a part of the region enclosed between the Euphrates and 
Tigris.9 While the term ‘Mesopotamia’ has not always applied to the same area, it has 
always applied to some portion of this region traversed by the Tigris-Euphrates river 
system and lying between the mountains of Kurdistan and the Persian Gulf. The 
ancient Greeks confined the name to an area stretching from the edge of the highlands 
in the north, where the rivers enter the plain, to what is now Baghdad, where the two 
rivers approach each other closely. This corresponded roughly to the ancient kingdom 
of Assyria and to part of the modern Turkish vilayet of Mosul.10 Not until much later 
did the name acquire a wider significance than that intended by the Greeks, and it 
came to include southern ‘Chaldaea’. In common use, the term Mesopotamia today 
refers to the whole of the area between the great rivers, covering a variety of regions 
between the mountains of Kurdistan in the north and the marshes of the river delta in 
the south, between the steppes and deserts in the west and the mountain slopes of Iran 
in the east. Virtually the whole of this area is now encompassed by the Republic of 
Iraq.
1.2.2. ‘Al-Iraq’, and ‘Al-Jazirah’.
The term ‘Iraq’ also has its own history. It is an Arabic term, possibly meaning ‘cliff, 
or ‘shore’, suggesting that the heights that faced the traveller who approached from
9 Rowley, H. (ed.) Translated by Welsh, D. R. ‘The Atlas o f  Mesopotamia: A  Survey o f  the History and 
Civilization o f Mesopotamia from the Stone Age to the Fall o f Babylon.’ (Nelson Publishing, London 
1962), p.9. See also Simon, Mattar and Bulliet, (eds.), ‘The Encyclopedia o f  the M odem  Middle East. 
II.’ (The Middle East Institute o f  Columbia University, 1996), p. 881.
10 Foster, Henry. The Making o f  Modern Iraq: a Product o f World Forces. (University o f  Oklahoma 
Press, 1935), p. 2.
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the south-western plains have given their name to the whole country.11 However, it 
remains doubtful how this term came into use, and it possibly represents an ancient 
name now lost, or was perhaps originally used in a different sense. What is known is 
that this term only came into use after the Arab conquest of the area in the seventh 
century, A. D. Since then it has been applied to the same portion of the valley 
formerly known as Babylonia or Chaldaea. Indeed, the old Arabic name of Chaldaea
19is thought to have been “Iraq ul ‘Arab”, or the Arab’s mudbank. Al-Iraq was 
approximately the region from Opis on the Tigris, at the mouth of Shatt-el-Adhem, to 
the locale of Ramadiya on the Euphrates; that is, from nearly latitude 34° to the 
Persian Gulf, and from the Syrian desert to the Persian mountains.13 This area covered 
the rich alluvial plain, where date palms flourished. The Arabs named the northern 
area of present-day Iraq, which corresponded closely to the ancient kingdom of 
Assyria, ‘Al-Jazirah’, or the ‘island’. This contained the pasture lands of the north that 
lay over a stony plain. The frontier between ancient Iraq and ancient Jazirah varied 
throughout different ages, but later Arab geographers made the line travel almost due 
west from Takrit, so as to include in Iraq many of the towns on the Euphrates to the 
north of Anbar.14
In the struggle between the Turks and the British over Mosul in the early parts of this 
century, the latter attempted to prove that Iraq included this portion of the two rivers 
country. The commission set up to enquire into the matter, came down against the 
British claim. The Arabs had not predominated in Mosul as they had further south, 
and they had not used the term Mesopotamia: that was a European construct. It was as 
the Arab aspiration to statehood developed, that the Arabs themselves sought (with 
the British) to extend the name of Iraq to cover Mosul.15 With this joint ambition of 
Britain and the Iraqis having been attained, we now use the name ‘Iraq’ as applying, 
as does modern Mesopotamia, to the modern State of Iraq that exists in that part of
11 Rowley, H. (ed.) 1962, p.9.
12 Chardin, F. W. “Iraq-Mosul”, The English Review, 1928, XLI, p.486.
13 See: Coke, Richard. ‘Baghdad: The City o f  Peace,’ (Butterworth, London 1927)
14 Le Strange, ‘The Lands o f  the Eastern Caliphate.’ (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1930),
pp.8-22.
Foster, Henry. 1935, p.3.
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western Asia approximately covered by the former Turkish vilayets of Basra, 
Baghdad, and Mosul.16
1.2.3. Geography of the Region
The low-lying Mesopotamian plain is about 400 miles long from Samarra to the 
Persian Gulf, and 125 miles across. Around the district of Samarra are river terraces, 
rising to 33 feet above the plain.17 To the south of these terraces is the start of the true 
river plain, the structure of which has been determined by the behaviour of the rivers. 
Both rivers have been known to have changed their courses, sometimes influencing 
the entire rise or fall of ancient cities.18
The Mesopotamian climate is generally dry, with the south-west of the country 
merging into desert. However, when heavy rainfall in the north coincides with 
snowmelt in the Zagros and Taurus mountains, the rivers are capable of inflicting 
serious damage downstream, though in recent times this risk has been reduced by the 
construction of major dam systems in the area.
Dust-storms can arise in spring and summer, which cause dune formation in the 
region east of the ancient site of Babylon. Generally however, the plain is wide and 
bare, relieved somewhat in the region south of Baghdad by lush groves of date palms 
and citrus trees. Moving south again, from the river plain to the delta, there is a 
distinctly different landscape. The delta is the cumulative product of the rivers having 
frequently formed new branches and changed course, until the region of swamps is 
reached, where there are no fixed boundaries between the water and the land. It is in 
these marshes that the rivers deposit the bulk of their silt, and also an estimated 90% 
of their water.19
A perennial problem in Mesopotamian agriculture has been the salinisation of the 
cultivable soil. The irrigation water from the rivers is slightly saline, and if it has been
16 Throughout this thesis, I w ill refer to the pre-First World War region o f the modern Iraqi State as 
Mesopotamia. I shall only use the name ‘Iraq’ as it referred to the new state established in 1921
17 Rowley, H. (ed.) 1962, p. 12
18 Le Strange. 1930, pp.28-52.
19 Rowley, H. (ed.) 1962, p. 13.
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used on the land for irrigation for century after century, the cumulative effect can be 
substantial. Even more significant is the salt that is left by evaporation when the water 
table is close to the surface.
In the more northerly regions the rainfall is greater and salinisation is not a problem. 
However, the inhabitable area is limited to strips in the vicinity of rivers. The country 
is mountainous, with a markedly continental climate. The red-brown loam deposited 
by the rivers makes a fertile soil, but despite this, the highland area appears as a 
heavily eroded plateau, with a thin covering of vegetation in the winter.
A glance at the soil map of Mesopotamia may thus help explain a feature of the 
region’s ancient history. This history is one of campaigns and conquest, with the goal 
always being to extend authority in the west, so that the caravan routes to the rich and 
fertile lands on the shores of the Mediterranean could be kept under strict control. The 
territory included within the present state of Iraq historically has been a frontier in the 
sense that the region’s unique geographic features and location have attracted a 
succession of invaders. Over the centuries, Iraq has therefore functioned as a military, 
economic, cultural and strategic cross-roads, which has greatly contributed to the 
cultural diversity within the country.
1.2.4. The Impact on the Iraqi State of the 1920s
This region’s inherent strategic position on communications routes within the Middle 
East and between Europe and Asia have made it the object of successive invasions for 
centuries. The British interest in the region leading up to the First World War was 
simply the most recent of these. Britain’s primary concern before, during and 
immediately after the First World War, was to secure economic and strategic interests 
that revolved primarily around India and Egypt. The British Government had a vested 
interest in the delineation of any Iraqi state, and the state’s boundaries were strongly 
shaped by British imperatives to safe-guard potential railway, pipeline, and air routes 
between Palestine and Mesopotamia. Iraq and Transjordan together were to form a 
British-controlled, strategic corridor linking the Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. 
Decisions regarding border positions in respect to Iraq therefore, were simply
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“Western attempts to impose boundaries as political solutions for Western 
problems. ”
This thesis demonstrates that Iraq’s pluralism, a result of its geographic location and 
turbulent history, as well as Ottoman practices of religious and ethnic tolerance, 
severely challenged British-imposed concepts of nation-statehood, citizenship and 
rigid territorial delimitations. Britain ignored the problems inherent in establishing an 
ideal that pre-supposed the existence of a national unit, where none had previously 
existed. British interests dictated that the territorial integrity of Iraq must be defended, 
and under British influence. This meant accepting the League of Nations mandate for 
the territory, and agreeing to establish a coherent nation-state within Iraq. However, 
the British decision to back the Sunni Arab elite of the country, to the exclusion of the 
other ethnic and religious groups highlighted the fact that their motivations within 
Iraq were always seen through the prism of British strategic interest. This left Iraq 
with a dangerous legacy. Immediately from its inception, the state’s authority was 
challenged, and the government had unrelentingly to seek political legitimacy.
20 Helms, C.M. 1984, p.44
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1.3. Methodology
The study of the establishment of Iraq presents many practical difficulties. The 
country itself contains several languages and dialects. Furthermore, the period under 
examination produced a substantial volume of literature in the languages of the 
various parties interested in Iraq, such as the British, French, and the Russians. Also 
problematic are the Ottoman archives that can help to reveal the condition of the Iraqi 
provinces before the First World War. These documents are in Turkish, and are only 
recently being discovered and made available for public examination.
As this thesis is set firmly in the period in which Iraq was set up as a state, the most 
useful sources of information are the archives and documents written at, or relating to, 
that particular time. Therefore my research was overwhelmingly historical and 
archival. Without a full grasp of not only French, but Arabic, Russian, Italian, German 
and Turkish, my research concentrated mainly upon the British archives relating to 
Iraq, especially those of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the India Office, and 
the army and airforce at the Public Record Office in Kew.
However, such archives, and personal narratives from European personnel and 
travellers in the region, are subject to methodological limitations, as they are not 
representative of the attitudes and realities of the resident populations. This bias is 
justified, as the thesis is mainly examining the British experience within Iraq. It 
explores British motives, their perceived interests and the basis of their policies. It 
was these documents, with all their limitations and inherent biases which informed the 
most important period of decision-making in Iraq, following the First World War. 
They are indicative of the mainstream cultural and political values amongst the 
administrators who would be the major decision-makers in Iraq. It was how they saw 
Iraq and its population that is important for this study, as such British self-interest 
largely determined the crystallisation of the Iraqi State as it was in the 1920s. The 
local and regional states and power bases were not party to the negotiations over the 
creation of Iraq beyond that recorded in these colonial archives. Therefore, these 
archives render a full account of the major decisions that affected the geopolitical 
form and function of the new Iraqi State. The gap between the British perception, and
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the reality, is filled by reference to studies that have examined the Ottoman archives 
and locally produced narratives.
To some degree, reliance on secondary sources for research in Iraq is merited as its 
fate was caught up in the conflict between so many competing foreign powers, and so 
many divided local powers. Very few studies of the region have cross-analysed these 
eclectic sources, and British policy in Iraq was certainly not created in a vacuum.
Secondary sources are used to provide the highly geographical angle that this thesis 
applies to the examination of the Iraqi State, Such a framework brings a novel, and 
highly informative perspective to the Iraqi predicament. The crystallisation of the 
State was hugely influenced by its relative location, the geographical spread of its 
populations, the new geographical boundaries imposed after the First World War, and 
the geopolitical perspectives of Britain. Thus such a geographical approach can reveal 
a great deal more about the factors impacting on Iraq in the 1920s, than a non- 
geographical historiography of the region could provide alone.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CRYSTALLISATION OF THE IRAQI STATE: 
THEORETICAL FIELDS
2.1. Introduction
Many theoretical fields are relevant to the attempt to unravel the reasons why the 
nation-state paradigm of the post-World War One international consensus so greatly 
affected the coherence of Iraq’s geopolitical identity, function and place in the world. 
Such a study necessitates an in-depth analysis of all the factors that contributed to the 
emergence of Iraq as a modern state, and the ways in which they bore on its 
subsequent geopolitical development. In this thesis, this analysis shall be limited to 
interpreting the international and regional context within which Iraq entered its 
formative phase. We must understand the exact elements that interacted to produce 
the form of the state as it underwent its transformation, and find bodies of theory that 
can shed light on the state’s geopolitical characteristics as it crystallised.
The limitations of certain territorially based nationalisms, encompassing many 
different ethnic and cultural groups, are already being realised -  not least within the 
heart of Europe. The creation of a new state brings up many issues: who is creating 
this state, what is the intrinsic purpose of the creation, who benefits from the creation, 
and, most importantly -  can such an entity be successfully created without the unified 
will of the entire resident population? The theory of state-building prevailing globally 
today evolved in Europe, and implied the consolidation of a strong political presence 
taking control of a defined territorial unit. In the case of Iraq, we must throw in the 
dynamic of the strong political presence being a foreign power, and not a local one. 
Could the Iraqi State ever function as a coherent entity when its design was imposed 
from outside, rather than evolving from internal catalysts? Other important issues 
surround the composition of the Iraqi population, and links with external groups. 
Elements of geographical theory can be helpful here in explaining the cultural
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‘crossroads’ nature of the area that became Iraq, as well as highlighting the reasons 
for foreign interest in the region.
2.2. The Role of Geography
Scholars differ in the amount of importance they attach to the impact of geography on 
the political sphere, but many argue that it is fundamental. Could such an approach 
add to our analysis of the crystallisation of the Iraqi State? Mackinder claimed that 
geography answers two vital questions; answers that may be instrumental in this 
particular thesis.
“I  have ventured to define geography ...by saying that it answers two questions. It 
answers the question Where? And it then proceeds to answer the question Why 
there? ”l
Could such an approach be utilised to answer not only where Iraq lies in relation to 
other powers, but also why, given this relative location, Iraq was subjected to such 
great change at the beginning of this century? In doing so, it could perhaps also help 
to explain the failure of the nation-state paradigm in producing an enduring 
geopolitical identity and function for the new state. Is the history and condition of Iraq 
fundamentally bound up with its geography? This approach could indeed provide 
some answers. For example, for the Ottomans, Iraq provided a buffer between the hub 
of its empire, the nomadic threat from the deserts to the south, and the might of the 
Iranian kingdom to the east. It lay on the major overland trade routes between Asia, 
Europe and the Arab Middle East, whilst also benefiting from access to the Arabian 
Gulf. In this, these Iraqi districts provided the Ottomans with unique strategic, 
economic and cultural advantages that other vilayets could not provide.
An understanding of the geographical elements that differentiate one space from 
another, is thus important for any research into the specific geopolitical place of one 
particular area, and any geopolitical pressures that are at work to prevent an area from 
consolidating into a coherent nation-state. Therefore, "Geography in this expanded
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sense is not confined to any one discipline, it travels instead through social practices 
at large and is implicated in myriad topographies o f power and knowledge. We 
routinely make sense o f places, spaces and landscapes in our everyday lives -  in 
different ways and for different purposes -  and these 'popular geographies' are as 
important to the conduct o f social life as are our understandings o f (say) biography 
and history”.
Newman too, calls for a renewed appreciation of the ‘geo’ dimension of global, 
regional and state politics when using geopolitics to study the changing world 
political map.3 In other words, he sees the geographical element as vital to the study 
of the relationship between politics and space -  as statecraft is not conducted in 
homogenous space but in geographically differentiated areas. Such thoughts could be 
productively applied to the crystallisation of the Iraqi State. By its very nature, such a 
geopolitical approach is multi-disciplinary, but this is where its strength lies as it 
clearly interprets the complexity of reality, and allows a greater analytical insight. 
Although closely related to political geography, it does not deal solely with the spatial 
dimensions of the political process at all levels, as political geography is prone to do. 
Rather, it focuses on the changing role of the State at global and regional levels. Some 
view it as little more than an alternative way of looking at International Relations, 
with a stronger emphasis on the ‘geo’ than is apparent in many of the traditional 
political and I.R. analyses -  from which the territorial and spatial dimensions are 
frequently lacking. However, it does emphasise vital factors that should not be 
underestimated. The contemporary study of Geopolitics contains several themes that 
can be drawn upon to inform any examination into the factors affecting the 
geopolitical development of Iraq at the time it became a state.
Most relevant of these themes is the ‘geopolitical imagination.’4 The relative location 
of a state in the global system is a function of the position accorded it by other states 
within the system, as well as the imagined preferences of its own citizens.5 The
1 Mackinder, 1904. Quoted in Parker, W.H. ‘Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft.’ 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982), p. 141.
2 Gregory, Derek, ‘Geographical Imaginations’. (Blackwells, Oxford, 1994), p .l 1.
3 Newman, David. ‘Geopolitics Renaissant: Territory, Sovereignty and the World Political Map.’ 
Geopolitics Vol.3, N o .l Summer 1998, p .l.
4 Term used by Newman, D. 1998, p.4
5 Newman, D. 1998, p.6.
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geopolitical imagination follows on from such ideas as ‘imagined communities’
(which shall be examined in depth further into this chapter) — which relate to the 
communal imaginings (or lack of) held by citizens of the state, which reflect the 
preferred geopolitical location of these groups within a global system.
The second theme in Geopolitics that proves of use in this study of Iraq is the present- 
day dual process of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation. De-territorialisation 
refers to the erosion of state-based ties due to globalisation, the developments in 
communications, and cultural, economic and political interchanges that transcend 
state boundaries. However, this is offset by the emergence of new states, and new 
ethnic, national and territorial identities, with the associated creation of new 
boundaries. Although such processes of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation 
are largely located within the discourse of post-modernism, it is not hard to see how 
equally contradictory dual processes may have been fashioning the world earlier this 
century. For example, whilst the imposition of a state over the region of Iraq might at 
first glance seem to necessitate a narrowing down of the population’s territorial 
perspective, because the new entity was much smaller than the Empire of which it 
was previously a part, - it actually demanded an expansion in people’s views of the 
community in which they lived. This was because the centre of state power was now 
far closer to their everyday lives than it had ever been before, and therefore had a 
much stronger impact and centripetal power than that of the former disorganised and 
inconsistent Ottoman administration. The new state also implied a loyalty beyond the 
local, which was not necessary under the Ottomans. Thus, a smaller territorial limit 
actually served better than a vast Empire in eroding the parochialism and tribalism of 
early twentieth century Iraq, as it allowed for a far greater actual control over the lives 
of the population by a Central Government. By this, I am referring to the 
strengthening of the relationship between population and state. The obligations of the 
population to the state, such as tax payments, were more readily enforced, just as the 
state held new responsibilities to its inhabitants. Such reciprocal ties became far more 
tangible to the local population under the new state structure, than they had been 
under Ottoman tutelage.
31
2.2.1. The Impact of Geographical Location on the Geopolitical Status of a 
Territory
The fundamental impact of geography on the world political map, and the nation 
building process was central to the ideas of Halford Mackinder (1861-1947). His 
ideas may also be of use in unravelling the forces at work at the time that Iraq was re­
fashioned as an international state. Mackinder’s human geography sought to 
emphasise man’s relationship with his varying environment, an environment where 
places differed due to individual kinds of community inhabiting distinctive localities. 
That is, space is not homogenous, both by virtue of its inherently diverse resource 
character and because of its relative location.
"Man in society forms local communities and the natural environment may be marked 
off into natural regions; natural regions influence the development o f  the communities 
inhabiting them; the communities modify the regions they inhabit; the regions, so 
modified, influence the communities differently than before, and so the interaction 
continues. ”6
Mackinder also strove to underline the significance of the geographical location of an 
area.
“The great wars o f history ...are the outcome, direct or indirect, o f  the unequal 
growth o f nations, and that unequal growth is not wholly due to the greater genius 
and energy o f some nations as compared with others; in large measure it is the result 
o f the uneven distribution offertility and strategical opportunity upon the face o f our 
Globe. In other words, there is in nature no such thing as equality o f opportunity for  
the nations. ”
Mackinder held a unifying imperial philosophy, which was expressed in a logical 
theorem intended to prove that Britain’s only salvation as a great power lay in 
consolidating around the mother country, and reinforcing a strong, united Empire. In 
1910 he wrote that “only by gathering together the several nations o f  the Empire can 
we cope in the international balance o f power with the newly-organised continental 
states”8
6 Parker, W.H. 1 9 8 2 ,p .ll5
7 Mackinder, H.J. ‘Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics o f  Reconstruction,’ 
(Constable, London; Holt, N ew  York, 1919), p.2
8 The Times, 19th October 1910.
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Such geographical positioning impacting on a nation’s power and potential on the 
world scene was first seen in his book ‘Britain and the British Seas’ (1902), when he 
accepted that although practicality required a regional treatment, "there is no 
complete geographical region either less than or greater than the whole o f  the earth’s 
surface ”9. As he saw it, advances in communications, and in infrastructure, were 
leading to an increase in the volume and extent of inter-regional movements of men, 
materials and ideas. Such developments reinforced the need to set regions within a 
global context. It was this global context that fundamentally affected the position in 
the world order that one region was accorded at the expense of another.
Added to this, he recognised another potent geographical factor -  that of ideology. 
Indeed Mackinder introduced the term ‘psychosphere’ as one of the six global spheres 
within which man existed. As part of this, he understood that man possessed other 
territorial drives than the mere desire for food and security: "ideas and ambitions 
were powerful forces which must find a place in a comprehensive human 
geography. ”l°
Since all other parts of the earth had already been discovered, the interplay of the 
forces of the psychosphere had now become a closed system -  thus their action in any 
part of the world would now have repercussions throughout the whole. It followed 
then, that future international tensions would tend to become global rather than simply 
regional. This is a crucial key to understanding Britain’s interest in the Iraqi region.
The history and development of any one region was also a crucial element that was 
often overlooked in spatial models of political geography. Mackinder used the term 
‘genetic’ to imply not only a study of the origin and development of features, but also 
that momentum which carries them from the past into the present. He saw this vis 
inertiae as vital to geographical explanation, and recognised that the facts of human 
geography would always be the result of the conflict between two elements, the 
dynamic and the genetic.11 Cohen too recognises this conflict, and relates it directly to 
the Middle Eastern arena: “Middle Eastern diversities are heightened by the fiercely
9 Mackinder, H.J. ‘The Music o f  the Spheres’, Proc. R. Philos. Soc. G lasgow  lx iii, 1937, p .179.
10 Parker, W.H. 1982, p. 135
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competitive drives o f modern nationalism and by the centrifugal pressures that 
outside interests bring to bear upon the region. ”12
2.2.2. Mackinder’s Heartland Theory13
Mackinder outlined his ground-breaking Heartland theory in 1904,14 and called on 
people to stop regarding European history as the only history that mattered, and rather 
to look upon it as subordinate to Asiatic history.15 His theory developed from the 
belief that the physical geography of Russia had encouraged a high level of mobility 
amongst the nomadic horsemen, and those who lived along the banks of the great 
central rivers that ran north to south. These mobile forces were then able to bring 
great pressure to bear on Europe, to the extent that: “Europe acquired much o f its 
character from its forced response ”.16
Thus the vast Eurasian landmass became the ‘Heartland’, and pivoting around this -  
forming an outer and imier crescent -  were marginal coastlands, peninsulas and 
islands, which supported dense populations. (See Map 2). Europe was just one of 
these ‘satellite’ regions, but developed ‘ship-men’ to counter the mobility of the 
heartland nomads. Through dominance at sea, Europeans became able to control the 
marginal coastlands and encircle the Euro-Asiatic land power that had for so long 
been a threat. In this way, the traditional core-periphery antithesis also became a land-
11 Mackinder, H.J. (1895). ‘Modern geography, German and English’, presidential address to Section E 
(Geography), Report 65,h M tgBrit. Assoc. Adv. Sci. (Ipswich 1895), Trans. Section E, p.8.
12 Cohen, Saul. ‘Geography and Politics in a World Divided.’ (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1975), 
p.255
13 Ideas such as these helped Mackinder become one o f  the most influential geographical thinkers o f  
modern times. His geographical views helped to build his geopolitical theories, which went on to 
impact upon the external policies o f  Germany before the First World War, and o f  the United States 
after it. His concepts o f  the ‘Heartland’ and the ‘Rimland’ in the ‘World Island’ were hugely 
influential, especially through the geopolitical thinking o f  successors such as Spykman.(Nicholas 
Spykman (1893-1943), Professor o f International Relations at Yale University! He made important 
contributions to the discipline o f  Geopolitics, and believed that the ‘Rimland’ o f  peripheral maritime 
states could successfully contain the Eurasian ‘Heartland’ power.
14 Although the Heartland theory was introduced in 1904, it lay largely neglected by English-speakers 
until the Second World War, when it became "one o f  the most intensively debated geographical ideas 
o f  all time. ’’ (De Blij, H.J. ‘Systematic Political Geography,’ Wiley, New York, 1967). The theory has, 
however, attracted much criticism since then, and Mackinder’s views are certainly not universally 
accepted.
15 Mackinder, H.J. ‘The Geographical Pivot o f History’, Geographical Journal xx iii, 1904, pp.421-37.
16 Parker, W.H. 1982, p. 150.
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power / sea-power antithesis. Whilst Europe had risen to the challenge and indeed 
become a great sea-power, Mackinder argued that the potential of the Eurasian 
landmass could never be exceeded, and that the opening up of its vast spaces due to
17new technology and transport systems would release her true economic power. 
Therefore, “does not a certain persistence o f geographical relationship become 
evident? ”18 Mackinder was convinced that this immense area of Euro-Asia was the 
pivot region of the world’s politics, and such a view reveals much about the position 
of Iraq, caught in the ‘marginal crescent’, in the global political manoeuvrings after 
the First World War.
The theory’s power lay in the way Mackinder had managed to relate the fact of the 
world having become a closed system of states to technological advances in 
communications, with the balance of advantage and disadvantage oscillating between 
land power and sea power, - or centre and periphery. “It thus reduced the complex 
interplay o f historical event and geographical fact to an astonishing simplicity”.19 
Mackinder argued that whoever had control of the Heartland, with all of its strategic 
advantages and huge economic potential, would hold the key to control of the ‘world 
island’, and by then adding sea power to its supremacy on land -  it could control the
0C\world. Mackinder claimed that the only way to prevent such a process was by using 
the great power of the present victors to see that super-states did not develop, and 
rather that the old continental empires were broken up into autonomous, economically
9 1balanced and viable nations. Here again can be seen possible explanations into the 
British interest in Iraq, and perhaps the decision to set up Iraq as just such an 
‘autonomous, economically balanced and viable nation’. Indeed, Mackinder himself 
actually considered the Middle East as the most vital part of the Inner Crescent due to 
its oil reserves and its strategic positioning. It was also a final region of political and 
territorial possibilities within an otherwise closed global system.
17 He envisaged that this landmass could itself become a vast economic world that would be largely 
inaccessible to oceanic commerce. If and when the time came for this to happen, the Eurasian heartland 
would again make its power felt in the surrounding lands.
18 Mackinder, H.J. 1904, p.434.
19 Parker, W.H. 1982, p. 162.
20 At the time o f  the Allied triumph in Europe at the end o f the First World War, Mackinder published 
Democratic Ideals and Reality, published in 1919 in New York and London. This book was not 
intended to be a deterministic account, but more o f a practical warning to statesmen o f  the need to 
follow a specific course o f  action to avert a crisis within the global political sphere.
21 In a sense this Mackinder view is a justification o f Britain’s nineteenth century balance o f  power 
strategic world view.
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Some writers simply deny geography any significant place in power politics. For 
example, Malin insisted that “the idea that geographical position is the basis o f 
power ” was now discredited and should be considered obsolete.22 However, such 
claims were countered by certain scholars, like Hooson, who supported the Heartland 
theory by declaring that “the most fundamental o f all the elements o f national power 
is sheer location on the globe. " 23 Even those who agreed with this in principle 
however, raised concerns about the uncertainty of the heartland’s boundaries 24 
Gyorgy commented that "this extremely vague outline o f so vital a geographical area 
seems unacceptable 25
Another main contention surrounding the Heartland theory was the determinism that 
many critics read into it. Many critics believed that economic and technological 
factors were of greater importance than geostrategic considerations.26 Yet Mackinder 
had always maintained in his own writings that the potential of the heartland could 
only be tapped via technical advancement and manpower organisation, so enabling 
the population to fully exploit the geostrategic position.
“The actual balance ofpolitical power at any given time is...the product, on the one 
hand, o f the geographic conditions, both economic and strategic, and on the other 
hand, o f the relative number, virility, equipment and organisation o f  the competing 
peoples ” 27
This then, could also bend in favour of the Rimland areas, in that their development 
could outstrip that of Eurasia, and thus rise above such ‘fatalism’ of the deterministic 
claims. Mackinder argued therefore, that although the Rimland could be dominant in 
such a scenario, the population should at least be aware of the geographical realities
22 Malin, J.C. ‘The contriving brain as the pivot o f  history. Sea, landmass and air power: some bearings 
o f  cultural technology upon the geography o f  international relations’, in Anderson, G.L. (ed.) ‘Issues 
and Conflicts’ (Univ. o f  Kansas Press, Lawrence, Kansas, 1959), p.340
23 Hooson, D.J.M. ‘A N ew  Soviet Heartland?’ (Van Nostrand, Princeton, N ew  Jersey, 1964), p. 117.
24 For example, see Teggart, E.T. ‘Geography as an Aid to Statecraft: An Appreciation o f  Mackinder’s 
Democratic Ideals and R ea lity’, Geographical Review  viii, 1919, pp.227-42; Chisholm, G.C. ‘The 
Geographical Prerequisites o f a League o f  Nations’, Scottish Geographical M agazine xxxv, 1919, 
pp.248-56; Gyorgy, A. ‘Geopolitics: the N ew  German Science’. (Univ. o f  California Press, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, 1944); ICristof, L.K.D. ‘Mackinder’s Concept o f Heartland and the Russians’, 
preprint, XXIII Int. Geogrl Congr., Symposium K5: History o f Geographical Thought. (Leningrad, 22- 
6 July 1976); Meinig, D.W. ‘Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History’, Western P olitical Quarterly 
ix, 1956, pp.553-69.
25 Gyorgy, A. 1944, p. 168.
26 See, Amery, L.S. ‘In Discussion o f  Mackinder, H.J. ‘The Geographical Pivot o f  History’, 
Geographical Journal xxiii, 1904, pp.293-307; Crone, G.R. ‘Modern Geographers’. RGS, London, 
1951; and East, W.G. ‘How Strong is the Heartland?’ Foreign Affairs xxix, 1950, pp.78-93.
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and historical forces which would have to be contended with. To him, whether 
overcome 01* not, geography would remain the fundamental element to be dealt with 
when it came to statecraft. In this way, the geography of Iraq would remain a crucial 
element within the new state constructed by the British after the First World War.
Was such a geographical legacy dealt with adequately in Iraqi statecraft?
Some writers argued that Mackinder had greatly over-emphasised the strategic 
importance of the heartland, and indeed, that its very centrality meant it was 
vulnerable to attack from all sides. Spykman and Cressey28 both held that the Rimland 
was in fact more important than the Heartland, and that whoever controlled the 
Rimland would rule Eurasia. Therefore, the question is posed: who is more likely to 
control the Rimland? A sea power emanating from the outer continents and islands, or 
a land power based centrally in Eurasia? By way of evidence it may prove valuable to 
look at the case of East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, who were all more 
developed and advanced than the Soviet Union, yet were still absorbed within the 
Soviet orbit.
Spykman drew different geostrategic conclusions from Mackinder’s Heartland model. 
Although he was writing about the global post-World War Two geostrategic situation, 
many of his ideas can be usefully related back to the post-World War One global 
political arena. He felt that the ‘Marginal Crescent’, or ‘Rimland’ was the key to 
world control, and he rejected' Mackinder’s land power doctrine to argue: “who 
controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies o f the 
world. ”30 To Spykman, the Rimland, and not the Heartland, was the key to the 
struggle for the world. In such a scenario, Mesopotamia, located squarely in the 
middle of the Rimland region, was of prime strategic interest to ambitious world
27 Mackinder, H.J. 1904, p.437.
28 see Spykman, N.J. ‘The Geography o f the Peace’. (Harcourt Brace, New York, 1944); and Cressey, 
G.B. ‘The Basis o f  Soviet Strength’. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1945)
29 Other criticisms were levelled at the belief that the geographical nature o f the heartland made it an 
area difficult for human habitation, therefore making economic development seem improbable at the 
time that Mackinder was writing. However, Mackinder had mentioned that the main power o f the 
heartland lay in its potential, which could be tapped when the area did finally benefit from the 
technological advances o f  the age. He never claimed that the heartland would dominate the world 
island, only that it was in a very favourable position to do so, should the area manage to develop its 
material and human resources. The more fundamental point, was that the sheer scale o f  the land mass 
ensured a sufficient range o f  resources to enhance the power o f whoever controlled them.
30 Spykman, N. 1944, p.43
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powers. (See Map 3). Control of an area such as this provided a ‘gateway’ into the 
Heartland. (See Map 4).
■31
Cohen developed these debates further, in a way that directly highlighted the 
Mesopotamian region. Cohen believed that there was a logic to the ordering of the 
patterns of the relations among states. The major tensions of international relations 
occur when geostrategic powers or blocs clash with one another as they interact in 
areas that are common ground. In this way therefore, the world is arranged politically 
in rational, not random fashion. “It can therefore be likened to a diamond, not a pane 
o f glass, in the sense that its cleavages can be anticipated along specific lines, rather 
than haphazardly. ”32 From such a belief, he developed the idea of a ‘Shatterbelt’, 
defined as “a large, strategically located region that is occupied by a number o f 
conflicting states and is caught between the conflicting interests o f adjoining Great 
Powers. ”33 Cohen’s ‘shatterbelt’ was a volatile region that marked the borders of two 
geostrategic power blocs, combined with a marked ideological frontier.
The impact of geographical location can thus be far-reaching. Although Cohen was 
analysing the Cold War situation throughout the 1960s and 1970s, in which he 
recognised the Middle East as one of the world’s two main shatterbelts, his ideas also 
directly relate to the position of Mesopotamia on the eve of the First World War. 
Mackinder had recognised that the Iraqi region was firmly in his ‘marginal crescent’, 
and was thus likely to be contested over by greater powers, but Cohen took this 
further. Caught between two great geostrategic regions, and offering various political, 
strategic and economic benefits to competing powers, Iraq can be seen as the 
archetypal shatterbelt region. (See Map 5). Indeed, it can be argued that the Iraqi 
region had been a ‘shatterbelt’ for many centuries, caught between the ambitions and 
interests of the Ottoman Empire and the Persians to the east. Such a history had 
created a politically, economically and culturally fractured region, a hallmark of 
Cohen’s shatterbelt.34
31 See Cohen, S. 1975
32 Cohen, S. 1975, p.vi
33 Cohen, S. 1975, p.85
34 Cohen claims that shatterbelt regions are characterised by their fragmented political and economic 
nature. Shatterbelt areas also reflect the outside world in their cultures, races, languages, religions and 
economies. Iraq certainly displays these characteristics.
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There is no question, according to Cohen, that the Middle East suffers due to its 
shatterbelt status, a result of ongoing shatterbelt designation and the legacy of past 
shatterbelt location. Although writing about the situation in the 1960s and 1970s, if 
we accept that the Mesopotamian region has long been a shatterbelt, Cohen’s 
conclusions can be directly related to the Iraq of the First World War era: “There is 
not a single Middle Eastern state that lives at complete ease with its neighbours, and 
almost every Middle Eastern state struggles with internal tensions that are the 
product o f deep-rooted cultural clashes and geopolitical immaturity. Everywhere the 
struggle is to consolidate states in the face o f internal divisions and external 
pressures. ”35 Such struggles were therefore to confront the Iraqi State established 
after the First World War, and greatly affect its internal consolidation and geopolitical 
function. In this sense, geographical location can fundamentally affect the 
development and crystallisation of a nation-state.
Such views are potentially of great importance when examining the role that Britain 
came to play in Iraq after the First World War. Can Mackinder’s geopolitical ideas 
shed more light on why that region in particular was of interest to Britain, and why 
the specific policies followed by the British administration there were chosen above 
others? Mackinder had called on the victors of the war to work towards undermining 
the strength of continental masses, and prevent super-states developing by breaking 
up old continental empires into autonomous and viable nations. Such a call can be 
seen to be clearly mirrored in the British stance towards Iraq.56
The perception of Iraq’s geographical significance and role in ‘Imperial space’ by 
Mackinder is important, as it reveals a great deal about the motives and strategies that
35 Cohen, S. 1975,p.253
36 Indeed, despite the criticisms levelled at the heartland theory, the reality was that many o f  
Mackinder’s practical suggestions emanating from these ideas, were closely listened to and followed  
after the war, due to the apparent relevance o f the ideas in the global structure at that time. Mackinder 
saw Britain’s future strength as very much tied up with the successful governance o f  her dominions. He 
viewed the Empire as an organic whole, which could supply British deficiencies, without intention o f  
exploitation. The Empire should be, he argued, a free partnership o f democracies united by common 
interest, forming a political organisation powerful enough to contend with the great continental realms. 
What was desired by Mackinder was an idea o f  ‘trusteeship’ rather than ‘possession’ to be spread 
amongst the people o f  Britain “and with it the idea that we have to improve ourselves because we are 
the trustees, and must be worthy to ru le”. (Mackinder, H.J. ‘On Thinking Imperially’ in Sadler, M.E. 
(ed.) ‘Lectures on Empire,’ London, 1907, p.41).
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lay behind the British desire for control in that region. It is important to note that 
many British politicians felt the same at that time, and Mackinder’s defence of the 
imperialist philosophy with intellectual argument pleased many in that camp. Many of 
his ideas of ‘trusteeship’ and the protection of British interests are more than evident 
in Britain’s handling of affairs in Iraq, and help inform the analysis into why Iraq was 
set up as an autonomous political entity -  an independent, sovereign state, but having 
to maintain certain privileges for Britain within its constitution. This in turn, along 
with other regional and local factors, sheds light onto the particular geopolitical 
identity and form that Iraq was left with after creation.
Cohen’s ideas however, add a further layer of analysis. He highlights the ‘shatterbelt’ 
status of the Middle East, which was certainly an arena for Great Power 
confrontations before, during and after the First World War. Such a framework allows 
us a greater appreciation of how a region’s geographical location can have immense 
political, cultural and economic consequences, all of which affected the consolidation 
of the new State of Iraq after the First World War.
2.3. British Interests in Mesopotamia
“After its occupation o f Iraq during the First World War, Britain began to find  that 
the country was not only important as a defence outpost but also vital for other 
purposes. ”37
British interests in Iraq were manifold, involving economic, commercial, military and 
strategic considerations. Only the most major British interests in Iraq will be outlined 
briefly here, as they shall be examined in detail later in this thesis.
Before the occupation of Iraq during the First World War, Britain had already been 
the predominant power in the neighbouring Gulf area, although Iraq itself had been 
under Ottoman domination since the 16th century. Britain had been largely satisfied 
with Ottoman control as a barrier to rival powers, as British commercial interests were 
not compromised by the Ottoman administration. However, this balance of power
37 Silverfarb, D. ‘Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East. Case Study o f  Iraq, 1929-41’. (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1986), p .l.
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began to shift in the early 19th century, as the Ottoman Porte38 was weak and rival 
powers -  namely Russia and Germany -  began to encroach. These states started to 
exert influence on the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, which was seen as 
detrimental to British interests and prestige throughout the eastern Mediterranean and 
the Indian Ocean. Britain wished to retain its position within the region, and when the 
opportunity arose with the demise of Ottoman authority, Britain sought “to ensure the 
security o f its imperial communications” 39 Britain found itself in control of the three 
Ottoman districts of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul at the end of the First World War, 
and, “as the victors, the British directed territorial design according to their own 
strategic concerns T 40
There were many reasons why Britain did not simply withdraw from Iraq. Of 
fundamental importance was power, and the significance of ‘realist’ conceptions of 
power: military strength, communication networks, visual displays of dominance and 
control. One geopolitical point relevant to Iraq under Mackinder’s world view was 
that it became an important link in the maritime control of Britain’s trade and 
imperial, maritime-based, interests. They saw Iraq as a vital link in a chain of airfields 
connecting Egypt to India, an air route that would help to tie their empire together by 
facilitating trade, travel and communication, whilst also providing a very important 
military capability, enabling Britain to reinforce far-flung garrisons in an 
emergency.41 They also wished to maintain a military presence near the large British- 
owned oilfields in south-west Iran, and the refinery at Abadan. They believed that if 
they withdrew from Iraq, Russia would increase its influence over Iran and eventually 
threaten these oilfields.42 Moreover, Britain also suspected that there were large
38 The Ottoman Sultan, supreme ruler o f  the Empire
39 Silverfarb, D. 1986, p.2.
40 Simon, R. ‘The Imposition o f  Nationalism on a Non-Nation State: The Case o f  Iraq During the 
Interwar Period. 1921-1941’. In Jankowski, J. and Gershoni, I. (eds.) ‘Rethinking Nationalism in the 
Arab Middle East’. (Columbia University Press, N ew  York 1997), p.87
41 See memoranda by Hugh Trenchard, Chief o f Air Staff, and the Middle East department o f  the 
Colonial Office, 1101 Dec. 1922, CAB 27/206; Higham, Robin, ‘Britain’s Imperial Air Routes 1918 to 
1939: The Story o f  Britain’s Overseas Airlines’. (Dent & Son, London, 1960), pp.l 10, 122.
42 Memoranda by the Middle East department o f  the Colonial Office, l l 11’ Dec. 1922, the Foreign 
Office, 15th Dec. 1922, and Amery, L.S. (1st Lord o f the Admiralty), 16th Dec. 1922, CAB 27/206; 
report o f the cabinet committee on Iraq, 23rd March 1923, CAB 27/206.
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quantities of oil yet to be discovered in northern Iraq and therefore this provided an 
added impetus to keep this area under the British sphere of influence.43
Britain essentially wished to undermine the authority of any other major powers in the 
Gulf. Retaining a sphere of influence within the shatterbelt of the Middle East was of 
crucial strategic importance. For over a hundred years Britain had seen these waters as 
a vital outpost on the western approaches to India. Control of Mesopotamia would 
allow the British to have control of the land route between India and Europe. If 
Turkey were to regain power in Iraq, it would therefore threaten British shipping to 
India, and damage British prestige in the area, as it would look as if Turkey had won 
the war. This in itself was very important, as "British leaders were very sensitive to 
the question o f prestige".44 One important reason for this was that Britain needed to 
maintain its authority throughout the colonies it still controlled. Any query over 
Britain’s competency to rule in one region of its Empire, could lead to general de- 
stabilisation of other areas under British control. Above all, Britain feared the rise of a 
large bloc of anti-British states within the Muslim world, stretching from Egypt and 
Turkey to Iran and Afghanistan 45 “It was especially concerned that anti-British 
agitation in these states would jeopardise its hold on the allegiance o f the Muslim 
community in INDIA (My emphasis).46 Therefore, Iraq would prove a useful 
‘wedge’, to weaken such a bloc, just as Mackinder’s theory suggested. The 
Mesopotamian area was of specific interest to the British because of its strategic and 
commercial potential. The port city of Basra already had a highly developed structure 
of maritime trade with Asia and the Indian sub-continent, a system that the British 
wished to seize control over.
43 Memoranda by the Middle East department o f  the Colonial Office, 11th Dec. 1922, and Amery, 16th 
Dec. 1922, CAB 27/206; Mejcher, H. ‘Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928’. (Ithaca Press, London 
1976), pp.105-175; Longrigg, S. ‘Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Developm ent’. (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1968), 3rd Edition, p.71; Kent, M. ‘Oil and Empire: British Policy and 
Mesopotamian Oil 1900-1920’. (London, 1976), pp.155-157; Stivers, W. ‘International Politics and 
Iraqi Oil, 1918-1928: A Study in Anglo-American Diplomacy’. Business H istory Review , V ol.55, 
1981, pp.519-521.
44 Silverfarb, D. 1986, p.4.
45 This was one o f the main reasons why the British wanted to keep the developing Arab Revolt 
movement in the Hijaz friendly to British interests.
46 Silverfarb, D. 1986, p.4. See also Memorandum by the Middle East department o f  the Colonial 
Office, 11th Dec. 1922, CAB 27/206.
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It is interesting to note that even as early as 1914, when British officials were 
discussing the possibilities of engineering an Arab Revolt, it was already being 
suggested that Britain should retain control of the Iraqi districts “to set up some stable 
authority strong enough to administer, but weak enough to be dependent upon us 
^Britain also wished to recoup some of the immense military and financial cost of the 
Mesopotamian campaign, by obtaining some long-term benefit from the country. 
Estimates suggest that the fighting on this front had cost the British Treasury £200 
million.48
2.3.1. Constraints on British Ambitions in Mesopotamia
However, Britain also faced many constraints in what they could actually do in Iraq. 
There was an obvious financial constraint, which was made all the more pressing by 
the dissatisfaction of the British public with their taxes being spent abroad with no 
clear benefits. Britain had also made promises to Arab leaders in return for local 
support that ruled out any possibilities of direct British dominance in the region. 
President Wilson’s 14-point peace plan also struck a blow against the old imperialist 
world order. Point 12 concentrated on Iraq, and stated that “nationalities which are 
now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security o f  life and an 
absolutely unmolested opportunity o f autonomous development” 49 Britain had to 
endorse this publication in order to avoid a breach with the United States, and also to 
encourage Germany to agree on an armistice.
Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the British also became party to
the covenant of the League of Nations. Article 22 stated that many former Ottoman-
controlled communities were now provisionally recognised as independent nations 
“subject to the rendering o f administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory 
until such time as they are able to stand alone ”.50 Thus, the future of the region was 
determined by western powers. It was to be an area of sovereign nation states within
47 Cohen, S. A. ‘The Genesis o f the British Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914’. M iddle Eastern Studies, 
12, 1976, pp.l 19-133
48 Brig. Gen. Moberly, F.J. ‘The Campaign in Mesopotamia: 1914-1918’, Vol.IV, (HMSO, London, 
1923-1927), pp.i, 331; Ireland, P.W. ‘Iraq, a Study in Political Development’. (Jonathon Cape, London, 
1937), p.60.
49 Quoted in Silverfarb, D. 1986, p.6.
50 Quoted in Silverfarb, D. 1986, p.6.
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the international community -  a fundamentally different territorial system than had 
been in place before in that region.
In 1920 at the San Remo Conference, Britain accepted the Mandate for Iraq under the 
provisions of Article 22, which implied a need to recognise Iraq as a quasi­
independent state that required the aid of a mandatory power in order to prepare the 
country for self-rule. This gave Britain the opportunity to step into the Iraqi territory 
with some international legitimacy, but also ruled out the possibility of imposing a 
predominantly British administration on the country. This seemed to satisfy the 
British, as they could legitimise their military presence, preserve their economic and 
political interests, whilst also dramatically reduce military spending overseas and 
concentrate on the chronic problems closer to home. By 1920, Britain decided that 
only by creating an Arab government in Baghdad under close British supervision, - 
with its own local army and police to maintain internal order -  could Britain withdraw 
enough of her troops to save money whilst still safe-guarding essential British 
interests.
“This British approach was founded on the premise that the division o f the Middle 
East into various countries should be preserved and the relations between Great 
Britain and each o f these countries should be dealt with independently o f  one 
another”.51
Thus, the state of Iraq was created by the international community of the 1920s, from 
the three Ottoman vilayets of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul that were in British control 
by the end of the First World War. It was created according to the territorial and 
political designs of not only that time, but of the powerful players in the world arena. 
The ascendancy of the United States in terms of world power, heralded an end to the 
age of imperialism that Britain had dominated for so long. A new paradigm was now 
being used to determine the world political map. The ideals of national self- 
determination were being championed, due to the perceived failure (by the United 
States) of European balance-of-power politics.52 Therefore, Iraq was set up as a 
nation-state, under British tutelage until such time as it could rule itself, with clearly 
defined boundaries, and hence an included and an excluded population.
51 Porath, Y. ‘Britain and Arab Unity’. Jerusalam Quarterly, 15, 1980, pp.36-50
52 See Kissinger, H. 1994
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2.4. State and Nation Building Theory
Before examining any further the exact details of British nation-state building within 
Iraq, we must define what is meant by a ‘nation-state’. The territorial areas set up in 
the Middle East by the western powers after the First World War, were given the 
status of international states, and were considered ‘nations in formation’ -  “in which 
all the different communities forming their heterogeneous populations rally around
53the idea o f nation -  as it is defined and diffused by a nationalistic doctrine The 
theory was that such a doctrine would act like a ‘glue’ -  assembling groups and 
persuading their members to work together in the process of building a state, which 
would then in turn further the process of forming a coherent nation. Thus, in the 
cultural, economic and political integration of the population lay the grounds for a 
common national identity.
“This is not therefore a case o f divide and rule just for the sake o f  colonial interests 
but rather a case o f state-building and compulsory integration for the very same
y> 54purposes .
But why choose the nation-state paradigm as the pattern for Iraq and the other new 
territorially defined countries in the region? The reasons for this decision help to place 
the construction of Iraq, and its subsequent geopolitical identity, within the 
appropriate international context.
In 1648 the European Princes had signed the ‘Treaty of Westphalia’, essentially 
intended to end the great religious wars. Over the next 200 years, “a system o f state 
territory evolved in Europe which was based upon the separation o f different ethnic 
and linguistic cultures. The nation-state system appears today as a universal 
feature ”55 This system was then transplanted from Europe throughout the globe via 
colonialism and Western control. Wilson’s 14 point plan ushered in a new age on the 
international arena, an age which had no place for imperialism and old empires. The 
emphasis was now on independence and self-rule, with respect for different 
nationalities and their wishes for self-determination. Such a system was underlined by
53 Lukitz, L. ‘Iraq: The Search for National Identity’ (Frank Cass, London 1995), p.2
54 Lukitz, L. 1995, p,21.
the League of Nations, which Britain was a part of, and who issued the mandates for 
the newly independent Middle Eastern regions. What was originally intended by these 
concepts o f ‘state’ and ‘nation’ must first be understood before we can examine where 
they succeeded, and where they failed in providing the new Iraq with a stable and 
coherent geopolitical identity and function. The ideals and realities of state-building 
prove invaluable in the analysis of the formation of the Iraqi State.
Ever since the interwar period of this century, “every successful revolution has 
defined itself in national terms... and in doing so, has grounded itself firmly in a 
territorial and social space inheritedfrom the prerevolutionary [sic] past".56 Indeed, 
nationhood is still a concept to aspire to, and remains the most “universally legitimate 
value in the political life o f our time”.57
Yet what exactly is this concept of ‘nation’ that the League of Nations wished to see 
fulfilled in the occupied Middle Eastern territories after the First World War? The 
concept unlocks a multitude of problems of definition and recognition, with many 
subjective and objective elements involved. The nation is simply one form of human 
association and communication that has risen to political dominance over the last two 
hundred years, but whilst it remains true that the nation is still something to aspire to, 
it remains an extremely hard phenomenon to define and hence, explain.
There is as yet no satisfactory criterion for deciding which of the many human 
collectivities should be labelled as nations, and thus, no way of telling an observer 
how to distinguish a nation from other entities a priori. So to Seton-Watson’s 
admission that; “I  am driven to the conclusion that no ‘scientific definition ’ o f the 
nation can he devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists. ” 58 This is 
reinforced by Smith’s similar recognition of the curiously simultaneous solidity and 
insubstantiality of nations -  being seemingly so recognisable from a distance, and yet
55 Grundy-Warr, and Schofield, R. ‘The Shifting Ground o f  Border Co-operation Between Nations’. 
Geographical M agazine June 1990, pp. 10-17
56 Anderson, B. ‘Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism.’ 
(Verso, London 1991), p.2
57 Anderson, B. 1991, p.3
58 Seton-Watson, H. ‘Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins o f  Nations and the Politics o f  
Nationalism.’ (Methuen, London 1977), p.5
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appearing to dissolve the closer we come.59 It is therefore tempting to think that the 
‘nation’ is in the eye of the beholder and thus is entirely situational: shifting, fleeting, 
even illusory. Anderson also notes this insubstantiality by describing nationalism — 
the driving force behind creating nations -  as the ‘pathology’ of modern 
developmental history, “as inescapable as neurosis in the individual”.60 He is 
tempted to see the nation as little more than a cultural artifact of a particular kind.
What then, is this phenomenon that supposedly surrounds us, and yet defies precise 
explanation, even by the most respected scholars of the subject? This section will 
attempt to unweave a few of the complexities surrounding nationalism and nations by 
trying to ascertain their true origins and foundations, as well as any notable catalysts 
along the way. These discussions will then be applied more specifically to Iraq. It is 
only in understanding these origins that the real ambivalence, direction and, most 
importantly, the peculiar strength of nationalism and nations can be grasped. The 
world today is undeniably trying to present itself politically as a world of nations (in 
which the cultural and political units are as one), yet without a fixed notion of what 
exactly constitutes a ‘nation’. The claim to nationhood is the claim to political self- 
determination and equality of international treatment. Yet who should this be 
extended to, and at whose subsequent cost? Also, the claim to nationhood does not 
automatically guarantee statehood.
This section will start by addressing the problem of defining the nation from a 
modernist perspective -  mainly drawing on the ideas of B.Anderson, E.Gellner and 
E.Hobsbawm - before introducing some important revisions from A.D.Smith. All, 
however, agree that in the modern sense of the word, a ‘nation’ is a very young 
concept, having been formed (possibly ‘invented’) by the ideological drive of 
nationalism. Nationalism itself can be seen as “primarily a principle that holds that
jr 1
the political and national unit should be congruent”. Thus in modernity, the 
‘nation’ can be seen as equating the People with the State, thus becoming one and 
indivisible. Hobsbawm puts forward the following equation as a preliminary working 
framework for this theory:
59 Smith, A.D. ‘The Ethnic Origins o f  Nations’ (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988)
60 Anderson, B. 1991, p.5
61 Gellner, E. ‘Nations and Nationalism’, (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1997), p .l
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NATION=STATE=GOVERNMENT=SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.62
Such a relation undoubtedly linked the nation to territory, since the structure and 
definition of states were now essentially territorial. The nation was also being linked 
to the political state, which necessitated a change from ethnic community groups 
within a territory, to a unified citizenship. The relation between citizen and state was 
to be one of mutual obligation and responsibility, irrespective of original cultural 
differences.
This equation by itself however, already throws up two important problems involved 
in defining the nation, and in aligning the ideology of a nation with its divergent 
reality. Firstly, the more ‘one and indivisible’ the nation claimed to be, the more that 
heterogeneity within it caused problems. Also, in equating the nation with something 
practical and political (the State), it then must take on these State elements. 
Citizenship might be achieved at the cost of ethnic self-determination, a situation 
where the differences between ‘nations’ and ‘states’ are highlighted. This was 
demonstrated by the Iraq of the early 1920s -  a new state in which various, distinct 
ethnic groups struggled for recognition and representation within the new territorial 
limits.
It is this political element that leads Anderson to his definition of a nation as “an 
imagined political community, and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign 63 It is imagined in the sense that members will never know all their 
fellows, yet in the minds of each is created an image of their community. The nation 
is imagined as a community, as regardless of actual inequality and exploitation which 
may exist, it is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship or fraternity, 
which makes possible the millions dying for such limited imaginings. The nation is 
also imagined as sovereign, as the concept rose to importance at a time when old 
legitimacies of divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realms were being destroyed 
by the Age of Enlightenment and Revolution.
62 Hobsbawm, E.J. ‘Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality.’ (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1990), p. 19
63 Anderson, B. 1991, p.6
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The questions arising from all this must surely be why were such imaginings 
necessary, why did they become so prevalent, and from where did they receive such 
extraordinary power over peoples’ minds. This leads us into one of the most important 
creative forces behind nationalism and nation-building -  the fundamental reason why 
such imaginings found such a particular niche at some point of historical 
convergence.
Most scholars agree that nation-states were born in Europe, and therefore such 
conceptualisations were not globally uniform. Anderson contends that the rise of 
nationalism must be seen in its true historical, sociological and economic contexts.64 
In European history, religion was the main force attempting to cushion the fatality of 
the human condition, with the hope of continuity after death. Thus, as religion 
declined, individuals and communities needed another form of secular continuity, and 
nationalism in a sense filled the void. Thus, Anderson contends, with the use of 
common memories and symbols, nations seemed to be anchored in a timeless past, 
and offer a limitless future -  thus offering some salvation from the void with the 
promise of communal immortality. “Nationalism must be understood by aligning it 
with the large cultural systems that preceded it — out o f which, - as well as against 
which -  it came into being”.65 Fundamental changes had occurred in European modes 
of comprehending the world, and it became possible to ‘think’ the nation. Anderson 
believes that this alone fully accounts for the rise of this form of imagining, and also 
its awesome potency.66 People needed to feel that they had a place, and a secure 
community.
Thus, the nation came into existence in Europe to fill an emotional space left by the 
retreat and disintegration of real human communities. As societies developed 
throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, traditional life-styles were broken down, and 
local communities eroded. Anderson therefore believes that such imagined 
communities -  by evoking a sense of immortality with which other anonymous 
individuals can identify -  serve vital psychological as well as economic needs under 
the peculiar modern conditions of secular capitalism. In doing this, they also provided
64 Anderson, B. 1991
65 Anderson, B. 1991, p .12
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a much more contingent present security. Smith concurs, describing the importance in 
the concept of the nation of the stress on a flow in time and delimitation in space, both 
of which are pivotal in providing mental barriers to the certainty of human mortality. 
By linking oneself to a ‘community of history and destiny’, a measure of immortality 
can be achieved, with nationalism acting as a surrogate religion. With the modern-day 
scientific undermining of old religious certainties, individuals are returned to their 
pre-religious isolation, and all that is then left is “memory and hope, history and 
destiny"?1 which is collective and inter-generational It is important to remember that 
the territories of the Middle East had not gone through this European experience, and 
had not suffered the same decline in religion that had been witnessed throughout 
Europe. In Iraq therefore, nationalism would be only one form of human community 
that would be in conflict with other, still deep-seated modes of human association and 
belief.
Hobsbawm’s term ‘proto-nationalism’68 identifies a process of pre-nationalist 
collective consciousness-forming, with certain groups of people developing new and 
wider communal identifications. Elements of such a process included the 
development of common denominators such as similar dialects, ethnicity, religion, the 
belief of membership in a historic state past, or even a simple economic partnership. 
However, all such elements in provoking proto-nationalist sentiments were not 
uniform, or even all present in different situations. Therefore they can only ever be 
seen as a rough-working framework, which must not be imposed arbitrarily. That is, 
language sometimes was, and sometimes was not an important criterion in proto­
nationalism. In fact, the simple consciousness of belonging has probably been the 
most decisive criterion of proto-nationalism: a feeling of belonging to a lasting, 
political entity.
Usually, where proto-nationalism did develop, the concept of a ‘political-nation’ only 
really gained ground amongst the elite and gentry. This concept then needed to be 
diffused downwards to the masses if anything approaching modern nationalism was to 
be attained. Hence, proto-nationalism is not the same as modern nationalism, and only
66 However, nations did not arise in a vacuum. It is important not to underestimate the role o f  
individuals and the historical process.
67 Smith, A.D. 1986, p. 177
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really constituted a fertile breeding ground for nationalism to take seed (which it did 
not always do), providing the necessary symbols and sentiments that could then 
potentially be mobilised behind the modem cause. Where nationalism did take root, 
nationhood was pushed for, and by the end of the nineteenth century the nation 
emerged as a spontaneous distillation of complex ‘crossings’ of discrete historical 
forces. Once created, the concept could then be endlessly transplanted, and mutated 
across the globe -  its success being largely due to its adaptability. This thesis will 
examine whether any appreciable levels of ‘proto-nationalism’ were evident in pre- 
First World War Mesopotamia, and if so, did such communities correspond to the 
imposed state limits?68b
Anderson holds that the transition from Hobsbawm’s ‘proto-nationalism’ to modern 
nationalism was due to the introduction of print-capitalism, which had the power to 
change people’s conceptions of time to a new idea of 'homogenous, empty time>69. In 
such a concept, simultaneity was transverse and crosstime, marked by temporal 
coincidence and measured by clock and calendar. Before this, people had no 
conception of history as an endless chain with cause and effect, or of any radical 
separations between the past and the present. "The idea o f a sociological organism 
moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time is a precise analogue o f the 
idea o f the nation ".70
2.4.1. The Absorption of the Nation by the State
According to Hobsbawm,71 the rise of Liberalism between 1830 and the 1880s 
witnessed a trend towards seeing the nation as more of an economic entity.72 The idea
68 See Hobsbawm, E. 1990
68b However, it is important to remember that other, non-European, state structures did exist in other 
parts o f  the world, and that the ‘Westphalian’ model was not the only state framework in existence. 
There were Hindu and Islamic ‘state m odels’ before the Westphalian system even evolved. For further 
details see: Khoury, P. & Kostiner, J. ‘Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East,’ (University o f  
California Press, Oxford 1990); Smith, A.D. 1988; Nichols, D.L. & Charlton, T.H. (eds.) ‘The 
Archaeology o f  City-States: Cross-Cultural Approaches,’ (Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington 
1997)
69 Anderson, B. 1991, p.24
70 Anderson, B. 1991, p.26
71 See Hobsbawm, E.J. 1990
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was that the fundamental criterion of nationhood was nothing so esoteric as collective 
identity, but that the nation must be of sufficient size to form a viable unit of 
development. This implied that small nations would be severely disadvantaged, and 
thus a ‘Threshold Principle’ was to be applied to aspiring nations. Whilst this 
economic angle actually helped to bypass the pending ‘problem’ of heterogeneity 
within nations, it denied smaller aspiring nationalities an independent future whilst 
also rendering the qualitative differences between a ‘state’ and a ‘nation’ virtually 
impossible to discern. In fact, as soon as ‘nationalism’ left the sanctuary of its purely 
ideological format, such ‘press-ganging’ of the ‘nation’ into the service of the state 
became commonplace, and indeed seemingly the only form in which the nation could 
exist.
Anderson documents the start of this trend as being in the mid-nineteenth century.
Due to the rapidly rising prestige in Europe of the ‘national ideal’, there was a clear 
tendency among European monarchies to lean towards a national identity as a means 
of retaining their legitimacy in a radically changing world. Anderson terms this
n n
‘Official Nationalism which became a means of combining naturalisation with the 
cleverly concealed retention of dynastic power, - “stretching the short, tight skin o f 
the nation over the gigantic body o f the empire T 74 Thus this reactionary policy 
managed to conceal the discrepancy between the nation and the dynastic realm, 
leaving the nationalists with a very hollow victory.
A similar ‘take-over’ technique has been utilised by many modern states, and it is 
easy to understand why. Defining the state proves less difficult than defining 
something so idealistic as the concept of nation. The modern state is novel in that it 
claims sovereignty over people within a certain, clearly defined territory and rules 
directly over these inhabitants. The state apparatus seeks standardisation of all rules 
and administration over this entire area. Increasingly, it had to listen to the opinions of 
its citizens, as whilst the state needed their consent and activity in ever more ways, the 
state’s political arrangements also gave them a real voice for the first time. Thus,
72 O f course, there was more than an economic ideology: the relation between citizen and state was one
o f mutual recognition and responsibility, regardless o f  original ethnic and linguistic differences. 
However, during this period 1830s to 1880s, it was the economic aspect o f aspiring nation-states that 
was emphasised above others.
73 Anderson, B. 1991, p.86
56
government and subject were linked by daily bonds as never before. This raised 
questions regarding citizen loyalty to the state and the ruling system, and any rival for 
loyalty had either to be removed or commandeered into state service. This was where 
the power of nationalist sentiments could be manipulated and so ‘national identity’ 
was pushed to the top of the political agenda. The process of state-building 
necessitated the integration of citizens, therefore the governments “plainly engaged in 
conscious and deliberate ideological engineering”?5 appealing to already present 
unofficial nationalist sentiments, for purely political ends. Thus the concept of the 
‘nation’ was reduced to the function of ‘carrier’ for the ambitions of the state, a hi­
jacking which was made possible by the fact that the ‘nation’ is a concept on which it 
is impossible to secure a patent. Such a scenario becomes evident in Iraq throughout 
the 1920s, as Sunni Arabs, concentrated around the Baghdadi region, consolidated 
their own power over the ‘nation’ of Iraq, allowing only their own vision of the Iraqi 
nation to distill downwards through the population. Such local geographies of power 
greatly influenced the geopolitical framework of the resulting Iraqi state.
We are forced then to accept Gellner’s observation, that the apparently universal 
ideological domination of nationalism today is, in many ways, a sort of optical 
illusion. We are also faced with an interesting question: to what extent does the idea 
of the nation depend upon the democratisation of the concept, and can this shed any 
light upon the nature of the new Iraqi state in the 1920s?
2.4.2. The Transformation of Nationalism
The nationalism of 1880 to 1914 saw the fall of the Threshold Principle, with 
ethnicity and language becoming the most important criteria for potential 
nationhood. This critically affected national sentiments within established ‘nation-
74 Anderson, B. 1991, p.86
75 Hobsbawm, E. 1990, p.92
76 This time also witnessed the advent o f  the Darwinian theory o f evolution, which was elaborated by 
nationalists o f the day into a set o f  ‘racial’ distinctions. That is, it provided racism with ‘scientific’ 
reasons for barring strangers, and nations became something to keep ‘racially pure’. (For example, see 
Romein, J. ‘The Watershed o f Two Eras: Europe in 1900’ (Middletown, 1978); Finot, J. ‘Race 
Prejudice’ (Archibald & Co, London, 1906)). This stress on the ethnic elements now required in a 
‘nation’, also led to a stress on the linguistic element, as there is a clear analogy between the insistence 
o f  racists on the importance o f  ‘racial purity’, and the insistence o f many forms o f  linguistic 
nationalism on the need to ‘purify’ the national language from foreign elements.
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states’, as many constituent groups felt that they could have a viable independent
future. Thus there was a re-ignition of the fires of nationalism. However, it was not
fully until 1918 that a true ‘national’ feeling had crystallised out among the broad
masses of the population into a stable component of consciousness, as until then
“people were not yet conscious o f the discrepancy between loyalty to the state, and to
77the nation, or had not yet made a clear choice between the two”.
The interwar Europe of 1918 to 1939 saw major attempts to redraw Europe’s political 
map on these new ‘ethnically homogenous’ definitions o f ‘national’ lines. How ironic 
that the impetus to consolidate the post First World War nation-state view should 
have been driven by the United States -  who then opted out of the ‘League of 
Nations’. This ‘Wilsonian Principle’ was unworkable in reality, fuelling the potential 
for dangerous mass expulsions and exterminations of minorities. “Such was and is the 
murderous ‘reductio ad absurdum ’ o f nationalism in its territorial version, although 
this was not fully demonstrated until the 1940s”™ An accompanying problem was 
that the hyped ‘national’ ideal was formulated by officials, which did not necessarily
<70
coincide with the actual self-identification of the people concerned.
Despite the difficulties of implementing such an ideology within Europe itself, the 
leading powers of the international community also sought to create nation-states 
from the newly founded territorial units in the Middle East -  Iraq among them. Here 
too, the problems of superimposing such an ethnically homogenous ideology over a
77 Quoted in Hobsbawm, E. 1990, p. 128. Original can be found in Hanak, P. ‘Die Volksmeinung 
wahrend des letzten kriegsjahres in Osterrich-Ungarn’ in D ie Auflosung, (Vienna, 1970), pp.58-66
78 Hobsbawm, E. 1990, p. 133
79 From the 1950s onwards national identity (still generally under the auspices o f  the state) gained new 
means o f communication in this modern world, in the form o f  the media, which performed the 
functions o f mobilisation and inclusion which were so necessary in generating a national 
consciousness. The media enabled the divide between the private sphere o f  the individual, and the 
public realm o f  the citizen to be largely broken down. As noted before, rather than seeing this 
phenomenon as the deepening and development o f  already present nationalist identification, Anderson 
argues that in the centuries before, the media -  under the label o f  print-capitalism  - had actually 
created nationalism, and allowed people for the first time to ‘think’ the nation. Hobsbawm, whilst 
acknowledging the undoubted importance o f print-capitalism in helping to form and spread a national 
collective consciousness, does not credit it with the same over-riding power as Anderson, instead 
recognising the other crucial components in this imagining which were already beginning to develop in 
his process o f  ‘proto-nationalism’. That is, Anderson does not perhaps give enough weight to the 
already present and important collective imaginings, with the fading authority o f  religion and the 
dynastic hierarchies demanding new imaginings o f  immortality and continuity. Thus, I would venture, 
the seeds o f nationalism as an ideology (within Europe), were already taking root, and print-capitalism 
simply acted as a (albeit vital) catalyst to this then fragile attempt to replace religion with another form 
o f  continuous community.
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heterogeneous population were largely ignored or misunderstood by President 
Wilson, and such a process greatly informs our understanding of the factors affecting 
the development of Iraq’s geopolitical identity and function in the world.
2.4.3. Questioning the Modernity of Nations
Whilst it is now firmly accepted that the nation is not the ‘natural’ and ‘universal’ 
entity that earlier scholars believed, Smith points out that there are dangers too in 
regarding the nation as a wholly modern phenomenon.80 ‘Modernists’, as he terms 
them, although they differ over the weight to be attached to various modern processes 
in promoting a sense of national identity, are in complete agreement regarding the 
periodicity of nationalism. Smith, however, calls on us to ground our understanding of 
modern nationalism on a historical base involving a much broader time-span than the 
modernists saw as necessary. Whilst accepting that the modern concept of the nation 
was indeed born in the last two hundred years, Smith’s wider historical perspective 
would allow us to see how far the themes and forms of modern nationalism were pre­
figured in history, and if any considerable connection with earlier ethnic ties and 
sentiments can be established.
“In rejecting the claims o f both the modernists, who say there is a radical break 
between pre-modern units and sentiments and modern nations and nationalism, and 
equally o f the perennialists, who say that the latter are simply larger, updated 
versions o f the pre-modern ties and sentiments, we look to the concept o f  the ethnie or 
ethnic community and its symbolism, to distance our analysis from the more sweeping 
claims on either side ”81
This approach succeeds in conceding a greater measure of continuity between 
‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ eras, thus not viewing them as such classic polarities, 
whilst also according due weight to the changes wrought by modernity especially in 
the realms of human loyalty. Smith claims that myths and memories form the 
fundamental bases of the nation, just as they are the life-blood of previous and present 
'ethnie ’ (an ethnic community). Somewhat paradoxically, the key to achieving a
80 Smith, A.D. 1988, p.3
81 Smith, A.D. 1988, p. 13
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modem ‘nation’ in the mass imagination, is to root it firmly in the past, giving the 
members a shared conviction of the antiquity and ‘naturalness’ of their unit stretching 
back into time immemorial via established communal symbols and myths. Hence, as 
the importance of such memories, myths and symbols become evident, clearly it 
highlights just how vital it is to give due recognition to their origins and their 
persistence. Such ideas prove crucial to understanding the extent of integration within 
the early Iraqi State. What were the established ‘ethnie’ within the territory? What 
was their geographical extent? In the State of Iraq, many prominent ethnic and 
religious groups co-existed, each with their own particular vision of the ‘IraqfState. 
Some communities, such as the Kurds, believed that the ‘naturalness’ of their 
community group had been destroyed by the various territorial agreements after the 
First World War, therefore their shared convictions and allegiances remained with 
communities that lay outside Iraqi territory from 1921. The strength of such divided 
communities, and the pressures they created, all filtered into the geopolitical form of 
the emerging Iraqi State.
2.4.4. The Mythical Elements of Nations
In exploring the necessary mythical components of a nation, we go back full circle to 
the idea of a nation as truly an ‘imagined community’. “No enduring world order can 
be created which ignores the ubiquitous yearnings o f nations in search o f roots in an 
ethnic past, and no study o f nations and nationalism that completely ignores that past 
can bear fru it” *2 Such ideas help to explain the form and nature that the Iraqi State 
took, as the ethnic pasts of many groups of its population were not recognised. Could 
this have had adverse affects in binding the new, territorially defined community? If 
so, Smith’s theories on the importance of ethnic past and memories in building a 
coherent nation-state may add much to our comprehension of 1920s Iraq.
The core of an ethnicity is found in its unique collection of myths, symbols, values 
and memories -  which together provide the ethnie with its ‘myth-symbol complex’. 
From these are developed ‘mythomoteurs ’ which function as the constitutive myth of 
that particular ethnic polity. These shared experiences and meanings are crystallised
82 Smith, A.D. 1988, p.5
60
over time and then carried down the generations by forms and genres of artifacts and 
activities, which are able to adapt with the changing circumstances. This ability to 
remain relevant in any age is the key to an ethnie’s success and durability; as if the 
relevance is lost an ethnie will dissolve or be subsumed by a more powerful 
imagining. In many of the dimensions of ethnie, some striking parallels can be drawn 
with the model of modern nations. Ethnie must have a collective name and a common 
myth of descent, both of which are highly evocative and add a sense of imputed 
common ancestry and destiny. A distinctive shared culture serves both to bind 
members, and differentiate from outsiders -  thus ensuring that the ethnie can feel 
unique and valuable. Developing a shared sense of solidarity is equally crucial, as 
without this, such groupings can only be seen as potential ethnie. In Mesopotamia, the 
sheer number of well developed ethnic and religious communities seriously 
undermined early attempts at ‘national’ consolidation.
An association with a specific territory is also of paramount importance, whether the 
ethnie resides there, or it is simply a potent memory of a ‘homeland’ to which they 
can symbolically ‘return’. Smith makes an important point when he states that 
“ethnicity is a matter o f myths, memories, symbols and values, and not o f  material 
possession or political power, both o f which require a habitat for their realisation”. 
Here we can identify a potential problem for the early Iraqi State. Several different 
and well-defined ethnic and religious groups lived within, and claimed, the same 
territory, leading to sectarian and ethnic tensions over control.
Factors that form and maintain an ethnic identity must also be recognised in today’s 
modern nationalism. Myths and legends are just as vital for stimulating nationalisms 
as they are for ethnie, as they instill a sense of collective heritage, arouse people to 
collective action, and bestow a message of revival and unique destiny. Parallels can 
again be seen when we analyse the impact of warfare on both ethnic and nationalist 
consciousness. Past inter-state warfare often crystallised ethnic sentiments, especially 
when it involved mass physical mobilisation of the population, leading to feelings of
83 Smith, A.D. 1988, p.28. In a sense, we can recognise a little more o f the ‘pure’ form o f  the nation in 
such a statement, before the umbrella o f  the state politicised the nation perhaps a little more than was 
intended by the early nationalist conceptualists. For example, surely the diaspora o f  the Jews, although 
having (until 1948) no habitat for the realization o f  political power, should be seen as a nation rather 
than as simply an ethnie?
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collective resistance. This also proved a critical feature of the First World War. The 
geo-political location of communities determined their relations with neighbours and 
often helped to sharpen a sense of ethnicity via self-determination. War then 
politicised original cultural differences, even in defeat, forming genuine integrated 
ethnie with distinct identities and destinies. Equally, Hobsbawm points out that 
"nothing stimulated nationalism on both sides as much as international conflict ”.84 
Surely, if two different phenomena are being stimulated and created by the same 
forces, we are forced to concede some measure of fraternity between the two, and 
how elements of the former may be simply being taken further in the latter. However, 
perhaps such a strengthening of collective sentiment via conflict with an outside force 
was overestimated by many scholars. Could such a failure for the ‘Iraqi people’ as a 
whole to merge together against the Ottomans highlight some deficiencies within the 
nation-building body of theory? And what happens when such a ‘sharpening of a 
sense of ethnicity’ divides a population of a given territorial extent, rather than binds 
them?
Ideally, the ethnie's myths and symbols are fed into the heritage of an enlarged 'proto­
nation’ . Of course, a nation is qualitatively different from an ethnie in many crucial 
ways, including a heightened sense of territoriality, the transformation of the 
population into ‘citizens’ with standard citizenship rights and duties, a coherent 
political culture and common legal codes affecting all citizens equally. It also requires 
a new imagination as a sovereign but limited community (as Anderson explained), 
plus a new level of inclusion and mass mobilisation, thus endowing a nation with a 
power that no ethnie could ever attain. However, even Smith’s distinction between the 
Western ‘territorialism’ in nation-formation, and the Eastern ‘ethnicism’, - whilst 
being too deterministic -  does underline the importance of the various ethnic and 
cultural backgrounds in subsequent nation formation, and implies that the entire ethos 
of any resulting nation will be unique, just as a previous ethnie’s ‘myth-symbol 
complex’ was unique. Nationhood, therefore, is not necessarily a new beginning, but 
yet another form of imagining being super-imposed on an already well-fashioned 
landscape of mythology, and each will take hold of nationalism in varied ways. In 
Iraq, different cultural and religious groups certainly took hold of nationalism
84 Hobsbawm, E. 1990, p.91
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differently. For the Sunni Arabs, nationalism was largely seen in terms of a wider
Arab nationalism, therefore excluding non-Arab groups. The Kurds of Iraq
championed Kurdish nationalism, calling for the unification of the Kurdish 'nation’, or
in
at least some form of cultural and political autonomy withthe Iraqi State. Such varied 
displays of nationalism led to internal cleavages within the territorial extent of Iraq. 
This is why the path to nationhood is never the same twice, and can not be engineered 
to be so.
2.4.5. The Paradox of the Nation
Thus we can see that nation-building needs myths to integrate individuals into 
communities, and therefore an understanding of the different mythical backgrounds 
leads in turn to an understanding of the nature of each individual nation. This brings 
us to the fundamental paradox of the issue: these masses are integrated into the 
‘ancient’ myth-ridden nation by new modes of communication, occasioned by modern
4 85 • ■ **science. The goal of the new national imaginings is to ‘rediscover’ a unified past, to 
evoke deeper meanings of collective destiny and community in the face of the 
dangerous fragmentation and alienation that modern industrialisation and science 
bring; yet “the nation can only be imagined through the medium o f science ” 86
Although modern science may be the conductor through which these communal 
imaginings are facilitated, this sense of an historic past is the crux of the nation. It is 
therefore modern communications that help to build “that image o f antiquity so 
central to the subjective idea o f the nation. ”87 Nation-building is not simply a matter 
of establishing the relevant institutions, but is a recurrent activity, necessitating 
endless reinterpretations and reconstructions of the community’s myths and symbols 
in the light of present needs. “All this powerfully qualifies the modernity o f
• f) 88 4 * 4 »nations If nations are to survive, they must have, or invent, a unique past — whose 
legends and landscapes locate a nation, give it solidarity and direct its future. In this 
way, “our myths, memories and symbols must be constantly renewed and continually
85 This indeed seems bizarre in view o f  the gulf between the romantic concept o f  the historical nation, 
and the increasingly mechanised and rationalised nature o f the modern disciplines used to disseminate 
such a communal illusion.
86 Smith, A.D. 1988, p. 172
87 Anderson, B. 1991, p.44
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retold, to ensure our survival The nation becomes the constant renewal and retelling 
o f 'our’ tale by each generation o f our descendants” .89 Without such a sense of 
‘antiquity’ in our modem nations, these units are simply states, lacking the ethnic 
cores and models for mobilising grass-roots aspirations and solidarities.
The trends inspired by the rise of modern communication techniques, whilst 
disseminating communal myths, could not by themselves account for the distinctive 
qualities of ‘nations’, their activation of the population and their sense of unique 
identity and destiny. It is indeed true then, that nations need myths and pasts if they 
are to have any future, and these pasts are invariably ethnic. In this sense, the modern 
science of Anderson’s ‘print-capitalism’ was only acting as a medium for the 
mythomoteurs of the past to find their expression in the present. Modern nations can 
be seen to simply extend, deepen and streamline the ways in which members of ethnie 
associated and communicated. That is, they do not really transcend ethnicity, 
introduce radically novel elements, or change the goals of human association.
Nations and nationalism must be seen in the context of their ethnic roots, and the 
power of ethnic ‘myth-symbol complexes’ should be taken seriously. Whilst nations 
as we know them are an undeniably modern phenomenon, they also owe a large and 
persistent debt to pre-modern forms of collective identity. Therefore, the numerous 
forms of collective identity present in pre-First World War Iraq greatly increase our 
understanding of the problems encountered by the Iraqi State of 1921. Ethnic myths 
can ignite and mobilise populations, and thus shape the dynamic and expressive 
character of identities formed before the age of nations, and their long-term influence 
on human affairs. In this, we must also recognise the very real possibility that 
different ethnic groups forced into one political nation-state, may well experience 
bitter conflict with their fellow ‘citizens’, as the various collective identities are so 
strong. It is within such theory that we can find explanations into the nature of Iraqi 
society after the creation of the new state. The Iraqi State contained a very 
heterogenous population, with many different social, cultural and religious groups. 
What exact impact did this have on the nature of the Iraqi State? We must recognise 
the roots of identity conflicts in their historical ties and ethnic mythologies, which
88 Smith, A.D. 1988,p.207
89 Smith, A.D. 1988, p.208
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alone can account for the depth of feeling created by ethnic nationalisms. Present day 
confrontations may therefore lie a lot deeper than the immediate economic or political 
‘problems’ may suggest.
One such area of confrontation is that the number of would-be-nations is liable to be 
larger than the present state-system can accommodate, or indeed tolerate. Many ethnie 
who missed out at the crucial moment of state-formation now call for territorial 
revision, but encounter not only the opposition of the state-system, but also the 
problem of ‘bureaucratic nationalism’ whereby states pass themselves off as a 
‘nation’, to retain control of an area which may in fact consist of several potential 
nations -  which are then ignored. This was the fate suffered by the Kurds of northern 
Iraq after the First World War. Thus there remains a problem of dual loyalty in 
polyethnic states, with suppression igniting the fires of separatism, due to this 
favouring of the earlier nationalisms in any area. Timing has been the decisive 
element in achieving nationhood, as late-comers to the table have found that they 
must struggle to gain recognition, as the social space has now hardened to squeeze out 
any power vacuum. Therefore, as Hobsbawm recognises, "the explosive issues o f 
1988-92 were those created in 1918-21 ”.90 The ideological ‘problem’ of 
heterogeneity within nation-states has never really been properly resolved. This leads 
us into a clearer understanding of the situation of Iraq. What proves crucial to our 
comprehension of the situation, is a recognition of the multitude of visions for 
statehood and communal identity that existed within the geographical area of Iraq. 
How severe are the problems that could arise when the majority of these are 
subordinated to a vision that is not universally shared? Just how far did the vision of 
Britain for a state in that geographical unit tie in with the visions of the local 
population? Such factors are fundamental to understanding the consequent Iraqi State 
in the 1920s.
The problem then remains that the international community has fully subscribed to 
what amounts to a worthy ideology, but one that oversimplifies the reality. Thus 
politically, it can now only recognise sovereign ‘nation-states’, and so is too often 
forced to accept all manner of brutality earned out inside these units on ‘minorities’,
90 Hobsbawm, E. 1990, p. 164
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by the ‘legitimate’ regime of the ‘nation-state’. If such a minority were labelled a 
‘nation’, the international community could more easily intervene.91
One important issue that this raises is that the ‘nation-state’ is not the ‘natural’ 
phenomenon that is often assumed. The State and the Government are determined by 
political criteria, whilst increasingly it is being recognised that People and Nation are 
determined largely by pre-political criteria. " What this suggests is that the idea o f 'the 
nation once extracted, like a mollusc, from the apparently hard shell o f the ‘nation- 
state ', emerges in distinctly wobbly shape ”.92 However, this was not the view held at 
the start of this century, when the nation-state paradigm was very much in vogue, and 
it was at this time that Iraq came into being.
2.5. The Issue of Boundaries
The discourses surrounding the imposition of international boundaries in a world of 
nation-states will also prove useful in analysing the factors that affected the identity of 
the Iraqi state as it emerged. What has become known as the ‘Westphalian’ model of 
territorial sovereignty, reached further than the European world when it was 
superimposed through the colonialism of the last century, and it brought with it the 
notion of fixed territories. “Sovereignty is territorial; hence it must have a known 
extent ”.93 This meant that these territories had exact points at which they ended -  and 
the sovereignty of another state began. As Mackinder described it: “You have two 
societies, organised on each side o f the frontier. In each o f these societies you have an 
organisation o f men such that they look towards widely separated centres ...Thus what
91 However, the nation as we know it, is going through radical change. Internationalism and 
globalisation are removing ever more economic and even political issues, from the control o f  individual 
state governments. With this, the old concept o f nation-states with distinct people on ‘their’ own 
territory is being undermined by mass international migration. That is, we are witnessing the decline o f  
the ‘nation-state’ as an operational entity. The old equation of;
NATION=STATE=GOVERNMENT=SOVEREIGN PEOPLE, has been seen as too simplistic, and is 
being broken down.
92 Hobsbawm, E. 1990, p. 190. Fragile it may be, but perhaps this new nation o f  the 1990s, once 
divorced from its controversial marriage with the state, can become the pure and largely emotional 
entity that the original ideology may have intended. Hobsbawm contends that in losing its operational 
capacity, which was solely due to its partnership with the state, it may be gaining the ability to exist 
contentedly in a supra-national world.
93 Kristof, L.K.D. ‘The Nature o f  Frontiers and Boundaries’. A.A.A.G. 49, 1959, pp.269-282.
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was at first merely an imaginary line becomes in fact a frontier o f the most marked 
character. It is as important as any natural feature ”94
Such boundaries raised many issues as they were imposed in many areas that had had 
a far more fluid conception of territory until that point. In Iraq, the population’s 
perception of territory and territoriality had to undergo immense change with the 
imposition of these international boundaries. Even now, there are areas in the world 
that have not yet fully adapted to notions of territorial fixation, which still clash with 
the territorial behaviour of many indigenous and nomadic or tribal societies.95
Boundaries, along with the states they contain, have long been seen as fixed, stable 
empirical entities that divide the global space into bounded units. The state-centred 
system of territories and boundaries largely defines how we understand and represent 
the world, and how knowledge of the geography of the world is produced, organised 
and used in the reproduction of the nation-state system.96 The logic of this maintains 
that all individuals should belong to a nation, have a national identity and state 
citizenship, and that the bordered state sovereignties are the fulfilment of historical 
destiny. States play the decisive role in the production of these manifestations of 
territoriality. Through state administration, education and governance, they try to 
overcome or marginalise other ways of viewing ‘space’, and other forms of identity, 
such as ethnic, tribal, religious, linguistic, gender or class.
However, perhaps our focus should be on the factors that mean that sometimes the 
state is unable to wipe out such a variety of identities within a bounded space. Anssi
QVPaasi argues that instead of seeing boundaries as fixed products, we should 
conceptualise them as social processes. Rather than analysing how boundaries 
distinguish social entities, we should concentrate on how social action and discourse 
produce diverging, continually changing meanings for boundaries. Many people that 
live within a given international bounded space, may well not identify themselves as 
being ‘distinguished’ by such boundaries. It is here that the nation-state paradigm can
94 Mackinder, H.J. In discussion ofW.L.Grant, ‘Geographical Conditions Affecting the Development 
o f Canada’. Geographical Journal xxxviii, 1911, p.377.
95 See Newman, D. 1998, pp.1-16.
96 See Paasi, A. ‘Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World o f  F low s’. Geopolitics 
Vol.3, n o .l. Summer 1998, pp.69-89.
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begin to fail, as it assumes too much. Traditionally, there always was “a social 
definition o f territory rather than a territorial definition o f society”,98 - and perhaps 
this is a process that can not be fully overcome, even though the nation-state paradigm 
seeks to. The issue becomes even more telling, when the boundaries have been 
imposed by a foreign power, and as such have never represented a true compromise 
between the inhabitants of the area. For example, many of the borders of the Middle 
East have their origins in the territorial arrangements arising from the dismemberment 
of the Ottoman Empire, and “claims have been made that they are artificial creations 
o f the former colonial power in territories which historically owe allegiance to other 
centres o f Arab power. Thus Iraq has in recent years laid claim to the whole o f 
Kuwait". (N.B. -  written in 1982)."
2.6. The Problems of Reality
Smith draws attention to the differences between what he terms Western 
‘territorialism’ and Eastern ‘ethnicism’ in respect to nation-formation.100 The former 
term refers to a process of nation-state formation usually seen in the West, where the 
new concept of communities bounded by politically delimited territory took hold.
Such a state gradually required increasing manpower and resources, and therefore 
peripheries were pulled in and standardised, slowly evolving into territorial nations 
via the operations and agencies of their states.
In contrast, the Eastern ‘model’ was perceived to be markedly different. In many parts 
of the east, including the Middle Eastern regions, ethnic ties and sentiments were 
paramount, but usually with no fixed territorial expression or political manifestation 
until the mid-19th century onwards. Although such a theory is perhaps a little over- 
simplistic, it does contain certain basic, useful ideas that give important insights into 
the resulting form of the Iraqi State. The lack of congruence between ‘etlinie’ and 
polity, and between co-extensiveness between ethnie and clearly demarcated 
territories was very great in the Middle East. The result was a clash between the 
ethnic and territorial concepts of the nation in this region. For example, with many of
97 Paasi, A. 1998
98 Soja, E. ‘The Political Organisation o f  Space’. AAAG Resource Paper 8, 1978
99 Day, A.J. ‘Border and Territorial Disputes’. (Longman, Essex, 1982), p. 178
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the Arabs, their geographical extent and their separate political histories led to a dual 
problem. Firstly, the application of the Western ‘territorial’ concept of the nation 
meant a permanent fragmentation of the Arab ethnic community. This in turn then 
meant that realising the ethnic concept of the Arab nation would encounter all the 
geographic, economic and political problems of any ‘Pan-movement’. Added to this 
was the often overlooked issue of many other non-Arab communities living within the 
area, breaking up any ‘pure’ geographical continuity of the Arab community. 
Moreover, even among the Arab communities, there was a distinction between the 
nomadic and settled views on space and territory. Therefore, many of the states in the 
Middle East were unable to make any clear movement along either the ethnic or 
territorial trajectory.
2.7. Conclusion
Whether we are talking about forming nations within the new individual states in the 
Middle East after the First World War, or the success of a wider pan-Arab nation, 
“Can a nation be forged from so many disparate elements or is a nation a natural 
configuration? Must a ‘nation ’ evolve or can nationalism be imposed from the top 
down? ”101 Such a question lies at the crux of this thesis, as, in the case of Iraq, many 
different cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic groups lived within its geographical 
confines, as shall be seen in the following chapter. Such a varied population contained 
a multitude of group identities, and even if national integration were to progress 
successfully, it is never an irreversible process, and group identities are never uni­
dimensional.
One must remember also, the particular context of Iraq’s path to statehood: “This was 
a period when the lingering effects o f the millet system still determined allegiances, 
loyalties, identities. The passage from the Ottoman era to modern statehood was in 
the making, while contradictory interests clashed continuously. ”102 This 
heterogeneous nature of the new Iraqi State therefore threw up many problems. It led 
to an inability to clearly follow either the ethnic or the territorial model of nationhood.
100 Smith, A.D. 1988
101 Simon, R. ‘The Imposition o f Nationalism on a Non-nation State. The Case o f  Iraq During the
Interwar Period. 1921-1941. ’ In Jankowski, J. and Gershoni, I. 1997, p.88
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It also had to find a common ground of allegiance amongst a disparate population 
base, and as the majority of its population was Arab, it then had to see whether any of 
the non-Arab Iraqis would ever subscribe to the idea of a national identity that was 
largely Arab in essence. Each community had different collective memories, and each 
had their own notions of identity. Even for the Arab ‘Iraqis’, the choice of framing 
Iraqi national identity as fundamentally Arab was problematic, as many Arab 
inhabitants of Iraq felt that they in fact belonged more to the larger community of 
Arabs, which was being dissected by such states as Iraq. Therefore, bringing Arab 
solidarity to the forefront of sovereign state building could backfire badly.
Overlying all of these internal divisions, and perhaps partly causing them, was Iraq’s 
geographical location in a prime region of Great Power rivalry. Such external 
pressures exacerbated Iraq’s political, economic and cultural fracture lines, and thus 
affected the geopolitical development of the state of Iraq that was established after the 
First World War. Such a shatterbelt location helps to explain foreign interests within 
the Iraqi region, and also emphasises the potential problems that such a state would 
encounter in its attempts to consolidate.
All of these issues impacted upon the geopolitical identity of Iraq as it sought to 
establish itself as a viable nation-state in the world community. There were to be 
geopolitical repercussions relating to the size, form, ethnic composition and religious 
make-up of the new state. There were to be reactions too, to the type of political entity 
chosen for Iraq, and one must question its appropriateness. Vital dynamics between 
Iraq and its equally new neighbours were introduced that affected Iraq’s geopolitical 
interests in the region. Also of importance is exactly how Iraq perceived its interests 
in the region, and whether such interests were imposed by Britain or were genuinely 
held by the local population.
After examining issues such as these, we can begin to place Iraq into the geopolitical 
order of the time, and see what bearing this in fact had on its immediate and longer- 
term viability. We can perhaps begin to see the exact factors, and the channels 
through which they worked, that affected the nation-state paradigm that sought to
102 Lukitz, L. 1995, p.4
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create an Iraq with a defined geopolitical identity and function. The following chapter 
begins this analysis by examining the composition of the population of the 
Mesopotamian region on the eve of the First World War and before the concession of 
statehood. It also looks at how the Iraqi provinces were governed and administered by 
the Ottomans, and what legacies such processes may have left behind.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE POPULATION, ADMINISTRATION AND HISTORY OF
THE REGION
3.1. Introduction
The State of Iraq, created after the First World War, was formed with a population 
that numbered about three million, widely diverse in race, religion and language. The 
new state was also faced with the consolidation and defence of its 116,000 to 120,000 
square miles of territory. The factors involved reflect the complexities of the past. 
Geographically, the State of Iraq has the apex of its triangular area resting upon the 
head of the Persian Gulf, with its meagre outlet to the sea being skirted by various 
strong powers. Iraq’s flanks also lie open and vulnerable to any foreign aggression 
from the east and west.1 Even before the concession of statehood, the borders that 
marked the approximate territorial extent of the Mesopotamian region were all very 
different in nature. The southernmost frontier was historically hazy and its 
enforcement was half-hearted, as it merged into the southern deserts of Arabia. It 
therefore ran across a predominantly tribal area, in which people had freely crossed 
and mixed. The eastern fringe of Iraq however, was separating the territory from the 
ancient, consolidated state of Iran that had long sought to control the Iraqi provinces, 
making this a strongly defended boundary. There was a complicating factor here 
however, in that the large Shi’i population of Iraq held strong cultural and religious 
allegiances to the Shi’i Iranian State. The final boundary of the Iraqi region was on its 
western flank, and this functioned merely as an internal demarcation during the time 
of the Ottoman Empire. This raises the interesting question of why that line was there 
at all, and why at that specific point? Was there ever a noticeable cultural, linguistic, 
ethnic, religious or economic divide represented by this internal boundary in the old 
Ottoman Empire?
1 Foster, Henry. 1935, p.303.
72
It is the make up of the population as it interacts with this geography that establishes 
the dimensions of the research question. It will be important for this thesis to examine 
how people were organised spatially within the Iraqi provinces, and whether this had 
an impact on the character and form of the resulting State. Also vital to this analysis 
will be an examination of any factors present that would pull the new state apart, such 
as the strength of any cross-border affiliations. Not only does Iraq contain numerous 
racial and religious minorities, but the majority of the inhabitants, the Arabs, although 
sharing many common characteristics, were themselves clusters of "distinct, 
discordant, self-involved societies, ” at the turn of the century.2 Previous Ottoman rule 
had long tolerated ethnic and religious diversity, even allowing certain autonomous 
powers to some communities in matters of worship and education. Foster, writing in 
1935, foresaw the problems that may come from such a split society, and the danger 
of having a large majority of the population that looked outwards to the east for 
religious leadership:
"The danger from the east is the more threatening because o f its connection 
with the internal conflict between Shiah [sic] and Sunni. The great mass o f the Shiahs 
live in Persia while their holy cities are in Iraq, which is the home o f  considerably 
more Shiahs than Sunnis. The dominant element o f Iraqi control... is Sunni, ”3
3.2. The Composition of the Population
The diversity of the population in this region is a crucial element in the area’s history. 
Early this century, Mesopotamia was a fragmented society with much ethnic and 
religious diversity, in which some groups called for independence and others paid 
nominal allegiance to whoever collected the taxes. Local, Ottoman and European 
sources generally agree that late 19th century Iraq was really a sleepy back-water of 
the Ottoman Empire. The historiography of 19th and early 20th century Iraq supports 
this view of the region.4 According to recent calculations, based on Ottoman sources,
2 Batatu, Hanna. ‘The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements o f  Iraq.’ (Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey 1978), p. 13.
3 Foster, Henry. 1935, p, 303.
4 For the state o f  the historiography o f 19th and 20ll‘ century Iraq, see Farouk-Sluglett, Marion and
Sluglett, Peter, ‘The Historiography o f Modern Iraq,’ in The American H istorical Review, 96, 1991,
pp.1408-1421.
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the total population for Ottoman Iraq in 1914 was approximately 3,650,000, 
(including the provinces of Kuwait and Najd).5 Ottoman estimates suggest that this 
population was spread between the provinces of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul as 
follows:6
Baghdad c.1898 1,300,000
Basra c.1908 1,150,000
Mosul c.1909 828,000
The population was predominantly rural, and this rural population was largely tribal. 
One estimate holds that the urban population was only 24% of the total population in 
1867, 25% in 1890 and 24% in 1905.7 The tribal population was divided between 
settled, semi-settled and nomadic, with the nomadic tribes mainly inhabiting the 
desert in the west and the south-west -  approximately 60% of the total area of Iraq.
It is notoriously hard to paint an accurate picture of the entire population of Iraq at the 
turn of the century, and its exact breakdown by subgroups for that period. E. Dawson 
produced some of the first estimates of settlement patterns, which were published in
o
1930 , estimating a total population of just above 2 million, with 8% purely nomadic, 
48% tribal cultivators (often semi-nomadic), 32% settled village dwellers, and 12% 
city dwellers.
3.2.1. Ethno-Religious Communities
Such a varied population, composed of many ethno-religious communities, contained 
many lines of tension, that ran through Iraqi society at the turn of the twentieth 
century. The depth, spread and causes of these lines of tension will be analysed 
throughout this thesis. Ethnic divisions were also superimposed over these settlement
5 See: McCarthy, Justin, ‘The Population o f Ottoman Syria and Iraq, 1878-1914,’ Asian and African 
Studies, 15, 1981, pp.3-44; Hasan, M.S. ‘Growth and Structure o f  Iraq’s Population. 1867-1947.’ in 
Issawi, C. (ed.) ‘The Economic History o f the Middle East, 1800-1914’, (Chicago University Press, 
Chicago 1975), pp.155-162; Cuinet, Vital, ‘LaTurquie D ’A sie,’ Vol. II, (Ernest Leroux, Paris 1892), 
pp.764-65, Vol. Ill, 1893, pp. 17, 220.
6 McCarthy, J. 1981, pp.3-44
7 M.S. Hasan, ‘Growth and Structure o f Iraq’s Population. 1867-1947.’ in Issawi, C. 1975, p. 157.
8 Dawson, E. ‘An Inquiry Into Land Tenure and Related Questions.’ (Orig. Baghdad, 1931,
Translation: Letchworth, England, 1932), p.9.
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variations, sometimes coinciding with added religious divisions, and sometimes not. 
According to Cuinet and Semseddin Sami, the ethno-religious composition of Mosul 
vilayet in the 1890s was as follows:9
Settled Arab 80,000 Yakubi 7,000
Nomadic Arab 93,000 Jews 6,000
Kurd 59,380 Suryani Catholic 7,000
Turkoman 16,000 Yezidi 14,900
Keldani 18,000 Various 1,000
Thus, the region of Mesopotamia was home to many different ethnic and racial 
groups, each with their own particular cultural values and local practices. The 
following maps, Maps 6, 7 and 8, each show geographically, the racial and ethnic 
divisions of Mesopotamia, according to various sources.
The religious composition of the provinces overlaid this ethnic pattern, creating an 
added complexity to the make-up of the population. (See Map 9). Cuinet’s estimates 
show the religious characteristics of the population of the three Iraqi provinces in the 
early 1890s:10
Muslims Christians Jews Others.
Baghdad 789,000 7,000 53,000
Basra 939,650 5,850 4,500
Mosul 248,380 30,000 6,000 15,900
Although in political terms, the non-Muslim communities were very small, the size of 
the Shi’i population (above 50% of the total population) always constituted a problem 
for the Sunni Ottoman government, especially as the 19th century saw the steady 
expansion of the Shi’i sect through conversion.
9 See: Cuinet, V. 1891, pp.764-65; Semseddin Sami, Kam usu’l-Alam, VI (1962), p.4483; Admiralty, A 
Handbook o f  Mesopotamia, Vol.I, (London, 1916), p.66; FO, Historical Section, M esopotamia, 
(London, 1920), p .8.
10 Cuinet, V. 1893, pp.17, 220, and 1891, pp.764-65; Admiralty, A Handbook o f  Mesopotamia, 
(London, 1916), p.66.
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The Shi’i were mostly organised in tribes and tribal confederations. Estimates
suggest that they constituted 53% of the population in 1919, and 56% by 1932.11 The
Shi’i occupied one of three approximate major religious zones that were in evidence
nearing the end of the Ottoman period. This southernmost zone was the most
populous, and extended over all the provinces to the south of Baghdad, therefore
covering the region of irrigated flatlands, and the marshes further south.12 The ethnic
composition of this zone was heavily Arab, except for concentrations of Persians in
Basra and the Holy Cities of Najaf and Karbala. It is important to note that as well as
these settled Persians, many thousands of Persians also made pilgrimages to these
Holy Shi’i cities every year, creating another interesting population dynamic. Small
pockets of Sunnis were also to be found in this zone, mainly urban in character, with
considerable communities in Basra and Nasiriyyah, and an entire Sunni town of
11
Zubair to the south-west of Basra.
Sunnis were statistically a minority group within the whole region of Mesopotamia, 
although Arab Sunnis enjoyed a high status due to the Sunni-dominated Ottoman 
administration. The majority of these Sunni Arabs were from a zone that embraced 
the Arab-inhabited valleys of the Euphrates above Baghdad and of the Tigris between 
Baghdad and Mosul. Only small communities of Shi’is could be found here, and a 
string of Turkoman settlements along the old Baghdad-Mosul-Istanbul post road, 
some of which were Shi’i and others Sunni.
The Kurdish rain-fed mountain region in the north and north east of Iraq comprised 
the third major religious zone. Most of the Kurds here were also mainly Sunni, but 
were non-Arab, and were in constant political struggle for at least some measure of 
cultural autonomy. These Kurds also displayed a strong leaning towards mysticism 
and Sufi sects. Map 2 shows the approximate religious distribution around the Iraqi 
provinces.
11 Simon, Reeva. ‘The Imposition o f  Nationalism on a Non-Nation State. The Case o f  Iraq During the 
Interwar Period. 1921 -1 941 .1 In Janowski, J. and Gershoni, I. 1997, p.87. Also see Nakash, Y. ‘The 
Shi’is o f  Iraq’. (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1994)
12 This zone covered the present day areas o f  Wasit, Babylon, Karbala, Qadisiyyah, Thi-Qar, Maysan 
and Basra.
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Mingled throughout these three zones were communities of non-Muslims. Christians 
comprised approximately 2% of the population, being mainly Chaldeans and 
Nestorians (offshoots of Roman Catholicism), with an Assyrian population that was to 
increase significantly after the First World War. This Christian element lived mainly 
in Mosul, and mostly stayed out of local politics, with their spiritual focus being 
Rome.14
Jews had also lived in this Iraqi area since ancient times, and by the dawn of the 20th 
century were a city-based people, concentrated in Baghdad.15 Consular despatches 
since the beginning of the century regarding the Jewish community in Baghdad, 
usually stressed the fact that it was the largest single group in the city. An estimate in 
1904 by a French Vice-Consul was 40,000 out of a population of only 60,000 in the 
whole vilayet. In 1910, a British consular report by H. D. Shohet, put the figure at 
about 45-50,000.16 To illustrate the predominance of the Jewish population in 
Baghdad, the last official yearbook of the Baghdad vilayet in 1917 put the population 
figures for the city of Baghdad as follows:17
Arabs, Turks and Muslims other than Kurds 101,400
Persians 800
Kurds 8,000
Jews 80,000
Christians 12,000
However unreliable such statistics are, broad trends can be noticed. The Jewish 
population was certainly very important in the life of the city, never estimated at less 
than a third to a half of the entire Baghdad population. It was also the largest 
homogenous group, and was generally a rich and well-to-do class, made up almost
13 Batatu, Hanna. 1978, p. 13.
14 Both o f  these religious groups were Catholic sects. Nestorians were followers ofNestorius (born 431 
A.D.), who became the Patriarch o f Constantinople. The Chaldean Church was formed by conversions 
from Nestorianism
15 See: Rejwan, Nissim, ‘The Jews o f  Iraq: 3000 Years o f  Histoiy and Culture’ (Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London 1985); Kedourie, E. ‘The Jews o f  Baghdad in 1910,’ in ‘Arabic Political Memoirs 
and Other Studies’ (Frank Cass, London 1974), pp.263-72.
16 Quoted in Haim, Sylvia, G. ‘Aspects o f Jewish Life in Baghdad Under the Monarchy’. Middle 
Eastern Studies, 12, 1976, pp. 188-209
17 Quoted in the Arab Bulletin No. 66, October 21, 1917.
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entirely of bankers and merchants -  again making it a central element in the life of the 
city.
3.2.2. Tribal Communities
In early twentieth century Iraq, the tribe still functioned as the primary military, social 
and political organisation, especially in the southern region. During the long period of 
Ottoman administration (1534-1918), the local authority of the tribal leaders was 
never successfully challenged for long periods of time by the central government.18 
Therefore, tribes had the chance to consolidate as powerful political units, with 
voluntary or forced alliances between different tribes sometimes producing strong 
confederations. In rural areas, such large tribal confederations prevailed, the most 
important nomadic confederations in Iraq being the ‘Anaza, Dulaim and Shammar.19 
The ‘ Anaza tribal territory, or dir a20 was on both sides of the Euphrates in the Jezira 
region, and extended into both present-day Iraq and Syria. The ‘Anaza were split into 
four main subgroups, of which the territory of the ‘ Amarat fell in Iraq. The Shammar 
of Iraq lived between the Tigris and the left bank of the Euphrates -  to the north of 
Baghdad. The Dulaim were nomads and migrated between the left and right banks of 
the Euphrates, from Falluja to ‘Ana. These three powerful northern confederations 
were Sunni and were often at war with each other.
South of Baghdad, there were many settled and semi-settled tribes, which as we have 
seen, were mainly Shi’i in religion. These were organised into about thirty-six large 
groups, which were themselves then subdivided. The most powerful of these tribal 
groupings was the Muntafiq confederation, whose dira encompassed approximately 
10,000 square miles and extended on both sides of the southern Euphrates from 
Samawa to Ghor al-Hammar. This particular loose alignment of tribes was ruled over 
by the Sa’dun clan who were Sunni, while the tribes they ruled were Shi’i. This
18 Sweet, L. (ed.) ‘The Central Middle East: A Handbook o f Anthropology.’ (Hraflex Books, New  
Haven, Connecticut, 1968), Vol.II, pp.253-260.
19 Tribal confederations were found amongst nomadic and cultivating tribesmen, and are best seen as 
highly fragile political alliances used for defence purposes.
20 A dira is a tribal territory that is managed and used communally, and whose extent is dependent 
upon the ability o f  the tribe to defend it.
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indicates the complexity involved when attempting to analyse the factors making for 
corporate tribal action. Such factors were rarely uni-dimensional.21
Above the Muntafiq, and along the Tigris, two large tribes shared the area up to the 
Persian border -  the Bu Muhammed and the Beni Lam. The Khaza’il predominated 
above ‘ Amara in the central Euphrates region, and the Zubaid were the dominant tribe 
to the south-east of Baghdad. However, these tribal lands were not delineated 
according to any concept of fixed boundaries, as the rights to any particular territory 
were determined by a tribe’s ability to defend it successfully. Thus, a rough, flexible 
pattern emerged. In the flatlands of Iraq, small areas of permanent settlement fringed 
with farms and palm groves, then led directly into the larger semi-settled regions of 
the riverine shaikh and his tribesmen. Beyond this lay the vast nomadic realm of the 
desert. The key characteristic of such a pattern was its ‘geopolitical’ instability, as 
hardly any tribe remained in the same position for very long, largely due to the 
predominance of raids in such a society. Thus, inward pressure from the nomads of 
the desert interior would occasion the movement of many of the tribes in its path, so 
heralding a new tribal distribution in the river valleys. Such sociological processes 
had, by the begimiing of the nineteenth century, created an ethnological tribal 
distribution that is represented by the following maps: Map 10 shows the distribution 
of tribal leagues and principalities up to the early 19th century, whilst Map 11 shows 
the approximate tribal lands of the main tribes in the late 19th century.
21 Vinogradov, Amal. ‘The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: the Role o f  Tribes in National Politics.’ 
In International Journal o f  M iddle Eastern Studies. 3, 1972, p.126.
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3.3. A Common Citizenship?
Such was the socio-cultural universe of Iraq coming into the twentieth century: a 
highly complex and multi-layered mosaic of separate groups, which ranged from 
Turkish-speaking urban notables to water buffalo herders in the southern marshes. 
Interaction between these disparate groups was often based on suspicion and hostility, 
because:
"despite the shared ideology o f Islam and Arahness (for the majority o f the 
population), there did not exist a common sense o f citizenship founded on shared 
interests and goals. ” 22
However, such a lack of a sense of citizenship might also be said of many other non- 
European societies at that time, so such a situation must be seen in its proper context. 
The reason it may start to present a problem is when a radical change is imposed on 
such a society. Of course, both tribal and urban Arabs were conscious that they were 
Arabs, especially when presented with a Turk or a Persian, but this consciousness was 
in no way comparable to that of the later Arab nationalists.
“That they were Arabs was to them a natural fact, a fact they may have taken 
pride in, but they did not feel at all impelled to do something about it. ” 23
Added to this was the division in the tribal domain created by a complex tribal 
hierarchy. Politically, the tribes were grouped into self-defined and mutually 
recognising hierarchies of chiefs and notables, with the authority of the tribal leaders, 
or ‘shaikhs’, stemming both from personal attributes and noble lineage. Tribes were 
also split into filih , peasants; m a 'dan, Marshdwellers; shawiyah, People of the Sheep; 
and ahl-il-ibl, People of the Camel.24 This last group functioned as the tribal 
aristocracy, looking down on the other tribes, and refusing to fraternise with them. As 
a general rule, those tribes who maintained all the elements of a truly nomadic
22 Vinogradov, Amal. 1972, p. 127.
23 Batatu, Hanna. 1978, p. 14.
24 Batatu, Hanna. 1978, p. 16.
86
existence and fiercely defended their liberty, tended to treat their more settled 
neighbours with disdain. It was the ascendancy of warriors over cultivators, with 
those tribes that held arms and possessed greater fighting skills, being able to rise to 
dominance in the tribal world.
Despite such fractures, what was remarkable in Iraq at that time was quite how 
important tribal life still was. Tribal people were, and still are, traditionally thought of 
as marginal, and incapable of any organised corporate action that transcended narrow 
tribal sentiments. In Iraq however, the tribes could hardly be thought of as marginal as 
not only were they able to form powerful corporate bodies, but they were also the 
majority of the population. Nor did they exist in a cultural void, as complex systems 
had evolved to regulate their interaction with the towns, and also between themselves. 
Tribesmen visited towns regularly, to trade and to visit shrines, and thus can be seen 
as neither isolated nor politically naive.25
3.4. The Town and Country Divide
A wide socio-cultural chasm separated the main towns from the tribal country, so 
much so that the inhabitants of each seemed to live in two distinct worlds which 
overlapped only infrequently. Any links between them were generally economic, 
although even in this, the links were tenuous and intermittent, with many areas of the 
tribal domain, which controlled most of the agricultural and pastoral lands of Iraq, 
remaining self-sufficient. The cities tended to have their own narrow band of 
countryside ringing them, which was worked by peasants who had generally lost most 
of their tribal affiliation, and were now held together by a territorial connection.
Psychologically too, urban and tribal Arabs were split by fundamental cleavages. 
Urban Arabs were governed more by Islamic and Ottoman laws, with a very 
pervasive consciousness of their Muslimness. Tribal Arabs, in contrast, responded 
more to Islamically-tinged ancient tribal customs, with rallying cries usually 
containing secular, tribal or Arab elements as opposed to religious ones. Relations 
between tribesmen were still patriarchal, whereas class positions had become more
25 See Vinogradov, A. 1972
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strongly developed amongst the urban Arabs. Tribesmen seemed to regard the 
townspeople with the same disdain they held for the more settled tribes, and 
celebrated their own irrepressibility and lack of respect for any government.
3.5. The Divides Existing Between and Within Cities
Although the urban population was a minority, the main cities of Iraq were very 
important politically, socially and economically, and thus so were the urban notables. 
During the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II, (1876-1909), the urban population was 
estimated to be approximately 24% of the population: Baghdad housing 145,000; 
Basra, 18,000 and Mosul, 70,000.26
Physical bonds between different cities in Iraq were tenuous at best. This state of 
affairs was fostered by the lack of any real communication infrastructure between the 
various centres. A very basic telegraphic service was established in the late nineteenth 
century, to connect main centres to Istanbul rather than to encourage communication 
within the region, and steamers on the rivers were infrequent and unreliable. In 
response largely to these conditions, and their own geographical positions, the cities 
evolved their own economic and social orientations. The ties of Mosul were 
predominantly with Syria and Turkey; those of Baghdad and the Shi’i Holy Cities 
with Persia and the western deserts, whilst Basra had its major links via sea trade with 
the Persian Gulf and India. The lack of economic integration was compounded by the 
use of different measures and weights in the different towns of Iraq, and wide price 
variations for the same commodity, due to dissimilar market conditions throughout 
the region. All this was further compounded by the use of different currencies, so 
hampering accessibility to certain markets.27 Thus, a strong spirit of localism 
prevailed, which fed into separatism even within cities. Whether tribal or urban -  
Iraqi society was marked by such social and cultural variations within relatively small 
geographical areas. Different regional links played a crucial role here; for example, 
due to the importance of the Shi’i shrines in Najaf and Karbala, there were many
26 Cuinet, V. 1891; Batatu, H. 1978
27 Before World War One, Persian currency seems to have been more commonly used in the Kurdish 
districts o f  Iraq, than the ‘official’ Turkish currency. See Cuinet, Vital, 1893, Vol. Ill, pp.38-39. In 
Basra, Indian and Persian currency was in wide use. See Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical 
Section, ‘Arabia , M esopotam ia’ (London, 1919), pp.l 19-120.
pilgrims from Shi’i communities elsewhere, especially Iran and Pakistan. As a result 
of such contacts, the various cultures of Iraq reflected a variety of alien influences, 
such as local Arab dialects around the Holy Shi’i cities, containing Farsi and even 
Indian terminology. Such cross-cultural contacts also fed through into local folklore 
and story-telling, reinforcing a pattern of surprising cultural variation throughout the 
Iraqi provinces. Louise Sweet remarks on this in her examination of the anthropology 
of the region:28
“In contrast with many other regions of the Middle East, where within 
comparatively large areas, one village is essentially like the next, southern Iraq offers 
macroscopic [sic] comparisons between neighbouring villages and tribes which 
provide contrasts in limited aspects of social and cultural life against a background of 
general historically derived similarity. The contrasts appear related to variations in 
ecological circumstances, length of sedentary existence, government policies 
(particularly with respect to land registration), contact with ‘alien’ groups, as well as 
differentials in economic opportunity.. .It is one of the comparatively few areas in the 
modern world where the dynamics of change are not embedded exclusively in the 
dialectic between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ culture contact.”
Even Islam in Iraq was a cause for division rather than integration. It cut sharply 
between the Shi’i and Sunni Arabs, who seldom mixed or intermarried, to the extent 
that in mixed cities they lived in separate quarters and followed separate lives. Batatu 
highlights the amazing degree of parity between confessional allegiance and social 
standing that is evident when juxtaposing the religious and social features of early 
twentieth century Iraq.29 The most influential landlords in Basra province were 
overwhelmingly Sunni, while the peasants working the land were Shi’i.30 Within 
Basra city itself, the leaders of Arab society were also Sunni, while the majority of the 
townspeople were again Shi’i. The same pattern repeated itself in nearly every town 
in Iraq (with the exception of the Shi’i Holy Cities), with the minority Sunni element
28 Sweet, Louise. 1968. Note the year that this observation was made, as it shows that such local 
variations were still highly visible in the 1960s, even after many decades o f  economic development and 
governmental policies o f  centralisation and standardisation.
29 Batatu, Hanna. 1978. Chpt 4, Some Religious-Class and Ethnic-Class Correlations.
30 The massive conversion o f the bulk o f  Iraq’s nominally Sunni Arab tribes to Shi’ism in the south 
occurred largely during the nineteenth century. Details o f  this process, and the factors driving it can be
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being socially dominant, and constituting the large majority of the affluent merchants 
and landowners. Thus it seemed that such a divide by sect was also underlain by deep- 
seated socio-economic cleavages. To some extent, such Sunni social dominance had 
its roots in the preceding historical situation. In some rural areas, it was a reflection of 
the dominance of the Sunni tribal warring People of the Camel over Shi’i tribal 
peasants, or People of the Sheep, whilst in the towns this existing divide was 
reinforced by the Sunni Ottoman political dominance. Also telling, is that Shi’ism as 
an ideology had an innate appeal to the underdog due to its preoccupation with 
suffering and passion.
Whilst these religious and class divisions approximately coincided in the south of 
Iraq, in a similar way in the north in ethnically mixed areas, the divide between 
classes was often a divide between races. For example, in an area of villages inhabited 
solely by Kurds, the vast majority of such villages would have been owned by 
notables from Arbil, who were predominantly Turkomen. Again, in Mosul, Muslim 
Arabs were the principal landlords, whilst the majority of the peasant population were 
Christian Arameans.
When such divides were transferred to the city areas, such urban cleavages, class, 
sect, ethnic origin, economic, - were reflected in the mahallah, or city quarter, with 
different groups living in their own distinct mahallah. Within these quarters, the 
inhabitants lived largely in a world of their own, with little concept of a larger city 
community. Furthermore, those constituting part of a millah, an officially recognised 
religious community such as the Jews or Christians, even had autonomy in their 
denominational affairs. An example of such mahallah mentality is evident in the April 
1915 uprising in Najaf against the Turks. After expelling the Turks from the city, each 
of the four quarters proclaimed their independence, - a situation that remained until 
the British arrival in 1917.31
The retention of certain tribal views and perspectives can be seen in such mahallah 
mentalities within the towns. Such forms of social organisation displayed the imiate
found in Nakash, Y. 1994, pp.25-48. The result was that the majority o f  the converted Shi’i population 
were tribal peasants and rural agriculturalists.
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need for protection through unity -  a protection that an overstretched Ottoman 
administration seemed unable to provide. The links provided by a tribe, or a town 
mahallah, gave the individual a sense of belonging, and an anchor to the world around 
him.
What must also be considered however, is that such loyalties and groupings were 
dynamic and flexible, and that by the start of the century, had undergone a 
considerable process of erosion. The impact of river steam navigation (1859), the 
electric telegraph (1861), the opening of state schools in 1869, the evolution of the 
printing press and the increasing economic penetration by Britain into the region with 
the subsequent commoditisation of Iraq, all wrought fundamental changes on the 
nature of the society. On top of this, efforts by the Ottoman government since the 
mid-nineteenth century to centralise its control of these lands, break the cohesion of 
the tribes and Ottomanize the city populations, had all begun to initialise change.
Thus, the balance of the town-versus-rural population dichotomy had begun to shift 
before the dawn of British administration in Iraq. In the past, the existence of 
powerful tribes in Iraq’s river valleys had forestalled the growth of strong cities. By 
the same logic, under the late Ottoman reign, the growth of the cities involved the 
decline of the tribes. Increased capitalisation, centralisation and the consequent ties to 
a less parochial market, led to the infusion of new ideas and life into the cities during 
the nineteenth century and onwards. With this came the decomposition of the tribal 
order. Ottoman policies of land tenure change and detribalisation were not 
implemented with the same fervour throughout the region, so leading to a bewildering 
array in the forms and expressions of tribal organisations.
Also significant was the impact of the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. Traditional 
patterns of political non-involvement in the Iraqi provinces began to change, with the 
stimulus provided by the rapid development of the Iraqi political press. From 1908 
onwards, the number and variety of political clubs and parties within Mesopotamia 
increased dramatically.32
31 Great Britain, Reports o f  Administration fo r  1918 o f  Divisions and D istricts o f  the Occupied  
Territories o f  Mesopotamia. (1919), I, p. 68.
32 Details can be found in Yapp, M.E. ‘The Making o f the Modem Middle East, 1792-1923.’ (Addison, 
Wesley, Longman Ltd., Harlow, 1987). Relative to areas such as Syria and the Hijaz, the level o f  
political activity within the Iraqi regions was quite low until this point.
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The population of Baghdad began to increase dramatically, with Basra also 
experiencing similar growth. (See table below) . Although the statistics may not be 
wholly accurate, the rapid urbanisation is unquestionable, and was due in large 
measure to mass migrations of peasant-tribesmen from the countryside.
3.5.1. Population of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra (1908-1947)
Year. Baghdad Mosul Basra
190834 150,000
192235 200,000 70,000 55,000
193536 350,000 100,000 101,535
194737 515,459 133,625
Another estimate suggests that there was a speedy fall in the number of nomads, 
which clearly corresponded with such a significant rise in the settled tribal population 
in the late 19th century -  as a direct response to the government’s policy of settling the 
tribes. As a proportion of the rural population, it is suggested that nomads fell from 
35% to 17% between 1867-1905, while settled cultivators rose from 41% to 50% 
during the same period.38
33 Source: Batatu, Hanna. 1978, p. 35.
34 Estimate by Chiha, Habib, K. ‘La Province de Baghdad. Son Passe, Son Present, Son Avenir’ (Cairo, 
1908), p .165.
35 Official estimate, Al-Iraq Year Book  (Baghdad, 1922), p.44.
36 Estimate, Dalil-ul-M amlakat-il-Iraqiyyah Lisanat 1935-1936. ( ‘Directory o f  the Iraqi Kingdom for 
the Year 1935-1936’), (Baghdad, 1937), p.97.
37 Ministry o f  Social Affairs, ‘Official 1947 Census o f Iraq.’ 3 parts, (Baghdad, 1954)
38 Hasan, M.S. ‘Growth and Structure o f  Iraq’s Population. 1867-1947’ in Issawi, C. 1975, pp. 155-162.
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3.6. The Extent of Ottoman Control Over Iraq39
3.6.1. An Uncertain Control: 1516-1831
Map 12 displays the extent of the Ottoman Empire in 1768, whilst Map 13 shows the 
extent of the Ottoman Empire and its breakdown into administrative units by 1914. 
Ottoman rule in Iraq was shaped by several factors: geographic, social, political and 
economic. Iraq was an outlying region. It contained a large Shi’i population, and as a 
frontier region it was vulnerable to invasion. The country was largely tribal and 
economically poor. Although Mosul was conquered by the Ottomans in 1516, 
Baghdad in 1534 and Basra between 1538-46;40 broadly speaking, Iraq remained a 
back-water province of the Ottoman Empire until the mid-nineteenth century.41 Until 
that time, virtually ignored by Istanbul and only under its nominal and occasional 
control, the territories were ruled by independent Mamluk42 and tribal chiefs. The 
Ottomans viewed the area as an important buffer to repel foreign encroachment into 
the region, and a useful source of taxation revenue, but the area was not of central 
importance in itself. Therefore, as long as the Ottomans could collect taxes, they 
considered their role in the area’s governance to be complete. The powers of the local 
representatives of the Sublime Porte did not really reach beyond the outskirts of the 
towns in which they were stationed, and the rural area remained the realm of inter­
tribal competition. Therefore tax collection was sporadic, and only implemented in 
the small percentage of Iraqi territory over which the Ottomans could exert their will.
39 Although the term ‘Iraq’ (or Irak), was an old one, it did not correspond to the area o f  the modern 
state, and was not used to designate any o f  the Ottoman administrative divisions o f  the area. The 
Ottomans divided the area into provinces based upon Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, Kirkuk and occasionally, 
Sulaimaniyya.
40 Inalcik, Halil, ‘The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600’, (Weidenfeld andNicolson, 
London 1973), pp.38 and 106; Shaw, Stanford J., & Shaw, E.K., ‘History o f  the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey,’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), I, pp.95-96.
41 Simon, R., Mattar, P. & Bulliet, R. (eds.), ‘The Encyclopedia o f the Modern Middle East, II.’ (The 
Middle East Institute o f  Columbia University, 1996)
42 These were the Georgian Mamluks o f the family o f Sulayman the Great. Their rise to power was the 
principle feature o f  the political history o f  Iraq during the late eighteenth century. They came originally 
from the Caucasus, as Christian slaves who had converted to Islam. As they possessed no local 
loyalties, they were deemed by the authorities to be more reliable than locals, and therefore many 
entered into the service o f  the pashas o f  Baghdad as bureaucrats. They consolidated their power, 
forming a strong military corps, and took control o f  the Baghdad government in 1747. Ottoman 
attempts to remove the Georgian Mamluks failed, and the Porte was forced to tolerate their rule in 
Baghdad, which reached its political peak under Sulayman the Great, 1780-1802. The Mamluk regime 
was brought to an end in 1831, when Ottoman authority was reinstated.
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“Like other outlying provinces which joined the Empire late, such as Egypt 
and the Yemen, Iraq was never fully integrated into the Ottoman administration 
system, and the Porte did not maintain an all-embracing political control there. Its 
control was further weakened by periodic wars with Iran, which did not finally end 
until the early 19th century, and also by periodic Iranian occupations. ”43
After 1831, when Ottoman officials were appointed direct from Istanbul, such 
governors could only exert any control via conciliatory relationships with the local 
power bases, so severely limiting their image of authority. As Vinogradov noted:
“Material scarcity, political insecurity, and the general arbitrary nature of the 
administration tended to reinforce the tribal framework which fulfilled the primary 
functions of conflict and resource management in the absence of a strong central 
authority.”44
This tribal framework fulfilled a vital function. As one Baghdad deputy to the 
Ottoman parliament explained in 1910:
“To depend on the tribe is a thousand times safer than depending on the 
government, for whereas the latter defers or neglects repression, the tribe, no matter 
how feeble it may be, as soon as it learns that an injustice has been committed against 
one o f its members readies itself to exact vengeance on his behalf ”45
The administration of the Iraqi regions changed much in the last 150 years of Ottoman 
rule. During the 16th-18th centuries, only Mosul was treated under the timar system, in 
which cavalry officers were given the right to collect and keep the tax on certain 
agricultural lands in return for military service in times of need. Baghdad and Basra 
were administered as salyane provinces, in which the tax revenues were not 
distributed as timars, but split between the provincial governors, who then delivered
43 For details o f  wars with Iran, and Iranian occupations, see: Longrigg, S.H. ‘Four Centuries o f  
Modern Iraq,’ (Oxford University Press, Oxford 19251; Shaw, S.J. & Shaw, E.K., 1977; Shaw, S.J. 
‘Iranian Relations with the Ottoman Empire in the 18 and 19th Centuries.’ in Avery, Peter (ed.) et al, 
‘The Cambridge History o f  Iran, Vol 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic,’ (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1991), pp.297-313.
44 Vinogradov, A. 1972, p. 127.
45 Baban, I.H. ‘De Stamboul a Bagdad. Notes d’un homme e ’etat Turc.’ (“From Istanbul to Baghdad. 
Notes o f A Turkish Statesman”), 1910. Translated from the Turkish, Collection de la Revue du Monde 
Musulman, Paris, 1911, p. 256.
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fixed annual sums (salyane) to the central treasury.46 In fact the pre-modern economic 
status of the three regions was very varied, which raises questions as to what benefits 
the Ottomans gained from each individual province. For example, in terms of 
agricultural production, Ottoman statistics show that in 1909-1910, the wheat 
production from Basra province was 1,254,140 kiles41 Mosul produced 4,784,515 
kiles, whilst Baghdad province only provided 551,631 kiles. Baghdad however, 
produced more millet than either Mosul or Basra.48 Clearly however, advantages other 
than economic strengths helped to shape Ottoman perceptions of the relative 
importance of each province.
The bulk of the land in Baghdad and Basra provinces was miri or state land, but this 
was complicated by old Islamic customs, including the extensive use of waqf, 
(religious endowments), and also by the destabilising influence of widespread 
tribalism. The provincial division of the region also varied. Iraq was originally 
divided into 3 provinces called elayet:49 Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. However, the 
province of Mosul at times lost territory to Iran, and a separate province called the 
elayet of Lahsa (al-Hasa), was also formed in Najd in the second half of the 16th 
century.
Over time, the central authority grew weaker, and the subsequent power vacuum was 
filled by local potentates, all owing a nominal allegiance to Istanbul. Georgian 
Mamluks rose to power in Baghdad and Basra provinces in 1747, and kept control 
until 1831, whilst the Jalilis, a local family, gained control in Mosul from 1726.50
46 See: Inalcik, Halil, ‘An Economic and Social History o f the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914,’ 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), p .104; Shaw, S.J. & Shaw, E.K. 1977, Vol.I, p .122; 
Shaw, S.J., ‘A Note on the Ottoman Administration in Arabia in the 16th Century,’ International 
Journal o f  Turkish Studies, 3/1 (Winter 1984-85) pp.93-99
47 an Ottoman kite was a measurement o f  volume, equivalent to approximately 36 metric litres
48 For more details and statistics, see McCarthy, J. ‘The Arab World, Turkey and the Balkans: A  
Handbook o f  Historical Statistics.’ (G.K.Hall, Boston, Massachusetts 1982). Agricultural production 
was listed by the Ottomans in kiles, okkas, kiyyes, and kilos.
49 Such elayet divisions did not carry the same status as the later vilayet provinces.
50 For details o f  the Mamluk period, see: Hourani, A. ‘A History o f the Arab Peoples,’ (Faber & Faber, 
London 1991), p.249; Hourani, A. ‘The Changing Face o f the Fertile Crescent in the 18th Century,’ 
Studia Islamica, 8 (1957), pp.89-122; Nieuwenhuis, T. ‘Politics and Society in Early Modern Iraq,’ 
(The Hague, 1982); Shaw, S.J. ‘Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 
1789-1807’ (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1971), pp .219,294; Perry, John, ‘The Mamluk 
Pasilik o f Baghdad and Ottoman-Iranian Relations in the Late 18th Century.’ in ICuneralp, Sinan, (ed.), 
Studies on Diplomatic History,’ Vol.I, (Istanbul: ISIS, 1987), pp.59-70.
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The reign of Suleiman Pasha (1780-1802) saw the curbing of the power built up by 
Kurdish leaders and the southern tribes of the Muntafiq. At this time too, Karbala and 
Basra were brought under Ottoman control. However, it was not really until the reign 
of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) that the central government attempted to restore 
some authority over the provinces, and produce a reformed and centralised system of 
provincial administration. By 1831, the Porte had regained firm control over Baghdad, 
taking advantage of the military weakness of the Mamluk Vali there, Davud Pasha 
(reign: 1816-1831). Mosul was also restored to central control in 1834, although the 
subordination of certain autonomous Kurdish Emirates around Diyarbakir and 
Rawanduz took several years longer.
3.6.2. The Tanzimat Reform Era in Iraq: 1844-1872
Immediately after the restoration of central Ottoman authority at Baghdad in 1831, 
issues of security took precedence over issues of reform, with many local uprisings 
and rivalries for the Ottoman government to contend with. However, during the reign 
of Sultan Abdulmecid (1839-1861), the Tanzimat Reform Program was declared, 
promising overall reorganisation in every institution of the state and society: from 
more orderly tax collection and a regular system of military conscription, to reform in 
the educational and judicial systems. Such a reform package was based partially on 
European models, and initiated a slow process of institutional and cultural 
‘westernisation’. Such reforms also broke fundamentally with Islamic tradition by 
extending the promise of civil equality to the Empire’s non-Muslim peoples. In the 
provinces, the reforms envisaged a radical overhaul of provincial administration, and 
a strengthening of central control. The authority of the provincial governor-generals 
was first to be actively weakened by giving many of their functions to other officials, 
and then by giving them advisory councils containing representatives of the local 
population, usually influential notables and important religious leaders. Also 
important was the reorganisation of the administrative divisions, using the traditional 
term sankaks, but redrawing the boundaries to establish units of comparable wealth 
and population..
Clearly, these new reforms could not be introduced everywhere at once, thus there 
was a delay in their implementation within the Iraqi provinces, and even then,
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implementation was not uniform throughout the region. Tanzimat reforms were first 
introduced into Baghdad in 1844 under Necib Pasha, and in Mosul in 1848 under 
Vecihi Pasha. However, not much was done in Baghdad until the appointment of 
Abdulkerim Nadir Pasha in 1849, when the registration of the population was started, 
and the financial administration began to be reformed. Even then, such reforms were 
hampered by financial difficulties, as their application was costly and required large 
amounts from the central government funds.51 Such financial constraints were further 
compounded by the refusal of many tribes within Iraq to pay any tax -  so severely 
limiting local revenues.
By 1851, the central Ottoman government had decided that Iraq’s problems would be 
better dealt with under a single administration. Mosul was reduced to the status of a 
sancak of Baghdad, and policies were concentrated on the restoration of law and 
order, with better control of the tribes, and hence more effective tax collection. This 
offered a partial solution to the administrative and financial problems of the region.
Great changes did not occur in Iraq until the era of Midhat Pasha as the Governor of 
Baghdad between 1869 and 1872, when the Ottomans really extended their control 
over the Iraqi provinces. As in other parts of the Empire, the Iraqi provinces were still 
governed largely by tacit agreement between the Ottoman authorities and the local 
notables, with each side understanding the limitations of the other.52 It was the 
advances in communications seen throughout the nineteenth century that enabled the 
Ottomans to penetrate more deeply into the affairs of the Iraqi region. The advent of 
the telegraph, of steamships on the Tigris, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 
all brought the world of Mesopotamia far closer to the seat of power in Istanbul. It 
also brought with it the possibility of access to more external markets, and more 
profitable agricultural ventures. The second half of the 19th century brought great 
expansion in trade, especially sea-borne after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. 
Mesopotamia’s main trading partners were Britain and British India, with a few new 
competitors entering the market in the early 1900s. Land trade with Iran was also 
important, as was the revenue raised from the Iranian pilgrims to the Shi’i holy sites
51 See Guran, T. ‘The First Statistical Yearbook o f the Ottoman Empire.’ (Ankara, Statistics Institute,
1997). Original published in Arabic script, 1897. Also see: Guran, T. Tanzimat Doneminde M aliyesi, 
(Istanbul, 1899), pp.93-96.
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within the Iraqi vilayets. Between 1869-70 and 1912-13, the value of official imports 
to the Iraqi provinces rose from approximately £152,000 to £3,264,000 (7.5% p.a.), 
and the value of exports rose from £218,000 to £2,593,000 (6% p.a.). 53 Such an 
increase in trade also provided a good indicator to the development of the region’s 
transport system, and its reformed land system. The desire by agriculturalists for the 
greater level of security needed to attain stable agricultural output was another aid to 
the Ottoman attempts to pacify the country, as the resistance of such settled farmers 
was hugely broken down. As agricultural production required peace and stability, the 
martial values that had served to promote tribal cohesion in times past, became less 
significant. With this, and the sweeping changes in land tenure ushered in by Midhat 
Pasha, the position and influence of the leading shaikhs began to wane.
The Ottomans also began to flex their muscles in Mesopotamia due to the increasing 
sense of threat they felt from Europe’s (and especially Britain’s) growing significance 
in the Persian Gulf from the early nineteenth century onwards. Foreign influence in 
Iraq, and the fear of its spread, were constant preoccupations of the central 
government and the provincial authority -  occasionally bordering on the paranoid. In 
bringing their more remote provinces under closer control, the Ottomans hoped to 
avoid the encroachment of British influence into Ottoman-held territory. 54The 
French, Germans, Russians, Iranians, Americans and of course, the British, all had 
consulates in Baghdad by the early 1900s, and their influence was growing. 55
Midhat Pasha did indeed implement many policies that were to accelerate socio­
economic change in the region, and his reign can be seen as a watershed in the history 
of the country. He had been sent to Baghdad in the midst of the Tanzimat Reform Era 
that was embracing the Ottoman administration,56 and his remit was to restore 
centralised Ottoman authority in the Iraqi provinces. Midhat initiated the process of
52 Slugglet, P. ‘Britain in Iraq 1914-1932.’ (Ithaca Press, London, 1976), p.2.
53 Issawi, C. ‘The Fertile Crescent 1800-1914: A Documentary Economic History.’ (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1988), p.132.
54 for details, see: Brown, Carl, (ed,), ‘Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint On the Balkans and the 
Middle East,' (Columbia University Press, New York 1996).
55 see: Lorimer, J.G. ‘Gazetteer o f  the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia,’ Vol.I/2, (Calcutta, 
1908), pp.2694-2699; FO, Historical Section, M esopotamia , (London, 1920), pp.26-27; Longrigg, S.H. 
1925, pp.4-5, 66-67.
56 The Tanzimat Reforms were initiated in the years after 1839, with their principal aim being to 
reassert the rights and effective control o f the central government, and to tie the provinces more closely  
to the centre.
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modernisation in Iraq by making sweeping changes in provincial administration under 
the 1864 Vilayet Law, in land registration57 using the Land Law of 1858, road 
construction, the creation of newspapers in the region, and the establishment of 
government schools with a standardised curriculum that allowed Iraqis to attend the 
military and law schools in Istanbul. This in turn enabled more Iraqis to become more 
socially and economically mobile, as they could then join the Ottoman civil service, 
and enlarge their perspective of the community in which they lived. The improved 
access to higher education created a new group of native intellectuals who then served 
as ‘ideological brokers’58 between the westernising Ottoman administration, and their 
own communities. Clearly then, such processes resulted in extensive disruptions to 
the traditional ideological and social spheres.
3.6.3. Land Tenure Change
“There is no need to explain the productive capacity o f the land in the 
provinces o f Syria and Iraq, and the capacity o f the Asi and Euphrates (rivers) to 
irrigate the land and transport its produce. Further, as the plains o f these regions are 
broad, and their mountainous areas are small, there is no question that roads, 
passages and land drainage will cost less than in the Balkan provinces. Yet the 
Ottoman state cannot draw any benefit from the few million bedouins (urban) who 
wander about the extensive andfertile plains between the lands o f  Damascus and 
Aleppo and Iraq, and to the eastward towards Jabal Shammar and the Najd border; 
on the contrary, there is seen much harm from their attacks on settled areas. Why not 
draw benefit from them, and why suffer harm? Has this matter ever been put on the 
agenda and discussed with attention and care? In your humble servant’s opinion, no 
idea has ever been circulated in central government, other than the forcible 
repression and devastation o f the Arabs. And they (the Arabs) have never been viewed 
as potential friends ...The Arabs are not savage, but they fear and hate us. ”
Abdullatif Suphi Pasha to Sultan Abdulaziz. 1864.59
57 More shall be said o f this in the following section devoted to Land Tenure Changes.
58 A phrase coined by Vinogradov, A. 1972, p. 125.
59 Original: ‘Suphi Pasha Hazretlerfnin Layihasi’ndan’ in Yeni Edebiyatt Antolojisi I: 1839-1865, 
Kaplan, Mehmet, et al (eds.), (Istanbul: IUEF, 1974), p.21. Quoted in Cetinsaya, Gokhan, ‘The
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As agriculture became an increasingly profitable enterprise and not solely a basis for 
subsistence, the tribal-land relationship also changed, causing the position of the 
shaikh to weaken further. This process was deliberately accelerated by the new 
Ottoman Land Law of 1858 that was implemented in the Iraqi provinces by Midhat 
Pasha. Such reforms had the effect of converting the majority of the land within Iraq 
into the private property of largely absentee landlords, and reducing the status of 
generally free tribesmen to near-serfs -  bound to the soil.
The new Land Law was declared in 1858 throughout the Ottoman Empire, (the Law 
went hand in hand with the Ottoman policy of detribalisation), upholding the rights of 
the Ottoman Government as the owner and lessor of all the land under its jurisdiction. 
The law was intended to re-establish the state’s legal right of ownership, and provide 
each cultivator with secure title to his fields. Such security, it was hoped, would 
encourage investment in improving production, thus boosting the economy, and 
raising tax revenues. The new law defined several categories of land: 1) private 
property (mulk)\ 2) state property (miri); 3) religious endowment lands (waqf); 4) 
communal or public land (metruk); and 5) idle or barren land (mevat). All miri land 
was to be registered in the name of an individual who could prove that they had 
worked on it continuously for a number of years, and such individuals could gain 
free-hold rights only via title deeds (tapu saned). In the Iraqi regions a Land 
Commission was established to survey the country and sell these title deeds, with the 
land rights going to the highest bidder if no individual could prove their rights. An 
added complication was that in the Iraqi provinces, Midhat also split all cultivatable 
land into three categories, which were dependent upon their ease of irrigation. Title 
deeds to land watered by a river or canal were seen as the most valuable, and were 
sold to the population on special terms which included an enhanced tax liability. Title 
deeds to lands requiring the re-opening of irrigation channels were sold mainly by 
auction, whilst deeds to lands watered by rain or waterwheel were seen as the least 
valuable and were given free of charge to those who had been cultivating them. Each 
category paid a different rate of tax.
Ottoman Administration o f  Iraq, 1890-1908,’ unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University o f  Manchester, 
1994
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Before long, the overwhelming majority of land within the Iraqi regions was in the 
hands of urban notables, with all rights taken away from those who actually worked 
the land. The Ottoman’s logic behind the change was to modernise their entire state- 
system in an attempt to compete with the growing European Powers, such as Great 
Britain. There was a desire to reassert their authority over the countryside; to break 
the foundations of shaikhly power; allow more vigorous revenue collection, and to 
offer more permanent rights of possession to landholders in the hope that this would 
encourage more investment in agriculture, and hence more productivity. Indeed, the 
opening up of the market, and the development of the region’s infrastructure was 
already leading to a shift from subsistence farming to market cash crops. Also, by 
holding the ultimate access to land, the Ottomans hoped that this would reinforce their 
legitimacy and demand the population’s acquiescence to their authority.
In introducing the new Land Law to the Iraqi provinces, Midhat hoped to create a
wlno
class of industrious peasant proprietors,^would be regular tax-payers. However, 
although the new system worked quite well in areas where there were already peasant 
proprietors, it was not a great success within the Iraqi regions. Such a system was 
fundamentally at odds with the widely-held tribal notion of land ownership. The tribe 
considered its dira as an extension of its tribal solidarity, with the land being held 
communally and individuals having usufruct rights -  a system that depended upon the 
mutual recognition of tribal lands. The Ottoman leases did not recognise such 
corporate legal entities, and title deeds could not be held communally. This meant the 
further breakdown of the tribe, as tribal leaders were given individual rights over land 
that had formerly been held in common by them and their tribesmen. A new class of 
proto-feudal landlords emerged, while free tribesmen were transformed into mere 
tenants with very few rights. Thus, the role of the tribal shaikh as a defender was 
redundant, and he increasingly became an economic burden to his tribe. As the 
process progressed, the peasants had no need for any allegiance to a shaikh, and the 
territorial connection came to dominate any tribal one remaining.60
Furthermore, by withdrawing and re-granting tapu deeds, the government was able to 
promote hostility between tribes, thus breaking down many powerful confederations
60 Great Britain, Tribes Round the Junction o f  the Euphrates and Tigris, p. 2-3, The Administrative 
Report o f  the Baghdad Vilayet, 1917, p.26
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and again extending Ottoman power. For example, from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards, the Ottomans succeeded in pitting the dominant Sa’duns of the Muntafiq 
confederation against one another, and parcelling out their land to the highest bidder. 
This created a serious divide within the confederation between Ottoman supporters 
and those who clung on to old tribal principles. The Muntafiq fractured along these 
lines into many mutually hostile tribes, which were themselves beginning to 
decompose into even smaller groups.
An added complication in the distribution of new tapu land was that many people 
with a legitimate claim to land did not come forward and register, due to the suspicion 
in which the Ottoman authorities were held. Such registrations were feared to be a 
first step towards compulsory military conscription. Others simply felt that there was 
no point in claiming something that they already considered to be theirs.61
However much the Ottomans had increased their administrative presence in Iraq by 
the early twentieth century, full domination of these lands was still hampered by 
financial constraints, growing problems in other parts of an over-stretched empire that 
diverted resources, and a cumbersome administrative machine. This meant that whilst 
such land registrations were implemented in Iraq, they were done so in an ad hoc 
manner, with policies not being fully followed through. What was left then when the 
British arrived, in 1917, was a mish-mash of different systems of land tenure 
throughout the country, which they took to be the normal way of things,62 and a tribal 
system in the latter stages of decomposition.
This political history of the Iraqi regions raises many important questions. How far 
did these Tanzimat reforms contribute to the development of an ‘Iraqi’ national 
identity? Were there any political implications for the subsequent creation of the Iraqi 
state, and if so, what? It is clear that the Tanzimat Reforms, as implemented within 
the Iraqi provinces, accelerated a process of tribal disintegration, and created new 
social layers of disinherited rural tenants and proto-feudal absentee landlords. Great
61 For details o f  the results o f  land tenure changes in Iraq, see: Owen, R. ‘Middle East in the World 
Economy, 1800-1914,’ (I.B.Tauris, London, 1993), pp. 118-119; Karpat, Kemal, ‘The Land Regime. 
Social Structure and Modernisation in the Ottoman Empire.’ in Polk, William, R., & Chambers, 
Richard, L. (eds.), ‘Beginnings o f  Modernisation in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century,’ 
(University o f  Chicago Press, Chicago 1968), pp.69-90.
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social and economic divides therefore still cleaved the society, in addition to the 
ethnic, religious and cultural tensions. Any political power was held by these rich 
landlords, who became concentrated within the urban areas, and who felt little in 
common with the peasantry out in the countryside.
3.6.4. Vilayet Law of 1864
This involved a general re-organisation of the provincial government. Old elayets 
were to be replaced by larger vilayets, each governed by a Vali (governor-general) 
with extensive powers. Such a move was intended to give Valis greatly increased 
discretion, as such valis were directly responsible only to the central government in 
Istanbul. Each vilayet was divided into smaller sancaks, and these into nahiyes or 
quarters and villages, with administrative councils at each level. Baghdad was finally 
brought into this system in 1867, but full implementation only came with the 
appointment of Midhat Pasha. Even, then, it was not until 1875 that Basra was 
established as a vilayet in its own right -  independent of Baghdad. This status was 
again suspended in 1880 however, when Basra was again subordinated to Baghdad. It 
was only after 1884 that the division of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul into separate 
vilayets, was maintained. It is important to notice then, that these administrative units 
were not particularly old by the time of the Ottoman Empire collapse. It is also worth 
stressing that such divisions were only administrative, within the framework of a 
unified empire, - and as such they should not be compared with the more rigid 
boundaries dividing today’s modern states. In commerce, as well as in culture, there 
was a constant stream between these ‘Iraqi’ provinces, and between them and other 
provinces of the Ottoman empire.64
Midhat set up this vilayet system in the Iraqi provinces, attempted to tackle the issue 
of military conscription, and tried to improve the navigation and irrigation on the 
Tigris and Euphrates. Steamer services began between Basra and Istanbul via the 
Suez Canal, and Basra harbour was radically improved. He also set up a printing press 
in the region, established an official newspaper, an industrial school, hospitals and
62 Slugglet, P. 1976, p. 238.
63 For details, see: Shaw, S.J. and Shaw, E.K. 1977, p.90: Davison, R.H. ‘Reform in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1856-1876,’ (Princeton University Press, N ew  Jersey 1963), p. 151.
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new factories. Despite such innovation and motivation however, Midhat was recalled 
to Istanbul in 1872, and thus was unable to bring many of his policies to fruition. 
There followed a reaction against the decentralising aspects of the Vilayet Law, with 
subsequent revisions designed to curb the independent powers of the future valis.65
3.6.5. Educational Reform
This was another of the central schemes in the Tanzimat Reform Program. Public 
education became a priority, to train the officials required to run the new 
administration, to aid social and economic development, and as a means of 
inculcating loyalty to the Empire. Non-state schools remained, - such as the mahalle 
schools and the madrasas run by the ulama, the private Shi’i schools, the foreign and 
missionary schools, and the educational institutions run by non-Muslim communities 
for their members, - but new civilian, military, commercial and industrial state 
schools were also now available.66 In 1908, a law school was founded in Baghdad for 
higher education.
Limited though it was, state schooling played a significant role in Iraq, enabling some 
poorer and middle class students to rise in the state apparatus, especially within the 
army. Each year, a number of selected military students from Baghdad, were sent to 
the military academy in Istanbul, whilst many upper class students favoured the Law 
School and Civil Administration School in the empire’s capital.67 Many of these 
students went on to play significant roles in the Ottoman administration, and then the 
new administration of the Iraqi state after the First World War.
3.6.6.1875 Administration Onwards
From 1875, the Tanzimat regime of the Ottoman Empire entered a period of profound 
crisis, with bankruptcy of the state treasury, rebellions throughout the provinces,
64 Brown, C. 1996, pp. 121-122.
65 Davison, R.H. 1963 pp. 167-172.
66 For details o f state education in Iraqi provinces, 1894-5, see: McCarthy, J. 1982, p. 116; Szyliowicz, 
Joseph, ‘The Ottoman Educational Legacy: Myth or Reality?’ in Brown. Carl, 1996, pp.284-301.
67 See: Pool, David, ‘From Elite to Class: The Transformation o f Iraqi Political Leadership,'1 in Kelidar, 
Abbas, (ed.), ‘The Integration o f  Modern Iraq,' (Croom Helm, London 1979), pp.63-87; Simon, Reeva,
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constitutional revolution, diplomatic confrontations with European powers, and 
disastrous wars with Russia, that culminated in the loss of large amounts of Ottoman 
territory. The authoritarian Sultan Abdulhamid came to power (1890-1908), placing a 
new emphasis on centralisation, on Islam and Muslim solidarity, and on his own 
position as Caliph. He saw Muslim solidarity, expressed in a common loyalty to the 
Caliphate, as crucial to the empire’s efforts to resist European penetration. Such a 
rallying point was also used to help ease the doubts he had over the loyalty of Arab 
Muslims. His aversion to risk at any cost, in a desperate attempt to maintain some 
stability in his empire, led to many fundamental problems being ignored and allowed 
to fester.
3.7. Conclusion
The historical geography of Mesopotamia contributed greatly to the nature of the
region as a geopolitical entity by the time of the First World War, The Tanzimat
a
reforms had compounded a process of tribal decay and the development of new class
A
of rich, urban land-owners. Such an urban population, whilst containing many 
cleavages within itself, also was greatly removed from the rural sphere, politically and 
culturally. Divides at all levels, cut through the society of the Iraqi provinces.
However, there was evidence of an incipient national political consciousness, born 
largely in opposition to the Ottomans, and stimulated by the Tanzimat reforms. Such a 
movement however, was almost wholly concentrated within the Arab sections of the 
urban elite.68 This elite had more access to education, and to new and radical political 
ideas and practices. Ironically, the Tanzimat reforms had caused the rural population 
to suffer greatly, yet it was the urban intelligentsia, who had benefited most from the 
Ottoman reforms, that had the opportunity and the will to question the Ottoman 
authority. Generally though, new political demands couched in a ‘modern’ idiom 
appeared only just before 1914 in Iraq, and possessed little substance or popular
‘The Education o f an Iraqi Ottoman Army Officer.’ in Khalidi, Rashid, et al (eds.), ‘The Origins of 
Arab Nationalism,’ (Columbia University Press, New York 1991), pp. 151-166
68 For more details see Kayali, Hasan. ‘Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism 
in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918.’ (University o f  California Press, 1997).
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support. Yapp identifies several specific reasons for this relative lack of political 
activity.69
One such reason was that one of the most prominent of the non-Muslim communities 
within Mesopotamia was the Jewish community, who kept out of political activity. 
They concentrated on commerce and finance, and gave their backing to the Ottoman 
regime. Two other substantial groups among the notables kept out of government, and 
tended to confine their opposition to traditional forms of protest. These were many of 
the tribal shaikhs, and nearly all of the Shi’i notables.
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 did instigate some changes to this pattern of 
political non-involvement. There was a rapid development of the Iraqi political press, 
with newspapers expressing a wide range of political opinions.70 The years 1908-1914 
also witnessed an upsurge in the number and variety of political clubs and parties, 
including in 1912, the Baghdad-based Arab Patriotic Society.
One important source of political activity in the Iraqi regions was the secret society of 
al-‘Ahd. Many of the Arab officers in the Ottoman army were from the 
Mesopotamian region, and it is thought that they made up the bulk of the members of 
al-‘Ahd, which aimed at the independence of the Arab provinces from the Ottoman
71Empire. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that some sections of the 
Mesopotamian population held aspirations for Arab independence before 1914, but 
this was not a unified and consolidated movement, was not even widespread amongst 
the Arabs of Mesopotamia, and was almost totally non-existent amongst the non-Arab 
communities of the region.
The historical geography of Mesopotamia also had territorial implications for a 
putative Iraqi state. For example, it was not until 1884 that the division of Baghdad, 
Basra and Mosul into separate vilayets was maintained. Before then, Basra had been 
intermittently attached to the Baghdad province. Although this was purely an
69 Yapp, M.E. ‘The Making o f  the Modem Near East, 1792-1923.’ (Addison, Wesley, Longman Ltd., 
Harlow, 1987) The level o f political activity within the Iraqi regions was quite low, relative to areas 
such as Syria, and down in the Hijaz.
70 Yapp, M.E. 1987, p.212
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administrative detail, it may have contributed to a certain sense of unity between the 
two regions, at least as seen from a foreign perspective. The following chapter 
examines the various interests that the Great Powers of Russia, Britain, France, 
Germany and Italy, had in the Mesopotamian area. Such a history of Basra and 
Baghdad being treated, at certain times, as one administrative unit, might have 
encouraged foreign powers to widen the scope of their interest. The vilayet of Mosul 
however, although regarded as a Mesopotamian province, was always treated as an 
administrative unit distinct from either Baghdad or Basra. Interestingly, the following 
chapters demonstrate how, after the First World War, it was indeed the province of 
Mosul that proved most problematic to the British. In setting up the Iraqi State in 
1921, the British found it very difficult to establish their claim that Mosul was an 
integral part of the new Iraq.72
71 Most o f  the Mesopotamian officers within the Ottoman army were from notable Sunni Arab families. 
After 1918 many o f  these men came to hold the leading positions o f  power within the new Iraqi State.
72 This matter remained unsettled until 1926.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GREAT POWER INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST BEFORE
THE FIRST WORLD WAR
4.1. Introduction
To fully appreciate the factors that had an impact upon the geopolitical form and 
function of the new State of Iraq in the 1920s, it is important to locate Iraq in its 
global space. Such a context is vital, as no country can be examined in isolation from 
the external factors and pressures that help to shape it -  especially one whose original 
form was so determined by foreign powers.
“The establishment o f  a League o f Nations mandate in Iraq represents the 
institutionalisation o f a western idea. It came, however, as one o f the climaxes in the 
play o f world influences. But now the world had greatly widened with the expansion 
o f civilisation. And the European nation-state had appeared as a new and dominant 
factor. Rivalry among these new and self-conscious western communities came 
eventually to converge their conflicting interests upon the Near and Middle East. ”l
The outcome of this rivalry between the Great Powers at that time, - Britain, Russia, 
France and Germany and the Ottoman Empire, - was the creation of a new political 
order in the Middle East after the First World War -  a true ‘tectonic shift’2 in the 
social and political structure of the region.
“Out o f the ruins o f the (Ottoman) empire emerged, by accident or design... a series o f 
states and mandated territories including Turkey, Albania, Syria, the Lebanon, 
Palestine (Israel), Transjordan (Jordan), Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Each o f these 
countries was, in the following years, obliged, sometimes with the help o f a
1 Foster, H.A. 1935, p.28.
1 Macfie, A.L. ‘The End o f  the Ottoman Empire: 1908-1923.’ (Addison W esley Longman, London
1998), p.234.
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mandatory appointed by the League o f Nations, to establish a new government and 
administration, fortify and defend frontiers, few o f which had been delineated in 
accordance with ethnic, strategic and geographical reality, and create from the crude 
rhetoric o f race, nationality and culture, an ideology appropriate to its needs. These 
tasks were to preoccupy the rulers o f the new states for many years to come. ”
How had this fundamental change occurred? The pre-war ‘circling’ of the Middle 
East by the Great Powers, had resulted in the creation of specific mandated territories 
by 1921, in the areas formerly under Ottoman control. Such a ‘tectonic shift’ 
therefore, may appear to have happened in a very short space of time. In fact, it was 
more of a rapid resolution of complex processes that had been developing and 
evolving over centuries: - processes that could have resolved themselves in different 
ways under different circumstances. Foreign powers had sparred with each other for 
hundreds of years over spoils in the Middle East, with even the Greek and Roman 
Empires making concerted pushes to the east of the Mediterranean. Napoleon said to 
the French at the very start of his career that if they meant "really to ruin England 
they must make themselves ‘masters o f Egypt ’. ”4 The strategic importance of this 
region only grew throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. Such a process was 
directly linked to the projection of new transport lines to the east, driven by the 
Industrial Revolution in Western Europe. With the increase in manufacturing, paths to 
foreign markets had to be correspondingly more direct and effective. Hence, in the 
1830s, the English, "after alternating in interest between an Egyptian canal to the 
Red Sea and an overland route to the Tigris and Euphrates, decided upon the 
latter... the double valley had its own trade possibilities and was always subject to 
seizure by others. ”5
This chapter will examine how such Great Power interests evolved, and what drove 
them. What was it inherently about the region that demanded their attention? Or could 
it have been that the region became a foreign policy objective for a particular Power, 
simply because it was for a rival Great Power? What were the predominant interests: - 
economic; strategic; military; security; to do with the local population, or simply a
3 Macfie, A.L. 1998, p.234.
4 Quoted in Foster, H.A. 1935, p.30.
5 Foster, H.A. 1935, p. 31.
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question of prestige? Also, even with an understanding of the European foreign 
interests in the region, how did some of them, especially Britain and France, end up in 
control of some of the former Ottoman territories after the First World War, finding 
themselves in a position to directly determine the political and geographical structure 
of these territories? Several major treaties and agreements were made between the 
Great Powers before and during the First World War, and each of these brought the 
partition of the Ottoman territories ever closer, should the Entente Powers win the 
war. These will be examined more closely in this chapter.
Of particular interest in this thesis, is the process by which Britain came to hold the 
mandate for Iraq, and why this specific region was of more importance to them than 
any of the other territories that had been under Ottoman control. Firstly, the various 
interests in the Middle East held by the significant powers in the run up to the First 
World War will be analysed. Then the emphasis shall be narrowed down to the 
interests that the British held in the specific territory that came to be incorporated into 
the State of Iraq in 1920.
4.2. Partition or Preservation of the Ottoman Territories?
The preservation or partition of the Ottoman Empire was central to the Eastern 
Question of the 19th and early 20th centuries. How did each of the Great Powers at that 
time view the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire? Understandably, such 
perceptions were determined by the interests of each power, which lay either in 
Europe itself or the maintenance of control over their respective empires, and by how 
the Ottoman Empire could help or hinder these interests. Throughout the greater part 
of the 19th century, the Great Powers, especially Britain, France, Russia and the 
Austrian Empire, generally supported the preservation of the Ottoman Empire.6
Almost until the outbreak of the War, the French continued their policy of supporting 
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, “in Syria and Lebanon we have traditional 
interests and we intend to see that they are respected... We ourselves are resolved to
6 See Macfie, A.L. 1998, p.98.
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maintain the integrity o f the Ottoman Empire. ” 7 For both France and Britain, the 
Empire constituted a necessary buffer between Europe and the advance of Russia. 
France also had pressing financial reasons for wanting to maintain the territorial 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. She held two-thirds of the Ottoman public debt, and 
also had significant financial and cultural interests in Syria. French involvement in the 
Ottoman pre-war economy was unrivalled by any European country.8 "Until the 
outbreak o f the First World War the French remained generally committed to the 
preservation o f the Ottoman Empire, which alone it was believed would secure 
French interests in the area. Nevertheless in the period following the defeat o f the 
Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars, French diplomats and politicians began 
seriously to consider the possibility o f partition. ”9
The French started to think that it may be best to concentrate on their interests in 
Syria, lest a sudden partition leave her unprepared. In 1913, therefore, a conference of 
French diplomats and ministers agreed that France should seek to recover railway 
privileges in southern Syria, which they had previously lost to Germany. However, 
the majority opinion remained committed to the preservation of the Empire.
“Partition wouldfavour mainly Russia and Germany, both well established in the 
area. In the event o f  a break-up, it was unlikely that French bond-holders would ever 
receive payment. ”10 Moreover, the preservation of Ottoman power was vital because 
the French (and indeed the British), were not strong enough to exercise direct power, 
and the Ottomans were therefore crucial to protect French interests in the region.
Britain was also generally committed to the principle of Ottoman integrity until the 
First World War. Until then, they believed that the Empire was best preserved, as it 
helped to maintain the European balance of power, and the stability of the area under 
Ottoman control. This safe-guarded British routes to India. The worry about the 
Ottomans using Pan-Islam to undermine British control in areas such as Egypt and 
India, made the British very cautious over their dealings with the Ottomans. “This
1 France, Assemblee Nationale, Journal officiel, Senat, D ebatsparlem entaires, Dec. 21, 1912, p.340.
8 See Tanenbaum, J.K. ‘France and the Arab Middle East’, Transactions o f  the American Philosophical 
Society (Philadelphia, 1978), Vol.68, p. 10.
9 Macfie, A.L. 1998, p. 110.
10 Macfie, A.L. 1998, p . l l  1.
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fear acted as a permanent constraint upon Britain’s Near Eastern Policy. ”n  How far 
this general British commitment to the integrity of the Empire went in practice is 
debatable. Yapp represents a widespread view that such support for the principle of 
Ottoman integrity had become merely nominal in the decades leading up to the First 
World War.12 The failure of the Ottomans to carry through grandiose reforms laid out 
in the Tanzimat era, the bankruptcy of the Ottoman State and the revulsion provoked 
by the Armenian and Bulgarian massacres had fatally undermined British support for 
the Ottoman Empire.
Britain also viewed Iraq’s position within the Ottoman Empire very differently to that 
of the other Ottoman territories. As early as March, 1910, the British Resident in 
Baghdad wrote in his political diary that: “the universal Turkish system o f  
administration is in almost every respect unsuitable to Iraq. The Turks themselves 
must recognise that it is a failure here... Iraq is not an integral part o f the Ottoman 
Empire, but a foreign dependency, very much in the rough; and its government by 
sedentary officials according to minute regulations, framed at Constantinople for 
Western Turkey can never be satisfactory. I  had no idea before coming to Baghdad o f 
the extent to which Turkey is a country o f red tape and blind and dumb officialdom, 
nor o f the degree in which the Turkish position in Iraq is unsupported by physical 
force. ”13
Britain was also getting increasingly worried by the end of the 19th century about a 
potential Russian attempt to take control of the Turkish Straits (the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles). Until this time, Britain had seen the Ottomans as a useful bulwark to 
preventing this Russian ambition, but were now beginning to feel that the Ottoman 
Empire did not have the power to resist the Russians. Russia had made an alliance 
with France in 1894, which was a great threat. “The concern o f the British regarding 
their seeming inability to prevent a Russian seizure o f Constantinople and the Straits, 
led Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, to speculate from time to time about 
the possible partition o f the Ottoman Empire. ”14 In such a partition, Russia would
11 Yapp. M.E. 1987, p.88.
12 See Yapp, M.E. 1987
13 Quoted by Gertrude Bell, in Review o f  the Civil Administration o f  Mesopotamia, cmd. 1061 
(London, 1920), p .l.
14 Wilson, K.M. ‘British Foreign Secretaries’, (Croom Helm, London 1987), p .129.
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gain Constantinople and the Straits, and Britain gain Syria and Mesopotamia. 
Mesopotamia in particular had been of interest to Britain well before this time, partly 
due to its location in the region of the ‘Garden of Eden’, and its perceived natural 
resource wealth. (See Map 14). France may be paid off with Tripolitania and part of 
Morocco, and Italy with Albania. On the 31 October, 1914, the British Resident in 
Baghdad issued a proclamation to Arab rulers in the Gulf that Turkey had entered the 
war on the side of Germany, “to her own destruction, and that it seemed impossible to 
hope that the Ottoman Empire could be preserved. ”15
Russia was also generally committed to the preservation of the Ottoman Empire in the 
period preceding the First World War, as they constituted a harmless neighbour lying 
on their southern borders. However, Russia had conflicting interests on this issue, as 
her priorities lay with opening the Straits up to Russian warships. She also had 
ambitions to hold Constantinople, the centre of the Russian Orthodox religion. Thus, 
as German influence over the Ottomans grew, Russian commitment to Ottoman 
territorial integrity correspondingly fell.
4.3. Great Power Interests in the Region
Early in the 20th century, Britain found itself in a very strong position in the Persian 
Gulf, so much so that the Gulf was seen by many as a ‘British Lake’.16 Securing a 
vital link in the ‘overland’ route to India had been a long-term policy objective, as 
“British hegemony in the Persian Gulf, its waters and its littoral, was established 
during the first quarter o f the nineteenth century, principally to serve British interests 
in India, and chiefly maintained by the Royal (or earlier, the Indian) Navy. ”I? (See 
Map 15 and Map 16). However, although Britain was in a very strong position on the 
eve of the First World War, she did not enjoy the same over-riding dominance that 
she had had in the nineteenth century. After three generations of unchallenged 
domination, Great Power rivals appeared, mainly Russia, Germany and France, who
15 Quoted in Gertrude Bell, in Review o f  the Civil Administration o f  Mesopotamia, cmd. 1061 (1920), 
p .l.
6 See Busch, Briton Cooper, ‘Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914’, (University o f  California 
Press, 1967), p .l.
17 Dann, Uriel, (ed.) ‘The Great Powers in the Middle East: 1919-1939.’ (Holmes and Meier: New  
York and London, 1988), p. 50.
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threatened the British position in the Gulf region. The problem was clear: "the ‘Lake ’ 
was no lake at all, but an international waterway o f steadily increasing importance in 
an age o f imperial rivalries, diplomatic flux, and sizeable dangers to international 
peace o f mind in the cycles o f decay and revolutionary activity in the Ottoman and 
Persian states. ” 18
In 1903, Britain’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Lansdowne, declared in 
the House of Lords that “we should regard the establishment o f a naval base, or a 
fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to 
British interests, and we would certainly resist it with all the means at our 
disposal ”19 Such a stance was supported by the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, on 
the 21st November 1903 during a tour of the Gulf. “We are not going to throw away 
this century o f costly and triumphant enterprise...The peace o f these waters must still
Of)be maintained... and the influence o f the British government must remain supreme!” 
The Gulf area was becoming a region in which European politics were played out, 
and European antagonisms and designs were reflected.
4.3.1. Great Britain
British interests in the region were manifold, involving “strategic interests o f
0 Ioutstanding importance. ” Of paramount importance, was the security of her routes 
to India, (see Map 17) seen as “a possession which all the world envies us. ” 
Therefore, keeping the waters of the Gulf free of piracy, and the land around the Gulf 
free of powerful contenders, became policies that the British and Indian governments 
spent a good deal of their energies and resources on. Oil was also a factor, although a 
limited one until after the 1920s. Britain’s Navy ruled the Sea, and this was only 
possible with a secure supply of oil. Thus, protecting the operations of the Anglo- 
Persian Oil Company, formed in 1909, and their pipelines and wells, was a significant
18 Busch, B.C, 1967, p. 1-2.
19 Gooch, G.P. & Temperley, H. (eds.), ‘British Documents on the Origins o f  the War, 1898-1914’, 
(London 1926-38), vol.4, p.371.
20 Lorimer, J.G. ‘Gazetteer o f  the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia,' (Calcutta 1908); v o l.l, pt.2, 
pp.2638-9.
21 Macfie, A.L. 1998, p .l 12.
22 Quoted in Fraser, David, ‘The Short Cut to India: The Record o f  a Journey Along the Route o f  the 
Baghdad Railway,’ (Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh & London 1909), p.319.
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factor. However, Cohen documents23 that the India Office let it be known in 1914, 
that if a crisis were to arise in the area, they would be unable to spare many troops to 
help the Oil Company. This demonstrates that although important, oil did not drive 
the formation of British policy in the way that more vital British strategic interests 
did.
The defence of India demanded that Britain preserve its supremacy in the Gulf, 
threatened in the early 20th century by the construction of the Baghdad Railway. Also 
important was securing the control of the approaches to the Nile Valley to defend 
Egypt and the Suez Canal, the principal route to her empire in the east. Britain was 
also having to defend her position within Europe, the Near and Middle East, and even 
the world, by defending her interests in the area of the Straits, threatened by the 
advance of Germany and Russia in the area.
Britain feared that in the event of war breaking out in Europe, the Ottomans would 
side with the Central Powers. Then, Ottoman armies, supplied and equipped by 
Germany and led by German officers, might then attack Britain’s position in Egypt 
and the Persian Gulf. They were also worried that secret agents, supported by a pan- 
Islamic propaganda campaign, might spark off uprisings among the people of India, 
Egypt and Afghanistan. If the Central Powers also gained control of the Straits, they 
could close the principal supply line linking the western Entente Powers, Britain and 
France, with Russia.24 Thus, when war did break out in August 1914, Britain went to 
great lengths to persuade the Ottomans to remain neutral, but all offers were rejected. 
By the end of October 1914, the Ottomans attacked Russian shipping in the Black 
Sea.25
Britain’s financial and commercial interests in the Ottoman Empire were by no means 
as extensive as its strategic interests, but they were not insignificant. The British share 
in the Ottoman public debt was approximately 15%, and its share of investment in
23 Cohen, S.A. 1976, pp.l 19-133
24 see Macfie A.L. 1998, p .l 12.
25 see Kent. M. (ed.), ‘The Great Powers and the End o f the Ottoman Empire’. (George, Allen &  
Unwin, London 1984); Macfie, A.L. ‘The Straits Question, 1908-1936,’ (Institute o f  Balkan Studies, 
Salonica 1993), Chpt. 2; Heller, J. ‘British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire’. (Frank Cass, London 
1983)
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private enterprise was 14%.26 In Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, where it had
27secured valuable oil concessions, it controlled two thirds of the import-export trade. 
Britain also controlled certain substantial industries and institutions, including the 
Izmir-Aydin Railway, the National Bank of Turkey, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam 
Navigation Co. and the Constantinople Telephone Co.
To secure these interests in the Persian Gulf area, Britain concluded a series of treaties 
with the Trucial States, obliging them to acknowledge the exclusive influence of the 
British government. In 1907, the British agreed a secret treaty with the Shaikh of 
Kuwait, providing for exclusive control of land likely to be used as a terminus for the 
Baghdad Railway. In 1913-1914, Britain succeeded in concluding with Germany and 
the Ottomans, a series of agreements promising that no extension of the Baghdad 
Railway, from Basra to the Gulf, would be permitted without British consent.
It became increasingly clear to Britain that control of Egypt and the Suez Canal was 
simply not enough, as without a wider territorial control, or at least influence, it would 
remain in a weak strategic position. They worried about French influence in the 
Mediterranean, and Russian influence in the Straits -  as this could still effectively 
close off the Suez Canal and cut Britain’s communications to India. Thus, in the mid­
nineteenth century onwards, Mesopotamia became increasingly important to Britain. 
Indeed, as early as the 1830s, “Britain began a new initiative in Iraq associated with 
the development o f steam navigation and the possibility o f developing shorter routes 
to India.1,28 Such steamboat experiments on the Tigris and the Euphrates proved 
unsuccessful, and Britain decided to direct the bulk of its energies towards the route 
through India and the Red Sea. However, the potential of Iraq had been highlighted, 
and it was an interest that Britain was to turn to increasingly in the build-up to the 
First World War.
26 Macfie, A.L. 1998, p .l 13
27 Macfie, A.L. 1998, p .l 13.
28 Yapp, M.E. 1987, p.73.
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4.3.2. France
France also had significant interests -  which were limited mainly towards the Levant 
region of the Middle East. By the end of the nineteenth century, France had acquired 
substantial interests in the Ottoman Empire, especially in Syria and Lebanon. French 
enterprises were involved in the construction of harbours, the exploitation of mineral 
resources, and the business of production in the Ottoman Empire. French interests 
controlled the Regie Generale des Chemins de Fer -  specialising in the construction 
and management of Ottoman railways, the Societe des Quais de Constantinople, the 
Societe d’Heraclee -  a mining company, the Regie des Tabacs, and the Imperial 
Ottoman Bank -  nominally Anglo-French -  but in fact French controlled. Perhaps 
most significantly, French investors also held nearly two thirds of the Ottoman public 
debt, and such a situation may explain France’s initial policy of maintaining the 
Empire’s territorial integrity. Both the French Government, and private French 
entrepreneurs, would lose everything if the Empire collapsed.
France also had a unique interest in the Levantine areas of present-day Syria and 
Lebanon, due to their significant Christian populations. Since the Crusades of the 11th 
and 12th centuries, France had established extremely close cultural and religious ties 
with these areas, as well as with Palestine. From then on, France regarded its role as 
the defender of the Catholics in the Middle East, a position even recognised by the 
Ottoman government when they took Constantinople in the 15th century. Over the 
following centuries, the Ottoman Empire acknowledged that France had the right to 
protect all Christians in the Levant, agreed that French citizens were immune from 
trial in Turkish courts, and granted French entrepreneurs concessions that led them to 
hold the powerful economic position mentioned above.29
Although clearly underpinned by other economic and strategic considerations, to the 
French, the Middle East also provided “a territory for the radiation o f France’s 
intellect and the expansion o f her culture. ”30 This helped to fulfill the French need 
for prestige to rival the British, both locally and in the global arena, which would in 
turn maintain the balance of power within Europe.
29 See Tanenbaum, J.K, 1978, vol.68, Pt.7, p.5.
30 Dann, U. 1 988 ,p .l64
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4.3.3. Russia
By the end of the nineteenth century, both Britain and France were becoming 
increasingly concerned over the ambitions of Russia in the Middle East, as these 
could prove a threat to their own position there. At that time, Britain and France saw 
the Ottoman Empire as an essential bulwark, preventing a Russian advance in the 
Middle and Near East. Indeed, in the Eastern Crisis of 1876-8, Britain and France 
stepped in to prevent the imposition on the Ottomans of the draconian Treaty of 
Stefano by the Russians -  which included clauses that made provision for the creation 
of a Greater Bulgaria, incorporating Ottoman territories.31 Britain and France did not 
want the Ottoman buffer to be weakened, especially for the benefit of an expanding 
Russian power.
Despite this, even Russia herself saw the Ottoman Empire as a harmless neighbour, 
and likely to preserve a degree of stability on Russia’s southern borders. However, 
this leaning was more than offset by Russia’s support for the Balkan League during 
the Balkan Wars. Russia had other designs too, despite the usefulness of an intact 
Ottoman Empire on her southern flank, "her attempts to have the Straits opened to 
Russian warships, her support for the Christian minorities ...and her dreams that 
Constantinople, the cradle o f the Russian Orthodox civilisation, might one day be 
liberated, tended to constantly undermine her efforts in that direction.1,32 The 
Russians were very concerned about the nature of the regime governing the passage 
of the Straits, and the need to secure the stability of the area. They believed that only 
the opening of the Straits to Russian warships would enable Russia to maximise the 
potential of her naval establishment in the world. In April-May 1912, closure of the 
Straits for several weeks, threatened to devastate the Russian economy. This 
therefore, was the area that the Russians had the most interest in,33 although her 
ambitions also extended to undermining the position of other foreign powers 
throughout the Ottoman region. (See Map 18).
31 Mentioned in Macfie, A.L. 1998, p. 98.
32 Macfie, A.L. 1998 ,p .l05 .
33 See Macfie. A.L. Chpt. 1. 1993; Zotiades, G.B. ‘Russia and the question o f  Constantinople and the 
Turkish Straits during the Balkan Wars,’ Balkan Studies, vol. 11, 1970, pp.281-298
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Also perturbed by the designs of the other Great Powers in the region, before the First 
World War, Russia followed a policy of simply trying to increase its own influence in 
the Ottoman Empire. They developed their bilateral trading links, sought local 
newspaper support, and secured the appointment of a Russian delegate to the Ottoman 
Public Debt Administration Council. Such a foothold in the region was of increasing 
concern to other powers, in particular Britain, as shall be seen in detail later on in this 
chapter.34
4.3.4. Germany
Germany had built up a close economic relationship with the Ottoman government 
from the mid-nineteenth century. In 1888, the Deutsche Bank had arranged a loan for 
the Sultan, and in 1889, Germany played a central role in the establishment of the 
Ottoman Railway Company in Anatolia. The German Levant Line set up a shipping 
service between Hamburg and Istanbul during the 1890s, increasing trade volumes 
between the two. However, “German military and political influence in the Ottoman 
empire generally marched hand in hand with economic investment,1,35 and from the 
1880s onwards, Germany was involved in training the Ottoman army.
German interest in the Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire evolved from this more 
general interest in influencing the Ottoman Empire’s economic and military affairs. 
Germany did not wish for their favoured position within the Ottoman economy to be 
damaged by the ambitions of France or Britain in the Empire’s outlying Arab 
provinces. German business, one in particular, was in the Gulf as early as 1897, when 
Robert Wonckhaus opened a mother-of-pearl trading firm at Lingah.36 Despite the 
Deutsche Bank arranging a loan for the Sultan in 1888, and the Germans playing a 
significant role in the setting up of the Ottoman Railway Company in Anatolia in 
1889, it was Wonckhaus’ firm which remained the only serious German interest in the 
region until 1906, by which time Wonckhaus was becoming aware of a change:
34 For a full explanation o f  the ‘Russian Danger’ to Britain, see Busch, B.C. 1967, chapter 4.
35 Macfie, A.L. 1998, p. 100
36 For more details see Staley, E. ‘Business and politics in the Persian Gulf: The Story o f  the 
Wonckhaus Firm,’ Political Science Quarterly, 48 (Sept. 1933), pp.367-385.
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“About 19061first began to feel that Germany was beginning to get politically 
interested in the Gulf, and Ife lt from the first that she was seeking an exchange object 
which she could trade o ff with Russia and England against corresponding 
concessions in the Baghdad Railway affair. I  wasn’t on the inside and didn’t know 
exactly, but I  smelled it in the air.1,37
The Germans certainly began to show an active interest in the region. In 1906, they 
established a regular shipping service to the Gulf, which ran in direct competition to 
the longer-established British cargo business. The Germans ran an efficient, regular 
service, that called at ports often neglected by the British lines.
The German intention to acquire a depot in the Gulf, posed both a commercial and a
n  o
strategic threat to the British. One important example of this was when Wonckhaus 
sought, and obtained, a concession for mining iron oxide on the small island of Abu 
Musa. As soon as the British noticed German interest, they warned the Trucial 
shaikhs who had jurisdiction over the island, that no concessions could be granted to 
the German firm without first consulting the Resident.39 The British firm of Strick and 
Co. tried to gain the concession, but it became clear in 1906, that two of the Arab 
holders of the concession had handed it over to the Germans. This prompted several 
attempts on the part of the British authorities in the region, to get the concession 
revoked, but each was unsuccessful.40 This implies that Britain was encountering 
important limits to their power in the region.
In 1902-3, the Ottoman Railway Company, in which the Germans played a leading 
part, secured a concession to build an extension of the Anatolia railway from Konya 
to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf. It was these plans over the railway that really started 
to worry Britain. As a result of these and other developments in the decade or so 
preceding the First World War, German economic enterprise in the Ottoman Empire 
expanded rapidly. However, even more unsettling was that German military and
37 Staley, E. 1933,p.376.
38 See Busch, B.C. 1967, p.355; and Letter from the Admiralty to the Foreign Office, 9 Sept. 1914. FO 
371/2139 48001/14.
39 Resident Agent, Sharjah, to Resident, January 16, 1905, SF  1/08, 617/08. The Residency Political 
Diary for week ending Feb. 19, 1905 (extract in FI 697/05) indicates that this action was ordered by the 
Resident himself.
40 See, for example, FSI to Cox, Feb. 11, 1907, F I 441/07; Minto to Morley, June 27, 1907, FI 1181/07.
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political influence in the Ottoman Empire grew correspondingly with this economic 
investment. Germany had been involved from the 1880s in training the Ottoman 
army, and early on in the 20th century, German arms manufacturers began to receive 
substantial contracts for the supply and equipment of the Ottoman military force.
“Nor was German economic, political and military influence in the Ottoman Empire 
lacking in a sense o f ideological support and direction. ”4! In 1886, Alois Sprenger 
had published ‘Babylon -  The Richest Land in Ancient Times. ’ in which he suggested 
that the German people colonise Asia Minor. Carl Kaeger wrote a similar work in 
1892, as did the pan-German League, who published a book called ‘Germany‘s 
Claims to the Turkish Inheritance.,42
It was clear then, that German commercial, military and political influence in the 
Ottoman Empire before the First World War was considerable. However, they did not 
originally respond favourably to Istanbul’s offer of joining the war on the side of the 
Central Powers. This was partly due to the Germans not wishing to reckon with the 
open hostility of Russia on the Empire’s weak eastern front, and also due to a belief 
that the Ottoman army was still incapable of fighting a modern war, and would thus 
prove more of a burden to Germany, than a useful ally. Germany decided that the way 
forward in the Near and Middle East lay not in the preservation of the Ottoman 
Empire, “but in its partition and a profitable division o f the spoils. ”43 Maps for Asia 
Minor were even prepared showing a possible sphere of influence.44 Therefore, the 
German decision on the eve of the First World War to regard the Ottomans as allies, 
must not be seen as the culmination of a long process of economic, political and 
military pressure, but rather as a sudden decision, taken due to the exigencies of the 
moment.
4.4. The Eastern Question
Such ambitions on the world arena, coupled with the perceived weakness of the vast 
Ottoman Empire, led to the ‘Eastern Question’, an issue that each of the Great Powers
41 Macfie. A.L. 1998, p. 100
42 For details see: Kent, M. 1984; Henderson, W.O. ‘German Economic Penetration o f  the Near East, 
1870-1914.’ Economic H istory Review, vol. 18, 1948, pp.54-64
43 Macfie, A.L. 1998, p. 102.
44 See Macfie, A.L. 1998, p. 102.
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tackled in their own way. What was the best way for each of the powers to safe-guard 
their own interests in the region? How was the Ottoman Empire best dealt with? What 
becomes clear through the documentary evidence, is that a deeper issue was at the 
core of the stand-off in the Middle East. The efforts of all the major European powers 
were channelled into finding a solution to the conflict “which would not upset the 
balance o f power in Europe ”45 From the British point of view, the problem boiled 
down to that of preventing the matter being resolved in such a way as to make Russia 
the predominant power in the region.
This emphasis on the balance of power is a vital factor that adds depth to the 
examination of the Great Power interests in this region. Many simple explanations can 
be enhanced when they are looked at through this framework. For example, British
• Ihactivity during the 19 century has been taken to indicate an over-riding concern to 
protect her routes to India. This was clearly an important policy. However, if Britain 
had merely wished to protect these routes, there was much to be said for making a 
deal in the 1830s with Muhammad ‘Ali of Egypt, who was the strongest power in the 
region at that time. It seems odd then, that Lord Palmerston, then the British Foreign 
Secretary, always rejected this line in favour of support for the Ottoman Empire,46 
demonstrating that he valued the preservation of the balance of power in Europe more 
highly than a possible regional advantage in the Middle East.
It also becomes clear that the main rivalries were not economic, but rather rivalries of 
“prestige, boundaries, armies and navies, the balance o f power, and the possible 
shiftings in the system o f alliances. ”47 This can even explain the entrance of Italy on 
the Middle Eastern scene early on in the War. Her interests were political rather than 
economic, and were “connectedprincipally with her desire to be recognised as a full 
member o f the Club o f the Great Powers. ”48 What must be stressed is that the Middle 
East became a good testing-ground for reflecting relative international strengths. For 
example, in Curzon’s 1892 statement on the Gulf, he made it clear that allowing a
45 Yapp, M.E. 1987, p.59.
46 see Yapp, M.E. 1987, p.73.
47 Fay, Sidney, ‘The Origins o f  the World War,’ Vol. I, (Macmillan & Co., N ew  York, 1928), p.46.
48 Yapp, M.E. 1987 p.90.
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Russian port in the Persian Gulf would "import an element o f unrest into the life o f  
the Gulf that would shake the delicate equilibrium so laboriously established'.49 
Similarly, the German and Austro-Hungarian penetration of the Middle East in the 
late 19th century, was a direct reflection of their increase in stature within Europe.
Such a process is aptly highlighted by the question of the Baghdad Railway. In 1872, 
a special committee from the House of Commons gave careful consideration to the 
Euphrates River Valley Project, but decided that they would let their interest in this 
Mesopotamian route to India lapse, in favour of the Suez Canal. However, in 1902, 
the Ottomans granted the concession to build a railway to Mesopotamia to the 
Germans, and it was then that Britain suddenly took an interest. Control of the railway 
was of prime strategic concern. Britain wished to prevent German control of this 
communications link, "lest such a possession...facilitate the invasion o f  India or 
disturb our political prestige. ”50 This was Anglo-German politics, simply being 
played out on an arena outside of Europe.
Yapp contends that the important element to remember during this period of Middle 
Eastern history, is that for each of the Powers, the Middle East was subsidiary to 
Europe, and their relations with the Middle East subsidiary to their relations with one 
another in Europe. Their main concern was that changes in the distribution of power 
in the Middle East should not affect the balance of power in Europe. Indeed, “the 
larger crises o f European relations set up sizeable eddies in the Gulf Fashoda, the 
Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, the formation o f the European alliance system -  
each had its effect on the situation in the Gulf ”51 Despite this it would be untrue to 
say that the European Powers’ interests in the region had not developed in the 19th 
century. Britain had marked out an informal system of control from the Red Sea to the 
Persian Gulf, running between the land bases of Egypt and India. Of course, India was 
the reason that the route was strategically important, and the route was much more 
vital to Britain for that reason than it was to Germany or France. Russia had also 
created a large land empire for herself, whilst France, Germany and Italy had all 
established important footholds for themselves, of economic, political and cultural
49 Lord Curzon, ‘Persia and the Persian Question,’ (Longmans, Green & Co., London 1892), p.465.
50 Memorandum, Signed G. Hamilton, March 1900, F /338 /00
51 Busch, B.C. 1967, p.4.
130
influence. However, all such advances must be seen in the context of not wishing to 
upset the balance in Europe.
The geographical element of global, regional and local politics is crucial, as politics 
are played out in geographically differentiated areas. As we have seen, the relative 
location of an area in the global system, is a function of the position accorded it at any 
given time by other states within the system. It becomes clear after an analysis of all 
the Great Power interests in the Near East before 1914, that the interest lay not in the 
land per se, but almost purely in its geographical location. The Middle East was of 
importance to various powers, because o f where it was positioned, relative to their 
other interests. Thus, for Britain, it was Egypt and India that were of prime concern, 
and Iraq became the object of Britain’s foreign policy interest, simply due to its 
relative location in respect to India. To stretch a point: if Iraq, with all the same 
resources, political structures and population, had been in South America, it would 
have been of little interest to Britain, and any interest would have been of a quite 
different nature.
Such ideas feed easily into Mackinder’s Heartland theory. He too stressed the 
importance of the geographical location of an area. Mackinder was convinced that the 
region of Euro-Asia was the pivot region of the world’s politics -  the meeting place 
between the sea-powers of Europe and the land-power of the Asiatic ‘Heartland’ -  
and such a view certainly seems to give some insight into the position of the Near 
East in the global political manoueuvrings around the First World War. His theory 
stressed that the world at that time had become an almost closed system of states after 
the huge technological advances in communications, with the balance of advantage 
and disadvantage, oscillating between land power and sea power. It seems obvious 
therefore, why such a struggle should be transferred to one of the only regions left in 
the world where the system had not yet fully closed. The political system within the 
Near East was still malleable, and each of the Great Powers wished to shape it to their 
advantage. In this sense, we see that a significant element of the importance that each 
power attached to this region, was purely due to thwarting the interests that others 
held there.
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Leading up to the First World War, it could be argued that this imperative of 
maintaining the balance of power in Europe lost some of its importance. Another 
factor was becoming dominant:
“By 1914, the outstanding element in determining the attitudes o f the Great Powers 
towards the Near East was prestige. Neither the protection o f the routes o f empire nor 
economic interest nor even the balance o f power in Europe weighed, in the end, 
against prestige, In order that they might remain great, Great Powers demanded to be 
treated as great...The integrity o f the Ottoman Empire was like a bank on which the 
Great Powers could draw to make up the balance o f their prestige. When the bank 
was exhausted there was no longer an easy line o f credit in the Near East; such was 
the fate o f Austria and Russia in 1914. ”52
Even with the issue of prestige, however, we can still understand the interest in the 
Middle East through a geopolitical framework. Old school diplomacy and politics was 
moving on from bulwarks and fortified positions, and prestige became an important 
prize on the global stage. This interest in the Middle East can therefore still be seen as 
individual Great Powers trying to carve out their niche in a region, just to demonstrate 
their global position. Prestige was simply another method of warning off a potential 
threat.
4.5. Specific Histories of the Great Powers in the Middle East: Before 
1915
4.5.1. Anglo-Russian Relations
A period of modest co-operation between Russia and Britain in the Near East broke 
down in 1854 with the outbreak of the Crimean War. Russia sought to control the 
Orthodox Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, whilst Britain and France 
backed the Ottomans. The war ended in 1856, and resulted in the formation of a 
European coalition against Russia, and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire 
was guaranteed by the major European powers. The Black Sea was neutralised, and 
banned to all warships, including Russian.
52 Yapp, M.E. 1987, p.92.
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The Russians moved their attentions to the regions east of the Ottoman Empire, and 
conquered the Caucasus, moving on to extend into Turkestan. Such advances by 
Russia in Central Asia began to cause concern again in Britain and India. This 
profound suspicion of Russia climaxed in the Eastern Crisis of 1875-8. This was 
similar to other 19th century eastern crises involving the Ottoman Empire, in that 
disturbances within the Empire attracted the interest of outside powers.
The Crisis had two important impacts on Britain. Firstly, there was the emergence of 
anti-Ottoman public opinion that acted as a major constraint upon policy in the East. 
Atrocities committed against the Bulgarians had raised very strong feelings against 
the Ottomans, and this antipathy was to have considerable influence in the future, 
especially during and after the First World War.
This Eastern Crisis was also the first time that the problem of security of routes to 
India had been clearly stated in connection with the fate of the Ottoman Empire -  
notably in Lord Derby’s (the British foreign secretary), note of 6th May 1877,54 in 
which he summarised British interests in the issue. Now the fate of Mesopotamia was 
given greater significance in relation to Russian advances in eastern Asia Minor and 
the routes to India.
The Indian government was very concerned about an emerging Russian spearhead 
from Central Asia towards Afghanistan or Tibet, leading to the security of this Gulf- 
Tibet Crescent being the cornerstone of Indian foreign policy. Such an Indian view of 
Russia at the turn of the century is demonstrated by Lord Ronaldshay, the biographer 
for Lord Curzon.
"Whose the grey-clad sentinel through all the clash o f conflicting interests stands 
threateningly on the shores o f the Eastern Sea, a menace to British commercial 
aspirations and to the peace o f the nations o f the world? The answer is for ever the 
same -  Russia’s! ”55
53 see Yapp, M.E. 1987, p.75.
54 mentioned in Yapp, M.E. 1987, p.81
55 Earl o f  Ronaldshay, ‘On the Outskirts o f  Empire in A sia’, (Blackwood & Sons, London, 1904), 
pp.320-321.
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Such a view was consistent with that of Lord Curzon himself, who stated in his 1892 
work on Persia: “I  should regard the concession o f a port upon the Persian Gulf to 
Russia by any Power as a deliberate insult to Great Britain, as a wanton rupture o f 
the status quo. ”56
This issue was set to divide opinion, with the main fault-line running between the 
priorities of the British and the Indian governments. However, even Godley, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary in the India Office leant more towards the ‘defeatist’ side 
of the argument, believing that Russia was bound to gain a port in the Gulf sooner or 
later, and therefore there was little point in trying to undermine this ‘inevitability’. “I f  
we retain the command o f  the sea, the fact o f Russia }s having a port in the Gulf, 
though disagreeable, will not be a vital matter: and i f  we do not retain it, we shall not 
retain our dominion in India, or our trade with the East. ”57
Curzon however, remained adamant that letting in the Russians would spell disaster 
for Britain, and stated his views strongly in his famous dispatch of September 21, 
1899. In this dispatch he analysed British interests in the Persian Gulf, examined the 
challenges facing Britain from Russia, France, Germany and Turkey, suggested future 
avenues for British policy, and also discussed the respective responsibility of the 
British and Indian governments in this affair. Curzon’s clear message was that more 
naval power was needed in the region and Britain’s entire stance on the issue had to 
be reinforced. Protection of British interest and position, if necessary by the expansion 
of official governmental responsibility, was the core of his policy throughout his 
viceroyalty. It was not a policy that could be accepted without question at Home. 
Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, back in London, displayed the rift 
developing between India and Britain regarding foreign policy. He explained to 
Curzon in a private message that the Gulf and Persia were parts of an extreme bastion, 
and that if Britain pushed too far in that direction, she may force the rise of a 
European combination directed against her.58
56 Lord Curzon, 1892, p.465. A lso quoted in Busch, B.C. 1967, p .l 15
57 Godley private to Curzon, March 15, 1899, Curzon Mss.
58 See Hamilton private to Curzon, Jan 26 1900, Curzon Mss.
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Hamilton also signed an important memorandum in which his views on the issue were 
clearly set out.
“In our constant struggle against the growth o f Russian influence in Turkey, China 
and Persia, we recently have not sufficiently acknowledged the changed conditions 
under which the contest proceeds. As Russia annexes territory she contrives with 
adroitness and determination to so assimilate the territory absorbed that in a short 
time it becomes a reliable stepping-stone for a fresh move. Our base o f  operations is 
the sea. We remain where we are: Russia steadily moves on. Our influence stands 
still: Russia’s progresses ...In the past we were more successful because sea 
communication gave us a power o f concentrating naval force at any given spot on the 
coast which no one nation could withstand. Railways now give to a great military 
power on land the advantages that we used to enjoy on the sea: but we have not 
seriously attempted to adapt our policy to the changed circumstances o f modern 
locomotion. We are constantly proclaiming interests in territories more extensive than 
we can absorb, utilise or protect...Have we the right to say that the civilised world is 
to be deprived o f the benefit o f railway access to the Persian Gulf because it will 
impinge upon the monopoly o f sea-borne traffic we there possess? Can we say that, 
because Persia is next to Baluchistan and Baluchistan next India, therefore no one is 
to have any part o f Persia, or any port in the Gulf lest such a possession might 
facilitate the invasion o f India or disturb our political prestige? ...Let us concentrate 
our attention on that which is essential to us, which we can hold, and let us not 
interfere with Germany getting her foot into this region. Let us, without in any way 
encouraging Russia to get a port in the Gulf avoid basing our whole policy upon the 
idea that we ought to and can ultimately prevent her from accomplishing this 
object. ”59
The above extract offers an insight into the changing power structure at the turn of the 
century. Sea power was perceived to be losing its edge (as claimed by Mackinder in 
1904), and therefore Britain had to accept that its far-flung empire could not receive 
the same support as before. Many echoed Hamilton’s stance:
“What right have we to stop (the creation o f rival interests) ...except the right o f 
might? What might have we with our army locked up in S. Africa? [sic]...It is
59 Memorandum, signed G.Hamilton, March 1900, FI 338/00. Cited in Busch, B.C. 1967, pp.237-238
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undoubtedly a peril to India, and therefore to us and to our overseas dominions, that 
the illusion which we have long cherished o f the Persian Gulf being under our control 
should be shattered. But the claim rested upon nothing except the tolerance or 
indifference o f European powers, and our overwhelming Navy. These however are no 
longer indifferent, nor is our Navy what it was in relation to others. We cannot stop, 
nor have we the right to stop, the creation o f rival interests. ”60
The matter eventually resolved itself with Lansdowne’s dispatch to Lord Hardinge, 
the Secretary of Embassy in Petersburg, in which he clearly indicated the British 
position. Britain would present no obstacles to the efforts of Russia to establish 
commercial bases for her trade in the Gulf, but they warned Russia that any attempt to 
acquire a military or naval station in the Gulf must be seen as a challenge to Great 
Britain and her empire.61
4.5.2. Anglo-Ottoman Relations
It is inaccurate to think that to Britain and possibly France, goes all the credit or 
blame for the modern political structure of the Gulf and Levant’s Arab states. This 
underestimates the role of the Arab leaders, and more importantly, “completely 
ignores the role played by the most important regional state in the pre-World War 1 
period, the Ottoman Empire. ”62
Any discussion about the Great Powers in the Middle East before the First World War 
would be incomplete without an examination of the Ottoman Empire. Although often 
thought of as a decaying, failing power, the ‘Sick Man of Europe’, the Empire had 
actually begun a revival under the Tanzimat reform era. It was the choice to join 
forces with Germany in the First World War that sealed its fate. The Ottomans had 
attempted to absorb the Arabian peninsula again in the mid-19th century, to act as a 
bulwark defence against foreign encroachment. In the years preceding 1870, the 
world had begun to undergo startling changes. The revolution in communications had
60 Lee-Warner minute, Novem ber 26, 1901. FI 1276a/01
61 Lansdowne to Hardinge, January 6, 1902, Brit. Doc., IV, No.321a.
62 Anscombe, F. 1997, p .l. However, this thesis argues that the dominant shaping forces were external 
push  factors, but that certain internal forces should also be recognized. For other viewpoints on this see 
Karsh, E. & Karsh, I. ‘Empires o f  the Sand,’ (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1999)
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brought the world within “easy striking distance o f the Ottoman Empire. ” The new, 
rapid transit of messages, men and material greatly increased European pressure on 
these once remote provinces.
The Ottomans saw that order in Najd would help to subdue a hinterland that provided 
a refuge to tribes beyond the jurisdiction of the Sherif of Mecca, and would secure 
direct land links between Iraq and the Hijaz. A base in Hasa would allow a quicker 
reaction to the threat of Wahhabis from Riyadh, who in the past had raided Iraq, Syria 
and the Hijaz. If foreign powers established bases in the south, they could easily 
agitate the unchecked tribes of the interior. Security for the shipping lanes between 
Basra and Jiddah also gained importance as Iraq became a major supplier of grain to 
the Hijaz after 1864.64 Thus, the scope of British interests, as perceived by the 
Ottomans, “seemed to threaten Ottoman supremacy not only in the southern Gulf, but 
in Iraq as well ”65 The Ottomans suspected well into the 20th century that Britain 
wished to establish a land link from India to Egypt. In fact, the laying of telegraph 
cable in the 1860s from India to Fao at the southern tip of Iraq, “confirmed official 
British interest in strengthening ties to the Gulf ”66
To meet these challenges on the state’s southern borders, the Ottomans made vigorous 
efforts to expand their effective control over territory and land, and make Asia a 
complete unit of their empire by overhauling their defence and administration. Thus 
the Ottomans brought eastern Arabia within the empire’s boundaries due to concern 
over British influence in a vulnerable border region. Perceptions and mis-perceptions 
of British activities and intentions affected changes within Ottoman strategic and 
administrative policies throughout the 4 decades of their rule south of Basra. The 
irony is that this neurosis regarding Britain actually contributed to the Ottomans’ poor 
performance in the Gulf. “Overblown suspicion often diverted scarce resources to 
meet unlikely outside threats instead o f to fix  problems caused by
A 7maladministration. ” Even more ironic was the fact that although Britain was 
interested in Iraq, and the stability of the Gulf region, “Britain was concerned with
63 Anscombe, F. 1997, p. 16.
64 Lorimeer, J.G. 1908, p. 1448-9.
65 Anscombe, F. 1997, p. 19.
66 Anscombe, F. 1997, p .19.
67 Anscombe, F. 1997, p.2
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maritime affairs, and i f  the Ottomans had governed the mainland effectively, Britain 
would not have become entangled in the territories... ”68
For Britain, the greatest concern before the First World War was the security of
India, and one of the most direct routes from Britain and India ran along the Tigris
and Euphrates rivers, and through the Persian Gulf. Therefore, it was not by ,
the
coincidence that Iraq was the site of the first and longest-running campaign of First
A
World War in the Middle East. The British needed freedom of movement on this 
route, and thus negotiated agreements with Arab shaikhs who controlled coasts close 
to shipping channels. The extension of Ottoman power down the coast as far as Qatar 
alarmed Britain, as it seemed to threaten its web of agreements. “As apparent 
Ottoman indifference to issues o f maritime peace and trade increasingly irritated 
them, the British grew ever more willing to widen the scope o f their policies. ”69 If the 
Ottomans had been an effective power for the prevention of piracy, and the 
maintenance of policing on the Gulf, Britain would gladly have divested herself of
* 7 n ■these duties. Britain did not want to overtax India’s limited resources in the Gulf.
It is important to note that the causes of Anglo-Ottoman tensions in the Gulf during 
this period were largely due to perceived weaknesses in their regional positions, and 
due to these misinterpretations of the other’s attitudes and intentions, each empire felt 
impelled to act more offensively than circumstances might have dictated. In the last 
quarter of the 19th century, Britain’s attitude gradually hardened into a position of 
challenging Ottoman authority throughout Arabia. The long-standing piracy problem 
spurred Britain into an increasingly aggressive stance. For example, they decided that, 
although tacitly accepting Qatar as under Ottoman rule, it would deal with pirates 
without reference to the Ottoman’s territorial water limit -  despite breaking
• • 71international law. This was a crucial step towards Britain’s eventual, northward- 
creeping denial of Ottoman claims to sovereignty over certain points on the coast. An 
added catalyst to this was Britain’s increasing worry about the entrance of new 
powers in the region, such as Russia’s plan to build a railway from Syria to Kuwait at
68 Anscombe, F.1997, p .l
69 Anscome, F. 1997, p.3
*70 Lonmeer, J.G. 1908, p.896 -  from the Indian government Secretaiy o f  State and Foreign Affairs to 
the Iranian minister in London.
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the end of the 19th century. “I f  realised, the scheme threatened to penetrate the 
carefully constructed buffer around India. ”72 Thus in 1899, Britain concluded a 
nonalienation bond with Mubarak of Kuwait, which secured Britain’s position.
In 1910, the Ottomans finally began negotiating with Britain to establish recognised 
spheres of influence in Arabia, within broader talks about the Baghdad Railway and 
Iraq. Agreement was reached on May 6, 1913, with Istanbul renouncing claims to 
Qatar and Bahrain, and Kuwait becoming an ‘autonomous’ kaza of the Ottoman 
Empire. In return, Britain recognised Hasa as Ottoman.73 It was hard for the Ottomans 
to accept a withdrawal from Muslim lands, “but it was worthwhile i f  it secured a 
defensive line south o f Iraq that could be tenable until the empire’s fortunes 
rebounded. ”74
4.6. Moving Towards Partition
The most crucial concern of British foreign policy at the turn of the century, in the 
Middle East as elsewhere, was “should England stand alone in isolation or search for 
allies — and, i f  the latter, which allies? Put another way: should concessions be made 
to this or that power, including concessions in the Gulf, to win friends for diplomatic 
issues o f a higher order? ”75 The pre-war decades were characterised by old-school 
diplomacy, which dealt more with the tangibles of protectorates, spheres of influence, 
and fortified strategic positions, than in the more modern concerns of local goodwill 
or compromise. The era where great powers could stand alone seemed to coming to 
an end. In a sense, this was the global system becoming closed even in this part of the 
world. The room for manouevre for the Great Powers was shutting down. (See Map 
19).
From the end of the 19th century, British military Indian policies were run with the 
increasing likelihood of a Russian invasion in mind. Such a pressure prompted Britain
71 See: Lorimeer, J.G. 1908, pp.977-999. At that time, the international territorial water limit was three 
nautical miles.
72 Anscombe, F. 1997, p .l 10.
73 For details see Busch, B.C. ‘Britain,’ 1967, pp.319-40; Finnie, D.H. ‘Shifting Lines in the Sand: 
Kuwait’s Elusive Frontier with Iraq,’ (Harvard University Press, 1992), pp.35-38.
74 Anscombe, F, 1997, p. 165.
75 Busch, B.C. 1967, p.235.
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to reach agreement with Russia in 1907. This resolved nearly all of the great disputes 
between them, and it was hoped would halt the advance of Russia in Central Asia and 
prevent the collapse of British power in India. Iran was divided into spheres of 
influence, and the Russian threat seemed to subside. However, the Indian government 
was not consulted over the 1907 Agreement, and did not agree with it. This again 
displays European interests taking precedence over the affairs of India.
Radicals in Britain also opposed the treaty as an accord "concluded with the most 
despotic autocracy in Europe. ”76 Proponents of the Accord pointed to the fact that 
Britain had gained an ally against Germany, and that the danger of a Russo-German 
alliance against Britain had been temporarily removed.77 Sir Edward Grey, the British 
Foreign Secretary, wrote about the Accord, saying: “The gain to us was great. We 
were freed from an anxiety that had often preoccupied British Governments; a 
frequent source o f friction and a possible cause for war was removed; the prospect o f 
peace was made more secure. ”78
However, the agreement did prove disappointing for Britain, as Russia continued its 
advances in Asia. Britain felt unable to challenge Russia for fear that they may side 
with the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Thus, a policy of 
conciliation began, and the preservation of friendly relations with Russia became 
paramount to Britain in the years leading up to the First World War. Anglo-Ottoman 
relations must be seen within this context. Even whilst Britain remained generally 
committed to preserving the Ottoman empire, “when pressed to do so by the 
Russians, they repeatedly sacrificed Ottoman (and indeed British) interests to the 
greater imperative.1,79 For example, in 1906-7, the Russians were pressing for more 
access to the Straits and Britain responded favourably, desperate to preserve good 
relations, and despite upsetting the Ottomans. Issues in the Balkan wars also initiated 
a similar response from Britain to Russian demands. British policy seemed almost
76 Busch. B.C. 1967, p.368.
77 see Busch, B.C. 1967, pp.368-369. Also see Monger, G. ‘The End o f Isolation: British Foreign 
Policy, 1900-1907.’ (Nelson, London, 1963), p.282
78 Viscount Grey o f  Fallodon. ‘Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916.’ (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1925), 
Vol.I, p. 154.
79 Macfie. A.L. 1998, p. 117
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♦ • ♦ ftfiwholly determined by the wish to keep on friendly terms with Russia. “So 
pronounced indeed, was Britain's support for Russia in this period that Djemal, the 
CUP leader, wondered i f  the British had not already agreed on a policy o f
o I
partition. ” Here, it can be argued again that it was not the Middle East that was of 
importance to these Great Powers: it was purely their relationships to each other. Such 
a stance is of importance, as it could be argued that the Ottoman entrance into the 
First World War on the side of the Central Powers, can be partly explained by this 
British policy to please Russia at all costs, and not simply to do with the influence of 
Germany over the Ottoman Empire,
4.6.1. The Constantinople Agreement, March 1915
In November 1914, following the entry of the Ottoman s into the War, the British, 
concerned that the Russians may withdraw forces from the western front to attempt to 
seize Constantinople and the Straits, sought Russian assurances that they would 
refrain. Russia agreed on condition that she receive assurances from her western allies 
that she would gain all that she claimed with regard to the Straits -  which may or may 
not mean the partition of the Ottoman Empire after the war.82 In March 1915, the 
Russians demanded that Britain and France acknowledge the Russian possession of 
the Straits and the incorporation of Constantinople into the Russian Empire. In return, 
they would accommodate whatever demands Britain and France would put forward
• ft *1regarding their interests in other parts of the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere. She 
also made it clear that if they did not support Russian ‘national aspirations’ in that 
area, the consequences would be dire. Britain and France took this to mean that 
Russia would break off their relations with the western allies, and broker a deal with 
Germany. Thus, on March 8, 1915, France responded favourably, and Britain 
followed on March 10. A more precise definition of French and British designs on the 
region would have to await further consideration.84
80 Hinsley, F.H. (ed.), ‘British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey.’ (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1977), p.345.
81 Macfie, A.L. 1998, p .l 18; Heller, J. ‘Britain and the Armenian Question, 1912-1913: A  Study in 
Real Politik.’ M iddle Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, no.l (1980), pp.3-27; Djemal Pasha, ‘Memoirs o f  a 
Turkish Statesman.’ (Arno Press, New York 1973), p.69.
82 Macfie. A.L. 1993, Ch.2. A lso See Sir F. Bertie to Foreign Office, FO 371/2449
83 See Sir Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, March 27, 1915, FO 371/2449. Includes 3 enclosures, 
including a statement from the Russians.
84 Macfie, A.L. 1993. p.54-66.
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The conclusion of the March Agreement in 1915, forced the western Entente Powers 
to undertake a radical re-evaluation of their ambitions in the Near and Middle East. 
Britain decided that to protect her empire in Asia against the threat posed by the 
strong Russian position, it would be necessary to create a strategic line of defence, 
running from the Persian Gulf (Baghdad maybe, or Basra), to the Mediterrannean 
(Alexandretta). Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War explained this 
position in a memo:
“the area which is here proposed to incorporate undoubtably offers a prolonged flank 
to Russia for possible attack from the side ofArmenia and Kurdistan, and to this 
extent it produces an unsatisfactory strategical situation. But it seems to be a choice 
o f evils. It is a question o f gaining complete control over the great line o f 
communications to India... or to leave that line permanently to another Great Power 
or Great Powers, which would thus dominate the Mediterranean terminus. It should 
obviously be no part o f our programme to create a frontier coterminus with that o f  
Russia; but it is to be hoped that sufficient remains o f the Ottoman Empire will be left 
to ensure a Turkish or Armenian buffer state stretching from Anatolia to the Persian 
border. But, even a frontier coterminus with Russia, with all its grave drawbacks, 
would be preferable to a Franco-Russian domination o f the line from the Gulf o f 
Iskanderun to the Persian Gulf. ”85
Unfortunately for Britain, France had already staked out her claim in Syria and
o £
Palestine. In April 1915, the De Bunsen Committee was set up to consider British 
desiderata in Asiatic Turkey.87 Britain had still not fully decided on the principle of 
partitioning the Ottoman Empire. The De Bunsen Committee considered 4 possible 
solutions to the problem:
1) a policy of outright partition, with the survival of only a small Ottoman state in 
Anatolia.
85 Quoted in Macfie. A.L. 1993, p.71; Such a threat is also mentioned in the de Bunsen Committee 
report, June, 1915. CAB 42/3, para. 43, in which the committee states: ‘ JF?Y/i Russia as our immediate 
neighbour in M esopotamia we should have to make provision fo r  the defence o f  the annexed territory 
against a nation which pu t in the f ie ld  in Manchuria an army exceeding three quarters o f  a million 
m en.'
86 See French Ambassador in Petrograd to Russian Foreign Minister, 14 March 1915, FO 371/2449
87 De Bunsen Committee Report, June 1915. CAB 42/3
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2) The preservation of the Ottoman Empire, subject to the exercise of Great Power 
control in zones of political and commercial influence.
3) The preservation of the Ottoman Empire in Asia as an independent state.
4) The creation of a de-centralised Ottoman state in Asia, reconstructed along federal 
lines, possibly including 5 semi-autonomous units of Syria, Palestine, Armenia, 
Anatolia and Jazirah-Iraq.
To the Committee, their analysis of British interests in the region, "shows how the
Persian Gulf and the growth o f our position there dominate our policy, and compel us
88for good or ill to claim our share in the disintegrating Turkish Empire. ”
The Committee in particular “identified Iraq as the centre o f British aspirations, 
seeing that region as a logical extension o f the existing British position in the Persian
O Q
Gulf ” The de Bunsen report emphasised the importance of Mesopotamia to the 
British position in the region. “Commercial and strategic considerations therefore 
combine to make the committee regard the vilayets o f Basra, Baghdad and Mosul as 
the area o f greatest interest to Great Britain in the event o f a partition o f Turkey. ”90 
However, the Committee favoured the 4th option, (as long as they could have an 
influence over the unit of Iraq), which they believed would best meet the needs of 
British imperial defence, and the communities involved.91 But, by this time, the 
momentum leading to partition, all too evident in the de Bunsen analysis of the 
problem, had become unstoppable.
4.6.2. Anglo-French Relations
In December 1915, Sir Mark Sykes, an assistant secretary in the British War Cabinet, 
member of the de Bunsen Committee, and an enthusiastic convert to the principle of 
partition, began talks with Francois Georges Picot, a French diplomat. The resulting 
agreement of Jan 1916 became known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement.92 In this, they 
delimited the territories in which, in the event of a victorious outcome to the war and
88 De Bunsen Committee Report, June, 1915. CAB 42/3. Para. 14.
89 Yapp. M.E. 1987, p.276. A lso see the de Bunsen Report, June 1915. CAB 42/3, ‘Preliminary 
Considerations’, para’s. 1-16, in which the importance o f  Mesopotamia to Britain is highlighted.
90 De Bunsen Report, June 1915. CAB 42/3. Para. 28
91 For more about the deliberations o f  the de Bunsen Committee, and British designs on Iraq, see 
Klieman, A. S. ‘Britain’s War Aims in the Middle East in 1915.’ In Journal o f  Contemporary History, 
Vol. 3, no. 3 (1968), pp.237-253; PRO, London, CAB 42/3/12 Asiatic Turkey, Report o f  a Committee.
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a Russian occupation of Constantinople and the Straits, Britain and France might 
exercise direct and indirect influence and control. The French felt that they were to be 
the biggest losers should the Ottoman Empire be destroyed, and so wished to be 
properly compensated for the loss of her privileged economic and social position 
within the pre-war Ottoman empire. This compensation, they decided, should be Syria 
— where French cultural, political and religious interests were greatest.93 The British 
focus was very much on retaining control in Mesopotamia.
“In the Baghdad-Basra region o f lower Iraq, Britain, it was agreed, might exercise 
direct control; in the Syrian littoral, France. In the remainder o f the Fertile Crescent 
and the Syrian desert, Britain might exercise indirect control in the south, France in 
the north. Britain would in addition obtain control o f a small enclave on the 
Palestinian coast, including Haifa andAcra, possible termini o f a railway linking the 
Persian Gulf and the Mediterannean. The rest o f Palestine might be placed under an 
international administration. ”94
These Anglo-French negotiations were held up for some time by an issue that seemed 
to fundamentally divide them -  that of Arab independence. As early as 1915, the 
British had impressed upon the Russians that whilst they would consider Russian 
demands in the Ottoman territories, “His Majesty’s Government have stipulated that 
the Mussulman Holy Places and Arabia shall under all circumstances remain under 
independent Mussulman dominion. ”95 The British were worried about provoking the 
hostility of the Ottoman sultan-caliph and his effect on Muslims everywhere. 
Therefore it was desirable to have a pole of Muslim attraction in a British sphere of 
influence. An added incentive was that a loyal Arab following may weaken France’s 
position in the region, to Britain’s advantage. As early as November 1914, Horatio 
Kitchener, the British War Minister, foresaw the possibility of using British- 
controlled Arabs to oust France from Syria:
“Supposing that the Arabs took up against the Turks, I  think it would be our policy to 
recognise a new Khalif at Mecca or Medina... and guarantee the Holy Places from  
foreign aggression as well as from all internal interference. I f  this were done there
92 The Sykes-Picot Agreement, L/P&S/18/B259
93 Briand to Picot, Nov. 2, 1915, AAE, serie: Guerre 1914-1918, vol. 871, fols. 32-36.
94 Macfie. A.L. 1998, p. 166.
95 Aide memoire communicated to M. Sazanof, 12 March, 1915, enclosed in Sir Buchanan to Sir Grey, 
27 March. FO 371/2449
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appears to me to be a possibility for allowing Syria to be organised as an Arab state 
under the Khalif but also under European consular control and European guidance 
as regards Government.
France would be greatly weakened by having Syria which is not a remunerative 
possession and which from its geographical position must lead France astray from  
her real objective: Tunis, Algeria, Morocco. ”96
Sir Reginald Wingate, the British governor-general of the Sudan, elaborated on 
Kitchener’s proposals, and again emphasised England’s role in the future Middle 
East, at the expense of the French position. It was not
“impossible that in the dim future a federation o f semi-independent Arab states might 
exist under European guidance and supervision, linked together by racial and 
linguistic bonds, owing spiritual allegiance to a single Arab Primate, and looking to 
Great Britain as its Patron and Protector.>,9?
Therefore, to keep the French position in the future Middle East as reduced as 
possible, and to retain a loyal Muslim of importance under British influence, Britain 
always insisted that Arabia should remain under independent Muslim rule, and looked 
there for an ally of standing. They found him in Hussein Ibn Ali, the Sherif of Mecca, 
and the recognised guardian of the Muslim Holy Places in Mecca and Medina.
Hussein was already discontented under the Ottomans, and responded well to British 
overtures. Britain promised Hussein an independent Arabia, but he demanded more. 
He wanted an independent Arab state, “bounded on the north by Mersina-Adana up to 
the 37° o f latitude, on which degree falls Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Amadia 
Island, up to the border o f Persia; on the east by the borders o f Persia up to the Gulf 
o f Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception o f  the portion o f Aden 
to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to
QQ
Mersina. " Such demands put Britain in a difficult position. To consent would not 
only jeopardise England’s military and imperial position in Mesopotamia, but would
96 Kitchener to Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, Nov. 11, 1914, Papers o f  Sir Edward Grey, 
Foreign Office Papers, PRO, London, 800/102. This letter is also quoted in Kedourie, Elie, ‘In the 
Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations, 1914-1939.’ 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1976), p.32.
97 Wingate, ‘N ote,’ Aug. 25, 1915, FO 371, vol. 2486, file 34982, paper 138500.
98 Sherif o f  M ecca to Mr. Storrs, 14 July 1915, L/P&S/18/B222. More details o f  these negotiations: 
Kedourie, E. 1976, chpts. 2-3.
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also fatally undermine Anglo-French relations. Such a dilemma was noted by George 
Clerk, head of the war department at the Foreign Office on October 19 ,1915:
"It is difficult to challenge the position which France claims, and to some extent has 
secured by acquiring special interests, in the northwestern portion (Lebanon-Syria) o f 
Arabia as now defined by the Arabs. But we cannot win the Arabs unless we can 
reconcile French and Arab claims and the position must be clearly understood from  
both the French and the Arab side from the outset, or we shall be heading straight for  
serious trouble.
However, the path that Britain chose is still highly controversial, and certainly did not 
allow the British position to be ‘clearly understood from both the French and Arab 
side.’ On October 24, Sir Henry McMahon wrote to the Sherif of Mecca, explaining 
Britain’s position on the issue of future Arab boundaries.
"The districts ofMersina and Alexandretta and portions o f Syria lying to the west o f  
the districts o f Damascus, Hama, Horns and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab 
and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries.
With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab 
chiefs, we accept those limits and boundaries, and in regard to those portions o f the 
territories wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to her Ally,
France... Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise 
and support the independence o f the Arabs within the territories included in the limits 
and boundaries proposed by the Sherif o f Mecca.
Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will 
recognise their inviolability...
... With regard to the Vilayets o f Baghdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise the 
established position and interests o f Great Britain necessitates special measures o f 
administrative control in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to 
promote the welfare o f the local populations and to secure our mutual economic 
interests. ”100
99 Clerk, Minutes, Oct. 19, 1915, FO 371/2468, 34982/15290.
100 This letter, along with the rest o f  the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, can be found in Kedourie.
E. 1976, pp.97-115. Also see L/P&S/18/B222
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At no time did McMahon and Hussein agree on the actual boundaries of the proposed 
Arab state, and therefore, Hussein’s reward remained ambiguous. McMahon had 
essentially promised Hussein an independent Arab state including Syria. However, 
this state was limited to those territories that were unclaimed by France. France, 
Britain knew, already claimed Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, thus the future Arab state 
would in fact only exist in the Arabian peninsula. It was within this context that 
Britain and France conducted their negotiations through Sykes and Picot.
Picot greeted the Anglo-Arab proposals about an independent Arab state with 
amazement.101 He argued that no French government could survive politically if it 
surrendered French claims in Syria. However, Picot believed that Arab tribal rivalries 
would prevent political unification, and that therefore British promises to the Arabs 
would never succeed. “What the British want is only to deceive the Arabs. They hope 
to accomplish this by offering them a lot while admitting that the building they are 
constructing will probably not last beyond the war. ”102
Precisely because the French believed that the possibility of an independent Arab state 
was so remote, Picot announced on December 21 that France, as Britain’s loyal ally, 
would accept Britain’s proposals, and make do with a protectorate over Syria, rather 
than direct control. The vagueness of the agreement did not worry Briand or Picot, as 
precision on the question of where sovereignty lay in the future Arab state was 
unnecessary when they believed that such a state could never be created. If it were 
created in the area under a French protectorate, it would be powerless to resist French 
pressure.
Another agreement that these two allies reached was regarding the establishment of a 
national Homeland for the Jews in Palestine. Britain and France feared the possibility 
that Germany would promise Palestine to the Zionists, and such a move would win 
support for Germany from the American Jewish community. The impact on the U.S. 
government could be decisive. “I f  the Jewish financial community o f New York 
should side with the Germans, all that could weigh heavily on the decisions taken by
101 See Lord Charles Hardinge, Indian Viceroy, to A. Nicolson, Dec. 28, 1915, Papers o f  Sir Arthur 
Nicolson, PRO, London, F.O. 800/380.
102 Picot to Briand, Dec. 2, 1915, AAE, serie: A Paix, vol. 129.
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Mr. Wilson.1,103 Such a worry on the part of the Allies demonstrates the new 
importance of America on the global political scene. In November 1917, therefore, 
Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, promising the Jews a ‘national home5 in 
Palestine.104
However, France would not initially endorse this document, as circumstances had 
now changed. By the time that the Balfour Declaration was issued, the U.S. was 
already committed to the Entente. Added to this, France's Jewish population was 
highly assimilated, and anti-Zionist, and therefore France felt it was more expedient to 
satisfy the demands of French Jewry. Possibly the most important factor however, 
was that France worried that Zionism may be a liability to France’s post-war designs 
on the Middle East.105 They were concerned that she may alienate the Arabs of the 
region if she supported the Balfour Declaration. It would be better, advised Picot, to 
have such Arab hostility directed solely against Great Britain.106 On advice from their 
High Commissioner in America, who stressed the fact that some of the U.S. 
President’s closest advisers were Zionists, the French agreed that Palestinian Jews 
would be "given administrative autonomy within the framework o f  an international 
state. ”/07
The Sykes-Picot Agreement did not mark the end of rivalry and mistrust between the 
two Great Powers. The British and the French, although allies, were keenly aware of 
the threat that each posed to the other. The pattern of relations was on the whole, one 
of conflict with each other, or at least of bickering, at many levels: “The British and 
the French against the rest; the British and French against each other; the British 
and French against themselves. ”108 France remained worried that their paucity of 
troops on the ground in the Middle East would mean Britain would take advantage 
and squeeze them out. Should the Sherifian Revolt succeed with too little support 
from France, French prestige in Muslim Syria would decline, with Britain’s
103 Memo by Jules Cambon, Sec. Gen. OfQuai d’Orsay, Mar. 11, 1917, AAE, serie: Guerre 1914- 
1918, vol. 1198, fol. 117.
104 Quai d’Orsay. Nov. 1917, AAE, serie: Guerre 1914-1918, V ol.1200.
105 Pichon to Andre Tardieu, French High Commissioner to the United States, Jan. 26, 1918, AAE, 
serie: Guerre 1914-1918, vol. 1200, fol. 205.
106 Picot to Pichon, N ov. 27, Dec. 6, 1917, ibid., fols. 61-62, 79.
107 Pichon to Tardieu, Feb. 14, 1918, ibid., fol. 171.
108 Lewis, Bernard, ‘Epilogue to a Period.’ in Dann, U. 1988, p.422.
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popularity there being enhanced at French expense.109 France’s main concern was 
the situation in her North African Muslim territories. The Quai d’Orsay realised that 
what "happens in Arabia could have the most serious repercussions in all our 
colonies.1,110 French mistrust over Britain’s motives was vindicated when it became 
clear that Britain wished to thwart French ambitions in Syria, and install the Sherif s 
son Feisal as its independent ruler.111 Why would England support Feisal at France’s 
expense? The Foreign Office considered France the greater threat to British economic 
and imperial interests:
"If we support the Arab movement we shall destroy Turkey with much less risk o f 
arousing against us the permanent antagonism o f Islam; and we shall knit up our 
Empire by establishing a link between Egypt and India, without being compelled to 
take France into partnership, and placing her ina position to break our newly-won 
territorial continuity. On the other hand, i f  we allow the Arab movement to fail, and 
Syria to pass from Turkish to French domination... we shall place ourselves and 
France in a position in which our traditional rivalry in the East, which has been 
removed only with great difficulty, will be bound to arise again in an aggravated 
form ."112
It is important to remember that British policy was itself subject to great internal 
bickering. The build-up to the 1907 Agreement with Russia had highlighted the 
difference in opinion between the Indian and British governments. British policy in 
the Middle East was therefore not monolithic. Policy was a culmination of the 
interaction between many separate institutions within the framework of the British 
Empire, each with their own vested interests in the Persian Gulf. There was "a 
multiplicity o f bureaucratic factions, departments and services, divided by social 
origins and by conflicting interests and purposes, all o f which helped to influence and 
determine what is nowadays known as the decision-making process. ”113
109 Quai d’Orsay memo, July 31, 1916, AAE, serie: Guerre 1914-1918, vol. 1683, fol. 60; Defrance to 
Briand, Aug. 18, 1916, ibid., vol. 1684, fol. 46.
110 Memo by Bruno de Margerie, chief o f  Quai d’Orsay commercial and political division, ‘Note pour
le president du conseil,’ July 19, 1916, ib id .y o l  1682, fol. 185.
111 See Balfour to Pichon, Oct. 8, 1918, AAE, serie: Levant S-L-C, vol. 2, fol. 184.
112 Arnold Toynbee, ‘Memorandum on French and Arab Claim s...to British Interests,’ Dec. 19, 1918,
F.O. 371/3385, 747/191229. Toynbee was a member o f the Intelligence division o f  the F.O.
113 Lewis, B. ‘Epilogue to a Period,’ in Dann, U. 1988, p.422.
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For the British Cabinet, taking account of public opinion was vital, and it was the war 
in Europe that was important, with the Middle East merely a side-show. They knew 
little about the situation and relied heavily on advice from men on the ground. To the 
Indian government, their long-established links and interests in the Middle East 
remained of paramount significance. They were also developing new concerns in Iraq, 
and the British government’s plans to set up an independent Arab state there, were 
strongly opposed by the Indian government.114
The development of the British Gulf position was thus not accomplished without 
friction between Home and Indian authorities. In this on-going controversy, India 
took a progressive line in most instances, sometimes initiating policy without Home 
Office approval, at least until 1905. The time when Lord Curzon held office in India, 
was the time when such a stand-off was at its peak. Under his leadership, the Indian 
government had viewed problems on its frontiers as purely Indian problems -  at least 
to the point that they should have the deciding vote in determining policy. It was 
inevitable that as the Gulf became drawn increasingly into European affairs, the 
British government would demand greater control over Gulf policy. If the Gulf was 
seen as a political whole, then British policy there must be conducted in a co­
ordinated fashion.
The British government was clearly mainly concerned with protecting British, not 
Indian, interests in the Gulf, and such policies were born out of a greater awareness of 
Britain’s new position in international affairs. Gone was the era when British 
influence in the Gulf was so predominant that all her interests could be safe-guarded. 
Britain now had to manouevre amongst many Great Powers, to secure those interests 
that were of most concern to her. Her priority was always to protect her position in 
Europe. The advent of war in Europe, despite Britain having made Near Eastern 
Agreements with the Ottomans, and with the Germans over the railway issues, only 
serves to highlight the obviously greater influence of European diplomatic pressures 
upon events in the Gulf, than of Gulf affairs upon international relations.
1,4 For details see Yapp. M.E. 1987, p.280.
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4.7. Conclusion
This examination of Great Power interests in the Middle East highlights the important 
role that geography played. The region seemed to hold little inherent interest for them, 
but rather held an indirect interest courtesy of its relative location on the world map, 
and positioning between different competing powers. The possible exception from 
this was France, who did hold strong cultural interests in the actual population of 
Syria and Lebanon.
On the whole however, it was the strategic location of the Middle East, and of Iraq, 
that drew the attention of the Great Powers. Each had their own interests to defend in 
the region, and each also had their own global position to defend. In a world that was 
rapidly becoming a closed system, the Middle East provided an opportunity to gain 
new global leverage and increased prestige. Map 20 shows the proposed partitioning 
of the Ottoman Empire, as decided by the secret agreements of 1915-1917. “It is 
doubtful i f  one could find  in all history a more striking example o f child’s play with 
human fate than that presented in the scramble for Turkish territory.1,115
The region also acted as a cross-roads, where vital interests of these Great Powers 
overlapped and clashed. For example, the strategic importance of the Straits to Russia 
was safe-guarded as long as no other anti-Russian power began to overly influence 
Ottoman policy. When the Germans threatened in this way, the Russians moved to a 
policy of partition of the Ottoman Empire, to better defend her interests.
We have seen too, how Britain sometimes compromised her own interests in the 
region, to the greater imperative of maintaining friendly relations with Russia. 
European antagonisms were being played out on a different arena. Certainly, each of 
the powers held important interests in the Middle East, but these were subsidiary to 
their interests in Europe, and coloured by the perceived threats that other powers in 
the area presented. That is, control of the Middle East became a foreign policy 
objective for certain Great Powers, simply due to the fact that it was important to 
another power. Global power struggles were being focused down onto the Middle
115 Foster. H.A. 1935, p.44.
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Eastern region. For Britain, her focus was drawn increasingly to Iraq, which, due to 
the presence of other Great Powers in the region, they regarded as a last vital 
stronghold of British authority in the Gulf.
It was in this way that the geo-strategic character of the region was developed, being 
fashioned largely out of these more European power machinations. The focus of the 
European world and the Ottoman Empire was being focused down onto this vital area 
between Russia and Europe, Britain and its strongholds in India and Egypt, and the 
Ottomans and the Arabian deserts. This was the perception of the region at the 
moment of Iraq’s crystallisation, and such designs on the area certainly had immense 
repercussions on the State that was established in Iraq.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT: CREATING THE STATE OF
IRAQ
5.1. Introduction
In 1921 the new State of Iraq was to emerge as a result of the various peace 
settlements after the First World War. It consisted of the three former Ottoman 
vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and was held under a British mandate ‘until 
such time as it could stand alone.’ The vilayets of Basra and Baghdad had been under 
direct British control and administration throughout a significant part of the First 
World War, and during this time, they had been organised along the lines of a 
province of British India. Until this time, the geography of the territory had assisted 
the people of Iraq to resist the imposition of any real authority not of their choosing.1 
Although technically under Ottoman administration, the Iraqi provinces were unruly, 
and Ottoman authority sometimes did not extend far beyond the towns. The 
mountains in the north had provided an almost impenetrable fortress for the Kurdish 
population, whilst the desert confederations and Shi’i tribes of the southern river 
valleys generally overcame military expeditions sent by the Ottomans to subdue them 
to increase tax revenue. However, a new era of nation-state building was underway, 
and the international community had decided that the land of Mesopotamia was to be 
forged into an independent state. It is necessary to distinguish two separate problems 
with respect to the post-First World War peace settlements as they affected Iraq: the 
physical, geographical delineation of the state, and the nature of its political system. 
This chapter will concentrate on detailing and analysing the territorial delimitation of 
the new state.
Crucial to the geopolitical form that Iraq was to assume from its inception, is the 
question of who ultimately had the power to determine how ‘Iraq’ should be defined.
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Who and what gave it its final territorial limits, and who was responsible for defining 
those limits? What arguments were used to justify them, whose interests were they 
meant to protect, and what impact did this all have on the nature of the crystallizing 
Iraqi state? New territorial frameworks were established throughout the 
Mesopotamian region, and the nature and impact of these must be examined. In the 
previous chapter, we have seen how the imperatives of the Great Powers were coming 
to have an immense impact on the Middle Eastern region as a whole. Through the 
cataclysm of the First World War the previously unthinkable partition of the Ottoman 
Empire gained unstoppable momentum. It was the geographical location of the region 
that lent it an importance in the eyes of these competing external powers. It was also 
clear that the British focus was concentrating increasingly on maintaining a 
stronghold in Iraq. How was this British ambition transferred into actual power and 
control? This chapter analyses how Britain came to hold the mandate for Iraq, how 
the limits of this new state were defined, and what impact these changes had on the 
geopolitical nature of the emerging state.
Britain’s interest in Iraq had been clearly outlined in all her agreements and treaties 
with the other powers. (See Map 21). Her interest had also been mentioned 
increasingly frequently in the war years. In her communications with the Sherif of 
Mecca during the war, Britain had stated repeatedly that “With regard to the vilayets 
o f Baghdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and 
interests o f Great Britain necessitate special measures o f administrative control in 
order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare o f  
the local populations and to safe-guard our mutual economic interests. ”2 Britain 
believed that these interests had been sufficiently safe-guarded by her treaties with the 
Arabs, and with her French ally.
However, as evidenced by the rift between Britain and France even after the Sykes- 
Picot Agreement of 1916, “no sooner had the Entente Powers concluded their 
elaborate and in parts inconsistent series o f secret treaties and agreements than the
1 “During the long p er io d  o f  Ottoman administration (1534-1918), the local authority o f  tribal leaders 
was never successfully challengedfor long periods o f  time by the central government. ” Sweet, L. 1968, 
p.253
Storrs to the Sherif o f  Mecca, 24 October 1915, L/P&S/l 8/B222
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treaties and agreements began to unravel ”3 In April 1917, the new Russian cabinet, 
installed after the March revolution, issued a declaration denouncing the policies of 
conquest and annexation adopted by the previous regime. In November they 
renounced all claims to Constantinople and the Straits. They also made public to the 
peoples of the Middle East, some of the treaties of which they had previously been 
unaware: notably the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Britain 
tried to placate an angry Sherif Hussein regarding the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 
explaining that the documents “did not constitute an actually concluded agreement. ”4 
In response to a document that became known as the Declaration of the Seven, 
prepared by seven leading Syrians living in Egypt, Britain stated “that in territories 
which had been free and independent before the outbreak o f war, and in those 
liberated from Turkish rule by the actions o f the Arabs themselves, the British would 
recognise the complete and sovereign independence o f the Arabs. In the territories 
liberated from Turkish rule by the action o f Allied armies, on the other hand, they 
would seek to create governments based on the ‘principle o f the consent o f  the 
governed’, while in territories still under Turkish rule they expected that the 
oppressed peoples would ‘obtain their freedom and independence ’. ”5
It is significant that none of these statements called into question the principle of 
partition on which the secret treaties and agreements had been based. The paradox 
here is that in the closing months of the war, the Entente Powers remained committed 
to policies based on a principle that had been enshrined in the 1915 Constantinople 
Agreement with Russia as a concession to Russian ambitions, despite the fact that the 
original Russian claim to Constantinople and the Straits, which had given rise to these 
policies of partition, had been abandoned. “Great Power policy with regard to the 
Ottoman Empire, in other words, once shaped by considerations o f long-term 
strategic interest, was now being driven merely by events. ”6
3 Macfie. A.L. 1998, p .170.
4 Holt. P.M. ‘Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922: A Political History.’ (Longmans, London 
1966), p.275.
5 Holt. P.M. 1966, pp.276-7.
6 Macfie. A.L. 1998, p. 172; also see Macfie. A.L. 1993, pp.81-85.
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5.2. The Peace Treaties and Conferences After the First World War
5.2.1. The Armistice of Mudros
In 1918, British Indian Forces were occupying Basra and Baghdad,7 and in October 
1918, the British Cabinet, foreseeing an Ottoman collapse, ordered the British 
commander to advance on Mosul -  which was eventually occupied one week after the 
armistice. Such a decision was justified on military grounds, and the need for law and 
order. “But in the minds o f the British authorities in Iraq, Mosul was required to 
make a viable state o f Iraq in the future. ”8 They were also concerned that the 
disappearance of Russia as a power in the region, would lead to a power vacuum, 
which would especially threaten areas contiguous to the vanished Russian sphere.
“ Whatever solution be reached in regard to the above mentioned area, it must modify 
the situation in Upper Iraq and Mosul, to which it is contiguous. ”9 However, no 
decision had been taken in London that there should be a state of Iraq, and the future 
of Iraq remained a very open question.
The Cabinet was also divided over the terms of the armistice with the Ottomans. 
Curzon and Austen Chamberlain wanted harsh terms imposed. As Ronald Graham put 
it: “It is absolutely essential for us, i f  we wish for future peace and order in India, 
Egypt and the Muslim World, to show with unmistakable clearness that the Turk is 
beaten and is forced to accept such terms as we choose to offer.1,10 Others, such as the 
chief of the Imperial Defence Staff, Henry Wilson, wanted far milder terms.
Ultimately, under the impression that the Germans and Austrians would go on 
fighting into 1919, Henry Wilson was prepared to pay a high price to secure the 
immediate withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the War. This would release half 
a million imperial troops, mainly Indian, to the western front. Also, it would get the
7 Slugglet, P. 1976, p.23, gives clear insight into how established the British Civil Administration in 
Mesopotamia had already become. Also see: Gertrude Bell, London, 1920, Vol. II, esp. pp.90-100; 
House o f Commons Debates, 23 July 1918, quoted in Wilson, A.T. ‘Mesopotamia, 1917-1920: A Clash 
o f  Loyalties. (London, 1931), p.99
8 Yapp. M.E. 1987, p.294.
9 Memo by Sir Mark Sykes to, undated, 1918, FO 371/3384.
10 Quoted in Rothwell, V.H. ‘British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy.’ (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1971), p.240.
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Straits open to Allied shipping, so that Entente forces could move through Romania to 
Austria.11 For this reason, the camp urging milder conditions won out, and out of 
some twenty clauses sent by the British government to their chief negotiator, he was 
advised that only the first four were imperative, and that the rest could be sacrificed if 
necessary.
Ironically, the Ottoman negotiators were inexperienced, and unaware of the 
importance that Britain attached to getting the Straits opened as soon as possible. If 
they had known, they could have come away from the Armistice with significant 
concessions. However, communications with Istanbul were poor, and their brief had 
been simple: as long as the Greeks were kept out of Istanbul, they would accept any 
conditions. Therefore they agreed to comply with all of the clauses that the Entente 
put forward. Naively , the Ottoman delegation pre-supposed that Britain and her 
Allies would be willing to conclude a peace that would secure the survival of the 
Ottoman Empire -  albeit in a decentralised form. They believed that British foreign 
policy was concerned with the preservation of a stable power in the area, capable of 
opposing the advance of Russia. In his view therefore, the British would be keen to 
ensure the integrity of a strong and independent Ottoman Empire. “It was to prove a 
fatal misunderstanding, for as events were later to show the British and her Allies had 
in fact every intention ofpartitioning the Ottoman Empire, including those parts o f 
the empire which had remained unoccupied at the end o f the war.1,12
The Armistice of Mudros was signed on 30 October 1918. The terms finally agreed 
upon, especially those to do with the rights of the Allies to occupy various parts of the 
empire, remained significant, as they helped to shape the situation in the post-war 
period. The destruction and partition of the Ottoman Empire was now inevitable.
5.2.2. American Influence
Another influence was to enter the global arena, and have a significant impact on the 
post-war settlement in the Middle East. This was the entrance of the United States of 
America into the equation -  “the last Western frontier o f liberalism, where, in a
11 PRO, ADM  116/1823. Conditions o f  an Armistice with Turkey arranged in order o f  importance.
12 Macfie. A.L. 1998, p. 181.
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detached and disinterested position, human interests as a whole stood out in
t o  • « »somewhat clearer and broader outline. " We have already seen that Britain issued 
the Balfour Declaration in 1917 in the hope of winning support for the Allies within 
the American Jewish community, as the impact of this community upon the United 
States government could be decisive.14 This demonstrated that U.S. opinion mattered 
to the Allies, and that the U.S. was taking its place among the Great Powers. President 
Woodrow Wilson, seeking to discover a set of principles that might form the 
foundation of the peace settlement, published his ‘Fourteen Points’ document, point 
12 of which suggested that the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire should be 
‘assured a secure sovereignty,’ while the other nationalities living under Ottoman rule 
"should be assured an undoubted security o f life and an absolutely unmolested
I $opportunity o f autonomous development. ” He decried the exploitation of people 
under imperial control, and championed the concept of self-determination. This 
ideology of self-determination was at odds with the old imperialist ideologies of 
France and Britain, and they realised that their pre-war plans for the Middle East must 
be adapted to fit in with this new global situation. “It followed that i f  the needs and 
ambitions o f Great Powers were to be satisfied' new devices must be found to disguise 
their gains. ”16
The First World War had seen a dramatic break away from the notion of multinational 
empires to a recognition of the principle of nationality, and the rights of these nations 
to self-government. Therefore, there came into prominence the concepts of treaties 
with independent states, spheres of influence, and mandates: “an invention designed to 
reconcile the wants o f Great Powers with the hopes o f aspirant nations or, as some 
cynics put it, to cast a garb o f respectability over the desire o f the Great Powers to get 
their teeth into their former enemies ’ colonies. Although the latter proposition often 
more justly represented the reality it would be wrong to discount the element o f moral 
fervour in those who made and carried out the settlement. ”17
13 Foster. H.A. 1935, p.87. What an irony this is, in view o f  current United States ‘realist’ attitudes to 
the setting up o f  an International Court to try war criminals.
14 See Memo by Jules Cambon, Secretary General o f  the Quai d’Orsay, Mar. 11, 1917, AAE, serie: 
Guerre 1914-1918, vol. 1198, fol. 117.
15 Anderson, A.S. ‘The Esatern Question, 1774-1923’ (Macmillan Press, London 1966), Doc. 27.
16 Yapp. M.E. 1987 p.302.
17 Yapp. M.E. 1987 p.302.
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Under a mandate system, the new ideology of self-determination could be safe­
guarded, without France and Britain losing total control over the regions in which 
their interests were greatest.
5.2.3. The Paris Peace Conference, 1919
Under the changed international atmosphere that followed the Armistice, outright 
annexation of territory was no longer acceptable, and other methods of maintaining 
control had to be sought. British policy had to be tailored not only to serve British 
interests, but also to satisfy President Wilson’s vision of self-determination and 
equality of international opportunity for all powers. The system of Mandates was an 
attempt to reconcile these two conflicting interests. On January 30, 1919, the Allies 
agreed to a British-sponsored proposal that the former Ottoman territories should 
receive administrative and political advice from a mandatory power until these states 
were considered economically and politically mature enough to stand on their own.
As a concession to Wilsonian principles, the native populations would receive the 
right to choose their own mandatory. The mandate system was a means to satisfy the 
Allies’ territorial ambitions without incurring the taint of annexation and the wrath of 
President Wilson.18
Britain desperately wanted to have some form of control over Mesopotamia, and yet 
was aware that a direct territorial claim may show her in a bad light. She therefore 
resorted to highlighting her involvement and effort in the war, claiming that the whole 
of the burden of operations which led to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire had 
fallen on Britain. Mr. Balfour explained that: “The British Government does not 
mention these facts in order to establish a territorial claim, but it does not think that 
in forming a judgement on the situation they can be ignored. ”19 Following this, he 
reiterated Britain’s acceptance of the proposal to send a Joint Commission of 
Representatives of the Powers to examine the situation in Syria, Palestine and 
Mesopotamia, to advise the Conference as to the wishes of the people, and the best 
distribution of mandates throughout the region. However, despite the disclaimer,
18 See Pichon to Balfour, Feb. 6, 1919, AAE, serie: Levant S-L-C, vol. 9, fol. 89; Quai d’Orsay Memo, 
‘Accord sur la Syrie-Cilicie,’ Mar, 17, 1919, AAE, serie: Levant S-L-C, vol. 25, fol. 108.
19 Memo by Mr. Balfour, 31 May, 1919. CAB 21/153
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Britain must have felt that they did indeed have territorial claims to Mesopotamia, and 
the fact that they had such a developed Civil Administration already established
onthere, must have made them confident of receiving the Mesopotamian mandate.
5.2.4. Sharpening of British Interests in Mesopotamia.
Britain began sharpening its focus on what their major designs were within the 
Mesopotamian region, even before the mandatory awards were to be made. Their 
main competitors in this respect were the French, and delimiting their separate 
spheres of influence became a major foreign policy objective for both countries 
throughout 1919 and 1920. A memorandum written by Lt. Col. W.H.Gribbon of the 
War Office summed up this situation: It is presumed not to be our policy to offend 
France. I f  this is the case, we must not allow our relations with her to be displaced by 
our relations with the unstable Arabs, and the problem which remains is to make the 
best arrangements for the British Empire between the French and the Arabs. This 
must be an arrangement which will enable us to maintain our relations with France 
without detriment to the strategical position which we have acquired in this war. That 
is, we must retain the possibility o f direct air, railway and oil routes between
9 /
Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. ”
In regard to these interests in Mesopotamia, the British were sensitive to any French 
influence: “the paramount consideration, from a British point o f view, is the 
feasibility o f constructing railway communication and a pipe line for oil outside o f 
territory which may fa ll within French influence. ”22 Britain requested, and was given 
the vilayet of Mosul by the French. “The advice on which he (the British P.M.) had 
based his request for Mosul was that Mesopotamia was o f very little use without 
Mosul. Now he wanted an outlet from Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean. ”23 The 
reason given for the French acceptance of the British request for Mosul, was that they 
recognised “that Mosul was geographically and economically part o f
20 Burgoyne, E. ‘Gertrude Bell: From Her Personal Papers 1889-1914,’ Vol. II, (Ernest Benn, London 
1958), pp. 75-79.
21 Memo. To War Office, Lt. Col. Gribbon, June 6, 1919. CAB 21/153
22 Appendix II o f Notes o f a meeting held at Trouville, Sept. 9, 1919. CAB 21/153
23 Notes o f a meeting held at Trouville, Sept. 9, 1919. CAB 21/153.
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Mesopotamia. ”24 In fact, there is evidence to suggest that the real French interest lay 
in securing Tangier, and Mosul was simply a useful bargaining chip.25 This again 
reinforces the fact that the Middle East was part of a larger power struggle, in a global 
arena. Decisions were being made about the future territorial lay-out of the region, yet 
the foundations of these decisions were often far from local.
Britain was also willing to make small sacrifices to French demands, but only when it 
did not impinge on British interests. “As regards Mesopotamia, it is not essential to 
include the oasis ofTadmor within the British zone, since the water supply ofTadmor 
is sulphurous ...The line can, therefore, he drawn somewhere east o f  Palmyra, and on 
this side there should he no special difficulty in meeting the French wishes. ”26 Thus, 
the boundaries of Mesopotamia became gradually more and more defined. Such 
delimitation of territory was the hallmark of the nation-state ideal that both Britain 
and France were seeking to create in the area. The League of Nations was to sanction 
the setting up of ‘independent nations’ in the region, as the best resolution to the issue 
of former Ottoman territories, and the ideology of nation-states demanded fixed 
geographical limits.
Britain issued an aide memoire on September 13, 1919, in which it clearly laid out its 
developing policy in regard to Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. In this, it promised 
the immediate preparation of the evacuation of British troops from Syria and Cilicia, 
leaving them in French hands. Britain stated that its troops would be pulled back from 
Syria, but would remain in Palestine and Mesopotamia: “Until the boundaries o f  
Palestine and Mesopotamia are determined, the British Commander-in-Chief shall 
have the right to occupy outposts in accordance with the boundary claimed by the
97British Government. ” They also made an outright claim for the Mesopotamian 
mandate, including Mosul.28 They justified the inclusion of Mosul in a Foreign Office 
document, which claimed that: “North Mesopotamia has been occupied more recently 
than Syria by the British forces, but it is already evident that the Arabs o f  Mosul
24 Lloyd George to Clemenceau, Oct. 18, 1919. Enclosed in Kerr to Foreign Office, Oct. 20, 1919, FO 
371/4184, note 7.
25 See Adam to Crowe, Oct. 9, 1919. FO 371/4184, note 3.
26 Appendix II o f  Notes o f  a meeting held at Trouville, Sept. 9, 1919. CAB 21/153
27 Minutes o f War Cabinet Meeting, Foreign Office,, Sept. 22, 1919. CAB 21/153
28 Aide M emoire Regarding British Policy in Regard to Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Paris, Sept. 
13, 1919. CAB 21/153
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90desire union with the rest o f Mesopotamia. ” It is noteworthy that only the wishes of 
the Arab population of Mosul seem to be of interest to the British at that time.
The problem facing Britain and France, as prospective mandatory powers, was 
exactly how to present their interests in the region, and how to delimit the proposed 
territorial units in the light of Wilsonian principles. The areas that they were to delimit 
were to be independent nations, provisionally recognised by the international 
community, and each being supplied with a mandatory only until such time as they 
could stand alone. These important issues were tackled in Mr.Balfour’s memorandum 
respecting Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, in 1919. In this, he made several 
fundamental points regarding the delimitation of the territories: “In the first place, I  
would lay it down that frontiers should be determined by economic and ethnographic 
considerations rather than strategic. ”30 Such a stance seemed imperative if these 
chrysalis states were ever to be viable independently. Balfour continued: “We have 
three coterminous areas to consider -  Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Their 
frontiers may be doubtful, but the great central core o f each is disputed by no 
one... Mesopotamia is essentially the region watered by the Tigris and Euphrates.
What we have got to do is to make such international arrangements, economic and 
territorial, as will enable each region to develop itself to the best advantage without
3 /
giving occasion for jealousies or disputes. ” Balfour admitted that such issues would 
be better dealt with by experts who had more knowledge of the situation than he 
possessed. However, he did include a precis of his ideas regarding the economic 
needs of Mesopotamia, which he saw as dominated by issues relating to water and 
access.
As regards the population, President Woodrow Wilson had naively demanded an 
Allied Commission be sent to the former Ottoman territories, to determine the wishes 
of the newly liberated peoples. This appears to have been the last of his efforts 
directly in line with their interests. “The failure to send this commission is further 
illustrative o f the fight by France and Great Britain for the old colonial system. 
Whatever obligations to the principle o f se lf determination these states had assumed,
29 Foreign Office Memorandum on ‘French and Arab Claims in the Middle East in Relation to British 
Interests’. Dec. 19, 1918. CAB 29/2.
30 Memo by Balfour, August 11, 1919, enclosed in Balfour to Curzon, Sept. 19, 1919. FO 371/4183
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whether on the basis o f the entrance o f the United States into the war, o f  the terms o f 
the armistice, or o f their declarations to the Arabs, seemed not to trouble their 
imperial consciences. ”32 After two months of waiting for the dispatch of the proposed 
Allied Commission, Woodrow Wilson decided to send his own King-Crane 
Commission.33 Both France and Britain opposed this, which indicates their fears as to 
its findings.
However, the King-Crane Commission did not even visit Mesopotamia, but met 
representatives from there, who presented a program for their country. It seemed clear 
from this that the Mesopotamians wanted America as their mandatory, and had strong 
feelings against Britain.34 However, the Commission noted that the British had made 
an effort to canvass the wishes of leading Mesopotamians as regarding a mandatory, 
and that they had also found good evidence of opinion favourable to a British 
mandate, although, as Foster states, as this opinion was “being reported to British 
officers, it was somewhat more favorable than it would otherwise have been. ”35 
Therefore, despite the wishes put forward by the Mesopotamian representatives, the 
Commission recommended that Britain get the mandate, as the United States had 
already been recommended as the mandatory for Syria Asia Minor.36The commission 
also recommended that the unity of Mesopotamia be preserved. “It should probably 
include at least the vilayets o f Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. And the southern Kurds 
and Assyrians might well be linked up with Mesopotamia. The wisdom o f a united 
country needs no argument in the case o f Mesopotamia.,,3?
5.2.5. The San Remo Conference of 1920, and the Consequences
At San Remo on 25 April, 1920, the Supreme Council conferred the Ottoman 
mandates upon Great Britain and France. The Ottoman Government would formally
31 Memo by Balfour, August 11, 1919, enclosed in Balfour to Curzon, Sept. 19, 1919. FO 371/4183.
32 Foster, H.A. 1935, p. 89
33 See ‘Report o f  the King-Crane Commission on the Near East.’ Editor and Publisher, Vol.LV (Dec. 
2, 1922), No.27, Supplement, pp.i-xxviii
34 ‘Report o f Commission,’ in Editor and Publisher, Vol. LV, No. 27 (2nd ed.; December 2, 1922), 
p.viii
35 Foster, H.A. 1935, p.91
36 See ‘Report o f  a Comm ission,’ in Editor and Publisher, Vol. LV, No. 27. (2nd Ed.; Dec 2, 1922), p. 
viii.
37 ‘Report o f  a Commission’, ibid, 1922, p.xi.
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surrender all of its former non-Turkish territories, and an Ottoman delegation was 
made to sign this officially at Sevres on August 10, 1920. France gained the mandate 
for Syria, whilst Britain retained Mesopotamia. This decision symbolically meant that 
France and England shared equal status in the Middle East, and that England would 
have to acquiesce to any action undertaken by the French in Syria.38 The spirit of the 
Sykes-Picot agreement had therefore suffered little infringement, and consequently, 
little regard was had for the wishes of the indigenous populations.
It was also a fundamental decision in that new states had been created: “It was 
decided to include in Peace Treaty with Turkey Articles recognising Syria and 
Mesopotamia as independent subject to the assistance o f a mandatory until such time 
as they are able to stand alone. ”39 The form of these new countries was clearly 
vulnerable to the self-interest of the mandatories. Also in the hands of the mandatories 
were decisions regarding the geographical extent of these new entities. “The 
boundaries o f these States will not be included in the Peace Treaty but are also to be 
determined by the principal Allied Powers. ”40
The Allies seemed worried about the Arab reaction, should mandates be awarded, and 
boundaries decided upon, all at the same time and without FeisaPs presence. They 
thought that stalling the geographical fixation of these new states until a token Arab 
input could be made, would appease the Arabs -  perhaps a case of being ‘seen’ to 
value Arab input. At the meeting of the Supreme Council at San Remo, “The Powers 
were most desirous that Peace should reign in those regions, and that a modus 
vivendi should be reached with Feisal...he had a strong backing, and it seemed 
certain that he would emerge shortly as the Head o f a new State. I f  the Allied Powers 
now fixed the boundaries without him they would be creating great difficulties for  
themselves in the future... The Emir Feisal would almost certainly be coming to 
Europe very shortly, and Lord Curzon urged that it would be better to await his
38 See Hardinge, Permanent Undersecretary o f  State at the Foreign Office, to Allenby, July 16, 1920, 
BD, 1st series, vol. 13, no. 284, p .313.
39 Curzon (at San Remo) to Foreign Office, April 26, 1920, FO 371/5035
40 Curzon to Foreign Office, April 26, 1920, FO 371/5035
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arrival before the Council definitely committed itself To fix  boundaries now was 
unnecessary, in the first instance, and unwise in the second.1,41
Negotiations with the French regarding the delimitation of their respective mandated 
territories, started immediately. Mr. Vansittart, the British Envoy in Paris, wrote to 
Curzon, emphasising that the major issues to resolve with the French related to the 
Tigris-Euphrates water supply, the Mesopotamian railway, and its access to the 
Mediterranean. He enclosed to Curzon certain draft articles for insertion in the 
French-Anglo Agreement, that would resolve these issues. It was proposed that: “the 
frontier between the French and British mandatory areas, eastwards from the point at 
which the eastern frontier o f Palestine as defined by the Palestine mandate reaches 
the Yarmuk valley from the north shall follow in principle the line laid down in the 
Anglo-French agreement o f 1916 to reach the Euphrates at Abu Kemal.
Nevertheless the French Government agree to the appointment o f  a special 
commission who, after studying the ground, may adjust the above-mentioned line in 
the Yarmuk Valley, as far as Deraa in such a way as to enable a British railway and 
pipeline to pass entirely within the British mandatory area, connecting Palestine with 
the Euphrates valley. ”42 Should the British pipeline and railway have to pass through 
French territory, “the French Government will recognise the perpetual right o f the 
British Government to transport troops along such a line at all times. ”43
Exchanges such as these highlighted the fact that any boundary decisions were being 
negotiated bilaterally between France and Britain, in accordance with their interests, 
and were informed very little by the wishes of Feisal, let alone the rest of the 
population. A preliminary draft mandate for Mesopotamia was sent by Vansittart to 
Curzon in August 1920, and whilst it detailed plans for the proposed administration 
and the beginning date for organic law, it seemed that there was no real haste 
regarding boundaries. It stated that “a Boundary Commissioner shall be appointed by 
the mandatory to trace on the spot, in co-operation with a Boundary Commissioner
41 Extracts from British Secretary’s notes o f a meeting o f the Supreme Council, San Remo, April 25, 
1920, FO 371/5244.
42 Enclosure in Vansittart to Curzon, 27 July, 1920, FO 371/5245
43 Enclosure in Vansittart to Curzon, 27 July, 1920, FO 371/5245
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appointed by each o f the Governments o f Palestine and Syria, the portion o f the 
boundary laid down in the annex between Mesopotamia and those countries. ”44
5.3. The Nature of Boundaries
"The precise determination o f the territorial extent o f a state is crucially important in 
determining the extent o f its jurisdiction... ”45 However, the nature of these boundaries 
could vary widely. Hartshorne46 and Boggs47, two American geographers, each 
attempted to categorize land-boundary types. Boggs’ classification contained four 
categories of boundary: physiographic, geometric, anthropogeographic and complex. 
Whilst Boggs’ system stressed the physical characteristics of a boundary,
Hartshorne’s classification put more emphasis on the cultural backdrop of a boundary. 
Drawing on the evolutionary models current in fluvial geomorphology at the time, 
(notably Davisian),48 he contended that there were five major categories of boundary: 
pioneer, antecedent, subsequent, superimposed and relict.
Examples of some of these different categories can be found in the Levantine region. 
However, Schofield contends that at the time of the post-First World War settlement, 
“conventional wisdom dictated that a natural (or physiographic) boundary should be 
adopted wherever possible. ”49 Such a claim is backed up by the fact that two of the 
Governments of India’s most influential administrators, Lord Curzon and Colonel 
Thomas Holdich (who headed the Indo-Persian Boundary Demarcation Commission 
in the mid-1890s), had each publicly advocated the use of natural boundaries. 
Holdich wrote in 1916 that no more perfect boundary could be devised than that of
44 Declaration Constituting the Mandate for Mesopotamia, enclosed in Vansittart to Curzon, 2 August, 
1920. FO 371/5245
45 Joffe, G. ‘Territory. State and Nation in the Middle East and North Africa.’ In Schofield, R.N. and 
Schofield, C.H. (eds.), ‘World Boundaries in the Middle East and North Africa,’ (Routledge, London 
1994), pp. 1-20.
46 See Hartshorne, Richard. ‘Suggestions on the Terminology o f  Political Boundaries,’ Association o f  
American Geographers, Annals 26, (1936) pp.56-57
47 See Whittemore Boggs, S. ‘International Boundaries: A Study o f Border Functions and Problems.’ 
(Columbia University Press, N ew  York 1940)
48 See Chorley, R.J. et al (eds.), ‘The Life and Work o f  William Morris D avis,’ (Methuen, London 
1973), Vol.II
49 Schofield, R. (ed.), ‘Territorial Foundations o f the G ulf States.’ (University College London Press, 
London 1994). See p. 15. A lso see Schofield, R. ‘’Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial 
Disputes.’ (Royal Institute o f  International Affairs, Chatham House, London 1991), p .85.
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mountains and rivers combined.50 Although such a standpoint has since been 
discredited, Schofield reminds us that it was hugely influential at the time, and that 
administrators coming up through the system in the 1910s and 1920s, would 
obviously have had their attitudes coloured in this respect. Subsequently, distinctive 
natural features, despite their scarcity throughout the region, were adopted where 
possible in the early 1920s. In many cases however, boundaries in this region had to 
be drawn through desolate terrain that presented very few distinctive features, and 
therefore, different strategies had to be exercised. Along much of the Saudi-Iraq 
boundary, many straight-lines segments, or geometric boundaries were utilised to link 
the infrequent natural features. Anthropogeographic boundaries, those which followed
C 1
tribal, ethnic or religious boundaries seem very under-used in relation to 1920s Iraq.
It was only in the late 1950s, with respect to the Trucial Coast, that British boundary - 
malcers began to make efforts to delimit the region with respect to such 
anthropogeographic considerations. Until that time, it seems that ethnic and 
religious considerations were seen as secondary to ‘natural5 ones, or only utilised 
when the resulting ethnic or religious mix was seen as advantageous to the British.
For example, the largely Sunni Kurdish population of Mosul were eventually included 
within the new State of Iraq, because the British wanted them to offset the influence 
of the Shi’i majority.
In Hartshorne’s original terminology, his superimposed boundary referred to the 
principle by which river systems established at one period on a particular strata might 
cut their way through onto different strata, thus creating a river system which 
reflected the influence of the earlier surface geology, now gone. However, the term 
can also be used very effectively to describe those boundaries that are arbitrarily 
imposed by an outside agency, which are also otherwise hard to explain in the context 
of their present surroundings. In this sense, it can be argued that any linear boundary 
can be viewed as superimposed within the Levant region. Fixed and rigid 
delimitations were drawn upon a cultural landscape for which they arguably held no 
relevance. Ideas of territoriality within the region pre-1920s were traditionally fluid 
and impermanent. The impact of British boundary-making should therefore be fully
50 Holdich, T.H. ‘Political Frontiers and Boundary-Making.’ (Macmillan, London 1916)
51 This was partly because delimiting anthropogeographic boundaries was difficult in areas where tribes 
were not sedentary.
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understood to truly appreciate the resulting geopolitical nature of the Iraqi state. 
Boundaries are not simply lines on maps, and are central to understanding political 
life. As Anderson states: “Examining the justifications offrontiers raises crucial, 
often dramatic, questions concerning citizenship, identity, political loyalty, exclusion, 
inclusion and o f the ends o f the state. ” He goes on to stress the role of boundaries as 
markers of identity. During the delimitation of Iraq in the 1920s, what was being 
marked out was supposedly a ‘national9 identity. Used in this way, boundaries are part 
of the political beliefs and myths about the unity of a given ‘people’, and sometimes 
the ‘natural ‘ unity of a given territory. However, evidence of how such ‘markers of 
identity’ were decided upon, may demonstrate that other considerations were of more 
importance, especially as the decisions were undertaken by Britain, who had interests 
other than that of the national unity of Iraq to satisfy.
5.3.1. The Western Boundary
The Eastern boundary of Mesopotamia was not a time-consuming issue, as it had 
always been an international border, previously separating Persia from the Ottoman 
territories. (See Map 22). The question of boundary fixation was held up by one 
boundary in particular. It was deciding exactly where the boundaries of Palestine and 
Mesopotamia should be positioned, and whether they should involve an interim 
territory, that became a sticking point between Britain and France. Deliberations on 
this issue seemed to provide three possible options of dealing with these frontiers. The 
first possibility was making the frontiers of Palestine and Mesopotamia coterminous, 
but leaving the actual boundaries undefined. Otherwise, the western confines of 
Mesopotamia could be extended to embrace all of the intervening territory not 
included in Palestine proper. Finally, the issue could be resolved by fixing mutually 
agreeable boundaries in accordance with the generally accepted definition of Palestine 
and Mesopotamia, and that the intervening space should be dealt with as a British 
sphere of influence, but not as a mandated territory. However, the Committee’s 
meeting on this issue in August 1920 was inconclusive, and the issue was left to
52 See Schofield, R. 1994, p.27
53 Anderson, Malcolm. ‘Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern W orld.’ (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1996), p .l
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resurface.54 There was a move however, to treat this intermediate territory of 
‘Transjordania’ as a separate entity, rather than simply adding it on to either Syria of 
Mesopotamia.
A subsequent meeting was held just a few weeks later in early September 1920 at the 
Foreign Office. Several important issues regarding the boundary between Palestine 
and Mesopotamia were raised, mentioning, for the first time, the potential impact on 
the local population, albeit from a British strategic standpoint. Colonel Meinertzhagen 
pointed out that: "the boundaries, even as now drawn, cut through the recognised 
territories o f several Arab tribes. It was clearly undesirable that more than one Power 
should be responsible for the control o f a single tribe. Each tribe should be able to 
appeal either to Damascus or to Bagdad, [sic] but not to both. In the case o f divided 
authority the Arabs would be inclined to play o ff one Power against another. ”55 
Major Marrs added that the boundaries as now drawn "would place certain friendly 
Arab tribes, who had remained loyal to us even under the present difficult conditions, 
under French administration. He considered that this would have a very bad effect. ”56 
Again, it was finally decided that the Committee would recommend that the line 
defined in the French mandate as being the eastern and southern boundary of Syria 
should be adopted as far as Deraa, but that no further attempts would be made at that 
time to define the boundaries of Mesopotamia. The manner in which these discussions 
were carried out, with the population being mentioned solely when it affected the 
British position, demonstrates a clear lack of any wish to base the proposed 
independent state around some local consensus. The British were clearly hoping that 
any unity that the future state was to have could be imposed from above. This was to 
have a fundamental impact on the nature of the emerging state, as its geopolitical 
identity and form were being determined by a European Power, for largely European 
reasons. Once such European interest had gone, would the resulting state be able to 
function independently, or have a viable place in the global state-system?
When the final declaration constituting the Mandate for Mesopotamia was released, 
the article dealing with frontiers had not progressed from the simple statement that a
54 See Minutes o f  Meeting held at Foreign Office, Aug. 17, 1920. FO 371/371/5245
55 Minutes o f  Meeting held at Foreign Office, Sept. 3, 1920. FO 371/5245/11316
56 ibid.
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Boundary Commissioner would be appointed by the mandatory power. The only 
decision was that the British Government accepted the frontier between Syria and 
Mesopotamia as that laid down in the French draft mandate for Syria. However, the 
wranglings over the frontiers between Palestine and Mesopotamia, and the status of 
the intervening territory continued. "A possible course would be to define the 
boundaries o f Palestine proper and o f Mesopotamia proper in the mandates, leaving 
the intervening territory for future arrangement, but this would at once raise the 
question o f the status o f the intervening territory, and might deprive us o f  the power to 
safe-guard British political dominance in that area.
For the present therefore, it is considered that we should define the boundaries o f -
1) Palestine, only so far as they march with Syria and Egypt.
2) Mesopotamia, only so far as they march with Syria, Persia and the Persian Gulf 
leaving the eastern boundary o f Palestine and the south-western boundary o f 
Mesopotamia for subsequent definition when the situation as regards Arabia has 
developed further. ”57
This statement highlights the state of flux in the region at that time. Countries were 
being created, but their final limits were awaiting further regional developments.
5.3.2. The Southern Boundary
As the British started to delimit the new post-Ottoman Mesopotamian state, the Civil
Commissioner in Baghdad pointed out that the boundary between the new state and
Kuwait would have to be delimited with the consent of the Shaikh of Kuwait.58
Britain had already decided that no attempt would be made to treat the former
Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia, and the nominally Ottoman qadha of Kuwait, as
the
one entity. A Foreign Office memorandum in 1918 reminded British Government of 
its November 3rd 1914 promise to the Ruler of Kuwait that the shaikhdom would be 
recognised as an independent principality under British protection.59 Thus, a new 
international boundary between the two had to be delimited.
57 Curzonto Vansittart, Sept. 30, 1920. FO 371/5245
58 Fone, C.T. ‘Foreign Office Memorandum on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti frontier: Events Preceding the 
Exchange ofN otes o f 1932’, 1938, India Office Library and Records, London, R/15/5/207
59 Foreign Office, 1918, ‘Memorandum respecting the settlement o f  Turkey and the Arabian 
Peninsula’, p. 6, India Office Library and Records, London, L/P&S/18/B302
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Britain however, felt that the southern Mesopotamian frontier with the emerging 
Saudi State was a more pressing issue. They were keen to protect the integrity of the 
Mediterranean-Persian Gulf overland route which they now controlled by courtesy of 
their mandates for Iraq, Transjordania and Palestine. Ibn Saud’s regional power was 
seen as a very real threat to this strategic link. The British High Commissioner in 
Baghdad, Sir Percy Cox, felt that his prime territorial concern in north-west Arabia at 
that time was to stabilize tribal unrest in the ill-defined southern Iraqi territories, 
which merged into the expanding Saudi region. To address this issue of tribal 
allegiances in the border zone, Cox first signed the Treaty of Muhammara with Ibn 
Saud on May 5, 1922.60 Sovereignty over the nomadic Muntafiq, Dhafir and Amarat 
tribes was assigned to Iraq, and that of the Shammar Nejd to Nejd.61
Cox and Ibn Saud then went on to negotiate and sign the Uqair Protocol of December 
2, 1922. Cox imposed an Iraqi-Nejd boundary that ran from the Batin in the east to 
Jabal Anaizan in the west. Assurances were included that oases and wells close to 
each side of the boundary would not be used for military purposes, and that nomadic 
tribes to the south of the line would be guaranteed access to watering places within 
Iraqi territory. Also as part of the protocol, the two delegations agreed upon a ‘neutral 
zone’ -  which was placed over the eastern-most section of the Iraqi-Nejd boundary. 
Within this area, tribes from both states shared equal rights to pasture and water.62
Now Saudi expansionism from the south had been curbed, Cox felt able to tackle the 
issue of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary. In a dispatch to the Colonial Office in December 
1922, Cox suggested that the ‘green line’ as set out in the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman 
Treaty, should be accepted as the Iraq-Kuwait boundary.63 Britain encouraged Shaikh 
Ahmad of Kuwait to claim this in full as his northern boundary, and in April 1923, he 
stated that the territory which he claimed ran: “From the junction o f  the Wadi al- 
Aujah with the Batin; eastwards to the south o f the wells o f Safwan, Jabal Sanam and
60 See Schofield, R. 1991, Chpt. 3.
51 Translation o f  Treaty o f  Muhammara o f  May 5, 1922, India Office Library and Records, London, 
‘Arabia: Nejd-Iraq and Nejd-Kuwait Boundaries, 1922-1923: L/P&S/10/937
62 Annotated text o f Iraq-Nejd boundary protocol, dec. 2, 1922, can be found in despatch from Sir 
Percy Cox to the Secretary o f  State for the Colonies, dated Dec. 19, 1922, L/P& S/10/937
63 Despatch dated Dec. 20, 1922, from B.H.Bourdillon for the British High Commissioner for Iraq, 
India Office, London: R /l 5/1/523
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Umm Qasr, to the shore o f the islands o f Bubiyan and Warbah, and along the coast to 
the present Najd-Kuwait frontier. Included in this are the following islands o f the sea: 
Maskan, Failakah, Auhah, Kubbar, Karu and Umm al-Maradim. These are the 
boundaries o f Kuwait which I  claim. ”64
Major John More, the Political Agent in Kuwait, then informed Cox in Baghdad that 
the Shaikh claimed the northern section of the ‘green line’ of the 1913 Anglo- 
Ottoman Agreement as his boundary with Iraq. Cox responded that; “the Shaikh 
could be informed that his claim to the frontier and islands indicated is recognised in 
so far as His Majesty’s Government are concerned. ”65 Despite this settlement being 
simply supported by the decisions of two British political officers, with no input from 
the new government of Iraq or its King, as far as Britain was concerned, this 
particular border was now settled. Maps 23 and 24 show the Kuwaiti region and its 
territorial definition.
Considering the wranglings over the other boundaries of Iraq, the British seemed 
relatively unconcerned about Iraq’s southern boundary with Kuwait, and did not fight 
to retain the strategic islands of Warbah and Bubiyan for the new Iraqi State. This 
becomes clear when the extent of the British influence over Kuwait is examined. 
Unlike the western frontiers of Iraq, the border with Kuwait was not contested with 
another Allied Power, but was a negotiation between two British Political Officers, 
over two British controlled territories. In this sense, the local advantages and 
disadvantages to each state as an individual entity, was lost in the desire to simply 
safe-guard Britain’s overall position. Britain’s decision to recognise Warbah and 
Bubiyan as Kuwaiti islands stemmed from Lord Curzon’s policy at the turn of the 
century to keep the Gulf free of other imperial powers. This was to protect British 
routes to India, and also to prevent the Ottoman Empire from having any developable 
coastline on the Persian Gulf. Curzon actively wanted the Ottomans to be ‘squeezed 
out’ of the Gulf.66
64 Letter o f  April 24, 1923 from Ruler o f  Kuwait to Political Agent, Kuwait, R /l 5/1/523
65 Cox to More, April 19, 1923, PRO, London, FO 371/8952
66 Schofield, R. 1991, p. 15
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From the late 19th century, Britain had noted that there were advantageous natural 
anchorage possibilities on the Khor Zubair at the site of the modern port of Umm 
Qasr, which may provide a useful location for a railway terminus.67 It was the 
perceived threat of this development by any rival European power that persuaded the 
Government of India to support the Shaikh of Kuwait’s claim to Bubiyan, and 
encourage him to extend this claim to the more northerly island of Warbah. The 
government of India knew that the Khor Zubair would be almost impossible to 
develop successfully by the Ottoman Empire if another power -  under British 
influence — held sovereignty over these islands. Thus, this decision was made before 
the British ever had any control over Mesopotamia, and as their interests were 
satisfied by Kuwait controlling the islands, they gave little thought to the future 
geopolitical impact on the state of Iraq. Britain’s wish to ‘squeeze out’ the Ottomans 
from the Gulf was ultimately successful, and was a legacy that Iraq was left to inherit,
with a significant impact on its own perceived strategic interests as an independent
+ . 68 state.
5.3.3. The Northern Boundary
The northern boundary of Iraq also took many years to determine -  years that could 
only hinder the development of a strong sense of unity within the country. The new 
state of Iraq was to include the vilayets of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, yet defining 
Mosul proved problematic. As a condition of the armistice in 1918, the Turks had to 
evacuate all of Mesopotamia, defined as these three provinces. But no final treaty had 
been signed with Turkey and so the precise frontier remained undefined. Mosul had 
originally been within the intended French sphere of influence, as agreed in the 
Anglo-French treaty of 1916 and the Sykes-Picot negotiations. However, the French 
were willing to surrender Mosul to the British, in return for a share of Iraqi oil
67 Lt. Col Lewis Pelly, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Report dated May 15, 1866, In Saldanha, 
J.A. (ed.), 'Precis o f  Koweit Affairs, 3 ’. (Simla: Government o f India, 1904). Also see Schofield, R. 
1994, p.42.
68 For more detailed research into the Iraq-Kuwait boundary, including more recent consequences, see 
Schofield, R. 1993; Finnie, D.H. 1992.
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revenues, as their main interests lay elsewhere.69 Meanwhile, the British were keen to 
stress that Mosul was "naturally, economically and ethnographically part o f Iraq. ”70
British interest in controlling Mosul as a part of Mesopotamia was shown as early as 
1915, in the de Bunsen Report. The Committee noted that Mosul would provide a 
useful defensive frontier for Mesopotamia. Indeed, "such a frontier can only be found 
along the ranges o f hills to the north o f the Mosul vilayet. ”71 The possession of Mosul 
would also provide good hill stations for troops, whilst its local Kurds and Arabs were 
thought to be good material for recruits. Mosul also promised other benefits: “oil 
again makes it commercially desirable for us to carry our control on to Mosul, in the 
vicinity o f which place there are valuable wells possession o f which by another Power 
would be prejudicial to our interests. Mosul too secures the full command o f  the area 
which will eventually come under irrigation and o f the water supply for that purpose; 
its possession is therefore called for i f  we are to take full advantage o f our 
opportunity to create a granary which should ensure an ample and unhampered 
supply o f corn to this country. ”72
Thus, the logic that Mosul would prove to be a beneficial economic part of 
Mesopotamia seems clear. That it was ‘ethnographically’ a part of the new state is far 
less sustainable. As we have seen, the population of the Mosul vilayet was in marked 
contrast to the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, as it contained a very large Kurdish 
element, and many other smaller ethnic minorities.73 This Kurdish population was 
also in constant struggle for at least some measure of cultural autonomy. With the 
advent of Wilsonian principles of self-determination, many Kurds were even seeking 
their own separate state, a goal that seemed attainable as even Britain spoke of
• H A‘Kurdistan’ as a region. The British Government had included Kurdistan as a 
geographical entity on its maps for the earlier part of the century. Major
69 See notes o f a Meeting held at Trouville, Sept. 9, 1919. CAB 21/153; Adam to Crowe, Oct. 9, 1919. 
FO 371/4184; Lloyd George to Clemenceau, Oct. 18, 1919, enclosed in Kerr to Foreign Office, Oct.
20, 1919. FO 371/4184
70 Major H.I. Lloyd, ‘The Geography o f the Mosul Boundary’. Paper read at the Meeting o f  the Royal 
Geographical Society, March 8, 1926. Published in The Geographical Journal Vol.LXVIII, 1926, 
pp.104-117
71 De Bunsen Report, June 1915, para, 22. CAB 42/3
72 De Bunsen Report, June 1915, para. 26. CAB 42/3
73 See: Cuinet, V. 1892, Vol.II, pp.764-65; Admiralty, A Handbook o f  Mesopotamia, Vol.I, (London, 
1916), p.66; FO, Historical Section, Mesopotamia, (London, 1919), p.8
74 See Asquith’s Diary 25/03/1915, cited in Wilson, A.T. 1930, p.83
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F.R.Maunsell, Britain’s Military attache at Constantinople until 1905, had mapped 
Kurdistan during his travels in 1892, and was responsible for the War Office’s maps 
of this area during the period before the First World War.75 These maps could have 
served as a useful starting point for the delimitation of a potential Kurdistan, keeping 
true to the Wilsonian ideal.
There are many reasons why such a state did not appear from the frenzy of nation­
state building after the First World War.76 The claims of the Armenians and those of 
the Kurds were incompatible, and the strongest world powers, namely Britain and the 
United States, felt disposed to prioritize the Armenian claims on both humanitarian 
and political grounds. A lack of consensus between the different Kurdish groups, and 
the absence of a recognised leader were also major stumbling blocks for the 
movement. It was therefore not thought that a Kurdish state would prove viable in 
such an area of mixed territories. It was impossible to satisfy the demands of all 
‘national’ groups or to fulfill all the conflicting expectations raised during and after 
the war.
Perhaps the most fundamental reason that a unified Kurdistan failed to materialize, 
was the existence of Great Power rivalries, and, most significantly, the fact that a 
‘Kurdistan’ did not fit in with the interests of Great Britain. The oil potential of Mosul 
gave the region a special strategic importance, and meant that Britain wanted Mosul 
to be part of ‘their’ Iraq. Previous promises that the Allies had made in the region to 
each other, the Hashemites, the Armenians and the Christians, also meant that any 
Kurdish territory had to fit in with what was left. However, the Allies had no control 
over Persian territory, which already encompassed a significant part of the proposed 
Kurdish state. With the Turkish enemy so close, Britain wanted Mesopotamia to have 
as short a frontier as possible, so ethnographical frontiers became less important than 
economic and geographical considerations, and consequently, Kurdistan could not be 
regarded as a political entity. Britain also wanted the Sunni Kurds to offset the large
75 Maunsell, Capt. F.R. ‘Kurdistan’, Geographical Journal Vol.III. No.2, Feb. 1894, pp.81-95
76 For a detailed analysis o f  these reasons, see O’Shea, Maria,‘Myths, Maps and Reality: Geography 
and Perceptions o f  Kurdistan.’ (Unpublished Ph.D., School o f Oriental and African Studies, London, 
1997)
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Shi’i majority within Basra and Baghdad vilayets, as they felt that this would make 
the state of Iraq more governable and viable.77
Under the new leadership of Mustafa Kemal, Turkey was re-consolidating, and also 
stated their claim over the Mosul vilayet. Throughout the early 1920s, the Turkish 
Government openly rejected the British claim to Mosul, and invaded parts of ‘Iraqi’ 
territory.78 To counter this claim, the British encouraged Kurdish nationalism as a 
weapon against the Turks, as they believed that a strong nationalist movement would 
force Kemal into a negotiated settlement favourable to the British. Shaikh Mahmoud 
was chosen as the leader of the movement, and, initially, was given a large measure of 
British support. However, when this emerging Kurdish nationalism began to get so 
strong as to threaten British interests, the British were quick to clamp down. By 1923, 
Shaikh Mahmoud was so out of British control that the Royal Airforce was given 
orders to mount considerable operations against him and other Kurdish insurgents, 
until the Iraqi army re-occupied Mosul in 1924, This demonstrates how Kurdish 
nationalism was only encouraged when it fitted in with the greater imperative of 
frustrating Turkish ambitions in the region. The Churchill-Cox correspondence of 
1921 gives an insight into just how subordinate the Kurdish policy was to the Turkish 
policy, just as it had previously been subordinate to Mesopotamian policy.79
The July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne recognised the new nationalist Turkish state, and 
most of its territorial demands. Such a ruling dealt a final blow to both Kurdish and 
Armenian hopes for independence. However, the British still refused to concede the 
vilayet of Mosul to the Turks, and the matter was left to the League of Nations to 
decide. In 1924, Mr. Branting, the head of the League of Nations sub-committee, laid 
down the status quo line, a temporary border, behind which they requested the Turks 
withdraw. This border became known as the ‘Brussels’, or ‘Branting’ Line, and it 
followed, with minor modifications, the old boundary of the Mosul vilayet. It was laid
77 See O ’Shea, Maria, unpublished Ph.D. 1997, p.227.
78 For a hill account o f the Mosul question, see Hussain, F. ‘The Mosul Problem -  A  Study in Anglo- 
Iraqi-Turkish Diplomacy and Public Opinion.’ (Ph.D., University o f  Indiana, 1952). A lso see O’Shea, 
M. unpublished Ph.D. 1997, pp.227-228
79 See: PRO CO 730/2, various numbers; Olson, R. ‘Battle for Kurdistan. The Churchill-Cox 
Correspondence Regarding the Creation o f  the State o f Iraq’. International Journal o f  Turkish Studies 
V ol.5, sections 1-2, 1991, pp.121-137
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down in accordance with the natural features as they appeared on the Maunsell sheets, 
as modified by the War Office.80
The League of Nations Commission went to Mosul in 1925 to make a final ruling on 
this issue. The Commission found that the Mosul vilayet should be included in the 
new State of Iraq, and the Branting Line was declared to be the northern frontier of 
Iraq. The Kurds around Sulaymania had told the commission that this was their 
preferred option for trade and economic reasons, although they ultimately preferred an 
independent option. This reasoning greatly influenced the commission, who felt that 
economic and strategic considerations should override ethnic ones81. The commission 
also felt that any Kurdish nationalism and solidarity was too underdeveloped to 
provide the basis for this territorial and political decision. Obviously then, the 
economic and political leanings of the Kurdish notables who offered most of the 
opinions to the commission were paramount. However, the Kurds did demand 
assurances that they could keep Kurdish as their official language, have Kurdish 
officials, and that the British would retain the Mesopotamian mandate for at least 
twenty years, all of which was agreed by the League.82
This Branting Line was then ratified as the boundary in the Treaty concluded between 
Britain, Iraq and Turkey in 1926. The British preferred a different boundary, but 
eventually accepted this Branting Line as the best compromise. Major Lloyd, on 
giving his paper on the geography of the Mosul Boundary, to the Royal Geographical 
Society in 1926, conceded: "It is not the best frontier; the line claimed by H.M. 
Government at Constantinople in 1924, and at Geneva in September 1925 is 
undoubtably an ideal frontier consisting o f high, almost impassable mountains. It 
would serve as a good defensive frontier for the weak Kingdom o f Iraq, and would 
make for ease in administration, as the barrenness and difficulty o f these mountain 
masses would effectively deter tribes on either side o f the frontier from raiding across
80 See Major H.I. Lloyd, ‘The Geography o f  the Mosul Boundary.’ Paper delivered at the Meeting o f the 
Royal Geographical Society, March 1926. Published in The Geographical Journal 1926, pp.104-117
81 Such a decision is fascinating, given the emphasis placed on fostering ethnic self-determination at 
that time.
82 The full findings o f  the League can be found in: ‘League o f Nations: Report Submitted to the 
Council by the Commission Instituted by the Council Resolution o f  September 30th 1924.’ League o f  
Nations, 1925.
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the line. ”83 Clearly, a ‘natural’ boundary was preferred, that would endow the new 
state with a ‘natural’ defensive flank. However, although not ideal in the predominant 
British view, the Branting Line was a reasonable compromise to London, in that the 
boundary was still largely informed by natural features.
Despite its compromise, the Branting Line was still not ethnically or culturally based. 
In the discussion following the paper, Sir Arnold Wilson voiced some of his very real 
concerns over the boundary delimitation. He raised the pertinent point that the 
Branting Line had been based on the pre-war Maunsell War Office maps, which 
"have never been fully replaced by any other series on the same scale (1/250,000), 
although we have been in the Mosul Vilayet for the last five or six years... I  have had 
sufficient experience o f laying down a frontier from bad maps to know the immense 
importance o f having good maps. ”84 However, for good or for ill, the British now had 
what they had wanted: Mosul within their control. (See Map 25).
Such a decision was to have a fundamental effect on the form and nature of the Iraqi 
State. Sir Arnold Wilson, the Acting Civil Commissioner in Iraq from 1918-1920, 
raised his concerns over disrupting historical population movements and trade within 
this region. He was unhappy that the Line "does not give the peoples who are living 
immediately north o f it access to a market. There are 20,000 or 30,000 tribesmen 
living north o f the Brussels Line who cannot obtain access to a Turkish market 
without great difficulty, and will have almost equal difficulty, owing to their exclusion 
from ‘Iraq, in obtaining access to the town o f Mosul or its ancillary towns. ”85
Including this province within the new state of Iraq would also permanently segregate 
the Kurdish population that lived across the region of present-day south-eastern 
Turkey, south-western Iran and northern Syria and Iraq. Due to the developed sense 
of nationhood that the Kurds had acquired, such a situation would prove a powerful 
divisive force upon the new state, as such intense cross-border affiliations had to be 
dealt with. This was a vital factor in determining the geopolitical form and function of
83 Major H.I.Lloyd. 1926, pp.104-117
84 Sir Arnold Wilson speaking after the delivery o f Major Lloyd’s Paper, Royal Geographical Society, 
March 1926, pp. 115-117
85 Sir Arnold Wilson, ibid , 1926
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the new state of Iraq. Right from inception, it contained a frustration that would only 
serve to pull the new state apart and a population that looked across the new 
boundaries more than it looked in towards Baghdad.
5.4. Conclusion
During the First World War, each Allied nation threw its greatest weight into the 
particular part of the struggle that touched its own vital interests. “Allied interests 
were seen whole only when individual national interests seemed to be otherwise 
unrealisable. Great Britain has been thought by some almost to have lost the war on 
the western front to save the Suez Canal and secure Mesopotamia. ”86 The foreign 
interest in the Middle East, and in particular the former Ottoman territories, was 
intense.
After the First World War, Britain found itself in a very dominant position within the 
region. The Ottoman Empire had been destroyed, Russian imperial might had 
disappeared, and the German threat had been removed. The Allied Powers were 
victorious, and Britain emerged as the strongest of these in the former Ottoman 
territories. In comparison to its pre-war power, France proved of little consequence 
after the First World War. This had to do with the configuration of European power 
and ultimately France’s dependence on Great Britain in containing the German threat 
within Europe. What had Britain wanted, and what did they actually get?
Firstly, we have seen that Britain wanted control in the Middle East for strategic 
purposes, and the reasons offered run from the Middle East as a buffer, a junction, a 
nodal point in communications, and as a military and political base.87 Also relevant 
were the political interests of the rival powers, which, as has been demonstrated, were 
secondary to strategic considerations. Political gain and prestige became important 
goals in the scramble for Ottoman territory. There was a pressing need therefore, to 
deny the area to others. Also of crucial importance to Britain, as to France, was the 
safe-guarding and stability of their other imperial possessions. Britain was concerned
86 Davidson, J.H. ‘Political Strategy: Mesopotamia’, The Nineteenth Century and After, XCII, Nov. 
1922, p p .697-709
87 See Dann, U. 1988 p. 421
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with her position in India, and feared that destabilising forces would come from the 
Muslim Middle East, unless the people of that region were kept under imperial control 
or influence. In gaining control of Mesopotamia, Britain hoped such imperatives 
would be amply protected, whilst also providing a pro-British Arab state in the newly 
emerging region. Iraq also offered additional benefits in terms of oil and arable 
potential. It seemed that the way was clear for Britain, and France in Syria, to exercise 
their power and re-build the Middle East in whatever style they preferred.
The structure of the Middle East that emerged by 1923, however, was the result of 
compromises between Britain and the other European states, between Europe and an 
expanding American influence, and between the leading world powers and a resurgent 
Middle East. Britain had needed American approval for the implementation of its 
secret treaties partitioning the Levant region, and Wilson had then pressed the 
mandate idea on his unwilling Allies as a partial fulfillment of his support for self- 
determination. Europe was still Britain’s priority, with the Middle East being 
peripheral. Also, principles had to be seen to underlie any peace settlement in the 
‘new world order’ of post-WWl. The war had seen a drift of opinion away from the 
notion of multinational empires to a recognition of the principle of ‘nationality’ and 
the right of nations to self-determination. The three Central Powers in the war had 
been multinational states, and so this nationalism had become a good argument to use 
against them.
The British gained the mandate for the new state of Iraq in an almost haphazard 
fashion. The occupation of Baghdad and Mosul had not originally been required by 
British imperatives. The 1914 occupation of Basra secured all British imperatives in 
the Gulf, and cheaply. Initially this Mesopotamian campaign had been launched with 
clearly limited objectives, with the India Office in London simply wanting a holding 
operation at the head of the Gulf.88 However, having met so little resistance, the 
temptation to advance seemed irresistible. In addition, the growing interest in the 
region from other European powers prompted Britain to stake her claim more 
explicitly, or risk losing her advantage. By March 1915, the Commander in Chief 
instructed Sir John Nixon, the commander of the Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ to
88 See India Office minute, 26 Sept. 1914. Quoted in ‘Report o f the Commission Appointed to Inquire 
into the Origin, Inception and Operations o f  the War in Mesopotamia.’ Cmd. 8610, 1917, p. 11
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prepare plans for the effective occupation of the Basra vilayet, and for a “subsequent 
advance on Baghdad. ”89 In 1924, the League of Nations then ruled that Mosul should 
be included in Iraq. The League was concerned that without Mosul, the British might 
find the financial burden of Basra and Baghdad too great, and give up the mandate.
By 1921, Britain had been awarded the mandate for Iraq, and a new Middle Eastern 
Department had been established within the Colonial Office in London to deal 
especially with the Middle Eastern mandated territories. Influence therefore was 
moved from the India Office. This was an administrative change which was to have a 
profound significance for British Middle Eastern policy.
The geographical boundaries decided upon for the new state presented their own 
problems. The decision had been made to establish the state of Iraq, but it would be 
the boundaries of this state that would define it, and mark the outer limits of the 
state’s authority. They would also, by virtue of including some groups and excluding 
others, determine the new ‘Iraqi’ population, and who would be deemed ‘foreigners’. 
Such far-reaching decisions were to play a fundamental role in determining the nature 
and form of the Iraqi state that was emerging. However, it is clear that Britain 
prioritised strategic considerations, and that, despite the ideological pressure from the 
United States to create post-First World War states on the basis of a recognized 
national character and self-determination, ethnic and cultural factors barely figured as 
defining issues. Even in the areas along the Iraqi border that were not of paramount 
strategic importance to Britain, natural boundaries were favoured over cultural ones. 
When it came to marking out a unified cultural or ethnic identity therefore, these 
boundaries were at a distinct disadvantage from the beginning.
Kurdish populations identifying with other Kurdish communities across a new 
international border, rather than with the predominantly Arab population of the new 
state, strongly coloured the geopolitics of the crystallising state. Solidarity and a 
feeling of nationalism were clearly going to be hampered by such powerful cross- 
border affiliations. Historically, the provinces of Iraq had proved very parochial, and 
despite being geographically contiguous, they had had little to do with each other,
89 Great Britain, India Office, ‘Mesopotamian Commission Report,’ (London, 1917), p. 16.
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each being just another province within the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans had 
encouraged such localism by their weak administrative presence in the region, and 
their tolerance of local customs and practices. Thus, the three vilayets had nothing 
marking them out as a unit, except for the fact that they lay next to each other.
In the south of the country, the disadvantageous access to the Gulf was also a factor 
affecting the geopolitical form and function of the new state. Britain had accepted 
such a boundary, as their interests were safe-guarded by their relationship with the 
Shaikh of Kuwait.90 It was the determination of Lord Curzon at the start of the 
twentieth century, to keep the Gulf free from imperial challenges, that greatly affected 
Britain’s decision to recognise Warbah and Bubiyan as Kuwaiti islands. Thus it was 
British strategic considerations again driving the boundary-making process. However, 
such a land-locked inheritance for Iraq was to create a powerful negative 
consciousness within the bounded territory, and this was another factor in the make­
up of the new country.
The fact that such boundaries were largely delineated by foreign powers, and to 
satisfy foreign imperatives, was in itself a powerful influence on the developing 
geopolitical form of Iraq. Tribes were included in Iraq if they were ‘friendly’ to the 
British administration. It was a foreign creation, and suited foreign interests. Local 
interests were of concern only in so far as they had an impact on wider British 
interests. In Iraq’s particular case, this could only be a negative inheritance. This is 
not to say that if Britain had followed the principles of nationalism and self- 
determination more faithfully, that a foreign-created Iraq could not have thrived. 
However, Britain was consumed with the constant concern for the safety of her 
strategic interests in the area, for which by 1920 the creation of an ‘independent’ state 
had become a necessary evil. It was due to these specific conditions that the British 
legacy could only have been a negative inheritance for the Iraqi State.
A population put together in such a manner was likely to feel frustrated, vulnerable 
and in an inferior position. Hopes of a united Arab community had been dashed, as
90 See despatch dated 20 December 1922 from B.H.Bourdillon for the High Commissioner for Iraq, 
India Office Library and Records, London: R /l 5/1/523; Despatch dated 19 April 1923 from P.Z.Cox to 
the Political Agent, Kuwait, PRO, London: FO 371/8952
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had dreams of an independent Kurdistan, and therefore there was an antipathy to the 
new state from many sides. Britain’s attitude towards the geographical delimitation of 
Iraq highlighted the fact that the recognition and consolidation of a strong, viable 
nation-state in the region, was not their priority. “In brief, nationalism is a theory o f  
political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across 
political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state -  a 
contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation — 
should not separate the power-holders from the rest. ”91 However, the boundaries of 
Iraq were patently fashioned by different realities, with the principles of nationalism 
being subordinate to British strategic necessities. It could be argued therefore that the 
new borders decided by Britain, would be seen not as protective and inclusive, but as 
divisive and damaging, especially to communities such as the Kurds and the Shi’is. 
All this was to be a legacy to the new state.
It was not until the final issuing of the mandates, and then the resolution of the Mosul 
issue in 1926, that the three areas of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul were officially to be 
held as a whole. Mesopotamia safe-guarded British routes to India, and provided an 
important base in the Middle East. The fact that Britain had defined Iraq by the 
benefits it offered in relation to elsewhere, pointed to another impact on the 
geopolitical form of Iraq. The state was being established as part of Britain’s global 
network of interests, not as a strong local state, fashioned by local considerations, and 
a natural crystallisation of local power. Its entire reason for existing seemed to be 
determined by realities elsewhere, and this would make the business of building a 
coherent and functional state very traumatic for the resident population. Nationalism 
needed a myth of the ‘naturalness’ of the nation; a myth that would prove that much 
harder for the Iraqi to produce, let alone believe in.
The ‘unity’ view triumphed in the end, albeit partly accidentally. There was a failure 
of any strong Kurdish leadership to emerge, there was rivalry with France, and their 
sphere of influence, and there were troubles within Arab politics. Thus, “Iraq was a 
consequence o f what may be termed a series o f logical accidents. Basra was required 
for prestige and the defence o f India, Baghdad for prestige and the defence o f Basra,
91 Gellner, E. 1983, p. 1
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QOand Mosul for prestige, the defence o f Baghdad and the viability o f the whole. "
Such was the method of nation-state building in the Middle East after the First World 
War. Maps 26 and 27 demonstrate graphically how the political geography of the 
region changed from 1914 to 1923. A new system was being established. “The 
question was, whether the British would employ the untried mandate system as a thin 
veil for old-fashioned protectorates. ”93
92 Yapp. M.E. 1987, p.333
93 DeNovo, 'American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939.’ (Minneapolis 1963), p. 173
191
LEGEND: Thick red line Vilayet Boundary
Broken red line Sancak Boundary 
Thin red line Caza Boundary
Map 26. Syria and Mesopotamia: Approximate Vilayet, Sancak 
and Caza Boundaries
Source: War Office 1919, Located at Public Records Office, London, F.O. 925/41156
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CHAPTER SIX
THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT: CREATING IRAQ’S 
POLITICAL SYSTEM
6.1. Introduction
After having determined the geographical extent of Iraq (finalised in 1926), and 
gaining the mandate, Britain had to decide on the appropriate political system for Iraq. 
Just as with the boundaries of the new state, such decisions were to be the product of 
British self-interest, international opinion and the character of local power bases. The 
previous chapters have detailed how the British focus between 1917 and 1923 was 
concentrating increasingly on defending their strategic interests in Iraq. How was this 
British interest transferred into actual power and control? This chapter will focus on 
the character of the nation/state as developed in the creation of an independent Iraq 
structured to meet British needs. Was the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity 
solely a result of British interest in the region? To what degree was Britain involved 
in extending Baghdad’s writ to the provinces? What was Britain’s role in promoting 
Sunni hegemony, and how did this influence the developing geopolitical form of Iraq? 
Did the new territorial integrity of the state imply the cultural integration of the 
resident population, and how did Britain influence the delineation of an embryonic 
Iraqi identity?
The newly formed states after the First World War were set up, under American 
influence, as ‘nations in formation’, “in which all the different communities forming 
their heterogenous populations rally around the idea o f  nation — as it is defined and 
diffused by a nationalistic doctrine. This therefore was the principle upon which 
Britain had to build in her mandated territory. The theory presupposed that such 
nationalist ideals would function as a glue, integrating groups and persuading their 
members to work together in the process of building a state. Once accomplished, the 
task of ‘inventing’ a nation is more easily achieved, as the process of political,
194
cultural and economic integration of the population lays the ground for a common 
national identity. The reality of course, is very different however, with many 
complexities involved in such a ‘process’. With such a doctrine being adopted for 
Iraq, it is important to investigate how widespread was any indigenous support for the 
British vision of statehood, what other visions existed, and what impact these had on 
the emergent state.
Clearly, any decisions regarding the political framework for Iraq, would also affect 
the identity that the new state would develop. Within the Mesopotamian region, there 
were many well-defined identities which could have been viewed as alternative 
nationalisms. Why did these proto-nationalisms not succeed? The presence, and 
persistence of such deep-rooted identities are vital factors in the geopolitical 
crystallisation of Iraq, and this chapter will discuss such identities and their fate 
within the system chosen for Iraq.
6.2. Constraints on British Plans for Iraq
Britain did not have an entirely free hand when it came to decisions over the political 
framework for the Iraqi State. After the First World War, and before the 
announcements of the mandates at San Remo, Britain’s problem in Iraq shifted from 
one of military control to civil administration. The question of how best to approach 
this was complicated, as many divergent views had to be reconciled. British public 
opinion on colonial and imperial questions was in a state of fundamental change, and 
the British government, sensitive to the change, tried to accommodate it, but with an 
uncertainty of policy and a lack of real conviction. This was coupled with a serious 
anti-mandate movement within Iraq. The United States also registered serious 
opposition to the proceedings at San Remo, and there remained the fundamental issue 
of what real authority the League of Nations had in the distribution of mandates. “It 
was evident that, i f  there were to be an Iraq at all, it must, under the complexity o f 
existing circumstances, be nothing less than a world-made Iraq. ”2
1 Lukitz, L. 1995, p.2
2 Foster, H.A. 1935, p.99
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6.2.1. The Position and Role of the League of Nations
The contested position of the League in this complicated situation is illustrated by the 
following extract from the Manchester Guardian in June 1920:
“We are supposed to have or to be about to acquire a mandate for Mesopotamia. 
According to Mr. Lloyd George we are to receive the mandate from ‘the Powers ’ 
presumably that signed the Turkish treaty. The Prime Minister in so many terms 
repudiates the contention o f Mr. Asquith that mandates are to be given by the League. 
I f  that is the intention ofArticle 22 o f the Covenant, we can only say that a situation 
has been created which is so anomalous that every well-wisher o f the League must 
strive to bring it to an end. It is perfectly true that the words o f the article are not 
explicit. It does not say who are to appoint mandatories, but simply speaks o f 
‘advanced nations ’ which are to exercise tutelage over others ‘as mandatories on 
behalf o f the League \ or, as the French version has it, ‘in the name ’ o f the League. 
Now whose mandatory are we to be in Mesopotamia -  the mandatory o f the League 
or o f the Allies? To which are we responsible? O f this there is no question, for article 
22 goes on to prescribe that the mandatory is to render an annual report on the 
territory commended to its charge to the Council o f the League, and the Council is to 
have a commission to advise it on the observance o f mandates. The position, then, 
taken by Mr. Lloyd George is that we are the mandatories o f one set ofpeople, but 
responsible to another set ofpeople for the execution o f the mandate. That is a double 
position, incompatible with the notion o f a mandate, and will not work. ”3
6.2.2. The American Influence
The League found itself in such a position largely due to the new political ideas and 
standards emanating from America. President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Point Plan was 
responsible for great changes in the political system that unfolded after the First 
World War. Wilson effectively introduced the idea of national self-determination, the 
principle that any ‘national’ grouping of people had an innate right to control their 
own political destiny. Such an idea was ground-breaking in a world of multi-national 
imperial states. It was an essentialist argument, that nations should be recognised, not
3 M anchester Guardian  June 26, 1920, p. 10
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created. That is, such national groupings already existed, and the principle should not 
be used to ‘create’ them where expedient. This was a completely different way of 
viewing the world and the place and role of world powers on the global scene. Indeed, 
rather than conquer and colonise, certain world powers, namely Britain and France, 
were now being called on to tutor and disengage. A new idea was being championed, 
which had an inherent mass appeal, and therefore could not be ignored by imperial 
powers. People were being told that they now had a right to design and control their 
own collective political futures, which was in marked contrast to old British 
paternalistic imperialism. America at that time was still a rising power, and fell far 
short of the global power it was to become. However, although Britain was a great 
power in terms of military strength, political dominance and extent of territorial 
control, America was challenging this position through the power of ideas, and a 
seemingly ‘higher’ political morality. Born out of the perceived failures of European 
diplomacy the Americans interpreted as responsible for the First World War, such 
ideas were highly appealing to millions that lived under imperialist control, 
threatening unrest and dissension in areas that affected Britain and France. The 
catastrophe that had overtaken European-style balance-of-power politics, severely 
weakened the European powers’ global influence, Therefore, Wilson’s statements had 
an immense impact, espousing principles which had to be seen to underpin any post- 
First World War settlement.
6.2.3. British Concerns Over European Relationships
Britain felt strongly that influence over any of the proposed new territories, should not 
be shared by more than one Power. Rather, each of the Great Powers should have an 
exclusive sphere of influence. Their reasons for this were that they felt that “The 
Arab... is an [sic] adept at playing o ff one Government against another, "4 The British 
worry about this situation was not that this would hinder the stability of the new states 
in formation, but rather, “This state o f relations would be a serious danger to 
international relations between the French and ourselves, ”5 Indeed, this concern 
about the French helped to determine many British policies within Mesopotamia. For
4 Memorandum on Possible Future Boundary Between British and French Spheres o f  Influence in 
Arabia. Unsigned and undated. FO 371/4178, point 4.
5 Ibid  point 4.
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example, Hirtzel, the under-Secretary in the India Office in London, was worried 
about how the French would react if they felt that Britain was forcing a particular 
candidate for king on the Iraqis. “I f  the French remain in Syria we shall have to avoid 
giving them the excuse o f setting up a Protectorate. ”6 It is evident therefore, that 
British policies and decisions were influenced by this European rivalry, and this 
would influence the resulting system they installed in Iraq.
6.2.4. Local Moves Towards Self-Determination
Britain also had to contend with local moves towards self-government. The forms that 
these took, and their relative successes, had a fundamental impact on the resulting 
state. In addition to the European realities already mentioned, the British were all too 
aware of the desire for self-determination that had been growing among the 
populations in the region. They knew that such desires must be accommodated, or at 
least be seen to be accommodated, if a stable situation was to emerge. Balfour wrote 
to Cambon in October 1918, that: “We seek; as has often been said\ a lasting peace 
and such a peace must be based not on any considerations o f finance or political 
advantage for this or that Power, but on the principle o f giving to each people as far 
as possible the Government which is most in accord with its desires and most likely to 
secure for it stability and prosperity, having regard to all relevant historical, 
geographical and strategic considerations. ”7
Gertrude Bell stated in The Review o f the Civil Administration o f Mesopotamia,8 that 
many of the leading men in Feisal’s army fighting under General Allenby in the 
Syrian Campaign were of Mesopotamian origin, with many from Baghdad. They 
claimed to have been fighting for the liberation of Mesopotamia, and the British could 
not afford to underestimate the strength of this feeling. In 1913 a Mesopotamian 
Society had been founded, called Ahd al-Iraqi -  some of the founders being 
commanders in the Turkish army right up until the end of the war. From a stronghold 
in Dair al Zor on the upper Euphrates, this society conducted considerable 
propaganda, whipping up support for the establishment of an independent
6 Hirtzel, Minute o f  1 February 1919. LP&S 10 4722/18/1919/1/551.
7 Balfour to Cambon, October 25, 1918. FO 371/3384/176523
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Mesopotamia without Western interference, and with a view to uniting the country 
with an independent Syria under the Sherifian family from Hejaz.9 Such ideas had 
first been proposed in 1905, when Najib Azuri had published a book entitled ‘The 
Awakening of the Arab Nation’. "That these developments indicated a change in the 
nature o f Arab opinion regarding the place o f the Arab provinces in the Ottoman 
Empire is not in doubt; but it may be doubted whether they constituted a movement 
which could as yet justly be described as an Arab National movement, ”w Nationalist 
they certainly were, though not yet national, but Britain could ill afford to ignore such 
developments.
6.2.5. Divergences of Opinion Within British Policy-Making
Britain decided that their only option was to build up an Arab state in accordance with 
the criteria for nationhood being advanced by the League. Hirtzel impressed this upon 
Arnold Wilson, the Acting Civil Commissioner in Iraq, but matters were further 
complicated by the fact that Arnold Wilson was a product of Britain’s imperial past in 
India, and could not conceive of Arab self-determination. He complained sarcastically 
to Hirtzel in September 1919: “Your statement that we are going to have an Arab 
state whether Mesopotamia wants it or not is the first indication I  have had as to the 
real significance o f self-determination for this country. ”n  Thus, British policy­
making was further complicated by divergences of opinion between India and 
London, the India Office and the Foreign Office, the India Office and the Residency 
in Baghdad, within the India Office itself, and within the Baghdad residency also. The 
Indian Government had different priorities to the London Government, and different 
populations to answer to. This often resulted in disagreements and local policy which 
was in conflict with British Government policy. For example, the security of the 
Indian forefield, such as the Persian Gulf, was a far higher priority to the Indian
8 British Government, India Office, ‘The Review o f  the Civil Administration o f  Mesopotamia,’ 
(London, 1920)
9 Hoepli, Henry, U. ‘England Im Nahen Osten’, (Erlangen, 1931), p.31. A lso see Macfie, A.L. 1998, 
p.93
10 Macfie, A.L. 1998, p.94
11 Wilson to Hirtzel, 12 September 1919, LP& S/l0/4722/18/1919/3/6202.
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Government, whilst the London Government, especially while at war in Europe, had 
more immediate security concerns.12
Official policy also had to take account of public opinion, and the rising anti­
imperialist feeling on the international scene. Political morality aside, many British 
politicians also felt that too much money had already been spent in Mesopotamia, 
money that was needed more at home. At the Paris Peace Conference, there was 
substantial British opinion against any further extension of the empire. It was seen as 
large enough, and “this sentiment was reflected among some o f the most responsible 
British representatives at Paris. ”13
Arnold Wilson however, was unable to move with the great changes developing on 
the international scene. To his mind, the best course for Mesopotamia was to rule it 
along the lines of India, as he regarded the Mesopotamians as incapable of making 
decisions in their own best interests. He therefore felt it his duty to make the decisions 
for them, and be responsible for their welfare. He believed that “any attempts to 
introduce institutions on the lines desired by the Sunni politicians o f  Syria would 
involve the concentration ofpower in the hands o f a few persons whose ambitions and 
methods would rapidly bring about the collapse o f organised government... the results 
would be the antithesis o f democratic government.1,14
Hirtzel however, was more than aware of the impossibility of using old imperialist 
policies in Iraq. He understood that the international community, and the resident 
population, would no longer accept any form of annexation, and he understood why. 
“But let us grasp the fact that this is not an administrative but a political question. I f  
Iraq al-Jazira were really an island somewhere in mid-Pacific, then Colonel Wilson's 
constitution might do, for a time. But it is unfortunately in the middle o f  a 
continent. ”15
12 For a more detailed account o f  the divergences in opinion between London and representatives in 
Iraq, see Slugglet, P. 1976, pp.25-41.
13 Miller, D.H. ‘The Origin o f  the Mandate System .’ Foreign Affairs VI, January 1928, p.281
14 Despatch by Wilson to the India Office, mid-November 1919. Quoted in Sluglett, P. 1976, p.26
15 Hirtzel, undated, 1919, quoted in Sluglett, P. 1976, p.27
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British policy was left to drift as the debate over how best to rule Iraq dragged on.
This in itself caused restlessness and frustration among the population. Shuckburgh 
commented from the India Office: “how can the local population settle down when 
we won’t tell them what we are going to do?... We must either govern Mesopotamia, 
or not govern it. ”16 Hirtzel once again explained that there was no question of 
‘governing’ Mesopotamia. An entirely new system had to be developed. Hirtzel wrote 
to Arnold Wilson throughout 1919 and 1920, trying to impress upon him the urgency 
of constructing an Arab state in Mesopotamia, as only a Mandate along these lines 
would have a chance of being approved by the League of Nations.17 However, his 
stance was hardly ideological, but rather, sharply practical.
“What we want to have in existence, what we ought to have been creating in this time 
is some administration with Arab institutions which we can safely leave while pulling 
the strings ourselves; something that won't cost very much, which Labour can 
swallow consistent with its principles, but under which our economic and political
1Rinterests will be secure. ”
Such practicality clearly demonstrates how British strategic concerns were being 
given priority over local considerations. This British attitude had an important 
influence over the nature and function of the state that was being established.
6.3. British Decisions Regarding the Form of Government for Iraq
The British had, in fact, long been preaching a message of self-government to the 
Arabs. However, this was not due to any moral belief in the right of self- 
determination for the people of Mesopotamia, but had been used first to enlist Arab 
help in overthrowing the Turks, and then in order to keep the peace within the 
troubled provinces once the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating. This qualitative 
difference in motivation would have a profound impact on the geopolitical form of 
Iraq.
16 Shuckburgh, undated, quoted in Sluglett, P. 1976, p.36-7.
17 Minute by Hirtzel. 8 July 1919 LP&S/10/4722/18/1919/2/4019
18 Quoted in Marlowe, J. ‘Late Victorian: The Life o f  Sir Arnold Talbot W ilson’, (Cresset Press, 
London 1967), pp. 182-3
201
Upon the occupation of Baghdad, General Maude claimed that the British had come 
not as conquerors but as liberators. The proclamation contained many important 
promises to the Arab people:
“But you, the people o f Baghdad, whose commercial professions and whose safety 
from oppression and invasion must ever be a matter o f the closest concern to the 
British government; are not to understand that it is the wish o f the British government 
to impose upon you alien institutions...Many noble Arabs have perished in the cause 
offreedom at the hands o f those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed them. It is the 
determination o f the government o f Great Britain and the great powers Allied to 
Great Britain that those noble Arabs shall not have suffered in vain...O, people o f 
Baghdad! Remember that for twenty-six generations you have suffered under strange 
tyrants who have ever endeavored to set one Arab house against another in order that 
they might profit by your dissensions. Therefore, 1 am commanded to invite you, 
through your nobles and elders and representatives, to participate in the management 
o f your civil affairs, in collaboration with the political representatives o f  Great 
Britain who accompanied the British Army, so that you may unite with your kinsmen 
in the North, East, South and West in realizing the aspirations o f your race.1,19
It is worth noting here that it was Arab solidarity and desires for self-determination
that Britain was appealing to, whereas Iraq was composed of many different
population groups, who would certainly not regard their own wishes for self-
determination to be fulfilled by a purely Arab administration over the region.
However, Feisal was satisfied, and thought, idealistically, that “the future
Government o f the Arab provinces will be the last lesson to be given by Europe to the 
20East. ” He did, however, go on to warn Lloyd George of the grave implications of 
partitioning the Arab lands. “Does not Your Excellency perceive that the Moslem 
World, which is looking for the reward promised to the Arabs for their loyalty to the 
Allies and sacrifices in their cause, will all rise in a general revolt when it realises 
that that reward is nothing but the disintegration o f the Arab People and the 
dismemberment o f its country...1 am certain that the men who represent the ‘brain ’ o f  
Great Britain will not misconstrue the facts and thus cause the rise o f  millions o f their 
subjects for no other reason than to meet the views o f an extremist Commercial party
19 Quoted in India Office Review o f  the Civil Administration o f  M esopotamia, (London, 1920), p.32
20 Feisal to Lloyd George, undated, FO 371/4182
202
in some other countries, which party has no right to gamble with the souls and 
destinies o f other peoples when Nature and public interest andjustice refuse that such 
a loyal nation should be so condemned to death. ”21
Again, Feisal was envisaging a nation purely Arab in content, despite the other 
indigenous populations within the proposed territory for the ‘Arab Nation’. Such an 
expansive Arab Nation was never contemplated by the Allies, as their agreements and 
treaties from 1915 onwards had favoured the partition of the former Ottoman 
territories, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5. They, rather, supported the idea of 
creating several new countries along the lines of nation-states within the region, and 
hoped that developing Arab national consciousness could be attached to each of these 
smaller units.
Balfour wrote a long missive to Earl Curzon in September 1919, picking out these 
very points, and morally questioning the Allies’ plans for the Middle East. “The 
language o f the Covenant assumes or asserts that in the regions we are 
discussing... there are in the advanced chrysalis state ‘independent nations’ 
sufficiently ‘developed’ to demand ‘provisional recognition’, each o f which is to be 
supplied by the Powers with a mandatory till it is able to stand alone. Where and 
what are these ‘independent nations ’? Are they by chance identical with Syria, 
Mesopotamia and Palestine? I f  so, the coincidence with the Sykes-Picot arrangement 
is truly amazing... ” Balfour continued by outlining the interests of the individual 
powers that led them to conclude their treaties of partition. “In other words, when 
they made the tripartite arrangement they never supposed themselves to be dealing 
with three nations already in existence, ready for ‘provisional recognition ’, only 
requiring the removal o f the Turk, the advice o f a mandatory, and a little time to 
enable them ‘to stand alone ’. ”23
21 Feisal to Lloyd George, undated, 1919, FO 371/4182
22 Balfour to Curzon, September 19, 1919, enclosing Memorandum by Mr. Balfour respecting Syria, 
Palestine and Mesopotamia, dated August 11, 1919. FO 371/4183/132187
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6.4. The 1920 Revolt and its Repercussions
Britain had thought that its interests could be fully safeguarded within a dependent 
State of Iraq, veiled by a token display of Arab self-government. However, they were 
to have their policies re-fashioned by a strong regional backlash. The years of delay 
whilst Britain had debated what was the best policy regarding Mesopotamia had 
facilitated the growth of a frustrated movement within Iraq, whose pressure British 
policy was ultimately forced to accommodate. Between 1919 and 1920 an acute 
restlessness developed within Iraq, due to the lack of clear-cut policy coming from the 
British representatives within the country, the length of the ongoing military 
occupation, and the resentment that Syrians were seen as capable to run their own 
affairs, whilst the Iraqis apparently were not.24 There was also great annoyance about 
the large percentage of Indian troops and officials present on Iraqi soil. Dissatisfaction 
spread from the towns to the countryside, and the Sherifians were growing 
increasingly determined to extend their newly gained independence in Syria to Iraq. 
Wilson wrote from Baghdad in March 1920, documenting that the chief Shi’i 
mujtahid had pronounced that all service under the British was unlawful.25 Unrest 
grew amongst the tribes, and when the news of the San Remo resolutions reached 
Baghdad in May, attacks began on British outposts as nationalists were now 
convinced that only force had a chance of securing them independence. Britain had 
perhaps been naive in believing that promises of self-determination to Arabs within 
the partitioned territories could compensate for their frustration at losing their vision 
of one great Arab Nation.
The ensuing Revolt lasted throughout the summer and into late autumn 1920, and 
heavy losses were suffered by both sides.26 Civil administration ceased to function 
outside of the towns, and “more than once ” wrote Gertrude Bell, “a complete 
breakdown in the administration seemed imminent.>>2? The situation increased the
23 ibid
24 For a full analysis into the causes o f  the 1920 Revolt, see: Vinogradov, A. 1972, pp. 123-139.
25 Political, Baghdad, to S/S India, 18 March 1920. LP& S/10/4722/18/1920/2/2211
26 A British military report estimated that 2,269 British and Indian troops were killed or injured. Arab 
casualties were estimated at 8,450 killed or injured. This document can be found in Haldane, A. ‘Chaos 
in Iraq. The Insurrection in Mesopotamia.’ (edited by Paul Rich). Allborough Middle East Classics, 
Vol.5, (Allborough Publishing, Cambridge, 1922)
27 British Government, India Office, Review o f  the Civil Administration o f  M esopotamia, (London, 
1920), p. 112
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calls for evacuation from those in favour of pulling out of Iraq. By October the Revolt 
was under control, and the return of Sir Percy Cox marked the end of Arnold Wilson’s 
regime in Iraq. However, many Britons seemed incapable of grasping the vital issues 
and the strength of feeling that underlay the Revolt. Lloyd George stated in the House 
of Commons that he was at a loss to understand the cause of the revolt, and this 
provoked an angry letter from T.E Lawrence to the London Times. He wrote: “The 
Arabs rebelled against the Turks during the war not because the Turk government 
was notably bad, but because they wanted independence. They did not risk their lives 
in battle to change masters, to become British subjects, or French citizens but to win 
a show o f their own... It is not astonishing that their patience has broken down after 
two years. The government that we have set up is English in fashion, and is conducted 
in the English language. So it has 450 British executive officers running it, and not a 
single responsible Mesopotamian. In Turkish days 70 per cent o f the executive civil 
service was local Our eighty thousand troops there are occupied in police duties, not 
in guarding the frontier. They hold down the people...This situation is galling to the 
educated Mesopotamians. It is true we have increased prosperity -  but who cares for  
that when liberty is in the other scale?1,28
Vinogradov provides an important insight into the role of the tribes in the 1920
90Revolt. Although Shi’i dominated, he contends that the Iraqi Revolt was a primitive, 
yet genuine, ‘national’ response to fundamental dislocations in the political and socio­
economic adaptation of the tribally organised rural Iraqis -  brought on by the 
encroachment of the West. It was he argues, ‘national’ in the sense that disparate 
communities within the Iraqi territorial region rallied around a core ideal in defiance 
of a common foreign enemy. After seizing Baghdad in 1917, the major aim of the 
British administration was simply to maintain order in the area, until the future of the 
country was decided upon. Thus, public statements regarding policy were often 
cryptic, and tribal policies tended to be ad hoc. This added to the frustration of the 
tribal Iraqis, and contributed to the Revolt. Alarmed by the violence of the uprising, 
Sir Percy Cox and Gertrude Bell, aided by many political officers, “proceeded to 
paint a native faqade over the British apparatus in Baghdad, and a provisional
28 T.E.Lawrence’s letter, London Times, July 23, 1920, p. 15
29 Vinogradov, A. 1972, pp.123-139
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government was established, ”30 hoping that this would prove enough to placate the 
population.
This is indicative of Great Britain’s attitude to state-building. Rather than having a 
strong ideological standpoint on the issue, they used it where expedient. Such an 
attitude towards the Middle East region in general is also highlighted by a statement 
by Churchill in regard to the present day state of Jordan: “It would be preferable to 
use Transjordania as a safety valve, by appointing a ruler on whom he could bring 
pressure to bear, to check anti-Zionism. The ideal would be a person who was not too 
powerful, and who was not an inhabitant o f Transjordania, but who relied upon his 
Majesty’s Government for the retention o f his office. ”31 Indeed such a standpoint was 
to be the new focus of the British administration, as local realities forced them to 
rethink their policy within Iraq.
6.5. The Cairo Conference of 1921: Choosing a King for Iraq
In February 1921, Churchill succeeded Viscount Milner as Colonial Secretary, and his 
goal was to implement a comprehensive, cohesive policy for the Middle East, which 
would then permit the demobilisation of the huge British battalions stationed there. 
The key was provided by the ‘Sherifian Plan,’ the brainchild of T.E.Lawrence, who 
believed the family of the Sherif of Mecca to be “the oldest, most Holy, and most 
powerful family o f the Arabs. ”32 Elevation of the Hashemites to overlords of the 
Middle East also held out practical advantages to the British. It would help to fulfill, 
in small part, the promises that Britain had made to the Sherif and his sons at the 
outset of the war. Also, as extraneous leaders imported by the British, the Hashemites 
would undoubtably be indebted to them. As Churchill himself expressed at the Cairo 
Conference on 12 March 1921, the gains of each of the Hashemite branches might be 
held for ransom against each other. “A strong argument in favour o f  Sherifian policy 
was that it enabled His Majesty \s Government to bring pressure to bear on one Arab 
sphere in order to attain their ends in another. ”33
30 Vinogradov, A. 1972, p.138
31 Gilbert, M. ‘Churchill,’ Vol. IV, (Heinemann, London 1971), p.553
32 Garnett, D. ‘The Letters o f  T.E.Lawrence.’ (New York, 1939), p.267
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The Cairo Conference in 1921, and then the British Cabinet, adopted the main lines of 
the Sherifian Plan, which would “preserve British interests in the Middle East for the 
next two to three decades. ”34 The cost of the Revolt had forced a British rethink, and 
had raised serious questions over imperial economy -  issues which were all addressed 
at this conference. Gertrude Bell in Baghdad forwarded the minutes of the 
Proceedings of the Council of Ministers, from a meeting held in late 1920, to the India 
Office, Foreign Office and the War Office. These encapsulated the British concerns 
regarding money, but highlighted the perceived duties that Britain now had towards 
Iraq. The British Chamber of Commerce in Baghdad, “fails to understand on what 
principles Great Britain can retain the province o f Basrah by force while evading her 
responsibilities further north, and questions the feasibility o f this course. It goes on to 
point out that having destroyed the only form o f Government which Iraq has known 
for centuries, we cannot leave it without any government worthy o f  the name and thus 
abandon the whole country to chaos. While recognising the urgent need o f lessening 
the burden o f the British tax payer, the Chamber believes that this end can be attained 
with safety and honour along the lines at present contemplated, that is to say the 
formation o f a stable Arab Government. ”35
The Revolt alone had cost the British tax payer an estimated £20 million.36 However, 
the curtailment of expense in Iraq would involve the further relinquishment of British 
control there. It was decided that this could most safely be done by hastening the 
establishment of a national government, to prevent an entire loss of control in the 
event of another uprising. The Sherifian Plan however, would enable an indirect form 
of control to continue. It was decided that Iraq should have a King, and it was 
essential that whoever was chosen by London should not be widely opposed in Iraq. 
However, Britain also wanted to chose a king who would be content “to reign, but not 
govern. ” After considering Abdullah, the elder brother of Feisal, quite seriously, the 
British were forced to rethink when he suffered an ignominious defeat at Maysalun.
33 Gilbert, M. 1971, p.545
34 Dann, U. 1988, p.94
35 Bell, Gertrude, ‘Mesopotamian Intelligence Report No. 4, 31 Dec. 1920’ includes the Proceedings o f  
the Council o f  Ministers in Baghdad, para. 13, CO 730/1
36 Foster, H.A. 1935, p.94
37 Minute by Bullard on Intelligence Report o f  30 N ov. 1920; Minute dated 4th March, 1921. CO 
730/1/9829, p.31
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With Feisal now throneless after his removal from Syria by the French, the British 
began to favour his candidature,
Feisal was a leading member of the Hashemite family, and had already had many 
dealings with the British throughout the Arab Revolt. Also, Mesopotamians returning 
from Syria offered active support for such a Sherifian emir. They sent a telegram to 
Sherif Hussein, "begging him to send one o f his sons as a candidate for the throne o f  
Iraq. " Although a Sunni Muslim, he was known for his tolerance in matters of 
religion, which would be necessary in an Iraqi leader if he were to rule effectively 
over such a large Shi’i population, as well as other minorities. In early 1921, Cox 
made it clear that, although understanding that a ruler should not be imposed, he 
believed that the people of Iraq would welcome a British lead, and urged London to 
state their support for Feisal as the best candidate for the Iraqi throne. “My belief and 
that o f those o f my staff on whose judgement I  rely is that such an announcement o f  
fait accomvli would be a welcome relief to the majority o f the people o f  Mesopotamia 
and that it would have the support o f the moderate elements among the Nationalists 
while it would take the wind out o f the sails o f the young extremists who want to get 
rid o f the Mandate altogether.1,39
In July 1921, the Council of State adopted a resolution proclaiming Feisal as “King o f 
Iraq, provided that His Highness ’ Government shall be a constitutional, 
representative and democratic government, limited by law. ”40 After a farcical survey 
of Iraq was conducted, designed to demonstrate how such a kingship was supported 
by popular will,41 the accession of King Feisal took place on August 23, 1921. Whilst 
using Feisal in the hope that he may make the ideal of a nation-state possible within 
Iraq, the British also hoped that this leader of the Arab Revolt would legitimise their 
own presence in the country. Feisal was very dependent on Britain politically and 
economically, a situation that Britain knew would prevent him from standing up to
38 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report o f  High Commissioner, (London, 1920-22), pp. 10-11
39 Telegram 148S to High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S India 2 January 1921. FO 371/6349
40 See Parliam entary Debates, 1921, vol. 144, col. 1630; also Great Britain, Report o f  High 
Commissioner, (London, 1920-22), p. 14
41 See Foster, H.A. 1935, pp.95-96; also important is a quote by Lt. Col. Fremantle, speaking in the 
House o f  Commons about this plebiscite: "WE arranged and hope that it is all fo r  the best, but fo r  
G o d ’s sake let us drop this sham o f  democratic government fo r  Orientals by themselves. ” (Pari. 
Debates, Vol. 151, cols. 1597-8)
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their presence within his new state. Thus Feisal was caught up in a vicious cycle of 
dependency.
6.6. The Political Foundations of the New State
Feisal’s candidature could only be justified in the name of ‘Arabism’, as he was not a 
native Mesopotamian. The British felt that this was enough, as it laid the grounds for 
the political separation of the Arabs and the Turks. However, the doctrine of Arabism 
delineated the ideological framework for possible Arab unity in the future, and thus 
was a spurious foundation for the new state of Iraq. With such an underlying 
legitimisation, it was hard to see how the new state of Iraq could be moulded into a 
cohesive unit, with a developed sense of national identity. Even if all the inhabitants 
of Iraq had been Arab, they would be more united in trying to overturn the partition of 
their ‘Arab Nation’, than making efforts to develop a more limited sense of identity. 
An added complication was that the population was of course not entirely Arab, and 
the British choice to install Feisal as King shows clearly that they overlooked the non- 
Arab elements of the state they were creating, and did not recognise the importance of 
addressing these issues.
6.6.1. The 1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty
Now that the issue of a king was largely settled, Britain turned their attention to the 
discussing what precise form the constitution should have, and what the exact 
relationship with Britain was to be. Sir Percy Cox appreciated that the term ‘mandate’ 
was in itself offensive to the people of Iraq. As he wrote; “The mere terms 
'mandatory', and 'mandate ' were anathema to them from the first, for the simple 
reason, I  am convinced, that the words translated badly into Arabic, or rather were 
wrongly rendered in the Arabic press when they first emerged from the peace 
conference... But it was taken in Iraq in its other sense o f an authoritative 
requirement, as by a sovereign; and the 'mandatory' as one who exercised the 
authority. "42 Therefore, British officials in Iraq began to favour a treaty relationship 
with the new state, which would relieve Iraqi fears, and ease British spending.
42 In Lady Florence Bell, (ed.), ‘The Letters o f Gertrude B ell,’ Vol.II, (Ernest Benn, London 1927), 
pp.535-6
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Gertrude Bell wrote in May 1921, that: “We have always known that Feisal would 
ultimately insist on a treaty in place o f a mandate -  now we have the opportunity o f 
making a beau geste and giving o f our own accord what we should certainly have had 
to give later at his request. ”43 All the difficulties and strong feelings surrounding the 
mandate, would, it was hoped, be eased by such a gesture.
Certain issues of the degree of control Britain was to have in the new treaty were all 
cleared with an announcement from the Secretary of State for Colonies that the 
mandate would lapse as soon as Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations.44 The 
Anglo-Iraq Treaty, named a ‘Friendship’ Treaty, was formally signed on October 10, 
1922. Feisal gave a public speech, declaring that “The Treaty...is based on the 
foundation o f mutual advantage and interest... Great Britain... has undertaken to 
assist us and has recognised our political independence and respected our national 
sovereignty. All other agreements subsidiary to the treaty will be based on these 
principles. ”45 The treaty covered such matters as British representation of Iraq in 
foreign countries, the duties of British officials, supervision of the judicial system, 
and payment for the public works constructed during the period of military 
occupation. In fact, the treaty allowed for nearly the same amount of British control as 
the mandate had, but under a different guise. Key advisory positions had to be created 
for British officials, and their substantial salaries were now the responsibility of the 
Iraqi Government. Article IV of the Treaty stated that the king of Iraq “agrees to be 
guided by the advice o f His Britannic Majesty tendered through the high 
commissioner on all important matters affecting the international and financial 
obligations and interests o f His Britannic Majesty for the whole period o f  this 
treaty. ”46 Flowever, the Council of State for Iraq refused to accept the Anglo-Iraq 
Treaty unless it was acceptable to the forthcoming Iraqi Constituent Assembly.
The elections for this assembly ran into their own problems. Clause 29 of the 1923 
Electoral Law stipulated that the elector had "an obligation to define himself as an 
Iraqi National and to declare his intention to remain an Iraqi on a permanent
43 In Lady Bell, 1927, p.593
44 Report by His Britannic M ajesty’s Government to the Council o f the League o f  Nations: ‘Report on 
Iraq Administration, April 1922 -  March 1923,’ (London, HMSO 1924), p.23
45 Report on Iraq Administration, 1922-3, ibid, (London, 1924), p. 187. For the texts o f  the treaty and 
subsidiary agreements see League o f  Nations Treaty Series, XXXV, 14-151
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basis. ”47 This therefore disenfranchised voters who did not yet regard themselves as 
‘Iraqi’, which left practically the entire electorate out of the process.
The Shi’i ulama, issued fatwas, forbidding their adherents participation in the 
elections.48 The tone of these proclamations was unmistakable: "Participation in the 
elections or anything resembling them which will injure the future prosperity o f Iraq 
is pronounced haram49 by the unanimous verdict o f Islam. ”50 Such a call had an 
immense impact on those registering to vote, as more than half of the population were 
Shi’i. Other inhabitants of Iraq also withdrew from the elections. In the northern
districts there was a very real fear that Kemalist victories may lead to the re-
• ♦ 1incorporation of these territories back into Turkey. In such an event, any
participation in the Arab Iraqi government would prejudice their futures. Also, it was 
impossible to have thought that an ‘Iraqi’ sense of identity could have been fostered in 
the short space of time since the partition, especially within the province of Mosul, as 
its final inclusion within Iraq was not to take place for a further 4 years.
The Iraqi Cabinet dealt harshly with the main Shi’i mujtahids who had created 
disturbances. The main protaganist, in their view, was al-Khalisi, and he was 
immediately deported as an undesirable alien.52 Several other leading mujtahids then 
followed in protest. Although this helped to solve one problem, it added to a more 
fundamental one. Such treatment of the Shi’i leadership by the new Sunni-led 
government, exacerbated deep-rooted sectarian hostility. This served to make the 
Shi’i feel excluded from the state and its apparatus. Sluglett writes: “Throughout the 
mandate, in attempting to justify their frequently discriminatory policy towards the 
Shia, [sic] the Iraq Government argued that until Iraq became ‘independent' the Shia 
had no voice at all in politics, no separate courts and no publicly financed 
educational institutions. In general, however, the obvious imbalance o f Shia in the 
Cabinet, the Chamber o f Deputies and in the Civil Service was a constantly
46 See '‘League o f  Nations Treaty Series, XXXV. Article IV.
47 See: Electoral Law o f  May 1922, CO 813/1, published in Iraqi Government Gazette, 24 November 
1924
48 See ‘Report on Iraq Administration, 1922-3’, (London, HMSO 1924), p.26
49 Arabic, meaning ‘forbidden’.
50 Abstract to Police Intelligence, 10 November 1922. Quoted in Delhi, BHCF File 23/15/1, Vol. 1, 
‘Propaganda and Activities Against Participation in Iraq Elections.’
51 Report on Iraq Administration, 1922-3, (London, HMSO 1924)
52 al-Khalisi was a Persian national -  as were many o f  the Shi’i ulama in Iraq.
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exploitable source o f irritation. ”53 Indeed, at this time, as Lukitz states: “the danger 
o f dismemberment from within was far greater than any danger from outside the 
borders. ”54
The relevance of the 1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty should not be under-estimated. It was 
not only a political agreement, but affected all spheres of life. It introduced new 
political and administrative measures, but it also institutionalised Sunni dominance 
over other sectarian, ethnic and linguistic groups within the country. In effect, the 
treaty defined the country over which the new rulers would rule, and this definition 
came from outside rather than from within. Britain’s avowed intent was clear: “we 
are committed to policy o f  setting up Arab national state in Iraq and were bound in 
honour to endeavour to carry that policy through and do our best for the Iraq 
state. ”55 That establishing a very Arab regime in Iraq may not prove to be the ‘best 
for the Iraq State,’ did not enter British thinking.
Iraq’s territorial continuity, along with a friendly regime installed in Baghdad, were 
the main British imperatives. This was the reason why Britain played such an active 
role in extending Baghdad’s writ to the provinces. This was a government that they 
could work with, and so the longer term implications of obvious Sunni dominance 
within a heavily Shi’i populated state, were given little attention. However, this was 
the very reason why the agreements between the British and the Sunni leaders, 
although providing the means for Sunni hegemony, were unable to confer the 
necessary legitimacy for a Sunni minority to rule over a Shi’i majority.
6.6.2. The Limiting of the Government of Iraq’s Sovereignty
Despite their support for the Sunni leadership, the Anglo-Iraq Treaty still severely 
curtailed their state sovereignty -  one of the foundations of a true nation-state since 
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Sovereignty, a state’s inalienable right to exercise 
supreme authority within its own bounded territory, is one of the golden principles of
53 Sluglett, P. 1976, p.84
54 Lukitz, L. 1995, p. 15
55 S/S Colonies to High Commissioner Baghdad, Telegram, 116 o f 3 March 1923. CO 730/46/11818
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the nation-state system. A nation is seen as “inherently limited and sovereign, ”56 It is 
limited in the sense that it constitutes a clearly defined, bounded territory, over which 
it has entire and ultimate decision-making power: sovereignty. Thus, sovereignty is 
linked to territory, as "Territory is a tangible attribute o f statehood and within that 
particular geographical area which it occupies, a state enjoys and exercises 
sovereignty. ”57 Such sovereignty allows national groups to exercise the idea of self- 
determination that Wilson resurrected, within their own limited physical area. The 
limiting of this sovereignty must therefore have had an impact on the developing 
state’s geopolitical form, function, and indeed place in the world community, as a 
foreign power still largely dictated its policy. Feisal himself had become deeply 
suspicious of the true British intentions in Iraq, and had been very reluctant to sign the 
1922 Treaty. When he asked for clarification on these points, the British revealed just 
how they regarded his position. The Colonial Secretary wrote: “I  have come to the 
conclusion that Faisal [sic] is rather too prone to raise difficult constitutional and 
foreign questions... why instead offretting and fussing cannot he live quietly and do 
his ordinary practical work as a ruler... the enormous cost and burden Iraq has been 
and still is to us is the important point for him to notice... ”58
The Treaty of 1922 was itself a source of frustration. The Iraqi Government was 
forced into entering agreements that they could not possibly afford, such as payments 
to Britain for personnel and for works constructed during the occupation; or that were 
simply humiliating, such as several articles of the Treaty and the subsidiary 
Agreements. The crux of the problem lay in the obviously subordinate position to 
which the terms of the Treaty had relegated Iraq’s position. The new regime did not 
even have full sovereignty over its own territory, as Article XVIII of the Treaty stated 
that “no territory in Iraq shall be ceded or leased or in any other way placed under 
the control o f any foreign power. ”59 The British clearly did not consider themselves 
as one of these ‘foreign’ powers. However, as Britain knew, the new Iraqi 
Government needed the British. They needed them to help maintain control over a 
disparate population, and to keep the country’s territorial integrity. The Iraqi
56 Anderson, B. 1991, p.6
57 Wallace, R.M.M. ‘International Law.’ (Sweet and Maxwell: London, 1986) p.81
58 Private and Personal, Mr. Churchill to Sir Percy Cox, 29 November 1921. Quoted in Sluglett, P. 
1976, p.73
59 See 'League o f  Nations Treaty Series, XXXV, Article XVIII
213
Government did not have widespread support from the population, which meant that 
it had to gain its power from outside until it had evolved a sufficiently strong 
apparatus of its own. They also needed British support in gaining Mosul, an issue 
which was not finalised until 1926. Iraq needed Mosul for its economic and political 
survival, and only British military assistance could secure the area, keep the Turks 
out, and subdue the Kurds.
From Britain’s point of view, guarding their own interests within Mesopotamia was 
the main concern. Certain British officials had felt all along that “Arabs should be 
told what is going to be done, not asked their opinion; they know that we shall be 
just. ”60 Therefore, considerable constraints were placed upon the Iraqi Government, 
to safeguard the British position. For example, the Council of Ministers in Baghdad, 
were only allowed to “be free in actions which do not touch the rights o f the British 
Empire. ”61 In the same report, in a meeting of the Council of State on 18 November 
1920, it was decided to ask the High Commissioner of Baghdad, for a definition of the 
duties of the Ministers.62
6.7. The Fragility of Iraqi ‘National Identity’
In the early 1920s, Iraqi national identity was a very delicate entity, and was certainly 
not the only communal identity struggling for dominance within the society. Feisal 
had warned the British about the unrest that would be unleashed if the Arab lands 
were to be partitioned, reminding them that they had “no right to gamble with the 
souls and destinies o f other peoples. ”63 However, the British had decided early on 
that a unified Arab Nation was an impossibility. Lt. Col. Gribbon of the General Staff 
commented in 1919, that "it may be as well to recognise here, once and for all, that a 
really united Arabia is an illusion and a dream. Arabs never have combined and
60 Memorandum. B y W.H.Gribbon, Lt.Col. o f General Staff, dated 12 June, 1919. CAB 21/153
61 Proceedings o f a meeting o f the Council o f  State, 29 November, 1920, enclosed in ‘Mesopotamian 
Intelligence Report’ no,4, 31 December 1920, CO 730/1, p.45
62 Proceedings o f a meeting o f the Council o f State, 18 November, 1920, in ‘Mesopotamian 
Intelligence Report,’ N o.4, 31 Dec, 1920, CO 730/1
63 Letter from Feisal to Lloyd George, undated, enclosed as an appendix in Summary o f  the 
Proceedings in Paris in Regard to the Military Occupation in Syria, Cilicia, Palestine and Mesopotamia, 
Sept 1919, prepared by the Secretary o f  the War Cabinet. Appendix I, para. 7, FO 371/4182
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never will combine. No one realised this better than the Turk, who knew that the only 
way to govern the Arabs was to maintain the balance o f power among them. ”64
The British were aware however, that their plans for the Middle East, and Iraq in 
particular, would frustrate these Arab feelings, and necessitate new frames of 
reference for the populations. However, they were over-confident that this delicate 
situation could be appeased by nurturing new ‘national’ identities within the emerging 
Middle East state system. Cox wrote in August 1921 that “at present nationalism in 
Iraq is a plant o f disappointingly sensitive and tender material... It is therefore 
necessary for us to bend every tendril to form and pattern a national state and that 
this may be accomplished I  beg as regards mandate that hand o f H.M Government 
will bear very gently. ”65 Gertrude Bell explained that in regard to Iraqi national 
sentiment, “this is the sentiment which we want to foster and as it is held exclusively 
by sharifians, [sic] they are the people for us to back as we decided at Cairo, ”66 The 
fact that such a sentiment was recognised as ‘exclusive’ should have highlighted the 
dichotomy endemic in presenting it as ‘national’. British authorities were naive in 
thinking that a national sentiment could be fostered from such a exclusive base, 
especially as the Sherifian form of national sentiment was decidedly ‘Arab’ in 
character, whereas any Iraqi national sentiment would have had to be pluralistic in 
content.
The 1924 ‘Iraq Report,’ again documents the lack of state-based nationalism. “An 
Iraqi nationality has hardly yet developed. Men feel the ties o f loyalty to their tribe or 
their town or family more than to their country. A patriotic sense ofpublic duty is 
often lacking. ”67 This situation seems hardly surprising, not least because Great 
Britain, the ‘creators’ of Iraq, as late as 1923 gave clear indications that they 
themselves did not regard the territorial integrity of Iraq as a ‘given’. A British 
evacuation from Iraq was debated throughout 1923, and British reasons for remaining 
ranged from the strategic importance of air bases in Iraq, to the fact that the terrain of 
the country was ideal for military training.68 Finally Cox claimed that it would be
64 Memorandum by Lt. Col. W.H.Gribbon o f  General Staff, 12 June, 1919 CAB 21/153
65 High Commissioner to S/S Colonies, Telegram 376, 10 August 1921 CO 730/4/40185
66 Lady Florence Bell, 1927, p.592
67 India Office ‘Iraq Report 1922-1923’, (London, HMSO 1924), p. 17
68 Quoted in Sluglett, P. 1976, p.80.
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especially wrong if Britain were to renege on her promises to the people of Basra. 
Britain should therefore not contemplate evacuating Iraq completely, but if forced to 
withdraw, should go no further than Basra.69 -  presumably holding this area as a 
separate territory. How was a national identity supposed to develop under these 
circumstances?
6.7.1. The Position of the Kurds
Further complications to the issue of national identity were added by the presence of 
many different ethnic groups within the new state. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, with the final settlement of the partition of former Ottoman territories after 
the First World War, all possibility of Kurdish self-determination was dashed. (See 
Map 28). The impact of this on the new state of Iraq should not be underestimated. It 
can not even be claimed that the British, the people mainly concerned in overseeing 
this partition, were unaware of the prevailing realities. Lord Curzon, the British 
Foreign Minister, and responsible for negotiating the Treaty of Lausanne in 192270 
even commented, “the whole o f our information shows that the Kurds, with their own 
independent history, customs, manners and character, ought to be an autonomous 
race. "7l Sir Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner in Iraq, wanted to offer the 
Kurds military and political support against the Turks, but these proposals were 
rejected by Winston Churchill, the minister concerned.72 The imperatives of empire, 
and the urgent need to make a settlement with the Turks became the priorities for 
Britain, and the Kurdish lands, with the exception of Mosul, were partitioned. The 
fate of Mosul was left for a later adjudication by the League of Nations, and its status 
was held in limbo for several years. This delay in itself could only have hindered the 
development of a state-wide Iraqi identity, as many within Mosul must have felt more 
of an adjunct to the new state, rather than an integral part of it.
69 British Cabinet, ‘Committee on Iraq,’ I.R.Q, 30, 5 February 1923, (London, 1923)
70 In 1922 in Lausanne, a Treaty o f  peace was concluded, incorporating the greater part o f  the Kurdish 
provinces, but not Mosul, into the new Turkish State. Mosul was eventually attached to Iraq in 1926. 
See Olson, R. 1991
71 McDowall, D. ‘A  Modern History o f the Kurds,’ (New York: J.B.Taurus, 1996), p .142
72 See Olson, R. 1991
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Mosul was also the home to Christian Chaldeans and Nestorians, Turkomen, Jews, 
Yezidis and Arabs, although the precise population statistics for these populations 
were hotly debated by the British and the Turks during their negotiations.73 The 
Commission sent by the League in 1925 to make a final ruling 011 the Mosul vilayet, 
found that “there was no national Iraqi feeling in the disputed territory, ”74 -  except 
among the more educated Arabs, and this was more of an ‘Arab’ feeling,
“chauvinistic and anti-alien. ” The Kurds demonstrated “a growing national 
consciousness, which is definitely Kurdish and not for Iraq, ”76 -  and this was 
strongest in the southern part, closest to the Iraqi vilayets. However, as we have seen, 
the decision was taken to annex Mosul to Mesopotamia. This was very pleasing to the 
mainstream British view, who had demonstrated 011 occasion a decidedly patriarchal 
and simplistic view of the situation, and the population dynamic within Mosul. Sir 
Mark Sykes had written in 1918, that “establishing an ordered government in the 
Mosul province where the presence o f a strong military force for an indefinite period, 
which only we can supply, can alone prevent the country from relapsing into a 
condition o f complete anarchy, inhabited as it is by illiterate nomads and savage 
tribes. "n
Difficulties became compounded in the north of Iraq by the lack of enthusiasm of a 
large percentage of the population for the whole idea of an Iraqi state, or at least their 
inclusion within it. The Political Officer in Kirkuk, C.J.Edmonds, suggested inviting 
popularly chosen representatives from Mosul provinces to Baghdad, to discuss a 
possible federation along the lines of an Indian Political Agency.78 However, it was 
becoming widely apparent to the Kurds that there was no longer any hope for Kurdish 
independence, but at best a form of limited autonomy within Iraq. In the following
73 See Foster, H.A. 1935, p. 146. Foster presents the population statistics offered by the Turkish 
negotiating team, and that given by Lord Curzon. Curzon offers a much higher number o f  Arabs and 
Kurds within the Mosul territory, while the Turks stressed the large number o f  Turkish people resident 
there.
1A See: League o f  Nations Council, ‘Decision Relating to the Turco-Irak Frontier Adopted by the 
Council o f  the League.’ Geneva, December 16, 1925. (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1925. G.B. 
Foreign Office, Misc. No. 17, cmd. 2562, 1925)
75 Foster, H.A. 1935, p. 163
76 See League o f  Nations Council, 1925 ibid.
77 Memorandum by Sir Mark Sykes, enclosed in Cecil to Pichon, 8 October, 1918.
FO /371/3384/176523
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years of upheaval and occupation in Mosul, until the final delimitation of the 
boundary, even this limited form of self-determination moved out of the reach of the 
Kurds. The Turks and the Kurds took advantage of the delay in the settlement of the 
frontier, to keep the area as turbulent as possible, both with their own interests in 
mind. Kurdish unrest however, backfired, as the Iraqi government felt that they could 
not now allow independence or even autonomy to be granted to the area.
The British felt that the annexation of Mosul would benefit the new Sunni Iraqi 
Government. The population of mostly Kurds and Turkomen were largely Sunni 
Muslim, and thus their annexation to Iraq would prevent Shi’is being the majority 
within the new state, and safeguard Sunni hegemony over the state. Unrest in Mosul 
over this decision was combated by the British R.A.F. -  who therefore played a 
fundamental role in extending Baghdad’s writ to the provinces.
6.7.2. The Position of the Shi’i
The position and significance of the Shi’i community of Iraq were important factors 
in the crystallisation of the Iraqi State. Feisal’s new government was forced to realise 
early on that the need to co-operate with Britain far outweighed any feeling that they 
should co-operate with the Shi’i leadership. Therefore the Shi’i became another group 
that was to display unhappiness about the political form and content of the new state.
” ...There is a fundamental difference between the Shia [sic] and the ordinary 
minority position. The Shia, aware that they are both more numerous and better 
armed than the Sunni Arabs, know that they could destroy the present Government i f  
British forces were not behind it, though they could not replace it without British 
help. ”79 Approximate censuses, taken in 1920, and again in 1932, show that the Shi’i 
made up almost 55% of the entire Iraqi population, the Sunni Arabs 22%, and the
finKurds 14%. However, despite this majority, both under Ottoman rule and 
throughout the mandate, the Shi’i were never given the part in politics of government 
that was in any way proportional to their numbers.
78 C.J.Edmonds, Kirkuk, to B.H.Bourdillon, Baghdad, K 847 o f 26 October 1922, Delhi, BHCF, 
‘Events in Kurdistan,’ 13/14/Vol. II
79 ‘A Note on the Political Situation to 2 7 / 9 / 2 7 by C.J.Edmonds, enclosed in DO 2032, Sturges to 
Shuchkburgh, 1 October 1927. CO 730/123/40465 paper 49.
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The Shi’i holy Cities, in particular Najaf and Karbala were within the new Iraqi state 
territory, and this clearly gave these areas an ongoing link to Persia. This had 
traditionally served to isolate Najaf and Karbala from centres of Sunni power, and 
make them semi-independent enclaves within the Ottoman empire. They therefore 
were accustomed to looking more towards Qum and Mashad in Persia, than towards 
Baghdad or Basra. “The most serious difficulty for Iraq in this regard is that while the 
Shiahs [sic] represent more or less o f a foreign radical and political element o f 
discord, the Holy Cities which constitute the center o f the Shiah influence, are in the 
very heart o f the land o f the Two Rivers. ”81 It is noteworthy that the Shi’is were seen 
as a ‘foreign’ element, an unwanted complication in the British desire to build a 
‘nation-state’.
This demonstrates just how self-serving the British view of nation-state building was, 
with the establishment of a strong and viable state based on national lines, being very 
low on their scale of priorities. The British were allies of the Sunni Sherif Hussein of 
the Hejaz, and their relationship with ‘the Arabs’ had been built up upon this basis. 
Therefore, when it came to building an Arab state in Iraq, headed by the Sherif s son, 
“Shiah authority would be curtailed. ”82 Such an attitude is crucial in understanding 
the nation-state building of the post-World War One period. The idealism of Wilson 
was heavily diluted with the real politik displayed by Britain in their execution of the 
new self-determination ideas. ‘Nations’ that fitted in with British strategic imperatives 
were recognised, others were not. While genuine contenders for nationhood, such as 
the Kurds, were relegated, artificial contenders were ‘created’ where expedient for 
Britain.
The British and the new Iraqi government decided that the Shi’i must be subordinate 
within the new state system, as they were seen as reactionary and dangerous, and 
therefore less subservient to British interests. The expulsion of the mujtahid al-Khalisi 
at the time of the Constituent Assembly elections in 1923 only served to compound 
this feeling. In 1921, R.W. Bullard, a Colonial Office official, wrote a memo on the
80 Delhi, BHCF, ‘Miscellaneous, Census ofNationalities by Divisions,’ File 34/172. 1920 figures: Print 
no. 270 o f Civil Commissioner o f  10 March 1920.
81 Foster, H.A. 1935, p.58
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Mesopotamian Report No.5 that he had just received from Gertrude Bell, the Oriental 
Secretary to the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia in Baghdad. With regard to the 
Arab Government, and the position of the Shi’i, he wrote that “The Shi’ahs number 
half the population o f Mesopotamia, but owing to the neglect o f secular education 
among them and to the fact that they have never sought office under the Turks they 
have no men fit to hold high administrative positions.
At the same time they are easily swayed by their learned men, who 1) are nearly all 
Persians, 2) are very fanatical, 3) have been brought up in the theocratic tradition 
and consider secular government superfluous, and 4) have everything to lose in 
money and influence if  a stable Government with reasonably honest law-courts and 
administrative officials is set up. ”83
The Mesopotamian Intelligence Report itself highlighted the problems that this 
exclusion caused, and outlined the political make-up of the new state apparatus. “The 
discontent o f the Shi ’ahs at their exclusion from participation in official employment 
is not likely to be diminished when the proposals o f the Council for appointments to 
administrative posts in the provinces are made known. There is not a Shi'ah among 
the 5 Mutasarrifs suggested up to date and but 1 among the 9 Qaimmaqams...the fact 
remains that the overwhelming majority o f the new officials will be Sunni. Nor is it 
possible to see how this can be avoided...As a whole they are more backward than the 
Sunnis. They seldom attended the Turkish secondary and higher schools which were 
all Sunni, nor, for the same reason, did they study in the higher schools at 
Constantinople... Their standard o f education is therefore perceptibly lower than in 
the case o f the Sunnis. ”84 This gave the Arab Government a convenient reason to 
keep most Shi’is out of high office, a situation which would only exacerbate sectarian 
emnity.
6,7.3. The Position of the Jews and Other Minorities
There were also other significant minorities within Iraq, each with their own deep- 
rooted identities which could have been used as the core of an ‘Iraqi’ identity. Some
82 Foster, H.A. 1935, p.59
83 Memorandum by R.W.B(ullard), 5 February 1921, on receiving the ‘Mesopotamian Intelligence 
Report N o .5 ,’ from Gertrude Bell. CO 730/1
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of these minorities were also at odds with the new Arab Government. When the idea 
of an Arab emir for Iraq was first put forward, the Jews of Baghdad, the most wealthy 
portion of the population, and one third of the population of Baghdad, sent a petition 
to the British. In this they asked to be made British citizens in the event of an Arab 
State being set up in Mesopotamia. The Mesopotamian Intelligence Report, number 4, 
mentioned the Baghdadi Jews’ apprehension: “The Jews feel I) that whereas there is 
some limit to the Turks ’ rapacity there is none to the Arabs 2) the Arabs have not the 
ability to maintain that security which is necessary for trade. 3) ...the wealth o f the 
Jewish community ...will infallibly lead to its being squeezed by an Arab
85  86administration. ” Many Christians, about 4% of the population, were also uneasy.
The British seemed to be very dismissive of such concerns, and calls for autonomy by 
several minority groups. In response to a request for Assyrian and Chaldean 
autonomy, sent by the President of the Assyrian National Executive, R.W.Bullard was 
biting: “If, having taken up this scheme, H.M. Government found time hung heavy on 
their hands, they might set about establishing an effective protectorate over the 
Desert o f Gobi. ” Such a flippant remark demonstrates just how little importance 
Britain attached to calls for self-determination that did not fit in with their own 
strategic agenda. Perhaps the British should have paid more attention to the plight of 
these minorities. The Christian Assyrians had only arrived in late 1918 into Iraq, as 
British-backed refugees. They were therefore hated by the anti-British Arab 
Nationalists, making their integration into an already unsettled Iraq very problematic.
The massacre of Assyrians at Simmel by Iraqi forces in 1933 was the shocking 
consequence, and epitomized the complexity of a situation in which the envisaged 
state-building could only progress via ‘nation-destroying.’ Britain had subordinated 
the minorities to the Arab Sunni Government, via political and military means, for the 
sake of safe-guarding their strategic interests in the region, whilst also being seen to 
adequately discharge their duties on the international scene. The concerns of 
minorities within Iraq were dismissed, despite the fact that such worries highlighted
84 ‘Mesopotamian Intelligence Report No. 5 ,’ 15 January 1921. Para. 9. CO 730/1
85 Memorandum by R.W.B(ulIard), para. 9, on ‘Mesopotamian Intelligence Report No. 4, 15 Jan 1921. 
CO 730/1
86 See India Office, ‘Review o f  the Civil Administration o f  Mesopotamia,’ (London, 1920), p. 127
87 Memorandum by R.W.B(uIlard), 11 February 1921, p.137 o f CO 730/1.
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the fact that the identity chosen for Iraq was unrepresentative and exclusionary. A 
minute written in August 1932 by J. Flood from the Colonial Office seems to 
emphasise this disregard for prenational feelings present within the area: “The 
Assyrians are really seeking what is impossible on general grounds. Their demand is 
to live in Iraq without taking their place as Iraqi citizens. This is not possible. The aim 
o f His Majesty’s Government is to create an Iraqi state and nation. ”88
All these issues would prove to be substantial obstacles to the acceptance of the new 
political system within Iraq, and the development of an integrated Iraqi national 
sentiment. In 1921, The Mesopotamian Intelligence Report, number 4 mentioned that 
“the chief impression I  get is that it will be supremely difficult for the Arab 
government to assent any sort o f authority over the tribes, especially the larger ones 
such as the Muntaflq, Kharraj, etc.. ”89
Indeed, for many years the unity of the country was only maintained by British 
military force, which in itself limited the Government’s authority. In May 1925, 
Amery wrote about his visit to Iraq: “I f  the writ o f King Feisal runs effectively 
throughout his kingdom it is entirely due to British aeroplanes. I f  the aeroplanes were 
removed tomorrow the whole structure would inevitably fall to pieces. ”90 As Iraq’s 
mandatory, Britain was responsible under international law for the defence of Iraq 
against foreign invasion. However, Britain also had her own interests to defend, such 
as protecting the routes to India. Thus, any civil unrest, even if entirely due to 
mistakes made by the Iraqi Government, also threatened British interests, and Britain 
would thus intervene to prop up the Government’s authority. Thus, many Iraqis could 
argue that the military system within their borders was mainly there to serve British, 
rather than Iraqi interests.
6.7.4. Other Political Obstacles to Iraqi National Solidarity
Britain had created other obstacles to the development of a modern Iraqi sense of 
solidarity. The position of the tribal shaikhs, decaying under the Ottomans, was
88 Minute by J.E.W Flood, 15 August, 1932. CO 730/178/1, no. 96602, pt. 4.
89 ‘Mesopotamian Intelligence Report, No. 4 ’ 15 Jan. 1921 CO 730/1
90 CP 235 (25), 11 May 1925. CO 730/82/22162
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rebuilt by the British, in a mistaken attempt to keep a link with the past, and its power 
structures. Indeed, the uprising in 1920 has been attributed in part to this policy of re­
building the power of the tribal shaikhs. “The decision o f individual tribesmen and 
small tribal shaykhs [sic] to join the revolt reflected their protest against the British 
policy o f re-building and solidifying the power o f the paramount shaykhs, which had 
been in decline prior to the occupation. ”91 This policy reduced the power of the 
individual tribesmen, and caused much resentment throughout the countryside.
In 1926, and again in 1928, the High Commissioner, Henry Dobbs, prepared two 
memorandums which outlined the principles of the land policy that Britain was 
attempting to introduce. This was an attempt to centralise the system, by granting 
rights and duties of collecting revenues upon a few tribal shaikhs. Supposed to slow 
down the disintegration of the tribes, this in fact only led to the concentration of great 
power into the hands of a few shaikhs. This distorted relations between shaikhs and 
tribesmen, as it undermined the mutual dependency that had been the foundation of 
their relationship. Such a situation was compounded by the debt problem in which 
many rural tribesmen found themselves. The ensuing mass impoverishment of the 
fellahin, led to control of the countryside falling increasingly into the hands of town- 
dwellers, as more tapu sanad land titles were sold as part payment for debts.92 These 
town-dwellers were mostly rich Sunnis, who became absentee landlords. Such a 
situation resulted in “the economic subordination o f the Shi 7 countryside to the
Q 3capital ” Town-dwellers were able to subdue the large tribes economically, and this 
shattered the structure of the countryside, whilst at the same time empowering much 
of the Baghdadi elite.
Obstacles to state-building were also found in the education policy for Iraq. Britain 
was reluctant to provide a good secondary education system, as they were scared of 
political agitators. British officials were concerned that by progressing too fast in 
education spending, a generation of young, enlightened people would be formed, with 
few appropriate employment opportunities. The belief was that this bottle-neck 
situation would instigate the politicisation of these groups, with subsequent political
91 Nakash. Y. 1994, p.71
92 See AIR 23/104, Appendix to the Monthly Report on Muntafiq liwa, September 1926, received from 
the High Commissioner under HQ/1223 in 31, October 1926
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unrest. As the 1923 Iraq Report described it, “Whatever may be thought desirable 
elsewhere, in this country it is neither desirable or practical to provide secondary 
education except for the selected few . ”94
It could appear from this that Britain had missed the point that state-building, and 
especially nation-building, required the widespread establishment of primary and 
secondary education, and that providing it for ‘the selected few’ would prove more 
divisive than nothing at all. It was for these very reasons that Smith, the British 
advisor to the Iraqi Education Ministry resigned in July 1924. With regard to the 
starvation of education funding by Britain, he naively wrote: “it is a mistake for us 
not to keep continually in mind that what we are trying to do in this country is a thing 
that has never been tried in history, I  mean to introduce self-government o f the most 
up-to-date kind into a country which has practically speaking no unity, no patriotism, 
no political instincts or traditions, no education and no actual wealth. ”95
However, not all of the ‘us’ he referred to agreed with this objective. Indeed, Britain 
did not ‘miss the point’, but rather, intended their own particular vision of statehood 
to be championed and consolidated by this ‘selected few.’ This goes right to the heart 
of conflicting visions of statehood, and Britain’s purpose in supposedly trying to 
create a ‘nation’. Although Britain’s education policy created obstacles to unity within 
Iraq, this highlights precisely what British priorities were, and what served British 
interests best: a narrow, Sunni Arab-based vision of nationhood, that did not depend 
on populist support and that owed its existence largely to Britain. This was the 
subservience of state-building to British strategic interests, and demonstrates how the 
establishment of the state of Iraq was little more than a necessary by-product of 
British strategic policies for the region. Britain never viewed their ‘job’ in the area to 
be that of building a nation-state, but rather to pragmatically further their own national 
interests.
93 Lukitz, L. 1995, p.55
94 ‘Report on Iraq Administration, 1923-1924,’ (London, HMSO 1924), p.206
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6.8. Conclusion
The Ottomans had erected a political structure that had been maintained for over three 
and a half centuries in the Mesopotamian region. Within this structure, the Iraqi 
provinces were governed as distinct, outlying parts of the Empire, and not as a unified 
state. During this time, a political culture had also evolved, in which each knew his 
position, powers, duties and limits. Although this system had been ailing from the 
mid-nineteenth century, it had been showing signs of recovery, and was still accepted, 
albeit passively, probably by most of the population. Such a situation was radically 
altered by the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War. The political 
system constructed within Iraq after partition asked the population to fundamentally 
alter their frames of reference, and to accept a new political culture almost overnight.
Slugglet contends that academics and politicians today are less inclined to believe that 
there can be a complete harmony of interests between different people when some are 
subordinated to others.96 It is even impossible to speak of a whole people, such as the 
Kurds, as having a single interest. This is why, during the period of the British 
mandate, “in the Kurdish areas, divided between Turkey, Iraq and Persia, for long 
remote from any form o f government control, inter-tribal conflict, sometimes
07accompanied by rebellion, flourished' ”
Not that Britain had had a completely free hand in choosing the political system they 
wanted for Iraq. They held the League of Nations’ international mandate for the 
territory, and this in itself carried important provisos over what the Mandatory’s role 
was, and was not. Therefore, whilst being able to manipulate policies within Iraq to a 
certain extent, there was always the public arena of the international community, as 
represented by the League, to satisfy. The other fundamental factor in determining the 
government of Iraq was the internal forces of the country itself. Violent resistance to 
European domination was a feature of the post-war settlement in Iraq, as it was in 
Syria and Palestine. For Iraq, this had a decisive influence over the form of 
government that emerged, and what the Iraqis eventually got was an embryonic
95 Smith to Dobbs, D.A. Advv/33/19/151, 15 July 1924. Delhi BHCF, ‘Education’ file 5/1/37.
A.L.F.Smith.
96 Slugglet, P. 1976, pp. 1-2
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‘national’ state, built upon self-determination, but profoundly Arab, and Sunni, in 
character.
Many factors shaped the creation of Iraq. Iraq was created with an inherent dilemma. 
The whole apparatus of the Iraqi Govermnent was imported from outside, and a 
dependency upon Britain was necessary in order to maintain it. The constitution 
claimed that Iraq was a sovereign state, but the Treaty concluded with Britain in 1922 
severely limited their sovereignty, and legitimised a very heavy British presence on 
Iraqi soil. The documentary evidence suggests that this military presence was 
necessary to maintain an Iraqi government that did not have the required popular 
support to survive alone. The power base of Iraq was therefore not indigenous, but 
unity was being imposed from outside, and for foreign reasons. British attempts at 
state-building seem naive and simplistic, but were in reality acutely practical, and 
governed by strategic interests that lay outside Iraq itself. Britain displayed just how 
little importance they attached to establishing a sense of national identity within the 
state of Iraq, when this conflicted with British imperatives. The spreading of an Iraqi 
collective sentiment came secondary to the British imperative of stability within the 
country. Therefore, it did not really concern them that large groups of the population 
were dissatisfied or politically frustrated, as long as the situation did not reach a point 
where British military might would be unable to contain it.
Britain could not avoid making ‘self-determination’ and ‘nationalism’ the public 
foundations of the new Iraqi State. The reasons for this were twofold. In part, it was 
due to President Woodrow Wilson’s ideals, and the reactions they had aroused among 
ethnic and cultural groups around the world. Perhaps more importantly however, it 
was because the European nations were unable to resist the ‘idealist nationalism’ of 
Wilson because of the failure of European balance-of-power nationalism which had 
culminated in the First World War. However, how was nationalism conceived by the 
British? Did they view it as a threat, perhaps to British interests in India, or as an 
opportunity, for secure government and a route to control or influence? Was it seen as 
a necessary evil, or as a natural phenomenon, related to race, culture, language or 
geography? Or was it simply regarded as a geo-strategic reality? Understanding these
97 Macfie, A.L. 1998,p.235
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issues will help explain the logic of British policies, and also the ramifications for the 
Iraqi society that was being fashioned. The British were certainly trying to create a 
certain ‘type’ of nation, in which some groups clearly fared better than others. This 
sheds light onto British attitudes towards nationalism and self-determination in 
respect to Iraq.
For all the propaganda of ‘giving the Arabs their freedom’, and setting up a modern 
state-system within the region along ‘national’ lines, the truth remains that “Nations 
do not vie amongst themselves for control over lands...primarily to give justice or to 
raise the standards o f living among the people or suppress disorder per se ... Ifthese 
benefits extend to the natives o f the country it is because the latter cannot, in the very 
nature o f the circumstances, help sharing them. I f  conscious efforts are made to 
extend improved conditions among the native populations, it is because any increase 
o f their well-being must lead to their increased productiveness and purchasing power 
and less costly methods o f control and administration... In a conflict o f  interests... it is 
very natural that those o f the mother country should come first and that the good o f 
the people must, in reality, be subordinated to the expected material and political 
returns. ”98
This reality had an immense part to play in determining the nature of the new regime 
developing in Iraq. It was created as a sovereign state, yet was clearly in a subordinate 
position to a power whose interests were global, not simply local. Therefore local 
considerations were often overlooked, and sovereignty limited, which was dangerous 
when creating an entirely new political and social entity which affected the lives of 
millions.
The next chapter explores the ramifications for Iraq, of all these geographical and 
political decisions made by Britain, supposedly on Iraq’s behalf. The fact that British 
policy for Iraq was fashioned by British concerns was to have an immense impact on 
the subsequent geopolitical function and nature of the Iraqi State.
98 Ireland, P.W. ‘Iraq, A Study in Political Development,’ (Alden Press, London, 1937), pp.34-35
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE IMPACT OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL FORM AND 
POLITICAL SYSTEM CHOSEN FOR IRAQ: DIFFICULTIES 
WITH NATIONAL INTEGRATION
7.1. Introduction
“ .. .it would be a miracle of adjustment if all this complex of East and West, thus 
brought together in Iraq, should fit itself at once into a well-ordered community.” 1
The foreign interest in the former Ottoman territories both during and after the First 
World War, was indeed ‘a striking example of child’s play with human fate. ’ 2 Britain 
wanted control of Iraq to satisfy strategic aims, as Iraq’s geographical location lent it 
great importance in the eyes of Britain. International Great Power rivalries were being 
played out in the Middle Eastern arena. Although the structure of the new state of Iraq 
was not solely determined by the British, but also by a new climate of international 
opinion and forces internal to the region itself, Great Britain did retain the dominant 
voice in the region. The geographical location of Iraq also helps to explain the cultural 
‘cross-roads’ nature of the area, containing many distinct communities.
1920s Iraq was considered by the victors of the First World War, as a ‘nation in 
formation’, in which all of the various communities were supposed to rally around the
a
idea of the ‘nation’, “as it is defined and diffused by a nationalistic doctrine. ” Thus 
the populations of the new state would combine to produce a homogenous, collective 
and state-wide sense of identity, distinct from that of neighbouring ‘nation-states’. 
This chapter will examine the impact of the chosen geographical form and political 
system, on the development of national feeling within the territory during the early 
1920s, whilst also analysing the factors that can frustrate this process, and hinder
1 Foster, H.A. 1935, p.63
2 Foster, H.A. 1935, p.44
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national integration. “Can a nation be forged from so many disparate elements or is a 
nation a natural configuration? Must a ‘nation ’ evolve or can nationalism be imposed 
from the top down? ”4 Iraq’s population was not only composed of several minority 
groups, but some of these groups held their own strong ideas about the form of the 
Iraqi state, and their place within it. When these ideas clashed with the form of 
statehood imposed by an outside European power, populations could feel excluded 
from the very state that they were now supposed to be part of.
Many of the territorial boundaries of Iraq had been negotiated bilaterally between 
France and Great Britain, in accordance with their own interests, and were informed 
very little by the wishes of the population they enclosed. Other boundaries, such as 
that agreed with Kuwait, were determined by independent rulers of neighbouring 
states, and a British team speaking ‘on behalf of Iraq. It was these boundaries that 
would define the territorial limits of the new state, and determine the geographical 
extent of the ‘Iraqi’ population. Such far-reaching decisions greatly affected the 
geopolitical form that Iraq was to assume. A population being defined by an outside 
power, and for largely outside imperatives, would feel subordinate and vulnerable in 
relation to that more dominant power. Various groups within the new state also felt 
resentful for different reasons. The well-defined Kurdish population held stronger 
affiliations with communities across the new borders, rather than with the 
predominantly Arab population of Iraq. With the partition of the Ottoman territories 
after the War, all hopes for an independent Kurdistan were dashed, and Iraq was left 
to deal with this dissatisfied population. Many Arabs also felt cheated, as they had 
been looking for the creation of one Arab Nation, united under a strong local leader. 
Thus, there was antipathy to the new state from many sides, and right from inception 
the territory held frustrated communities that would only prove a divisive force upon 
the new state.
An examination of the history and geography of the region has demonstrated how 
such distinct communities developed in the Iraqi region. The provinces now 
constituting the State of Iraq had historically been very parochial. Such localism had
3 Lukitz, L. 1995, p.2
4 Simon, R. 1997, ‘The Imposition o f Nationalism on a Non-Nation State. The Case o f  Iraq During the 
Inter-War Period. 1921-1941’. In Janowski, J. and Gershoni, I. 1997, p.88
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been encouraged by the inconsistent Ottoman administration over the region, as well 
as Ottoman tolerance for different ethnic and religious groups.5 Therefore, although 
geographically contiguous, the former vilayets of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra shared 
very few economic and cultural similarities, and constituted distinct units.
Britain was now committed to building a modem nation-state within the territory of 
Iraq. They wished to establish a strong state apparatus which would then imbue the 
territory with a strong spirit of nationalism, “primarily a principle that holds that the 
political and national unit should be congruent, ”6 - and based within a clearly defined 
territorial extent. However, the more ‘one and indivisible’ the nation claimed to be, 
the more that heterogeneity within the territory became hard to accommodate.
Building a modern nation-state would require the erosion of parochial allegiances 
within the area, and the construction of new frames of identification. This was a huge 
undertaking in Iraq, and would have proved challenging even if the political 
leadership and inspiration had come from within the culture. The central policy­
makers at the time were probably unaware of the social, ethnic, cultural and political 
complexities involved in such a process. As Lukitz points out: "The lingering effect o f  
old loyalties is sometimes fe lt well after the emergence o f newer ones. Loyalties are 
part o f the mass offeelings, beliefs and motivations that -  like the submerged base o f 
an iceberg -  determine the direction and movement o f a human group. ”7 Although 
old loyalties do not necessarily continue to determine the direction of a community, as 
new loyalties can prove very powerful, Lukitz does draw attention to the fact that old 
loyalties must be respected and addressed.
As mentioned in Chapter Two, constructing a ‘nation’ required the utilisation of the 
ethnic group’s -  or ethnie’s8 -  collective symbols and memories, to emphasise a 
group’s common heritage. However, problems can arise when several distinct ethnic 
groups, each with their own myths and historical memories, inhabit the same 
supposed ‘nation-state’. The Wilsonian ideal of nationalism assumed that a nation, or 
a sufficiently strong prenational feeling, would develop in an area with a homogenous
5 See Longrigg, S.H. ‘Four Centuries o f  Modern Iraq.’ (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1925); Shaw,
S. 1977
6 Gellner, E. 1983, p. 1
7 Lukitz, L. 1995, p. x
8 See: Smith, A.D. 1986.
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population. However, the ideological ‘problem’ of heterogeneity within nation-states 
had not been properly addressed by the time of Iraq’s creation, so little was done to 
accommodate it.9 This clearly appears to have been an important factor in the 
geopolitical development of Iraq. Batatu has demonstrated that at the turn of the 
twentieth century, the Iraqi people “were not one people or one political 
community. ”10 Not only was Batatu referring to the many racial and religious 
communities within Iraq, but also the divides between the Arabs of the region, who 
despite sharing many similar characteristics, “were themselves in large measure a 
congeries o f distinct; discordant, self-involved societies. ”}I The multitude of visions 
for statehood and communal identities underlay the competition for power within the 
geographical area of Iraq. This chapter highlights the problems that arise when the 
majority of these are subordinated to a vision that is not universally shared. Just how 
far the British vision for Iraq tied in with the visions of the local population, proves an 
important factor in understanding the consequent Iraqi state of the 1920s.
7.2. The Effects Upon National Consciousness Within Iraq
The process that the League of Nations envisaged for Iraq, as set down in their 
mandate, necessitated a rapid passage from traditional, multi-dimensional loyalty, to 
modern, exclusive loyalty. An even harder concept to grasp, even in theory, was that 
of ‘national identity’. It is an idea that determines a nation’s character, by pervading, 
communal national experiences. This process is supposedly the result of collective 
cultural traits which gives a nation a unique meaning, and provides the basis for a 
stable and viable polity. Such a process can lead on from the development of ‘proto­
nationalism’, according to Hobsbawm, 12 and is also the culmination of Smith’s ethnie 
development. Although they differ in the terminology used, and the origins of such
9 In the present day we can see many examples o f  the ideological ‘problem’ o f  heterogeneity within 
nation-states, being solved in a variety o f  ways. There is also a better understanding o f  the fact that 
nation-building is a permanently dynamic set o f  processes. However, the post-First World War era was 
one o f  dramatic and chaotic change. Before this war, state-craft and diplomacy had been based upon 
balance-of-power strategies. After the horror o f  the First World War, W ilson’s ideas were based firmly 
on principle, and thus were a great break from the past. As with many ideas based on principle, they 
were set down and championed before all the issues and complexities had been explored.
10 Batatu, H. ‘O f the Diversity o f  Iraqis, the Incohesiveness o f  their Society, and their Progress in the 
Monarchic Period Toward a Consolidated Political Structure.’ In Hourani, A. Khoury, P.S. & Wilson, 
M. (eds.), ‘The Modern Middle East.’ (I.B.Tauris, London, 1993), p. 503
11 Batatu, H. 1993, ibid, p.503
12 Hobsbawm, E.J. 1990. See chapter entitled: ‘Popular Proto-Nationalism’.
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feelings, both Smith and Hobsbawm contend that the development of such strong 
community identity is a pre-requisite for the development of nationalism, although it 
does not make it inevitable. National identity also implies social cohesion and 
political unity. 13 This modern concept of national identity, therefore, is supposed to 
override all other loyalties, without however, implying their total erosion. It is thus a 
‘rediscovery’ of a nation’s past, and usually emphasises the common ethnic origins of 
the population. 14
Such a political approach to territories such as Iraq after the First World War was a 
result of Wilson’s ideals of self-determination for distinct ‘nations’. This was an 
essentialist belief that nations already existed and were simply awaiting political and 
legal recognition. Wilson’s premise was that groups within the Middle Eastern 
territories constituted distinct communities, with strong identities that were verging on 
‘national’. Such communal identities were to be respected and given undisputed 
political freedom within a bounded territory, because nationalism itself was seen as 
upholding the principle that the political and national unit should be one and 
indivisible.
Wilson’s 14 Point Plan ushered in a new era on the global political stage, one in 
which there was no longer a place for imperialism and ethnic subjugation. It was only 
in such a world, Wilson believed, that political stability could be achieved. People 
needed to be in control of their own destinies for the global political arena to function 
fully and fairly. Thus, the post-First World War concepts of nationalism were a 
mixture of ideological essentialism (‘self-determination’), and idealism, with de­
colonisation, and antipathy towards two immense multi-national empires that had lost 
the war: Germany and the Ottomans. The morality and strength of the nation-state 
principle lay in the idea of allowing unique communities an independent, and self­
governed future.
The reality in Iraq, however, presented several major obstacles to achieving such a 
goal, and highlighted many of the limitations of this nation-state ideal. In Iraq, the 
concept of a ‘national identity’ had not been forged out of a long process of a national
13 Lukitz, L. 1995, p.79
14 See Smith, A.D. 1988
233
life lived in common, as envisaged by Smith’s concept of ethnie. Such an experience, 
which could have laid a foundation at least for the type of proto-nationalism 
envisaged by Hobsbawm, was notable largely for its absence. Furthermore, in the 
sudden emergence of opposition to external powers (such as Ottoman, British and 
French), sentiments crystallised not around the idea of an Iraqi ‘nation’, but around 
different factions within the putative Iraqi State.
Iraq was a new state, and was without common myths of ancestral territory. Iraq 
lacked common historical memories to appeal to, as no single past could be used by 
the various groups of Iraq’s population. There was no widespread yearning for 
collective political redemption, and each group retained its own distinct collective 
memories, and visions of their ‘nation’s’ collective future. Thus, even if they did 
subscribe to the idea of an Iraqi state, they may still dispute the content and form that 
the state should take. Wilson’s ideals were too dependent on ethnic homogeneity 
throughout a territory, to be able to work in reality. Although he felt that people 
should be in control of their own destinies, who was to decide who ‘the people’ were? 
It is here that the role of the British within Iraq became important, as they had their 
own agenda for the area, and their own interpretation of ‘nationalism.’ Many in 
Britain did not share the American-led ‘essentialist’ view in the first place. More 
importantly, they also had the political and military power to enable their vision of 
‘nationhood’ to dominate others that may have compromised British interests. In fact, 
Britain’s ‘vision of the nation’ was constantly interpreted through the prism of 
strategic interest.
Almost two years passed between the Armistice of Mudros and the arrival of Sir 
Percy Cox in Baghdad, with a remit to try to stabilise the situation in the wake of the 
1920 Revolt. This delay was important as it did allow the growth of an embryonic 
national movement within Iraq, whose pressure British policy was forced to 
recognise. 15
Batatu16 documents an unprecedented level of Shi’i and Sunni collaboration during 
the 1920 Revolt. Resistance to British occupation had created, it was thought, a broad
15 See Sluglett, P. 1976, pp.25-26
16 Batatu, H. 1978
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base of national sentiment. Although the Revolt was not nationalist in the modern 
sense, and was mainly a tribal affair, it did enter national mythology and thus 
eventually became an important factor in spreading national consciousness. 
Nonetheless, Batatu, and others, such as Nakash and Vinogradov, 17 warn against 
reading too much into this limited period of Shi’i and Sunni co-operation. The 
collaboration was encouraged by the fact that the Shi’is and Sunnis at that time held a 
mutual interest: to force the British out of the country and to prevent the partition of 
Arab lands - an issue that seemed to provide a point of reconciliation for the two 
largely Arab groups. The collaboration was short-lived, as with the end of the Revolt, 
the British backed the Sunni leadership, at the expense of the Shi’i religious 
leadership, thus again exacerbating the divides between the two communities. Such an 
episode demonstrates just how difficult it is to pin down ‘identity’, and communal 
interests, as such concepts are so intangible and in a constant state of re-alignment. 
Also, any ‘national’ consciousness that had been demonstrated was purely Arab in 
essence, and therefore was also problematic within a heterogenous territory. Just why 
was heterogeneity within the territory so divisive?
7.2.1. The Shi’i Within Iraq
The Shi’is constituted a distinct group in Iraq, and, it could be claimed, still do so 
today. They held an entirely different ideological base from that of the Sunnis, and 
had their own religious hierarchical society and rules. Some British officials viewed 
them as “a foreign radical and political element o f discord\ ”ls who were "very 
fanatical "19 Yet, they constituted the majority of the population of Iraq, and were a 
powerful community group. To understand the impact of the establishment of the 
State of Iraq, we must ask: what were the basic political aspirations of the Iraqi 
Shi’is?
20  • * * Nakash contends that during the nineteenth century, Iraq’s nomadic southern tribes
began to settle and take up agriculture, and that this development marked the
17 See: Nakash, Y. 1994; Vinogradov, A. 1972
18 Foster, H.A. 1935, p.58
19 Memorandum by R.W.B(ullard), 5 February, 1921, on receiving the Mesopotamian Intelligence 
Report, N o.5, from Gertrude Bell. CO 730/1
20 Nakash, Y. 1994
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beginning of a process of Shi’i state-formation in Southern Iraq, which had its vague 
territorial limits built around the Shi’i cities of Najaf and Karbala. The settlement of 
the nomads fragmented old tribal confederations that had developed over centuries to 
give political and economic function and form to the nomadic tribal existence. The 
settlement also increased agriculture and trade. The ongoing conversion of the tribes 
resulted in the establishment of a more unified religion and a more cohesive value 
system. At the top of this political hierarchy were the grand mujtahids -  religious 
leaders, many of them Iranian settlers, who supervised the urban-rural partnership and 
controlled resources derived from tax and contributions. Such an emerging political 
system therefore was religiously based, and so was greatly informed by teachings and 
culture emanating from Iran, rather than from closer Iraqi centres. Nakash claims that: 
“The process o f Sh i’i state formation in southern Iraq came close to maturing early in 
the twentieth century, when leading mujtahids formulated a theory defining the nature 
o f the state which they had envisaged and laid foundations for their own 
representations in politics. The attempts o f the mujtahids to establish an Islamic 
government in Iraq did not materialise however, and the process o f Shi ’i state 
formation was aborted following the British occupation and the subsequent formation 
o f a Sunni state in the country. ”2i
The formation of modern Iraq as a Sunni dominated state dealt a severe blow to the 
position of Shi’i Islam in the country. The Sunni government eradicated much of the 
power traditionally held by the Shi’i religious establishment. They reduced the 
position of Najaf and Karbala in relation to Baghdad, in terms of political status and 
as a cultural centre. The Shi’i religious establishment was in a position to compete 
with any government in Iraq over the mobilisation of the population, and was 
therefore an unwanted danger to the new Sunni authority. "The conflict between the 
Shi ’i mujtahids and Iraq’s Sunni politicians in the early 1920s stemmed from the 
clash between the process o f Shi 7 state formation, which had begun in the mid­
eighteenth century, and the establishment o f the Iraqi monarchy. This conflict 
manifested itself in the struggle between the two groups over the nature o f  
government as well as the control o f the Shi 7 population in the new state. ”22
21 Nakash, Y. 1994, p.5
22 Nakash, Y. 1994, p.75
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The added complication that many of the settled Shi’i in Iraq were of Persian origin, 
created even greater problems for the Shi’i community. Firstly, the creation of modern 
Iraq forced many Shi’is in the country to assess their ‘national’ identity for the first 
time, and make hard decisions regarding their future in the new state. Many Persians 
had lived in the Mesopotamian region for a long time, and felt bound up in its 
destiny. Secondly, the Shi’i became increasingly frustrated that many of their 
legitimate grievances against the Sunni authorities were presented by the Sunni 
government as sectarianism against the state. Shi’is were painted as ‘outsiders’, who
• OAdid not really ‘belong’. Thus, whilst the Shi’is were really protesting against the 
government’s very narrow definition of ‘Arab’ nationalism, the Sunni authorities 
simply turned to disputing Shi’i Arab origins in an attempt to discredit them. In fact, 
Shi’i opposition to the government did not necessarily derive from a lack of 
nationalistic spirit or disloyalty to the Iraqi state, but from their strong feelings of 
exclusion from the Sunni-dominated form of the state. A Shi’i student in 1931 asked: 
“(Have) the Shi ’is sacrificed their men, orphaned their children and widowed their 
wives in order to set up governmental chairs for the Sunnis on the skulls o f their 
martyrs? ”25
Paradoxically, many Shi’is resented the fact that Iraq’s nationalist program did not 
involve them more. In 1921, not a single Shi’i was included in the lists of candidates 
for the five positions of provincial governors, and there was only one Shi’i among the 
nine candidates for district officers.26 Such a situation was bound to create tension and 
resentment. As Lukitz describes it: “The Iraqi Shi’is were not opposed to the concept 
o f an Iraqi State, but to its translation in terms o f Sunni hegemony. ”27 There is strong 
parallel here to the Muslim/Hindu opinion in 1940s India, just before the
9 oestablishment of an independent Pakistan.
Also, the idea of authority implied in a nation-state, clashed with the tendency of 
rebellion and autonomy typical of a tribally-based society. The social structure of
23 See: Intelligence Report N o. 4, 31 December 1920, FO 371/6348/2904
24 See Kelidar, Abbas, ‘The Shi’i Imami Community and Politics in the Arab East.’ MES 19 (1983), 
P-12-
5 AIR 23/385, S.S.O. Baghdad to Air Staff. Ref: Bd/28, 27 November 1931
26 Intelligence Report N o.5, 15 January, 1921, FO 371/6350/3116
27 Lukitz, L. 1995, p.58
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Shi’ism and the historical conditions in which it developed were very different to 
those of the Sunni community. In each case, different symbols, rituals and customs 
helped to define the members’ collective identity. Myths and memories form the
■JQ
fundamental bases of ethnic communities, or ethnie , just as they do of consequent 
‘nations’. To bind an ethnic or religious group, such myths are required to root the 
community firmly in the past, to give its members a sense of tradition and antiquity. 
Thus, Shi’i-Sunni tension was not simply a conflict over the ‘fruits of office’ in the 
new regime, but was far more fundamental. The two groups clashed on a fundamental 
level as one’s vision of statehood meant the eradication of the other’s vision.
Traditional Shi’i motifs often stressed resistance to oppression and the inclination to 
stand up to temporal authorities. Motifs of combat and martyrdom were also 
appealing. These motifs held great appeal for tribesmen experiencing increasing 
hardship. Such ideas therefore pervaded the Shi’i pysche, and could arouse great
• TOstrength of feeling. Thus, the Shi’is became a community almost defined by their 
being in a state of constant protest against Sunni authorities, or at least any Sunni- 
dominated authority. This was the situation even before the British arrived.
The Shi’i/Sunni conflict became a struggle over the principles informing the country’s 
entire identity. The Shi’is refused to relinquish their own cultural values, adamant that 
being Arab, did not mean being Sunni. The more the Sunni regime threatened their 
position, the more the Shi’i reacted as a consolidated community. Thus differences 
were enhanced, and divisions compounded. Any developing national feeling then, in 
1920s Iraq, was held solely by an exclusive Sunni strand of society.
7.2.2. The Kurds Within Iraq
The British wished to be seen as fulfilling their mandatory requirements to establish 
self-determination within Iraq, less due to ideological convictions than to 
considerations of real politik. It becomes increasingly clear that self-determination 
was never the priority, as groups like the Kurds were manipulated to secure wider
28 For more details see Wolpert, Stanley, ‘A N ew  History o f  India,5 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1977)
29 A term introduced by Smith, A.D. 1988
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strategic aims. For example, despite the fact that Curzon had remarked that "the
3 I
whole o f our information shows that the Kurds ...ought to be an autonomous race, " 
the British Government wanted Mosul to be attached to Iraq, as “Mesopotamia was o f 
very little use without Mosul. ”32
An ‘imagined political community’ is necessary for all emergent nations. Anderson 
contends that nationalism ‘invents nations’ by a creative process, where all 
communities larger than the primordial village must be imagined, as members of such 
a group will never get to meet all other members. Therefore, a mental image of ethnic 
and national identity must be constructed to allow an individual to feel part of this 
greater collective. It is through such an image that the political community can be
• T ' lexperienced by its members.
Over centuries of semi-autonomous political and cultural life, the Kurds had 
constructed their own ‘imagined community’, which had been distilled down from 
several such imaginings within the Kurdish region, into one roughly identifiable 
general ‘Kurdish’ community.34 These imagined communities were infused with 
Kurdish myths and symbols, that created a feeling of shared identity amongst them. 
The creation of Iraqi national identity would therefore require the destruction, or 
subordination, of these smaller political communities. However, the British under­
estimated the importance and resilience of these forms of identification.
In the ideal Kurdish ‘imagined community’, the relationship between territoriality and 
nationalism was fundamental. The three strongest themes of this community were 
language, topography and the rural experience. Also important were shared myths of 
origins, religion, material culture and the Kurdish world view .35 Such ‘banks’ of 
shared memories are vitally important, as over the last 2 0 0  years, all aspiring nations 
have based their claims to that identity on such a collective mythology. In this sense, 
the reality stems from the myth. Smith points out that while a common origin is not
30 See Lukitz, L. 1995. Also see Nakash, Y. 1994.
31 Quoted in McDowall, D. ‘A  Modern History o f  the Kurds’. (J.B.Taurus, N ew  York, 1996), p.142
32 Notes o f a meeting held at Trouville, Sept. 9, 1919. CAB 21/153. See also the De Bunsen Report, 
June 1915, para. 26. CAB 42/3
33 Anderson, B. 1985
34 See O ’Shea, M. 1997, unpub. Ph.D. thesis, pp.234-259
35 See O ’Shea, M. 1997, unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Chapter 11
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necessary for a sense of ethnic community, a myth of common and unique origins in 
time and place is essential.36
A fundamental element of the Kurdish mythology, was that of struggle waged against 
the host government; an element sharing strong similarities with the Shi’i experience. 
This is because the Kurds have been split into different states and empires for 
hundreds of years. Such a mythology helped to inform the reaction to the post-First 
World War partition, to the extent that the mythologised account of the division of 
Kurdistan at that time, tends to ignore the fact that Kurdistan was already split 
between more than one empire. Such strength of communal cultural feeling can 
override divisions caused by language and religion.
The language theme of Kurdish identity was problematic, as there were in fact many 
Kurdish languages, which created their own divides. Similarly, although religion was 
an important motif, not all Kurds shared the same religion. Approximately 85% were 
Sunni Muslim, whilst in southern ‘Kurdistan’, many Kurds were Shi’is. There were 
also two Sufi Muslim orders specific to Kurdistan, the Qaderiya and Naqshbandiya. 
Yazidism was another religion of the area, unique to Iraqi Kurds.37 Christian and 
Jewish Kurds also constituted significant numbers of the Kurdish population, but had 
a minimal role in the creation of a Kurdish identity, except in that their existence 
enabled Kurds to claim an identity that partly transcended that of religion.
The Agrarian ideal also defined the Kurdish communal identity, and served as one of 
the few common threads of culture that united the disparate parts of Kurdistan. This 
‘rural idyll’ was idealised by many Kurds in much the same way that the virtues of 
nomadic life were championed by many tribal, and even settled Arabs. Kurdish 
mythology did not contain many images of Kurds portrayed in urban contexts, and to 
some, the urban culture posed as great a threat to its existence as foreign culture. 
These idealised mythologies thus build up a distinct ‘culture’, or ‘webs of 
significance’, that are established by men to inform their collective behaviour.38
36 Smith, A.D. 1981, p.66
37 For more on the Kurdish religions, See O ’Shea, M. 1997, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, pp.248-250
38 Geertz, C. ‘The Interpretation o f Cultures’. (Hutchinson, London 1975), pp.4-5
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Culture thus becomes the total way of life for a group, directing its way of thinking, 
feeling and acting.
The Kurdish social network was determined by physical and spiritual links, embodied 
in the role of the agha, Kurdish tribal leaders, which characterised a self-sufficient 
cultural system whose modes of communication and behaviour remained resistant to 
external ideas. This was why the idea of an Iraqi State, modern, Sunni or Arab, could 
not appeal to Kurds as a collective. Thus resistance to the state was more than ethnic, 
but not yet national. It was social and cultural.
All these factors contributed to the unwillingness of distinct groups such as the Kurds, 
to subscribe to the idea of an Iraqi national identity that was Arab in essence. As a 
hegemonic ideal of national identity emerged, it became inevitable that there would 
be a clash between the Kurdish and the Sunni Arab communities, due to the refusal of 
one to submit politically to the other -  highlighted by the discontent and instability 
throughout Mosul in the early 1920s. The Kurds refused to submit politically and 
economically to Arab-dominated Baghdad. Fundamentally, this was a cultural 
reaction from the Kurds, as a community with their own deep religious, cultural and 
social characteristics which had moulded the structure of this group and determined 
its members’ identities.
Such a situation has important geopolitical ramifications. Within an emerging 
hegemonic state, just as there may be socially and politically dominant groups, so the 
internal distribution of these groups may be a very significant factor in their access to 
power. The Kurds were clustered in the northern Iraqi regions, a geographical reality 
that impacted heavily on their independent political potential, and their political clout 
within the new Iraqi State. Cohen39 claims that differences among peoples within a 
country may have developed or have become accentuated because of isolation caused 
by the geographical terrain. “The Kurds, in northern Iraq, are a mountaineering, 
grazing people, who differ racially, linguistically, and culturally from the Arabs o f 
Mesopotamia. They constitute a separatist element in modern Iraq. Often such 
differences make it difficult for a state to achieve strong, centralised control. ”40
39 Cohen, S. 1975, p.4
40 Cohen, S. 1975, p.4
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Hemphill also recognises that “once elected, his (FeisaTs) bane, and that o f the Turks 
before him, was the disunity o f his realm and the limits set to governmental authority 
by geographical and human diversity.1,41
Whilst such geographical realities held important geopolitical consequences for the 
Iraqi administration, it also impacted upon individual groups’ opportunities for power. 
What was difficult for the Kurds and the Shi’is, clustered in specific geographical 
regions, was any real access to power. It was overwhelmingly the urban Sunni Arabs 
of Baghdad who had had the greatest exposure to education and military opportunity 
in the decades preceding the First World War. After the war therefore, as those with 
the greatest education and strongest political voice, the Sunni Arabs were favoured by 
the British administration. This was in part a geographical legacy, which badly 
affected both the Kurds and the Shi’is of southern Iraq.
7.3. The Importance of Different Collective Memories
History, and its imprint on collective memories (both real and imagined), can aid the 
understanding of the attitudes of all the main groups within 1920s Iraq, as 
documented above. It can help to explain why different perceptions of the past lead to 
different perceptions of the present, and therefore future. Before 1921, partly due to 
the semi-autonomy enjoyed by many groups under the Ottoman administration, the 
main ethnic and religious groups within Iraq were insular and distinct, each with 
different collective memories and varying notions of identity,42 For example, O’Shea 
documents a well-developed sense of a Kurdish ‘imagined community’ in the 
northern parts of Iraq by 1921.43 The ‘Iraq Report of 1924 also recorded that “Men 
feel the ties o f loyalty to their tribe or their town or family more than to their
m 44country.
These communal identities were fashioned by factors internal to each society, such as 
the myths and shared memories that each community formed around, but also
41 Hemphill, Paul. ‘The Formation o f  the Iraqi Army. 1921-33.’ in Kelidar, A. 1979, p.88
42 See Batatu, H. ‘O f the Diversity o f  Iraqis.’ in Hourani, A, Khoury, P, & Wilson, M. 1993, pp.503- 
525
43 See O ’Shea, M. 1997, unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Chapter 11
44 Great Britain, Colonial Office, ‘Iraq Report’. (London, 1924), p. 17
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compounded by opposition to other communities (for example, traditional Shi’i 
motifs of combat and resistance to oppression), and to the state as established in 1921. 
Communities such as the Kurds and the Shi’is opposed the state because it 
represented the monopoly of power in the hands of Sunnis, allowing the political 
expression of Sunni cultural values, to the detriment of their own.45 As such distinct 
cultural and ethnic values were the core around which such communities were 
constructed, this dissemination of Sunni culture and identity threatened the very 
existence of the other community groups. The Kurds in particular felt that the strength 
of their distinct identity warranted an independent state and national home, a hope that 
was thwarted by the Great Power politics of the post-First World War territorial 
settlements. The Shi’is however, “were not opposed to the concept o f an Iraqi State, 
but to its translation in terms o f Sunni hegemony. ”46 Thus, their communal identity 
did not necessarily demand an independent state, but rather a more balanced role 
within the Iraqi state, with Shi’i motifs and memories being drawn on as much as 
Sunni values.
Each community had its own historical ‘heroes’ that fed into their myths of communal 
identity. “Each community promoted different types o f heroes who embodied some o f 
the concepts shaping their community’s collective identity. ”47 Such processes of 
identity development were highlighted by Anderson and Smith, as seen in Chapter 
Two. They claimed that these myths and legends were fundamental in the creation of 
pre-nationalist sentiment. However, nation-state building is compromised when this 
process is hindered within a particular territory due to the pre-existence of several 
such distinct identities, all clashing with each other. The development of any state­
wide form of collective identity would clearly necessitate the choosing of one of these 
political communities over the others, and the subsequent subordination or destruction 
of the rest. A situation where state-building may require nation-destruction.
45 See Intelligence Report No.4, 31 December 1920. FO 371/6348/2904
46 Lukitz, L. 1995, p.58
47 Lukitz, L. 1995, p.32
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7.4. The Role of Education in Spreading a National Identity
Just as Anderson claimed that ‘print-capitalism’ had the power to change people’s 
conceptions of time and community,48 so the establishment of a strong educational 
system within a state may help to diffuse a standard nationalist message amongst the 
population, and encourage nation-building. The situation within Iraq in the early 
1920s was not so clear-cut. During the first decade of the monarchy, Shi’is were not 
well represented in government, or in education, experiencing great difficulty in 
penetrating the Sunni network of patronage in the state machinery. This meant that 
educational content was drawn from the Sunni cultural reservoir, and that Sunni 
values were highlighted. As the influence of education can be so far-reaching, the 
Sunni-dominance in this sphere was an important issue. With a group’s cultural 
mythology not being reinforced via the schooling of the next generation, their 
collective identity would be progressively weakened, to the benefit of the Sunni 
identity. Thus, education could be utilised as a powerful tool by the ruling elite.
Between 1923-7, Sati al-Husri was the Director General of Education within Iraq. 
There were deep cultural and philosophical divides between the Istanbul-educated 
Husri, and the Iraqi Shi’is. The Shi’i resented al-Husri, who they regarded as an 
outsider in Iraq. They felt that his educational philosophy and nationalist ideology 
ignored the strong tribal attributes of Iraqi Shi’i society, and they opposed his 
advocacy of allegiance to national over regional bonds.49 History was also re­
represented by the Education Ministry, to give a version of history of the modern Iraq 
that enhanced the Sunni Arab character of the Iraqi national identity. To safeguard 
their own values, and indeed their own identity, the Shi’is wanted a more de­
centralised form of education within Iraq. They also felt that insufficient resources 
were allocated for the development of education within Shi’i areas, and that this 
would compound the educational gap already present between Sunnis and Shi’is.
Ironically, radically different policies regarding languages all served to further divide 
the communities of Iraq. In the late 1920s, the Iraqi government, in a bid to fracture 
Kurdish resistance to the state, encouraged the Kurds to use their own languages. This
48 Anderson, B. 1991. See especially chapters 2 and 3.
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helped to preserve feelings of ‘Kurdishness’, but was also designed to prevent 
standardisation and thus collective action.50 This was “indeed a subtle poison. ”51 This 
clear attempt to hinder Kurdish language standardisation was intended to weaken the 
political potential of the Kurds.
The Iraqi government also utilised another language policy. Although local Kurdish 
dialects were encouraged, places for Higher Education were made contingent upon 
the speaking of Arabic. Paradoxically, this standardisation of education, and the 
establishment of national schools, also compounded the fractures within Iraqi society. 
A memorandum sent to the League of Nations in 1930, noted that depriving 
communities of their local schools, “reinforcedrather than weakened communal 
feelings”,52 thus widening the gap between different communities. Feeling their 
distinct identities under threat, communities turned in on themselves. Thus, the 
government’s policy of speeding up national integration through standardised and 
centralised national education, ironically had an immediate opposite effect.
7.5. Different Visions of ‘Independence’
It becomes clear through the documentary evidence, that different groups of people 
wanted different things from ‘independence’. Indeed, it was recorded that: “outside 
the towns, the tribes are entirely indifferent to the nature o f the prospective 
government. ” Ethnic and religious divisions were not the only elements pulling the 
new state apart. Class divisions were also important and played just as important a 
role in hindering the development of a sense of equitable ‘citizenship’ within the new 
state. Chapter Three examined how any nascent nationalism within the Mesopotamian 
region pre-1914 was at a relatively low level, and was a sentiment only held by the 
Arab urban intelligentsia, and Arab military officers.54 The average tribesman in the
49 See Nakash, Y. 1994, pp. 111 -112
50 See Lukitz, L. 1995, chapter 4
51 CO 730/161/1, Nuri al Sa’id to  F. Humphrys, 16 February 1931; AIR 23/419. Secret Note, 
unnumbered and unsigned, p.25B, 9 November 1931, attached to Secret Dispatch o f  18 December 
1931, R/5/25, from S.S.O. Sulaimaniya to Air Staff
52 FO 371/15316 -  E3087/751/93, Position o f  the Non-Moslem Minorities in Iraq, Memorandum sent 
to the League o f  Nations, 3 September 1930
53 Mesopotamian Intelligence Report No.5, 15 January, 1921, paragraph 9. CO 730/1
54 See Kayali, Hasan. ‘Arabs and Young Turks,’ (University o f  California Press, 1997). A lso see Yapp, 
M.E. 1987.
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rural areas displayed no real national consciousness. This begs an important 
geopolitical question. How far does the urban/rural geography of identity inform the 
ultimate geography of power? I would contend that its impact in Iraq was 
fundamental. It was the Sunni Arabs of the urban centres (principally Baghdad), and 
those of the high-ranking military classes, that had enjoyed Ottoman education, 
opportunities and privileges. Such a situation led to them being looked on favourably 
by the British. They were seen as the most able section of the population and 
consequently as the most obvious nucleus for the new Iraqi State.55 Into their hands 
therefore, was placed the real power of the new state apparatus. A fundamental issue 
therefore, was that due to the distribution of the ethnic and religious communities 
throughout Iraq, such class divisions often reinforced cultural and sectarian ones.
Such class divisions within the society, and the corresponding questions over access 
to power can be seen in the documentary evidence even before the establishment of an 
Arab administration within Iraq. The Proceedings of the Council of Ministers, as 
noted in the Mesopotamian Intelligence Report of December 1920, show that “the 
law as submitted to the Council provided for 25 representatives who should be 
specifically chosen by the tribes in a manner convenient to themselves. ”56 Such a 
suggestion “met with considerable opposition, at the bottom o f which lay the rooted 
objection o f the propertied and conservative classes to admit the tribesmen, who were 
regarded as little removed from savages, to a share in the counsels o f the State. ”57 
The minutes of the same meeting reveal just how much ‘independence’ meant 
different things to different people. “It is the cry o f Independence, not that o f Arab 
Government, which has made special appeal to the smaller shaikhs, the heads o f 
sections. To them it holds out the hope o f throwing o ff the yoke o f the paramount 
shaikh o f the tribe, through whom administration has been conducted, and o f 
dropping the burden o f rent and taxation. ” -  and in contrast -  “the chiefs o f big 
confederations have in most cases felt themselves strong enough to defy public 
opinion and support Government, relying in turn on Government support. ”58 In this 
way, the desires of the majority of the population clashed with the interests of those
55 See Hemphill, Paul. ‘The Formation o f  the Iraqi Army. 1921-33.’ in Kelidar, A. 1979, pp.88-110
56 Proceedings o f  the Council o f  Ministers, paragraph 1, enclosed within Mesopotamian Intelligence 
Report No.4, dated 31 December 1920, sent by Gertrude Bell to the India Office and Foreign Office on 
14 January 1921. CO 730/1
57 ibid; CO 730/1
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who now found themselves in power, creating fundamental dislocations within 
society.
Further dislocations were caused by the British misunderstanding of the tribal system 
within Iraq. Forces arising from the process of sedentarisation had triggered the
WMOlUj
process of tribal disintegration, whereas Britain wrongly attributed it to the previous
A
Ottoman system. To counter this disintegration, Britain sought to restore the eroded 
bonds, by re-establishing the authority of the shaikh. This would simplify rural peace­
keeping, whilst also minimising the cost. Thus, in return for tax and other 
concessions, the chief shaikhs and landlords pledged their support for the new 
national government. This in effect, destroyed the tribesman/shaikh relationship, as 
the shaikhs’ authority was no longer sanctioned from within his community, but from 
without. He was therefore immune from being held to account by the tribesmen he 
was said to represent. Such a situation further removed the individual tribesmen both 
from the hierarchy they knew, and also the new state apparatus. This also happened in 
the north, with Kurdish leaders being courted by the new administration. Attracted by 
the ‘fruits of office’ promised to them by the government if they were 
accommodating, increasing numbers of Kurdish representatives remained in Baghdad, 
and alienated themselves from the populations in the provinces. The Kurdish 
tribesmen then felt misrepresented on the political level, totally estranged from the 
state and its political machinery. 59 Their access to power was removed by the 
disintegration of their traditional hierarchical links.
Power became increasingly urban-based, whilst the rural areas became increasingly 
politically disenfranchised. Under the Ottoman administration, the vilayets of Mosul, 
Basra and Baghdad had each been a regional centre of approximately equal status.
The new political power within the region however, was the British, and their 
administration was centralised and state-wide. The British administration was also 
based in the country’s towns, and positions of power were increasingly to be found in 
urban centres, especially as traditional power structures that had previously bound the 
rural and urban spheres together, disintegrated. Furthermore, the supremacy of 
Baghdad over other regional centres was reinforced by the British. This emphasised
58 ibid, CO 730/1, paragraph 20.
59 AIR 23/413, Enclosure to Report no. 1/1/72, from S.S.O. Sulaimaniya to AHQ, 4 January 1928
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local specific geographies of power, as the cultural and ethnic make-up of each of the 
main towns was of great significance in Iraq. Thus, subordinating Basra and Kirkuk to 
Baghdad, was in reality subordinating a largely Shi’i town and a largely Kurdish 
town, to a predominantly Sunni Arab centre.
7.6. Conflicting Models of Statehood
The entire form and content of the Iraqi Government was imported from outside, and 
fulfilled largely external criteria. The Government was in no sense ‘popular’ or 
‘representative’, despite being lauded by the British as an example of successful self- 
determination. The overwhelming majority of the new state apparatus was controlled 
by Sunni Arab urban communities, who were in fact a minority of the population. 
Thus, in order to maintain itself, this Government had to gain suppoit from the main 
tribal shaikhs and landlords, and form new interdependencies. However, it is clear 
from the records that it was the British who really propped up the new state, and 
extended Baghdad’s writ to the provinces, sometimes via military force.60 This reality 
was highlighted by a Colonial Office note, during Iraqi instability in 1929. Offended 
by recent anti-British feeling within the Iraqi government, Britain said that it would 
not help unless Iraq ”formally admitted” how much they needed Britain.61
It has been demonstrated that each community within Iraq had their own strong 
identities and communal mythologies. Batatu records that even within Iraqi towns 
under the Ottomans, the development of mahallahs, distinct ethnic quarters, was the 
norm. Such communities were seen as vital and performed a positive need. Batatu 
argues that they were partly an expression of the imiate need for protection through
f t )  • •unity. The tribal structure offered a similar protection to its members, ready to 
defend any of its members.63 Crucially therefore, many of the community groups now 
within Iraq had little trust or dependence upon a more centralised power, and actively 
retained their local characteristics.
60 See CP 235 (25), 11 May 1925. CO 730/82/22162. “I f  the writ o f  King Feisal runs effectively 
throughout his kingdom it is entirely due to British aeroplanes. I f  the aeroplanes w ere rem oved  
tomorrow the whole structure would inevitably fa ll to pieces. "
61 CO 730/150/68593, Dobbs to Shuckburgh, 28 December 1929
62 See Batatu, H. 1978, p.21
63 See Baban, I.H. ‘From Istanbul to Baghdad. Notes o f  a Turkish Statesman,’ (Paris: Collection de la 
Revue du Monde Musulman, 1911), p.256
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There seemed therefore, to be no common components from which to forge an Iraqi 
collective identity, or indeed any popular will to do so. Some of the ethnic groups 
could be seen as ‘proto-national’ in the sense that the process of pre-national 
collective consciousness forming was highly developed. 64 It was just such 
communities that had the potential to develop into nations, as they held the necessary 
symbols and sentiments that could be mobilised behind the modern cause of 
nationalism. However, despite the fact that the period following the First World War 
represents the peak of recognition of nationalism as the most legitimate force in world 
politics, it was not these developed ethnie that were used as the building blocks of this 
new political system. Rather, these potential ‘nations’ were considered too small, and 
their geographical spread did not tie in with British imperial interests. Ironically, 
embryonic Arab nationalism was considered too large, in the sense that it also did not 
fit in with the Allies’ territorial designs. ‘Nation-state’ building therefore became a 
fac^ade, as the system envisaged for Iraq necessitated the destruction of the already 
present community based identities.
Each community within Iraq held a different vision of statehood, which was different 
again from that which might best serve British interests. The Shi’ i/Sunni dissension 
became a struggle over the principles guiding the country’s identity. Throughout the 
1920s, there emerged a new current of Republican tendencies amongst the Shi’is in 
Iraq, as they saw this system as offering increased possibilities of more equitable Shi’i 
political representation.65 They were unable to identify with the dominant Sunni 
elements in the proposed texture of Iraqi ‘nationalism’.
The Kurds were equally frustrated with being asked to subscribe to a concept of the 
nation that was moulded in Baghdad’s political and cultural circles. Iraq contained 
multiple concepts of nationalism, which meant that any one chosen over the others 
would lead to resentment, division and fractures within the state. Any state-wide sense 
of collective identity, rather than imposing one dominant concept of nationalism, 
would have to be cultivated by drawing from all of the present cultural reservoirs to 
avoid exclusion, and highlight similarities. “The motifs advocated by the parties fell
64 See Hobsbawm, E.J. 1990, chapter entitled ‘Proto-Nationalism’.
65 See Lukitz, L. 1995, p.62
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short o f bringing radical changes in perception when not drawn from the context o f 
common practices and cultural religious legacies. ”66
Another dimension is added to this issue, with the concept of nationalism being 
imposed from outside. Originally dependent upon the idea of ‘nation’ imported from 
Britain, many groups within Iraq grew increasingly resentful towards their 
Mandatory, and stressed the artificial nature of the state that had been created. With 
the frustration felt by many at their political and cultural exclusion from the new state, 
the power that had largely created it became the natural target for such feelings. In 
fact, it becomes increasingly clear that Britain made no real attempt to rigorously 
impose the concept of nationalism over the new state. Due to American pressure, and 
the constraints of the League of Nations mandate, Britain had to be seen to help 
establish a nation-state in Iraq. However, this was never more than an empty 
framework to allow Britain to further its vital strategic interests in the region. This is 
why Britain made no attempt to fully integrate the various communities of Iraq, and 
establish a more workable nation-state. The complexities thrown up by the 
heterogenous population within the country were not Britain’s main concern, and this 
is partly why they were so poorly accommodated. Thus communities such as the Shi’i 
and the Kurds felt doubly subordinated, first to the Sunni Government, and then to an 
outside power that had come in and manipulated the situation for wider strategic aims. 
The population was aware that it had been grouped together largely for imperial 
interests, which must exacerbate the desire to separate.
• £7Lukitz emphasises what she sees as the naivety of the British policy-makers, in not 
understanding the difficulties that imported ideologies would have in penetrating the 
deeper levels of cultural awareness, and in re-shaping such strongly held identities. 
Strong communities were finding it difficult to internalise supra-communal messages, 
as these communities were formed around strong, local myths and memories, with 
their characters and identities determined by the very things that made them distinct 
from other communities. Supra-communal messages therefore threatened the 
individualism and distinctiveness of some communities.
66 Lukitz, L. 1995, p. 145
67 See Lukitz, L. 1995, p. 144
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However, Britain was being far from naive. It was not that they did not understand 
how difficult it would be for an imported ideology to re-shape local identities, but 
rather that this was not their real concern. Britain never regarded nation-state building 
as its true purpose in Iraq. It had desired the mandate for Iraq in order to secure wider 
British strategic interests in the region. However gaining the mandate had meant an 
acceptance of the conditions laid down by the League of Nations, namely that the 
mandatory had to help in the establishment of viable nation-states within the 
mandated territories, until such time as they were able to stand alone. To Britain, this 
was nothing more than a necessary annoyance, and the state they constructed in Iraq 
was given all the external trappings of a western nation-state, in order to satisfy 
America and the League, and yet had none of the substance. The establishment of the 
State of Iraq was always seen through the prism of British strategic interests.
A vital point was that the substance of a nation-state could not ‘be given’, but had to 
develop over time. The process of forging the European state was a process rooted in 
often violent contest for power. The ‘model’ of the nation-state thus vaunted after the 
First World War, had been created out of centuries of conflict, civil war and religious 
persecution. The true naivete therefore lies in the Wilsonian expectation that 
somehow nations and states could be created in a ‘de-politicised’ form.
Placed at the centre of such a situation, Feisal was in an almost untenable position.
Not only did he face deep divisions within the Iraqi population, he also had to contend 
with the limiting of his sovereignty by Great Britain. The crux of this dilemma is 
demonstrated by the fact that upon his accession to the throne of Iraq, the British 
National Anthem was played, in the absence of any acceptable substitute.68 In a way, 
it was British authority being enthroned that day, and it also highlighted the lack of 
national feeling within the new territory.
Feisal himself was acutely aware of the divides within the society he was given to 
rule, and of the difficulties involved in cultivating any ties of common feeling and 
purpose. He wrote in a confidential memorandum: “In Iraq, there is still -  and I  say 
this with a heart full o f sorrow -  no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses o f human
68 Personal communication from Mr. Peter Hinchcliffe. British Ambassador to Jordan, 1993-1997
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beings, devoid o f any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, 
connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually 
ready to rise against any government whatsoever ...Out o f these masses we want to 
fashion a people which we would train, educate and refine...The circumstances, being 
what they are, the immenseness o f the efforts needed for this (can be imagined).69
This impact of this predicament upon the Iraqi State was noted by Edmonds, writing 
in 1931: “The general impression left on the mind is that the bases o f  the Iraqi State 
are still not as broad as one would wish: it dangerously resembles a pyramid 
balanced on its point. The Government is - I  suppose inevitably -  in the hands o f a 
limited oligarchy composed essentially o f Sunni Arab townsmen really representing a 
very small minority o f the country. ”70
7.7. Key Obstacles to Stability
Bradnock’s paper on the conflict over Kashmir raises certain comparisons with the 
situation within 1920s Iraq. Bradnock argues that the Kashmir dispute, when 
examined through a geopolitical framework, can also be seen as a result of conflicting 
models of statehood.71 Its origins lie in the contested partition of the area by the 
departing imperial power, Great Britain. Upon independence, India had to take 
account of great cultural diversity within her borders. To cohere under these 
circumstances, the state had to become ‘secular’, in the sense of respecting all 
religions equally. The form of political organisation chosen was inherently inclusive, 
and was therefore fundamentally opposed to the partition of Indian territory on any 
basis, but especially religion. This was why, when a large percentage of the Muslim 
population opted for an independent state, it hit at the very essence of Independent 
India. In effect, they were setting up a state in direct opposition to India’s well-being.
69 Quoted in Batatu, H. 1978, p.25-26. Original text, which was written in march 1933, see ‘Abd-ur- 
Razzaq al-Hasani, Tarikh-ul-Wizarat-il-Iraqiyyah (The History o f  the Iraqi Cabinets), (Sidon, 1953), 
III, pp.286-293
70 Note by C.J.Edmonds, 10 October 1931. Enclosed in Secret Despatch, o f 28 November 1931. E 
5732/3715/93: FO 371/15324
71 Bradnock, R. ‘Regional Geopolitics in a Globalising World; Kashmir in Geopolitical Perspective,’ 
Geopolitics, 1998, Vol.3, No.2, pp.1-29
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Korbel argued in 1954 that the dispute over Kashmir lay in the inherent character of 
the two states themselves. The following extract strongly echoes the situation within 
Iraq: “The real cause o f all the bitterness and bloodshed that characterised the 
Kashmir dispute is the uncompromising and perhaps uncompromisable struggle o f  
two ways o f life, two concepts o f political organisation, two spiritual attitudes, that 
find  themselves locked in deadly conflict, a conflict which in Kashmir has become 
both symbol and battleground. ”72 Thus the conceptions upon which each state was 
founded, were utterly opposed. Just as in early Iraq, the origins of the contest for 
Kashmir, must be seen as a contest between competing principles of statehood.
Many points from Nonneman’s study of ‘The Middle East and Europe: The Search 
for Stability and Integration’,73 are also pertinent to early Iraq. In outlining the key 
obstacles to stability in the Middle East, many seem to reinforce what we have 
already seen in early Iraq. The lack of political participation as an obstacle to longer- 
term stability is one such issue. Such a lack of popular involvement in politics can 
create pressure for change from dissatisfied internal groups, which can lead to the 
jealous protection of privileges by the controlling elite.
This is then linked into the lack of legitimacy of such regimes. The historical 
subordination of these regions to Ottoman and then Allied imperial interests, meant 
the artificial creation of ‘nation-states’ in the region. This did not lead to a general 
acceptance of these new structures of political culture, nor the regimes that embodied 
them, and thus alternative foci of identity were lent added potency. Such ethno­
religious fragmentation made the country increasingly volatile, exacerbated by 
feelings of exclusion from the new system. The ethnic mosaic caused added problems 
due to the way boundaries were drawn, often without sufficient reference to ethnic or 
religious cohesion. This fragmentation did prove to be an obstacle for integration 
within Iraq, as it led to domestic upheavals and dissension.
The issue of foreign domination is also raised by Nonneman. He argues that the sense 
of having been dominated, not surprisingly creates feelings of inferiority and
72 Korbel, J. ‘Danger in Kashmir,’ (Princeton University Press, N ew  Jersey 1954), p.25
73 See Nonneman, G. (ed.), ‘The Middle East and Europe: The Search for Stability and Integration.’ 
(Federal Trust For Education and Research, London, 1993)
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vulnerability, causing resentment to build against that dominant power. In Iraq, this 
resentment was also extended to the Sunni regime that Britain helped to establish, as 
they were seen as ‘collaborators’ to the degradation. Therefore, even when the 
dominant power departs, problems with accepting the political structure in place, 
continue. Ideological differences can also be a major obstacle to integration. As we 
have seen in Iraq, the different philosophies on how the state should be organised, 
impede integration, as excluded communities turn inwards and foster their own 
distinct identities. ‘Functional interest’74 is also crucial. Each group must see that 
some of their interests can be achieved by such integration, 01* they will not wish to 
become involved in such a process.
7.8. The Regional Issues Facing the New Iraqi State
It is important to briefly examine the regional territorial and political issues faced by 
the new Iraq in relation to its also new neighbours. For example, what interests did the 
economic geography of the new state suggest would be paramount in its relations with 
these new neighbours? How far would the cultural identity of the new state set it 
apart? Finally, how far would trans-border links disrupt efforts to create a coherent 
political unit?
Iraq was one new state amongst many in the region. It was part of a new regional sub­
system of international sovereign states, and as well as having relationships with 
established global powers such as America and Britain, it also had to construct new 
modes of political communication with its immediate neighbours. Previously, the area 
now recognised as Iraq, had been several outlying provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 
After the First World War, Iraq was set up as a sovereign state, and therefore had to 
construct new frames of reference to deal with the other new political entities of the 
region. Iraq had to establish its own society, its own internal economic framework, 
and work to promote Iraqi interests on the international arena.
74 Nonneman, G. 1993, Section entitled: ‘Problems Facing Co-operation and Integration Attempts in
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7.8.1. Issues of Identity
The Iraq of the 1920s was suffering from identity clashes within the country’s new 
territory. The homogenous ideology of nationalism was being applied to a 
heterogenous population. As well as containing a very ethnically and religiously 
mixed population itself, strong community groups also spread across the new state 
borders. Thus, Iraq contained a very similar population mix to some of the other 
surrounding areas. So what was an Iraqi identity? What local traits and communal 
loyalties set it apart from the neighbouring regions?
Fattah documents how mixed the towns and areas of Iraq had become, a process 
which continued right into the late nineteenth century.75 The Ottomans wanted to 
control the successful market towns in lower Iraq and Kuwait in the nineteenth 
century, to benefit from the extra tax revenue. However, many of these towns were 
semi-autonomous, and controlled by very powerful merchants whom the Ottomans 
were afraid to alienate. Therefore, they created government-sponsored towns 
throughout middle and upper Iraq. One of the most successful of these was ‘ Amara on 
the banks of the Tigris, which became a major centre for riverine trade and export- 
orientated agriculture. The Ottomans deliberately threw open the district to any 
farmer, regardless of origin. They were offered free plots of land and access to water. 
Such promises attracted hundreds of settlers from within Iraq, and from across the 
Shatt-al-Arab, especially from Arabistan (present-day Khuzistan).76
Because of this cultural and ethnic mix, many segments of the population identified 
more with their parochial leaders, or with groups and leaders from outside Iraqi state 
territory. Shi’is living within Iraqi territory held strong affiliations with the Shi’i 
communities of Iran, and looked to Iranian religious leaders for guidance. Such a 
situation seems inevitable given the history of cross-border mixing within the region. 
We can deduce the importance of this integrated region from the context used in 
historical texts. For example, Fattah examines how Najdi literary sources mention
the Middle East’, in previous citation, p.39
75 Fattah, Hala, ‘The Politics o f  Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf: 1745-1900.’ (State
University o f N ew  York Press, New York 1997)
255
events not normally within the confines of Central Arabia proper, as if they had a 
direct bearing on that society’s development. Factional struggles within Iraqi towns 
and villages are sometimes inserted in the middle of narratives concerning Najd, as if 
they naturally belonged in the same narrative sequence.77 Fattah claims that "a 
substantial number o f the local histories written in eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf were o f a transregional nature, written most often by 
‘ulama ’ whose places o f  origin may have been almost incidental in the larger scheme
j o
o f things. ' Such a transregional legacy was obviously going to affect efforts to 
nationalise group identities along state lines.
Thus Iraq, and its newly fashioned neighbours, suffered both from internal pressures, 
and ‘pan’ pressures from some widely spread groups. Khoury and Kostiner examine 
how such divides and prenational group affiliations affected the resulting states.79 The 
tribe as an actual social structure within Iraq had been already eroded under the 
Ottomans, but it remained a significant focus for social identity and loyalty. Thus, the 
legitimacy of a state, and its territorial sovereignty can only be described as partial, as 
different groups within the state, or regional or international powers can limit the 
state’s authority and strength. As Joel Migdal explains it, within society, “the state is 
one organization among many. ”80 After the First World War, the authority of the new 
States was undermined by these tribal habits, as they had to accommodate a certain 
measure of tribal power, and be aware of the ideological pull that other new states 
may have for ‘Iraqi’ tribes.
Machiavelli, born in the late fifteenth century, had studied the Ottoman Empire and 
considered its strength to be due to the weakness of civil society in the East. Once the 
centre was defeated, he believed, society could no longer oppose you, and the rest fell
♦ 0 1  ,into your lap. However, he did not appreciate “that in the Middle East, tribes will
16 See Jwaideh, Albertine. ‘Aspects o f  Land Tenure and Social Change in Lower Iraq During Late 
Ottoman Times.’ in Khalidi, Tarif. (ed.), ‘Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East.’ 
(American University o f  Beirut, Beirut 1984) p.334
77 Fattah, H. 1997, p.21
78 Fattah, H. 1997, p.21
79 Khoury, P.S. & Kostiner, J. (eds.) ‘Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East’. (University o f  
California Press, 1990), pp. 1-22
80 Migdal, J. ‘A Model o f  State-Societv Relations.’ in Wiarda, H.J. (ed.), ‘N ew  Directions in 
Comparative Politics.’ (Boulder, Colorado, 1985) p.47
81 See Gellner, E. ‘Tribalism and State in the Middle East,’ in Khoury, P.S. & Kostiner, J. 1990, p. 122
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also cause you trouble, even after you have defeated and replaced the sultan. The 
distinctively Middle Eastern path to political fragmentation eluded him. ” Tribes 
caused problems both within new states, and between them, as states fought to 
assimilate them to reduce their ‘national security’ risk.
Iraqi state identity therefore had many issues to resolve. The identities and loyalties of 
the internal population had to be accommodated, whilst inter-state relationships with 
immediate neighbours were also vital to the equation. Agnew and Corbridge remind 
us that “states are historically constructed (and reconstructed) in the nexus between 
global and domestic/local social relations. ”83 The resulting geopolitical order of the 
day arises out of these spontaneous actions of the state itself, and other actors, which 
may include other states. In this way, the geopolitical order is always precarious and 
impermanent, and constructed through social practice rather than being imposed via a 
timeless determinism.
7.8.2. New State Boundaries
The geography of the new state presented new challenges. New international 
boundaries bestowed new fixed legal limits of jurisdiction on all the surrounding 
states. This was a radical break from the past experience of the area. One of the 
principal features of the Ottoman period within Middle Eastern societies such as Iraq, 
was the reality of the shifting frontier, which gave the region its coherence in spite of 
the many tensions threatening to pull it apart. The notion of the frontier society 
implies fluidity, permeability, access and acculturation, all characteristics that 
permeated the region at one level or another. “It also suggests flux and 
impermanency, the natural by-products o f societies constantly in the throes o f  
formation, making and re-making themselves to suit the particular circumstances o f 
the moment. ”84 Regional shaikhs and merchants constantly drew and re-drew the 
contours of regional society under the Ottoman Empire, and it is here that we can 
begin to see mirrored the earlier comments regarding the fluidity and changeability of 
group identities and loyalties.
82 Gellner, E. ‘Tribalism and State in the Middle East.’ in Khoury, P.S. & Kostiner, J. 1990, p. 122
83 Agnew, J. & Corbridge, S. ‘Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political 
Econom y.’ (Routledge, London, 1995), p. 16
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Thus, in Iraq and Arabia throughout the nineteenth century, there were constantly 
evolving frontiers that were defined from within the region, according to the socio­
economic and political context of the time. Most of Iraqi-Gulf society therefore 
coalesced around a region of shifting frontiers. However, with the establishment of a 
state system within the area, the new logic demanded that rigid boundaries must be 
defended to safe-guard sovereignty. This was very different from the more fluid tribal 
process. Previously, the region had been territorial extents "that functioned as 
passages instead o f barriers. ”85 Such a fundamental change would clearly feed into 
economic ramifications for the new state.
7.8.3. Constructing National Economies
From the mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth century, several districts in central 
and eastern Arabia, lower Iraq, Kuwait, south-western Iran and portions of the 
northern Gulf, formed a regional market that bought, sold and shipped to India. This 
formed a certain organic structure that lasted until late into the nineteenth century, and 
such a trading structure “gave the Indian Ocean an unparalleled spatial and temporal 
unity. ”86 At that time there were no imposed boundaries, no national economies or 
borders as such.
Indeed, far from constituting a national economy, the Iraqi region was divided 
between several different regional economies. Before the delineation of the Iraqi 
nation-state, the inhabitants of Mosul "were culturally and economically closer to the 
Arabs o f Syria than to those o f southern Iraq. ”87 Baghdad functioned as an important 
centre for the central Mesopotamian region, and Basra, due to its role as a port city, 
was historically orientated towards the Persian Gulf and India.
A fundamental facet of this regional trade was the establishment of family firms over 
a wide region. Many merchants during the time of the Ottoman Empire survived
84 Fattah, H. 1997, p. 13
85 Fattah, H. 1997, p.21
86 See Chaudhuri, K.N. ‘Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the 
Rise o f Islam to 1750.’ (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985), pp.34-79
87 Helms, C.M. 1984, pp. 19-20
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adversity through family alliances and the posting of relatives to distant areas. These 
far-flung representatives of merchant houses were often able to control and to re­
direct trade to their own advantage. This meant that even though merchant houses in 
Aleppo, Najd or Bombay were often directly allied to a parent firm elsewhere in the 
network, "their interests were not completely parochial in nature. Because o f their 
regional ties ...necessity decreed that these interests become regional over time, tied 
neither to a specific country nor to a set government but ultimately to an international 
trading community. ”88 For example, Basra in southern Iraq, was settled by Najdi and 
Persian merchant communities of long-standing.89
Such a cultural milieu was also a result of Ottoman administration policies. If overly 
burdened by the Ottoman taxation and legal system in one area, important sectors of 
Iraqi and Gulf society would simply physically uproot and relocate to other markets in 
the large trans-national trading community.90 As well as providing an effective 
restraint on Ottoman excess, this process also created incredibly culturally diverse 
market towns throughout the region, containing heterogenous populations originating 
from all corners of the network. Such a legacy would clearly affect the national 
economic structures of the states created after the First World War, as well as the 
identity issues of the newly enclosed populations.
Anne Perotin-Dumon highlights one such impact on national economies. She 
demonstrates that under Ottoman administration, there was often very little to 
distinguish between state merchants and ‘pirates’. She claims that the critical 
difference between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ trade seems only to have come about with the 
rise of the nation-state, the emergence of protectionism and ‘exclusivism’, and the 
consolidation of international law.91 Within a nation-state, ‘pirates’ posed a threat to 
the nation-building efforts of state elites, and to the state regulation of the economy. 
Thus, the centuries old system of piracy was targeted by the state, involving great 
structural societal change and the disintegration of ancient economic networks.
88 Fattah, H. 1997, p.9
89 de Rivoyre, Denis. ‘Obock, Mascate, Bouchire, Bassorah’. (Plon et Cie., Paris 1883) p. 182
90 For more details on the state-merchant system o f  the nineteenth century in Iraq and the Gulf, see 
Crystal, Jill. ‘Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar.’ (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1990).
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Whilst it may be argued that boundaries in general created huge challenges for the 
new State of Iraq and its economy, it is true that specific boundaries presented more 
problems than others. The boundary with Kuwait, in particular, was seen as very 
economically and strategically unfavourable to Iraq. Access to the Gulf was severely 
impaired, creating a negative consciousness within Iraq, and practical economic 
challenges.
7.8.4. Iraq’s Attitude Towards its Neighbours
The boundary between Iraq and Kuwait created an immediately negative issue with 
Kuwait, sowing seeds of competition and tension.92 (Kuwait also may have felt 
vulnerable right from inception, due to this large, unhappy northern neighbour.) 
During the time of the British mandate though, there were no reports of serious 
clashes, and traditional nomadic migrations continued over the unmanned boundary.93 
However, this did not mean that Iraq did not have designs on its tiny southern 
neighbour. In the spring of 1930 Lt. Col. Harold Dickson, the Political Agent in 
Kuwait, cautioned that efforts were possibly already being made by prominent Iraqis 
to encourage Kuwait to consider amalgamation within a wider Iraqi territory. Dickson 
claimed that “there is little doubt in my mind that important Basrawis who come 
down on visits, or who own property in Kuwait, are by order actively engaging 
themselves in anti-British propaganda as well as preaching the doctrine o f the 
amalgamation o f Kuwait with Iraq. ”94 Indeed, by 1931, small incidents had started to 
occur on the Kuwait-Iraqi boundary.95
Neighbouring states were now seen as competitors, not just geographically contiguous 
and disinterested provinces. Claims to territory began between states, which had not 
been such a critical issue before, as all had been part of one empire. Frontier
91 See Perotin-Dumon, A. ‘The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and the Law on the Seas. 1450-1850* in 
Tracy, J.D. (ed.) ‘The Political Economy o f  Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350- 
1750.’ (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991), pp.200-206
92 For more details see Schofield, R.N. 1991
93 Schofield, R.N. 1991, p.59
94 despatch dated 25 April 1930. Lt. Col. H.R.P. Dickson to Lt. Col. H.V. Biscoe, Political Resident in 
the Persian Gulf, India Office Library and Records, London: R /l5/5/12
95 Letter dated 18 February 1931 from the Ruler o f  Kuwait to the Political Agent, Kuwait, India Office 
Library and Records, London: R /l5/5/184
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territories became especially hard to administer, as their inhabitants were sometimes 
unwilling to surrender their autonomy to a new central authority that wished to 
establish sovereignty over them. Some frontier tribes and communities tried to play­
off new state governments against each other. “Moreover, neighbouring states also 
treated the inhabitants o f these frontier regions as part o f their own constituencies or 
as agents through whom to extend their influence into the other state. ”96 Thus, 
frontier areas became hubs for domestic and inter-state rivalry, with local tribes 
manouevering between the different governments.
Iraq’s large Kurdish and Shi 7 populations caused concerns such as these for the 
Iraqi government. Both populations were part o f wider communities that had been 
carved up by the new international boundaries in the region. Iraq therefore worried 
about Iranian influence over Iraqi-based Shi ’i, which caused immediate tension 
between the respective governments. Iraq was also concerned about the centripetal 
pull factor o f the Kurdish diaspora, again affecting Iraq’s attitude towards states that 
also contained Kurdish populations.
During the early part of the twentieth century, the mainstream international 
geopolitical opinion was that the Great Power potential of states was a function of 
their industrial prospects, which in turn could be traced to their natural resources and 
their ability to exploit them.97 Such a prevailing mindset of environmental 
determinism supposed that in a closed system (as the post-First World War was 
becoming), a premium would therefore be placed on relative national efficiency.98 
Such a belief created an inherent competitiveness and paranoia within new states. 
“Nationalism and protectionism helped countries mobilize the resources o f their earth 
and their people... A country without access to the full complement o f modern 
industries was vulnerable, would be a pushover in a war, and thus would attract the 
bellicose attention o f more well-balanced nations. Such an immense economic 
(perceived) pressure upon a new state was clearly going to affect how that state
96 Khoury, P.S. & Kostiner, J. 1990, p. 15
97 Such ideas were proposed by Mackinder and Spykman.
98 Agnew, J. & Corbridge, S. 1995, p.64
99 Kearns, G. ‘Prologue: fin de siecle  Geopolitics: Mackinder. Hobson and Theories o f  Global Closure,’ 
in Taylor, PJ. (ed.) ‘The Political Geography o f  the Twentieth Century.’ (Belhaven Press, London, 
1993), pp.18-19
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viewed its immediate neighbours, as it was seen as a matter of national security, not to 
mention national survival.
Many different political systems grew up surrounding Iraq: the independent Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, the French Republic of Syria and the undefined territory of 
Transjordan, Therefore, as well as institutionalising rivalry between these countries, 
the establishment of a state system in this region also brought great upheaval and 
confusion. It is important to remember that the entire region was going through the 
same turmoil and change as Iraq, which again added to regional insecurity. This was 
clearly a time of great uncertainty and tension, with each new state waiting to see 
how things would ‘settle’.
Completely new frames of reference were needed, not just for individuals within each 
state, but also for state governing systems in respect to their neighbours. Neighbours 
were no longer simply open markets and cultures, but were now framed as 
competitors for territory, population and trade. Boundaries had provided new dividing 
lines for populations and economies, whilst the ideology behind nation-states 
provided new cultural, political and supposedly ethnic divides. In effect, Britain was 
telling Iraq that it was unique: that by drawing the boundaries where it had, Britain 
was enclosing Iraq’s distinctive and coherent ‘national’ population. That this was so 
patently untrue, made it all the harder for Iraq to define itself in terms of other states; 
harder to find a focal point for identity that would set it apart and justify it both 
culturally and politically.
7.9. Conclusion
An historical and geopolitical framework has been necessary to understand the 
complexities of the Iraq formally created in 1921. Different alliances, loyalties and 
identities clashed in Iraq, and contributed to its consequent geopolitical form and 
identity. Britain had established a new state in the territory of Mesopotamia, with 
defined boundaries and the fa9 ade of a European-style political system. However, the 
question remained: whose state was it? It was clearly not set up with local aspirations 
being the priority, but rather to safe-guard British strategic interests and international
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responsibilities. There was a disavowal of the new state by the majority of the 
population, as they clearly felt it was not their state. "Britain’s attempts to build a 
state on the basis o f Western models o f constitutionalism, parliamentarianism and 
political order could hardly succeed. The different kind o f logic underlining events 
and developments in the Middle East proved that recommendations o f the League o f 
Nations drawn from the political realities in Europe could hardly find  an echo in a 
country where different codes o f political behaviour were still predominant. ”100
A small Sunni Arab, and predominantly urban elite came to the forefront of the new 
political system. Was it their state? This is hard to answer, as although they were 
given the greatest access to power, even their sovereignty and power was curtailed by 
the ongoing British control. Their power base was not indigenous, but was imposed 
from outside, to satisfy foreign imperatives. Therefore this Sunni elite needed the 
military support of Britain if it were to survive. This echoes back to the earlier 
comment by Hirtzel in 1920 that what Britain wanted in Mesopotamia was some 
administration with Arab institutions, "which we can safely leave while pulling the 
strings ourselves.,,WI By 1923, Britain was well on the way to establishing such an 
apparatus in Iraq, which allowed for a continuation of British control in Iraq, and the 
subsequent limiting of the Iraqi Government’s sovereignty. Power within Iraq was 
firmly in foreign hands.
The fact that the area of Iraq was not ethnically or culturally homogenous proved so 
divisive, because the political principle chosen for Iraq was unable to encompass the 
reality of heterogeneity. The communities of Iraq held multiple concepts of 
nationalism, each feeling that it had a right to political existence. The ideal of self- 
determination had a mass popular appeal, yet each community held a different vision 
of what this may entail for them and such a situation was exacerbated by the 
geographical clustering of these strong communities. The myths, symbols and shared 
memories of these communities made them a formidable focus of loyalty and 
allegiance, especially when the officially disseminated ideology alienated the majority 
of the population. When threatened by the new Sunni Arab Iraqi state, many ethnic 
and religious groups turned increasingly to their traditional loyalties to their local
100 Lukitz, L. 1995, p.75
101 Quoted in Marlowe, J. 1967, pp. 182-3
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leaders, rather than surrender them to wider, complex, and not yet fully understood 
frames of identification. The concepts of national sovereignty and cultural 
homogeneity implied in the state-building process, had been chosen for the Iraqis, not 
by them. As well as exacerbating certain divides within Iraqi society, this created a 
widespread resentment towards Britain, and a certain degree of reinforcement of 
ethnic identities. Such ethnic identities were reinforced most, where access to power 
was the least, such as in the Iraqi countryside.
After being awarded the Iraqi mandate, British interests needed Iraq’s territorial
continuity, and for this reason, Britain played such an active role in helping Baghdad
extend its writ to the provinces. It becomes clear that Britain saw nationalism firstly
as a necessary evil that had to be seen to underpin any post-war political
arrangements, and then as a real politik opportunity. Britain was aware of the many
different visions of nationhood that existed within the territory of Iraq, yet recognised
also that the principle of nationalism was vulnerable, in the sense that it was open to
deliberate misinterpretation. Britain could construct their own ‘vision of nationhood’,
that could prove a useful vehicle for British interests, whilst still seeming to fulfil
Wilsonian ideals. A narrow, Arab based, Sunni nationalism was thus actively fostered
by the British, to the detriment of other communal identities. Nations were being
a
created rather than recognised, which led to divisive and inherently unstable situation.
A
Agreements between the British and the Sunni leaders, although providing the support 
that enabled Sunni hegemony, could not bestow the necessary legitimacy to allow a 
Sunni minority to rule over a Shi’i majority, and thus an ongoing British dominance 
within the state was secured.
If Gellner’s definition of a nation holds true: “an artefact o f men’s common 
convictions, loyalties and beliefs, ”102 then, whilst Iraq was arguably further along the 
path to statehood, its path to national crystallisation was still a long way off in the 
1920s. Geographical, religious and ethnic chasms split the country, and we have seen 
that the ideology behind the whole process itself did not correspond to the sets of 
loyalties, beliefs and cultural values of the various sectors of the population. 
Established ethnic and religious communities held their own visions of an ‘Iraqi’
102 Gellner, E. 1983, p.7
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community, so putting pressure on sectarian and cultural fracture lines within the 
society. When discussing the Allied plans for partition in 1917, Colonel House 
described his meeting with Balfour when he was back in America, and concluded that 
“they are making it a breeding ground for future war.1,103
As well as internal cultural divides, Iraq had to deal with its geographical inheritance. 
Certain communities were divided by new international lines, putting great centripetal 
pressures on the resultant states due to strong cross-border affiliations. Boundaries 
were laid down with British perogatives in mind, rather than attempting to be true to 
the surrounding cultural landscape. In fact, certain tribes were included in Iraq as they 
were seen to be ‘friendly’ towards Britain -  surely an unsuitable base from which to 
foster a national identity. Nomadic tribesmen of the south held very different views on 
territoriality to the new state-based vision, and cross-border allegiances and 
migrations continued.104 Even within the territorial extent of the new Iraqi state, well- 
defined communities inhabited distinct geographical regions, leading to ethnic- 
religious ‘blocs’ within the country. With the elevation of Baghdad (a nucleus of the 
Sunni Arab ethnic-religious community) to the position of capital over the other 
important Iraqi towns, Sunni Arab authority was established over the largely Shi’i 
south, and Kurdish north. Correspondingly, Shi’i and Kurdish access to power was 
hampered by their geographical distribution. Geographies of power, seen so clearly at 
the global level, were therefore also operating on a more local level within the Iraqi 
State itself.
Iraq also had to contend with the negative consciousness created by what was seen as 
inequitable access to the Persian Gulf. The fact that this inheritance was seen as 
largely due to British imperial interests, heightened the resentment and discontent 
within the new state. All of these factors fed into the crystallisation of the Iraqi state 
in the 1920s, and its subsequent geopolitical nature.
!03 Seymour, C.S. (ed.), ‘The Intimate Papers o f  Colonel House,’ Vol. Ill, (Ernest Benn, London 1926), 
pp.47-48
104 See Fattah, H. 1997. These tribesmen held different views on territoriality as nationalism had not 
diffused downwards to these sections o f  the population. Therefore, their priorities remained parochial 
and traditional.
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A ‘prophecy’ that can be seen to relate to this early Iraqi state, can be found in a letter 
sent by Ali Pasha, then Foreign Minister for the Ottoman Empire, to his Ambassador 
in Paris, Mehmet Jemal Pasha, dated 18 September 1862. In this letter, he gave a 
survey of the situation in Europe. He ended with Italy, then in the throes of 
unification: '‘Italy, which is inhabited only by a single race speaking the same 
language and professing the same religion, experiences so many difficulties in 
achieving its unification. Judge what would happen in Turkey i f  free scope were given 
to all the different national aspirations which the revolutionaries, and with them a 
certain government, are trying to develop there. It would need a century and torrents 
o f blood to establish a fairly stable state o f affairs. ”105
This was a reality that did not concern the British policy-makers. The longer-term 
problems inherent in superimposing such an ethnically homogenous ideology as 
nationalism over a heterogenous population were largely ignored. Britain actively 
used the concept of nationalism in such a way that would secure British interests over 
local ones, whilst still saving face on the international arena. Clear evidence 
demonstrates that Britain was not committed to the morality of nationalism and self- 
determination, but rather to how such concepts could be manipulated to secure British 
ends. This was shown by the unwillingness to let the American-backed King-Crane 
Commission into Iraq during the time of the Peace Settlement, to gauge the 
sentiments of the local populations. This attitude is again highlighted by the fact that 
Britain, whilst officially preaching ‘self-determination’ within the Arab lands, voiced 
clear anxieties about Ibn Saud’s "complete and absolute independence ”.106 Britain 
did not desire the establishment of a strong and coherent nation-state in Iraq, as this 
would jeopardise the dominant British position. In this spirit, Britain encouraged one, 
well-controlled form of nationalism within Iraq, whilst frustrating and discouraging 
other valid communal identities. If nationalism was the political paradigm that Britain 
had to work with in Iraq, they wanted to make sure that it was one particular vision of 
nationhood that was narrowly-based and unsustainable without dependency upon the 
British.
105 Quoted inDann, U. 1988, p.425
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The resulting tensions and conflicts between the various communities and their 
conflicting visions of identity and statehood fed into the geopolitical nature and form 
of 1920s Iraqi society. The theories of nation-state building discussed in Chapter Two 
mentioned the impact of warfare on the crystallisation of national sentiment.107 In 
much the same way that international warfare can unite a community by raising 
national consciousness, so it is true that competition between ethnic and religious 
groups within a state territory, can compound these ethnic sentiments. Conflict 
politicises the original cultural differences, and distinct ethnic identities are 
reinforced. Such was Iraq’s inheritance in the 1920s.
106 Article 1 o f  the Treaty o f  Jeddah between Britain and Ibn Saud, 20 May 1927, in Dann, Uriel, 1988, 
p. 55. Also see Hurewitz, J.C. (ed.), ‘Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East.’ (Princeton University 
Press, N ew  Jersey 1956), vol. 2, pp. 149-150
107 See Hobsbawm, E.J. 1990, p.91. Also see Smith, A.D. 1988, pp.37-41
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
“the earth is in effect one world, in which empty, uninhabited spaces virtually do not 
exist. Just as none o f us is outside or beyond geography, none o f us is completely free 
from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it 
is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about 
images and imaginings.1,1
In their study of state-formation in the Middle East, Khoury and Kostiner contend that 
only when anthropology, history and political science are used in synthesis can we 
grasp a full appreciation of all the issues.2 However, geography has also proved 
fundamental in an examination of early Iraq. Iraq’s crystallisation as a state was 
inherently about the nature of power and the specific geographies of power at global, 
regional and local scales which were dominant at the time of its creation. Mackinder 
highlighted the importance of geographical location on a nation’s power and potential 
on the world scene.3 Although many of Mackinder’s views have been criticised as 
being simplistic and deterministic, he himself claimed that his ideas should not be 
seen as fatalism, but rather that states should be aware of the geographical realities 
and historical forces which would have to be overcome.
Agnew and Corbridge have attempted to move the discussion of geopolitics away 
from the fixed effects of a determining global physical geography, to an 
understanding of how geographies are socially constructed in different historical 
eras.4 In this way, geography has still informed our analysis of the great changes 
wrought in the Middle East after the First World War and the crystallisation of the 
Iraqi State, as it offers a deeper perspective of space and change:
! Said, E. ‘Culture and Imperialism.’ (Vintage, London 1993), p.7
2 Khoury, P. & Kostiner, J. 1990, p. 1
3 See Mackinder, H.J. 1919
4 Agnew, J. & Corbridge, S. ‘Mastering Space,’ (Routledge, London 1995)
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"Surely space, or the presumed effect o f geographical location and spatial setting on 
economic and political life, is fixed and, hence, o f little use as a focus for  
understanding change? In fact, the production o f space and how it is conceived can 
be used to convey the sense o f how change is occurring. But this is so only i f  space is 
historicized; put in a historical context rather than seen as a permanent set o f  
influences or fixed backdrop upon which history is inscribed. ”5
In the same way, the ‘space’ of Iraq has had to be put in its historical context to fully 
appreciate not only all of the complexities that fed into the Iraqi State in the 1920s, 
but also to understand how Iraq’s location was perceived, and consequently fought 
over, by the Great Powers of the time. In this sense, the more ‘fixed’ perception of 
Iraq’s geographical significance and role in ‘imperial space’ by Mackinder is 
important, as it highlights exactly how space was perceived in that particular time. 
Such perceptions have certainly changed through time, but it was the perceptions of 
the Great Powers at the end of the First World War, that fashioned their policies 
towards the Middle East and Iraq. Agnew and Corbridge, whilst disagreeing with 
Mackinder over whether the relative success or failure of a given region in the 
international system is due directly to that region’s natural resource endowments, 
stress that this relative position is partially determined by how foreign powers 
perceive that region’s assets, liabilities and resources. Of course, such perceptions are 
seen through the prism of self-interest that each one of those foreign powers will 
possess.
Iraq’s relative location on the globe gave it great significance in the eyes of Britain, 
and thus was a major influence on the geopolitical form and function that Iraq would 
be given. Iraq was not only a symbol of prestige for the British, but was also a vital 
link in Britain’s imperial communications network. Beyond Europe, but influenced by 
European balance of power politics, India was Britain’s prime concern. Iraq provided 
not only an excellent physical link, but also a large Muslim population that could be 
under British influence. This was very important, as Britain feared the rise of a large 
bloc of hostile states within the Muslim world would de-stabilise the Muslim 
population of India. Iraq would provide a useful ‘wedge’ to break up such a bloc.
5 Agnew, J. & Corbridge, S. 1995, p.x
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A geopolitical framework is also useful in understanding the European political 
system that was functioning at the turn of the twentieth century -  a system that was to 
have a profound effect on the new Iraqi State. The European ‘balance-of-power’ 
system was greatly criticised by the Americans at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference 
after the First World War, and they proposed that from henceforth, the international 
system should be based upon ethnic self-determination. However, Kissinger contends 
that the European nations did not choose the balance-of-power system out of ‘innate 
quarrelsomeness,’ but rather that they were thrown into it partially as a result of 
geographical realities. Whilst Americans "inhabited a nearly empty continent 
shielded from predatory powers by two vast oceans and with weak countries as 
neighbors, ” Europeans had a very different reality to face. “Europe was thrown into 
balance-of-power politics when its first choice, the medieval dream o f universal 
empire, collapsed and a host o f states o f more or less equal strength arose from the 
ashes o f that ancient aspiration. When a group o f states so constituted are obliged to 
deal with one another, there are only two possible outcomes: either one state becomes 
so strong that it dominates all the others and creates an empire, or no state is ever 
quite powerful enough to achieve that goal In the latter case, the pretensions o f the 
most aggressive member o f the international community are kept in check by a 
combination o f the others; in other words, by the operation o f a balance ofpower. ”6 
Despite Wilson’s ground-breaking new agenda at the Paris Peace Conference, Britain 
was not going to be able, or willing, to change its own modes of political strategy 
overnight.
Such an ongoing process of elusive equilibrium, meant that if one of these powers 
showed interest in a region, such an interest would also have to be balanced out - 
almost a ‘prestige race’. Such a geostrategic power struggle created ‘shatterbelt’ 
regions at these political and ideological frontiers. This was the case in the Middle 
East leading up to the First World War, as Britain could not afford to cede strategic 
advantages to Russia, Germany, or even France. The region functioned as a ‘cross­
roads’ where the vital interests of these Great Powers overlapped and clashed. Even 
the webs of allegiances formed between these powers through the War were not based
6 Kissinger, H. 1994, p.20
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upon ideology, but were sharply practical and used where expedient. Each of the 
powers held important interests in the region, but these were always subsidiary to 
their interests within Europe, and coloured by the perceived threats that the other 
powers represented in the area. Global power struggles were being played out in a 
Middle Eastern arena, and for Britain, Iraq became the primary focus.
Such processes of global geographies of power impacted fundamentally upon the 
destiny of Iraq, as it lay in the middle of a global shatterbelt. "The tribal territories o f 
the Middle East are peripheral and yet internationally important... they did possess 
strategic, and sometimes symbolic, significance. This led outside powers to take an 
active interest in controlling them or denying such control to others. ”7 Thus control 
of Iraq was useful to Britain in order to protect its core areas in India and Egypt, 
rather than holding an inherent advantage in itself. In this way the geo-strategic 
character of the region was developed, being predominantly fashioned from these 
more European power machinations.
The imposition of western-style boundaries also had a great impact on the Middle 
Eastern region and the newly delimited Iraqi State. Although tribes within the area 
had their own notions of territoriality, these were generally fluid and flexible, and 
were primarily designed to prevent overexploitation of natural resources.8 The 
essential right that had to be preserved in territorial organisation was mobility in 
space. Wilson’s stance on self-determination for recognisable ethnic ‘nations’ implied 
that all the members of a putative nation or ethnic group had a natural right to live 
within the boundaries of a political state. Where these limits of political authorities 
were located, and the purposes they served, greatly influenced the lives of all the 
people separated by these new frontiers, and the stability of the political units 
themselves. Boundaries raised crucial questions regarding identity, allegiance, 
inclusion, exclusion and separation. The change in status from outlying Ottoman 
province to independent state under British patronage had profound consequences for 
Iraq: ‘‘the frontier was transformed into the ‘cell wall o f the basic unit o f national
7 Khoury, P. & Kostiner, J. 1990, p .l 13
8 See Wilkinson, J.C. ‘Britain’s Role in Boundary Drawing in Arabia: A Synopsis.’ In Schofield, R. 
1994, p. 97
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identity, ’ marking an emotional and psychological divide as well as a political- 
geographical line. ”9
The positioning of Iraq’s boundaries also created very noticeable strategic 
disadvantages for the new state. Iraq’s inequitable access to the Gulf has been an 
overriding concern for successive Baghdad regimes. This was hardly surprising given 
that Lord Curzon himself had originally encouraged the Ruler of Kuwait to claim the 
islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, an act “motivated above all by a desire to prevent the 
Ottoman Empire from having any developable coastline on the Gulf. ”10 However, 
such British self-interest has been a legacy that Iraq, and not the Ottoman Empire has 
had to deal with. There are still some uncomfortable questions to be answered: can a 
boundary ever be seen as settled without the full consent of one of the countries 
sharing that territorial limit? As early as 1931 Iraq displayed their intent to exert some 
form of control over Kuwait, in order to benefit from Kuwait’s enviable position at 
the head of the Gulf. Thus the geopolitical form of Iraq was strongly coloured by the 
boundaries that were drawn around it.
The principle of ethnic self-determination espoused by America after the First World 
War presented its own problems for Iraq. Under the Ottomans, the Iraqi provinces had 
loose and tenuous links with each other, which had facilitated a strong degree of 
localism throughout the region. Furthermore, although state formation within the 
Middle East region was not new, the building of nation-states certainly was. In the 
European identification of the state with the nation, territorial sovereignty became 
fused with the fate of the nation. The ‘interests’ of people were rigidly 
territorialised.11 Woodrow Wilson believed that free institutions were next to 
impossible in a country made up of different nationalities.12 However, fundamentally 
in the case of Iraq, “the existence o f minorities has conflicted with the objective o f 
creating a homogenous national identity bounded by the frontiers o f  states. ”13 
Political and cultural identities within Iraq did not always coincide with the frontiers 
of the new sovereign state. Locality, social hierarchies, language, ethnicity and
9 Anderson, M. 1996, p.3
10 Schofield, R. 1994, p l4
11 See Agnew, J. & Corbridge, S. 1995, p.31
12 See Anderson, M. 1996, p.38
13 Anderson, M. 1996, p.5
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religion were also the basis of deeply-rooted identities. Such identities were also 
geographically linked, as the Shi’is of Iraq predominated in the south, the Kurds in the 
mountainous north, whilst the Sunni Arabs were concentrated in the central region 
surrounding Baghdad. It was this central locality that was politically and 
economically elevated over the others by the British administration structure.
The many identities and communities within the Mesopotamian region fed into the 
crystallisation of the Iraqi state. Tribal power, although in a process of erosion since 
the Ottoman Tanzimat Reform era, still had to be accommodated within the new state, 
so affecting Iraq’s nation-state formation. The nation-state ideal was a novelty to Iraq 
in two ways. Firstly, it was based upon a concept of internal sovereignty. The core of 
this was the idea of citizenship, which presupposes transforming tribal and prenational 
ties into a national identity and loyalty. Secondly, the modern nation-state is based on 
a concept of external sovereignty, which refers to mutual recognition of boundaries by 
a set of states that form a systemic framework of interaction -  an entirely new concept 
within Iraq. It has already been demonstrated that Iraq itself was unhappy with its 
southern boundary with Kuwait almost from inception. The fact that this particular 
boundary was decided upon between Kuwait and a British team ‘on behalf of Iraq, 
means that this line was never really ‘mutually recognised’ by the two states that 
actually shared it.
The concept of internal sovereignty also proved problematic for the new Iraq.
Ghassan Salame recalls Ibn Khaldun’s formula that “in the lands which are inhabited 
by a multitude o f tribes it is difficult to establish a state. ”14 Nation-state building is 
clearly compromised when the process of creating pre-national sentiment is hindered 
within a particular territory due to the pre-existence of several such distinct identities 
-  each vying for position. In Iraq, Britain enabled a Sunni Arab-dominated authority, 
centred upon Baghdad, to emerge, to the detriment of other identities within the state. 
As such a situation was unstable, it needed British military strength, and coercive 
measures to prop it up. Therefore, due to both dissensions from within the territory
!4 Quoted in Khoury, P. & Kostiner, J. 1990, pp.128-129. Ghassan Salame quotes the Muthana Press 
edition o f  Ibn Khaldun’s Al-Muqaddimmah (Baghdad, n.d.), p. 164, in his book Al-M ujtama ’ wa al- 
D aw la fi al-M ashriq al- 'Arabi (Beirut, 1987), p. 11
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against Sunni Arab hegemony, and the dominant role of Britain within early Iraqi 
politics, the internal sovereignty of the state was limited and nominal.
Each of the communities within Iraq had developed their own, strongly held, yet 
constantly shifting, cultural and political values, that had been conditioned over 
history. This led to conflicting models of statehood with many ethnic or religious 
groups wanting their particular vision of the state to be created. The Shi’is and the 
Kurds, were both caught in an inherent dilemma; they wanted the continuation of their 
strong cross-border links, whilst also demanding a more equitable role in the 
fashioning of the new Iraqi state. They despised the Sunni Arab vision of Iraq because 
it was so exclusive, and contained only Sunni Arab symbols and meanings. Minority 
groups within Iraq, if they could not have their own separate political future, at least 
wanted the texture of Iraqi nationalism to be more expansive, and contain elements 
and meanings that all could relate to. As Esman and Rabinovitch noted, the 
imposition of nation-states created ”tensions between the pluralism o f society and 
claims o f the state to regulate the lives o f all who live in its territorial 
boundaries... The European model o f the sovereign state15 ...was the threat to 
minorities, and in some cases to majorities, that exacerbated tensions among the 
various ethnic group communities in the Middle East and between those communities 
and the new states. ”16
Iraq was only ever nominally a nation-state based on the concept of nationalism, as 
this presupposed the existence of a national community, which in fact never existed. 
Even Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, denounced Wilson’s nationalist 
ideals as utopian. He feared that they would stimulate false hopes and could lead to 
new conflict.17 However, Britain and France were obliged to accommodate these 
ideas, and implement them as laid out in their mandates. Wilson’s views on self- 
determination risked the establishment of non-viable nation-states, and of creating 
insoluble disputes over territory with trapped minorities and stranded majorities,
15 As informed by post-First World War Wilsonian principles. Esman and Rabinovitch are presumably 
referring to those European models that were not inclusive. O f course, some models were inclusive, 
depending on validation o f  identities in non-political or de-politicised forms.
16 Esman, M.J. & Rabinovitch, I. (eds.), ‘Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East.’ (Ithaca 
Press, London 1988), pp.3-4
17 Anderson, M. 1996, p.39, note 4.
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especially when new states were being fashioned at such speed, at such a chaotic time 
within the global political structure.
Why was Britain so seemingly unaware of all of these complexities when setting up 
Iraq? In fact, Britain was simply being acutely practical. Even without the inherent 
conflict between the state and the nation in Wilson’s principle, Iraq would still have 
had problems in establishing a strong national state-wide identity. This was because 
Britain was never committed to the construction of a strong nation-state in Iraq. “In 
the treaties which followed the war, the principle was applied to the vanquished and 
was ignored when it ran counter to the interests o f the victorious powers. ”18 In fact, 
Britain had never been asked to create a nation-state in Iraq, just to recognise the one 
supposedly already there. That there was no national feeling within the area defined as 
Iraq was patently obvious to the British, yet they needed to be seen to fulfil their 
moral requirements on the international scene, due to their increasing political 
dependence upon the United States. Britain needed to retain control over Iraq to safe­
guard vital strategic interests, and so claimed that the territory constituted a coherent 
whole. If accepting the mandate for the new state was the only way to keep that 
control and remove Iraq from the control of other powers, such as France, then Britain 
felt that creating the fa?ade of a national state within the territory was a small 
sacrifice. Any gains to the Iraqi people, or any specific section of the Iraqi population, 
along the way, were incidental to the British pursuit of basic imperial interests. Thus, 
the consolidation of an Iraqi national identity was always seen through the prism of 
British strategic interest.
The fact that Britain defined Iraq by the benefits it offered in relation to other parts of 
the world, had a great impact on Iraq’s geopolitical form. The state was moulded by 
Britain’s strategic outlook, not by strong local power bases or a crystallisation of local 
considerations. It’s entire raison d ’etre seemed to be determined by realities 
elsewhere, which severely hampered the development of a coherent and functional 
state and nation-wide sense of collective identity. Sovereignty was limited, and the 
search for any common ground amongst the population was left to a mistrusted, 
unrepresentative Sunni Arab elite.
18 Anderson, M. 1996, p. 139
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State formation within Iraq therefore, was not the outcome of an integrative social 
process emanating from ‘within’, but was largely the result of a disintegrative 
political process being driven from ‘without’. Thus, the state became merely an 
arbiter among conflicting nationalities and ethnicities. This was not done in an 
organic way that can lead (often after bitter struggle), to the emergence of a ‘nation’, 
but through the instruments of central power such as the army and a dominating 
bureaucracy. Although written about state formation in the Levant region in general, 
the following comment stresses that in Iraq also, there was “a deep cultural 
disjunction so that the culture o f the dominant side joins up with the superior 
European currents, whereas the culture o f the dependent sides retreats into the 
cocoon o f a historical and linguistic heritage whose prime function is to proclaim its 
difference. ”19 The State thus excluded important parts of the social experience of its 
society, by deliberately isolating them.
Without the pressure of Wilsonian ideals to accommodate in the political framework 
chosen for Iraq, would the British ever have established a state in Iraq? British policy 
in Iraq was certainly not created in a vacuum. Although this is speculation, the 
uncertainty over the answer does highlight both the immense role that America had to 
play on the world stage, and the strategic and real politik concerns of the British in 
Iraq. After the First World War, America claimed that foreign policy should be 
informed by principle, yet Britain’s history and experience had taught it that such 
policies should reflect self-interest. Despite the failure of such ‘balance-of-power’ 
politics, a failure that had culminated in the War in Europe, such a British attitude 
towards foreign policy could not be radically altered in such a short space of time, and 
indeed it was not.
Establishing a nation-state in Iraq was clearly not done on principle by the British, 
rather by necessity. Britain wanted a formally autonomous, but politically affiliated 
country. Strong nationalist sentiments did exist within the region, that could have 
provided the bases for nation-states. The Kurds are only one example. However, the
19 Sharara, W. Al-M as'ala al-tarikhiyya ... (The Historical Question in Contemporary Arab Thought), 
(Beirut: M a’had al-Inma’ al-‘Arabi. 1977). Quoted in Ayubi, N. ‘Overstating the Arab State.’ 
(I.B.Tauris: London, 1995), p. 109
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British saw some of these potential nations as too small to fit in with their imperial 
interests. The developing pan-Arab consciousness was ironically judged by the British 
as too large, as it would have challenged British dominance in the region. ‘ Nation’- 
state building in Iraq therefore became truly a farce, as already present community 
based identities would have to be destroyed. In keeping with this, the complex issues 
surrounding the imposition of a homogenous ideology over a heterogenous population 
were ignored, creating great resentments and tensions within the new society. All this 
greatly affected the geopolitical function of Iraq as it crystallised in the 1920s.
The Iraqi State as it was created at inception, displayed great difficulties in 
establishing its authority in the face of so many conflicting visions of statehood. It 
greatly lacked internally bestowed legitimacy, and there was a general reluctance to 
accept this new structure of political culture. The new state was not of ‘functional 
interest’ to enough of the population.20 Even for the Arab ‘Iraqis’, framing Iraqi 
national identity as fundamentally Arab was problematic, as many felt that they 
belonged to a far wider community of Arabs that was being dissected by these new 
state lines.
Migdal coined the phrase ‘strong societies/weak states, and Tibi has restated this 
duality as ‘segmentary fragmented societies/artificial imposed states.21 This holds a 
lot of truth for the geopolitical predicament of Iraq in the 1920s. Iraq had to deal with 
the dual legacies of the Ottoman Empire, and British colonialism, both of which fed 
into the subsequent geopolitical function and form of Iraq. One fostered the 
development of strong, deep-rooted local identities, due to policies of ethnic and 
religious tolerance and the de-centralisation of authority. The colonial legacy 
however, was twofold. Firstly, it exacerbated existing tribal and ethnic divisions via 
policies of divide and rule -  playing minorities against majorities. In contrast, their 
policies also gave rise to an anti-colonial nationalist movement within Iraq. However, 
such a genuine nationalism was not one that the British wished to encourage, as it 
would mean a reduction in British dominance within the country.
20 See Nonneman, G. 1993, ‘Functional interest’ is crucial to the stability o f a political regime. Each 
community must believe that enough o f  their interests can be achieved through such integration, 
otherwise they w ill withdraw from the process.
21 Tibi, B. ‘The Simultaneity o f  the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States in the 
Modem Middle East.’ in Khoury, P. & Kostiner, J. 1990, p. 147
277
Thus, the British, motivated by strategic self-interest, backed the narrow Sunni Arab- 
based community within the state, so subjugating other forms of identification within 
the territory. The Sunni Arab community of Mesopotamia was concentrated in the 
central regions around Baghdad, whilst the other significant ethnic and religious 
communities formed their own geographical clusters, in the north and south of the 
country. With the central Baghdadi region raised in status under the new 
administration, the very close correlation between religion/ethnicity and geography 
made itself felt upon the Iraqi State. These local geographies of power hugely 
determined the geopolitical structure and character of the state created.
Britain had no strategic interest in establishing a strong, viable, coherent Iraqi state 
with a broad base of legitimisation, as they wanted to retain their own control and 
influence over the area. All the cultural values presented as ‘Iraqi’ were drawn solely 
from the Sunni Arab cultural reservoir, so alienating the vast majority of the new Iraqi 
population, who then turned increasingly to their traditional loyalties for support and 
familiar frames of identification. Although written more recently, the following words 
from Batatu could have been written about the Iraq of the 1920s: “the new national 
loyalty...is still hazy, uncertain o f its direction (Iraqism? Pan-Arabism?), 
unacceptable to the Kurds, poorly assimilative o f the Shi ’is, and lacking the 
normative ethics, the warm intimacy, and the sustained emotional support once 
associated with the old loyalties. ”22
As this thesis has demonstrated, such ethnic and religious issues were inherent within 
the Iraqi state created in the 1920s. Several specific factors shaped the geopolitical 
crystallisation of Iraq. Firstly, its location in a shatterbelt region made it a contested 
area, and attracted the interest of foreign powers. Britain, who prevailed in 
Mesopotamia after the First World War, had their own strategic imperatives to 
consider, and were concerned with control, rather than the consolidation of a strong 
nation-state. Such dominance of a foreign power over the shaping of the Iraqi state 
greatly influenced its geopolitical function, as sovereignty was limited, and local
22 Batatu, H. 1978, p.3 6
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considerations were subordinated to foreign ones. The government of Iraq was 
essentially controlled by the government of Britain.
Added to this, was the presence of several deep-rooted ethnic and religious 
communities within the territory, each quite geographically concentrated. The 
establishment of a nation-state in the region called for these communities to adopt 
new frames of reference, and to develop new loyalties and allegiances that were based 
on the territorial extent of Iraq, rather than on kinship and community. The Sunni 
Arabs, of the central region of Iraq, had been exposed to more employment and 
educational opportunities under the Ottomans, due both to their geographical 
concentration around the principal town of Baghdad, and their status as Sunnis, within 
a Sunni Ottoman Empire. Such advantages allowed them to come to the forefront of 
Iraqi politics after the First World War, as the easiest solution to Britain’s problem of 
having to be seen to install self-determination within the mandated territory. This 
exacerbated ethnic and sectarian divides within the country, hindering the 
development of a country-wide feeling of nationalism and ‘citizenship’. The final 
main factor that shaped Iraq’s geopolitical crystallisation was the imposition of 
international boundaries. The borders chosen for Iraq cut through established 
community groups, putting not only internal but also external pressures on the new 
state.
Thus, many factors had a profound influence upon the geopolitical crystallisation of 
Iraq. Without speculating about whether such issues still persist within the 
contemporary Iraqi State, it has been of fundamental importance to examine the 
factors that first shaped the state and presented inherent obstacles. Such an 
examination allows a clearer insight into problems of national integration, state 
consolidation, and the limitations of the globally accepted paradigm of nation-states 
and self-determination. This thesis has also highlighted the vital importance of 
geography, a reality that underlies and shapes all of these political processes. The 
consolidation of the Iraqi State in the 1920s was fundamentally about the nature of 
power, and the geographical patterns that such global, regional and local powers 
displayed. The geographies of power demonstrated at each of these levels have 
greatly informed this analysis into the crystallisation of a modern nation-state in the 
region of Mesopotamia. This approach has allowed a deeper understanding of the
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establishment of Iraq, the politics of the post-First World War era, and the ongoing 
yet changing geopolitical patterns that shape the world in which we live.
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